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Chapter 1. Sensory linguistics 
1.1. Introduction 
Humans live in a perceptual world. All of humanity’s accomplishments, from 
agriculture to space travel, depend on us being able to interact with the world 
through seeing, feeling, hearing, tasting, and smelling. Everything we do, 
everything we feel, everything we know, is mediated through the senses. 
Because the senses are so important to us, it is not surprising that all languages 
have resources for talking about the content of sensory perception. Miller and 
Johnson-Laird (1976, p. 3) remind us that “word-percept associations are 
fundamental” to language. Rakova (2003, p. 34) says that we do not have words 
“just because it is nice for us to have them,” but because they are “devices that 
connect us to the external world.” In fact, without the ability to express 
perceptual content, language would be useless. 
 “Sensory linguistics” is the study of how language relates to the senses. It 
addresses such fundamental questions as: How are sensory perceptions 
packaged into words? Which perceptual qualities are easier to talk about than 
others? How do languages differ in how perception is encoded? And how do 
words relate to the underlying perceptual systems in the brain? The time is ripe 
for bringing these questions and many others together. 
Research into the connection between language and perception has a long 
tradition in the language sciences. Among other things, researchers have looked 
at how many words there are for particular sensory modalities (e.g., Viberg, 
1983), how frequently particular sensory perceptions are talked about (e.g., San 
Roque et al., 2015), and how metaphor (e.g., Ullmann, 1945; Williams, 1976) and 
iconicity (e.g., Dingemanse, 2012; Marks, 1978, Chapter 7) are used to achieve 
reference to the perceptual characteristics of the world. Yet, to my knowledge, no 
	 2	
work has taken an integrated look at all of these topics together, along with other 
topics relating to perceptual language. That is what this book sets out to do. 
The book is split into two parts. Part I focuses on what can be studied 
under the banner of “sensory linguistics.” Part II focuses on the how. Whereas 
Part I is theoretical, focusing on the synthesis of existing research on language 
and the senses, Part II is empirical, providing a detailed analysis of English 
sensory adjectives and their linguistic and textual properties. To develop a 
comprehensive theory of the interaction between language and perceptual 
content, we need to focus on “those parts of the lexicon where dependence on 
perceptual phenomena is reasonably apparent” (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976, p. 
119). In English, adjectives are the word class that is devoted to describing 
properties (see Givón, 2001; Murphy 2010), and what we may call “sensory 
adjectives” are those adjectives that are about sensory content (Diederich, 2015, p. 
4; Lehrer, 1978). Because of this, sensory adjectives provide the optimal starting 
point for an investigation into sensory linguistics. 
 
1.2. Contributions 
There is already a lot of existing work on language and perception. Because of 
this, it is important to clarify what this book contributes. Together, there are three 
sets of contributions: descriptive, theoretical, and methodological contributions. 
 
1.2.1. Descriptive contributions 
On the descriptive side, this book characterizes the vocabulary of English 
sensory adjectives; how this vocabulary is composed and how it is used. With 
respect to describing the sensory vocabulary of languages, existing works have 
already looked at the language of color (e.g., Berlin & Kay, 1969), sound, and 
music (e.g., Barten, 1998; Pérez-Sobrino & Julich, 2014; Porcello, 2004), touch 
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(e.g., Popova, 2005), temperature (e.g., Koptjevskaja-Tamm, 2015), pain (e.g., 
Lascaratou, 2007; Semino, 2010), taste and smell (e.g., Backhouse, 1994; 
Croijmans & Majid, 2016; Lee, 2015; Majid & Burenhult, 2014; Ronga, 2016). Few 
works have been published that compare two or more senses. For example, 
Dubois (2000, 2007) compares the language of sound with the language of smell, 
and Majid and Burenhult (2014) compare performance in a smell labeling task to 
performance in a color labeling task. Yet, there is little empirical work that 
encompasses all five common senses to attempt wide descriptive coverage (but 
see Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). Describing the sensory vocabulary of English 
is important for many reasons—not only for facilitating future theoretical work 
within linguistics and perceptual psychology, but also for applications in such 
domains as advertising, marketing, and food science (see, e.g., Diederich, 2015; 
Fenko, Otten, & Schifferstein, 2010). 
 
1.2.2. Theoretical contributions 
On the theoretical side, this book makes a number of contributions that are 
important for various aspects of linguistic research. I will begin by considering 
the notion of “ineffability,” the difficulty of putting certain experiences into 
words (Levinson & Majid, 2014). Considering the limits of language poses deep 
questions about the nature of linguistic expressivity and whether it is truly the 
case that anything that can be thought can also be said (Searle, 1969). 
 Following this, I will deal with the topic of embodiment—what Wilson 
and Golonka (2013) call “the most exciting hypothesis in cognitive science right 
now” (p. 1). According to embodied approaches, we are “not just minds floating 
in the air” (Rakova, 2003, p. 18), and language is not just an abstract piece of 
software that can be instantiated by any physical system. Instead, embodied 
approaches see language and the mind as influenced by and deriving structure 
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from bodily processes and sensory systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Gallese & 
Lakoff, 2005; Gibbs, 2005; Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Wilson, 2002). 
However, embodied approaches to cognition and language are not without their 
critics (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). In a recent critique of embodiment, 
Goldinger and colleagues (Goldinger, Papesh, Barnhart, Hansen, & Hout, 2016, 
p. 964) rhetorically ask the question “What can you do with embodied 
cognition?” Their review suggests that many experimental findings within the 
cognitive sciences can seemingly do without invoking the notion of embodiment. 
In contrast to this, this book will show that it is not possible to do “sensory 
linguistics” without considering the notion of embodiment. As such, the 
empirical results presented in Part II provide an answer to Goldinger and 
colleagues’ rhetoric question, showcasing one more thing that one can do with 
embodied cognition. 
 Considering embodiment also means that language scientists have to turn 
to other fields that study the senses in order to understand many of the patterns 
observable in language. As a result, sensory linguistics has to be an 
interdisciplinary endeavor: It has to look at the contributions of other fields that 
study the senses, such as psychology, neurophysiology, anthropology and 
philosophy. Any research that studies the connection between language and 
perception needs to consider both linguistic evidence and evidence from other 
fields. This book brings different strands of research from different disciplines 
together. 
The final set of theoretical contributions relates to metaphor and 
polysemy, both of which are core topics in linguistics and cognitive science. It 
has been noticed by many scholars that sensory words such as bright and rough 
can be flexibly used to describe sensory experiences that are quite removed from 
what appears to be the core meaning of these words, such as in the expressions 
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bright sound and rough smell (Ullmann, 1959; Strik Lievers, 2015; Williams, 1976). 
It is not clear how these so-called “synesthetic metaphors” fit into existing 
theoretical frameworks, such as conceptual metaphor theory (Gibbs, 1994; 
Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and how they relate to psychological 
phenomena such as synesthesia (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). Chapters 6 to 
9 integrate the literature on synesthetic metaphors into the existing body of 
research on conceptual metaphors and the existing body of research on 
synesthesia. In doing so, I will also deconstruct the common view that 
regularities in how these metaphors are used are governed by a hierarchy of the 
senses. 
The theoretical contributions presented in this book are not only relevant 
to the language sciences, but to the cognitive sciences more generally. After all, 
how language intersects with perception is one of the most fundamental 
questions we may ask about the language system and how it works together 
with other cognitive systems. 
 
1.2.3. Methodological contributions 
Finally, the book also makes a set of methodological contributions. Part II shows 
how sensory language can be studied objectively, using a mixture of human 
ratings and corpora. Many previous works on perceptual language have almost 
exclusively rested on the intuitions of linguists, with little quantification. Within 
the empirical study of sensory linguistics, some researchers have studied sensory 
language using experimental methods (e.g., Lynott & Connell, 2012; Speed & 
Majid, 2018) or field work (e.g., Floyd, San Roque, & Majid, 2018; San Roque et 
al., 2015). The study presented in Part II shows how far one can take an approach 
that uses ratings by naïve native speakers in conjunction with corpus data. Part II 
also demonstrates how a seemingly simple dataset of perceptual ratings for 423 
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sensory adjectives harbors a tremendous amount of theoretically relevant 
information—if subjected to the right statistical analyses. The methodological 
contributions of Part II are by no means limited to the study of sensory 
linguistics and have wide applicability in many areas of linguistics, especially in 
the quantitative study of semantics. 
 The book’s empirical contributions also demonstrate how one can do 
sensory linguistics in a reproducible and open fashion. Reproducibility and open 
science are key topics in many different fields these days (Gentleman & Lang, 
2007; Mesirov, 2010; Munafò et al., 2017; Peng, 2011), and the methodological 
approach outlined in Part II makes quantitative semantics and corpus linguistics 
more reproducible. 
 Some of the findings in Part II have already been believed to be true for a 
long time, but the evidence so far has relied too much on the intuitions of 
individual linguists. In part, the reproducible and objective approach advocated 
in this book will replicate what others have already done. In doing so, these ideas 
will rest on a firm quantitative footing, which facilitates future research in this 
domain. On the other hand, new methods naturally come together with 
theoretical adjustments. The methodological approach assumed in this book will 
lead to a number of incisive theoretical changes that affect foundational issues in 
sensory linguistics. For example, the new methods lead us to question the 
popular notion that there are five senses represented in language. It will also lead 
us to question the notion of a hierarchy of the senses. 
 
1.3. Overview of the book 
This book proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses a potentially controversial 
choice that had to be made early on in the analysis presented here; namely, to 
adhere to what I will discuss as the “five senses folk model” of distinguishing the 
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senses. Most work that has studied perceptual language up to this point has 
tacitly assumed a division of the sensory world into sight, touch, sound, taste, 
and smell. However, rather than taking this system as self-evident, this book will 
problematize this idea. 
Chapter 3 introduces the many different semiotic strategies that can be 
used to express sensory content. Since later chapters in the book predominantly 
focus on analyzing sensory words, it is important to be clear from the outset that 
it is not only words that communicate sensory meaning. Instead, sensory 
language is characterized by semiotic diversity. 
Chapter 4 introduces the notion of “ineffability,” the difficulty of putting 
particular experiences into words. This notion was discussed at length in an 
important paper by Levinson and Majid (2014). This chapter draws from this 
work and extends it, making a number of distinctions that demand further 
attention. 
Chapter 5 then moves to the topic of embodiment, reviewing the evidence 
for embodied semantics—the idea that words engage mental simulations of 
perceptual content. The evidence from embodied semantics will be used to argue 
for what I call the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis, according to which the 
structure of the sensory world imprints itself into the structure of the lexicon and 
the way sensory words are used. 
Chapter 6 is the first to deal with “synesthetic metaphors” such as bright 
sound, where an adjective primarily associated with sight (bright) is used to 
modify a noun primarily associated with sound. Such metaphors are often 
discussed in the context of the neuropsychological phenomenon of synesthesia. 
People with synesthesia experience vivid perceptual sensations in one sensory 
modality triggered by experiences in another concurrent sensory modality (such 
as seeing colors when hearing certain sounds). I will argue that any past 
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invocations of synesthesia in the literature on “synesthetic metaphors” turn out 
to be red herrings: There is little connection between the two phenomena. This 
helps to clarify what “synesthetic metaphors” are in their own right. 
Chapter 7 then argues that the term “synesthetic metaphors” is a 
misnomer because these “metaphors” are not all that metaphorical after all. 
Following Rakova (2003), I will present a literal (i.e., non-metaphorical) analysis 
of meaning extension in the domain of sensory words. This chapter also clarifies 
how crossmodal language is to be distinguished from other concepts in cognitive 
linguistics, such as metonymy and primary metaphor. 
Chapter 8 then deals with asymmetries between the senses in meaning 
extension. For example, touch words are easily extendible to sound words (rough 
sound, smooth melody)—the reverse is not the case (?squealing feeling, ?barking 
touch). To account for such asymmetries, researchers have proposed a hierarchy 
of the senses. Chapter 9 deals more closely with what is supposed to ground this 
hierarchy, contrasting several different explanatory accounts. This completes 
Part I of the book.  
Several of the theoretical ideas presented in Part I will recur in the 
empirical part of the book, Part II. The empirical part of the book is not meant to 
be an exhaustive study of all of sensory language, but rather a detailed case 
study demonstrating how one can go about doing sensory linguistics. Several 
important topics will be ignored, such as perception verbs and the history of 
sensory language, but the methodological approach used throughout these 
chapters can be used for any kind of investigation into the language of 
perception. Because the empirical approach adopted throughout the book is new 
and rests almost exclusively on the utility of a dataset of human ratings of 
sensory words, it is important to defend the methodological principles on which 
all analyses are based. This will be done in Chapter 10. 
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Chapter 11 focuses on how words can be classified according to sensory 
modalities. The issue of sensory classification is often glossed over in other 
research, even though many sensory words are highly multisensory, such as the 
word harsh, which can be used to express perceptual content from many different 
senses, such as harsh sound, harsh taste, harsh smell, and harsh feeling. This chapter 
on sensory classification also introduces the main dataset that will be used 
throughout the book, a set of modality ratings for 423 sensory adjectives that was 
collected by Lynott and Connell (2009). 
Chapters 12 and 13 will present the first set of analyses of this dataset. 
Some of these analyses recapitulate what has been achieved by Lynott and 
Connell (2009) and Lynott and Connell (2013). These analyses mainly serve to 
familiarize the reader with the details of the set of sensory adjectives. However, 
several new analyses extend existing research by showing that sensory words 
occupy a “sweet spot” between sensory specialization and multisensoriality. I 
will furthermore present analyses which show that the dataset harbors particular 
clusters of words, such as words that relate to skin and temperature or words 
that relate to the spatial characteristics of the environment. In addition, I will 
show that correlations between the different perceptual ratings also suggest 
larger groupings, such as a part of the sensory lexicon that is devoted to 
expressing both taste content and smell content. 
Whereas Chapters 12 and 13 look at the perceptual ratings in isolation, 
Chapter 14 looks at sensory words in context. Specifically, I will investigate how 
the senses are associated with each other in a corpus of naturally occurring 
language. This chapter shows that sensory words are used together in a way that 
reflects the structure of the senses in the real world; for example, taste and smell 
are closely aligned as perceptual modalities, and taste and smell words similarly 
stick together. Besides addressing several important topics in sensory linguistics, 
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the methods used in this chapter provide a new quantitative look on core topics 
in corpus linguistics, such as the notion of “semantic preference.” 
Chapter 15 then relates the sensory words to other datasets. This chapter 
will highlight further linguistic asymmetries between the different senses; for 
instance, sight words are more frequent and more semantically complex, but 
sound and touch words are relatively more prone to harbor iconicity in their 
phonological structure. In a similar fashion, Chapter 16 shows that the senses 
differ in how they relate to the evaluative dimension of language. Taste and 
smell words are more evaluative than sight, touch, and sound words, which are 
relatively more neutral. 
The final empirical chapter, Chapter 17, returns to the topic of synesthetic 
metaphors and brings the study of these expressions together with the topic of 
ineffability, presenting a new set of empirical analyses which question the notion 
of a monolithic hierarchy of the senses. In addition, I will show that the 
crossmodal use of sensory words is partially accounted for by linguistic factors 
discussed in previous chapters, such as the construct of “emotional valence” (see 
Chapters 5, 10, & 16) and the iconicity of sensory words (Chapter 15). 
The final chapter of the book, Chapter 18, concludes by showcasing how 
the core themes discussed in the theoretical part of the book (Part I) are 
addressed by the various analyses presented in the empirical part (Part II). This 
chapter also discusses avenues for further research in sensory linguistics. 
Together, the two parts of the book attempt to establish sensory linguistics 
as a field and showcase the utility of sensory linguistics in describing, and 
accounting for, important and widespread linguistic patterns that relate to the 
intersection of language and perception. The time is ripe to make “sensory 
linguistics” a subject in its own right, and this book is a first step toward this. 
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Part I. 
Theory 
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Chapter 2. The five senses folk model 
2.1. Introduction 
Williams James (1891 [1890], p. 462) famously spoke of a “great blooming, 
buzzing confusion” of the senses. Humans are exposed to a complex “amalgam 
of sensory inputs” (Blake, Sobel, & James, 2004, p. 397). Yet, there is structure to 
perception. For example, color is perceived through the eye, which is a sensory 
organ that also simultaneously perceives spatial features such as distance and 
size, shape features, and motion through space. These perceptual features are 
correlated in our experience by virtue of being perceived through the same 
sensory organ and by presenting themselves to us at the same time. Humans can 
also perceive motion through sound, but sound experiences are principally 
dissociable from sight, such as when one’s eyes are closed or when it is dark. 
Moreover, although sight may interact with the other senses in perception, it is 
associated with its own dedicated neural subsystem, such as the primary and 
secondary visual cortices. In this book, the term “sense” or “sensory modality” is 
used to refer to a subtype of perceptual experience that is associated with a 
dedicated sensory organ and its own cognitive machinery in the brain. 
 Traditionally at least, we recognize five senses: sight, hearing, touch, taste, 
and smell. These are sometimes called the “Aristotelian” senses (see, e.g., Sorabji, 
1971). The analyses presented in this book are structured around the five senses 
of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. A lot of research on language and the 
senses tacitly assumes the five senses model and takes it to be self-evident. 
However, it is not universally accepted that there are five senses, and it is not 
even clear that there are separate senses to begin with. Stoffregen and Bardy 
(2001, p. 197) say that “the assumption of separate senses may seem to be so self-
evident as to be atheoretical,” but instead, it carries “profound theoretical 
implications” (see also Cacciari, 2008, p. 431). This means that assuming five 
	13	
senses is an analytical choice that a linguist studying sensory language makes, 
and this choice may be problematic and, thus, has to be defended. This brief 
chapter will justify the analytical choice of adhering to the five senses folk model. 
 
2.2. Issues with the five senses model 
The idea that there are five senses, rather than fewer or more, is a culture-specific 
one. Classen (1993, p. 2) remarks that “even in the West itself, there has not 
always been agreement on the number of the senses,” and anthropological 
research shows that not all cultures adhere to the five senses model (Howes, 
1991). The cultural relativity of how the sensory world is partitioned is 
recognized explicitly by some researchers working on sensory language (e.g., 
Day, 1996), but it is often glossed over. 
 The five-fold way of carving up the sensory space furthermore does not 
correspond directly to everything we know from neurophysiology and 
perceptual psychology. Scientists recognize many subdivisions that do not fall 
neatly into the categories of sight, sound, touch, taste, and smell (Carlson, 2010, 
Chapter 7; Møller, 2012). For example, researchers recognize that pain is separate 
from other dimensions of touch: Pain perception is supported by underlying 
brain structures that are separate from regular touch perception (see, e.g., Craig, 
2003; Tracey, 2005). Indeed, most researchers think of pain (“nociception”) as a 
separate sense. Similarly, the so-called “vomeronasal organ” may be involved in 
constituting another sense that is different from the Aristotelian senses. This 
organ, partially separated from regular olfaction, is responsible for the 
perception of pheromones (see, e.g., Keverne, 1999). These are but two of many 
examples which fall through the cracks of the five senses model. 
 The existence of intense crossmodal interactions between the senses (see, 
e.g., Spence, 2011) poses further challenges for any attempt to classify the senses. 
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If there are separate senses, yet these senses interact both behaviorally and in 
terms of shared neural substrates, then it is not clear where to draw the 
boundary between two senses. For example, taste and smell are characterized by 
intense interaction (see Auvray & Spence, 2008; Spence, Smith, & Auvray, 2015). 
At what point do two senses interact so much as to call it one sense rather than 
two? Thus, multisensoriality poses another problem for categorizing the senses. 
The question as to how many senses there are may be philosophically 
interesting, but it cannot be answered by any empirical data alone. It is not only a 
scientific question; it is also a definitional one. The problem is that there is no 
universally agreed set of criteria that could be used to differentiate the senses 
(Macpherson, 2011; Cacciari, 2008, pp. 430–431). We may define a sense with 
respect to what perceptual aspects of the world it specializes in, which was 
Aristotle’s approach (Sorabji, 1971). We could also classify the senses with 
respect to what type of energy is involved, such as molecular energy (taste and 
smell), mechanical energy (touch, sound), or light energy (sight). Alternatively, 
we may define a sense as something that corresponds to a clearly recognizable 
body organ, such as the nose or the tongue, or we may define the senses with 
respect to the types of sensory receptors involved. 
Not only are there many different criteria from which to choose, but each 
criterion itself is fuzzy. For example, what do we consider as a “body organ”? 
How are we to deal with distributed organs, such as the skin, or sensory systems 
that span the entire body, such as the internal senses? Do we treat neural tissue 
as being part of a sense? If so, the distinctions between the senses become even 
more messy, because the brain is massively interconnected. If we follow the 
receptor-based criterion, what divisions do we make? Should we treat 
mechanical perception and temperature perception as two separate senses 
because they are associated with their own receptors? But then, what about the 
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many different types of mechanical receptors, with some receptors specializing 
in slow or fast vibrations, others in the perception of sustained touch, and still 
others in the perception of skin stretching? Shall we assign separate senses to 
each one of these receptors? These questions show the difficulty of establishing 
criteria for what constitutes a sense. Individuating the senses is a philosophically 
thorny issue that is at present unresolved (Casati, Dokic, & Le Corre, 2015; 
Macpherson, 2011) and perhaps even unresolvable. As McBurney (1986, p. 123) 
says, the senses “did not evolve to satisfy our desire for tidiness.” 
 
2.3. A useful fiction 
Given this, is it not problematic that this book focuses on just five senses? The 
way the five senses folk model is used in this book is perhaps best seen as a 
“useful fiction.” We may apply George P. Box’s famous statement “All models 
are wrong but some are useful” here (Box, 1979, p. 2). The five senses model is a 
gross first-pass generalization that may form an adequate starting point for 
investigating language and perception. Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976, p. 16) say 
that the classification of words “by modality and [perceptual] attribute still 
represents the best psychological insight we have into the perceptual basis for 
their use.” However, whereas Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) assume the 
validity of the five-sense distinction, this book explores how far one can carry 
this model. To some extent, the proof is in the results, as the empirical chapters 
will show. Part II of this book will show that many important results can be 
derived from a five-fold division of the sensory world, even if this division is a 
deliberate abstraction. Dennett (2013, p. 31) says that oversimplification, such as 
is evidently the case when using the five senses model, allows scientists to “cut 
through the hideous complexity with a working model that is almost right, 
postponing the messy details until later.” 
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One may also ask rhetorically: What other model could we possibly use? 
As stated above, there is no scientifically agreed list of the senses, nor do 
philosophers show any consensus. Given this, it is appropriate, for the time 
being, to use a culture-specific model. This book focuses on the English language, 
which is part of the cultural complex where people generally count five senses. 
When studying English, working with culturally endemic categories that are 
recognized by the speakers themselves is an advantage. Language is sometimes 
called a window into thought, but it can similarly be seen as a window into the 
folk model of sensory perception: Speakers “maintain conceptions about sensory 
perception as such; these conceptions are manifested in the linguistic expressions 
that designate perception” (Huumo, 2010, p. 50). There is much anthropological 
work on the fact that at least in the West and in modern times, the view that 
there are five senses is dominant (Classen, 1993; Howes, 1991). Given this, it 
makes sense to study how sensory words are used in English with respect to 
these cultural categories. 
These cultural concerns are also connected to practical matters. First, it is 
desirable to achieve consistency with the large body of existing literature within 
linguistics that has already made interesting generalizations based on the five 
senses model. Second, the main dataset used in the empirical chapters (Part II) is 
a set of perceptual ratings collected from British native speakers by Lynott and 
Connell (2009). If we want to inquire native speakers’ knowledge of sensory 
words in a reliable manner, it makes sense to stick to culturally endemic 
categories—asking naïve native speakers to make more fine-grained 
physiological distinctions may not be feasible.  
 
2.4. Clarifications 
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It should be specified, however, what is regarded as a particular sense in this 
book and what is not. Following the folk model, the senses are each associated 
with one major sensory organ: the eye for vision, the ear for hearing (ignoring the 
vestibular system), the skin for touch, the tongue for taste, and the nose for smell 
(cf. Macpherson, 2011). Each one of these senses also has dedicated neural tissue. 
Although there is much crosstalk between different brain areas, and even though 
each brain area performs multiple tasks, one can identify visual cortex as 
primarily responsible for vision, the auditory cortex as primarily responsible for 
audition, the somatosensory cortex as primarily responsible for touch, the 
gustatory cortex as primarily responsible for taste, and the olfactory cortex (e.g., 
the piriform cortex) as primarily responsible for smell. 
In this book, the word “touch” and the adjectives “tactile” and “haptic” 
are used in a deliberately broad fashion, as cover terms for everything that 
Carlson (2010, pp. 237–249) calls the “somatosenses,” which describes those 
sensory systems that retrieve input from the skin, muscles, ligaments, and joints. 
This deliberately broad definition includes mechanical stimulation of the skin, 
thermal stimulation, pain, itching, kinesthesia, and proprioception. In focusing 
on the five senses folk model, these distinctions are deliberately ignored. The 
label “touch” is warranted because the bulk of the “touch words” dealt with in 
this book relates to the tactile exploration of surfaces, such as the words rough, 
smooth, hard, soft, silky, sticky, and gooey. A reason for including words such as 
warm, hot, aching, and tingly as belonging to touch is that this is how native 
speakers classify these words when having to them into the five senses folk 
model (Lynott & Connell, 2009). Thus, although there are more fine-grained 
distinctions when looked at from the perspective of physiology, we will follow 
the strategy of lumping the different somatosenses together for the time being. 
As some of the later chapters show (e.g., Chapter 13), more fine-grained 
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distinctions can emerge out of an analysis that initially focuses on touch as a 
gross category. 
The sensory modalities of taste and smell also warrant special attention: 
The folk model distinguishes these two senses, attributing the perception of 
flavor to the mouth and the tongue, even though flavor in fact arises from the 
interaction of taste and smell (as well as other sensory systems; see Auvray & 
Spence, 2008; Spence et al., 2015; see Chapters 13 and 14 for more details). 
However, when the terms “taste” and “smell” (and correspondingly “gustatory” 
and “olfactory”) are used in this book, the folk sense is implied. Distinguishing 
taste and smell, at least initially, allows us to explore the relation between these 
two sensory modalities (see Chapters 13 and 14). Later analyses will explore to 
what extent taste and smell can be differentiated in language, or not. 
Some researchers have made more nuanced distinctions between the 
senses in their linguistic studies (see Whitney, 1952; Williams, 1976; Ronga, 2016; 
Ronga, Bazzanella, Rossi, & Iannetti, 2012; Ullmann, 1945, 1959). Critically, 
different researchers have made different distinctions, making it difficult to 
compare across studies. Moreover, Healy (2017, p. 121) reminds us that 
“demands for more nuance actively inhibit the process of abstraction that good 
theory depends on.” The five senses folk model is a considerable abstraction that, 
although not without its flaws, prevents us from falling into the nuance trap of 
making ever more fine-grained distinctions, many of which may not be reflected 
in language use. However, several of the chapters will show that concerns about 
oversimplifying the sensory world are not relevant because the analytical 
techniques used in this book can overcome the limitations of the folk model. 
Thus, although the choice of adhering to the five senses may at first seem 
theoretically limiting, this book demonstrates how these limitations can be 
broken down. The five senses model occupies a nice sweet spot, allowing us to 
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make broad generalizations aimed at a high level of abstraction and 
generalization, while at the same time not being too constraining in the long run. 
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Chapter 3. Sensory semiotics 
3.1. The sensory semiotic toolkit 
To study how humans encode perceptual content, it “makes sense” to begin with 
semiotics, the study of meaning-making at its most general level. We can then 
explore how different semiotic strategies are used to talk about different aspects 
of our sensory world. Although this book focuses on sensory adjectives, we need 
to consider other semiotic strategies for communicating perceptual content. This 
is because sensory adjectives are part of a larger semiotic toolkit, and they are 
always chosen relative to this toolkit. 
 There is a “multiplicity of semiotic channels people use as they 
communicate in each other’s presence” (Wilce, 2009, p. 31). Speakers use 
whatever semiotic means are available to them to achieve their communicative 
goals. The traditional way of structuring a discussion of semiosis is to adhere to 
the classic Peircean categories of icons, indices, and arbitrary symbols. Each of 
these sign types involves a different relation between the signal, such as a word 
or gesture, and an intended referent or meaning. The relations include perceptual 
resemblance (icons), direct connection (indices), and convention (arbitrary 
symbol; Clark, 1996, pp. 183–184). 
Iconicity involves signaling meaning via resemblance, such as drawing. 
Indices are signs that establish meaning through a spatial, temporal, or causal 
relation (contiguity), such as smoke which indexes fire through causal contiguity 
(fire causes smoke) and spatial contiguity (smoke tends to be close to fire). 
Finally, symbols are best described in contrast to indices and iconicity: They 
establish meaning neither through resemblance nor through direct connection, 
but through arbitrary convention (de Saussure, 1959 [1916]). The only way to 
understand a symbol is to have learned its meaning. For example, there does not 
appear to be anything about the word form purple that gives away its meaning, 
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and the German language actually has a completely different word for the same 
color, lila. 
Clark (1996, Chapter 6) reconceptualizes Peirce’s tripartite division of 
semiosis and speaks of “demonstrating” or “depicting”, “identifying” and 
“describing-as.” These terms serve to remind us that using icons, indices, and 
arbitrary signs are forms of communicative action. Iconic signs depict, indices 
identify, and arbitrary signs describe-as (e.g., the word dog describes a dog as a 
member of a conventionalized category in the English language). 
Clark (1996) also emphasizes that the three forms of meaning-making 
“rarely occur in pure form” (p. 161). Iconicity, indexicality, and arbitrariness are 
not mutually exclusive, and they are frequently combined in what he calls 
“composite signals” (p. 161), which represent an “artful fusion of two or more 
methods of signaling” (p. 156). This idea is echoed by several other researchers 
who also view language from a wide lens: Enfield (2008) talks of “composite 
utterances” that combine gestures (often iconic or indexical) with speech. 
Kendon (2014, p. 3) speaks of a “semiotic diversity” in utterance production and 
highlights how utterances “always involve the mobilization of several different 
semiotic systems.” Liddell (2003, p. 332) reminds us that “spoken and signed 
languages both make use of multiple types of semiotic elements.” 
I will now exemplify how sensory perceptions can be communicated 
using each of the three different semiotic strategies. The ability to encode 
perceptual content encompasses all three forms of semiosis. In addition to the 
three Peircean types of semiosis, it is useful to talk about “technical language” 
and “metaphor” as distinct categories as these are two means of communicating 
that have special relevance for encoding perceptual information. Technical 
language and metaphor are additional (derivative) means to express sensory 
content that are based on the three basic types of semiosis in some form or 
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another, but they warrant discussion in their own right. The following provides a 
list of the different encoding strategies covered in this chapter (see also Barten, 
1998; Portello, 2004): 
 
1. iconicity (Chapter 3.2) 
2. indexicality / source-based language (Chapter 3.3) 
3. arbitrariness (Chapter 3.4) 
4. technical language (Chapter 3.5) 
5. metaphor (Chapter 3.6) 
 
After discussing each encoding strategy in isolation, I will discuss 
common dimensions along which the different strategies vary (Chapter 3.7). 
 
3.2. Depicting sensory perceptions with icons 
Imagine a proud hunter who tells you about a massive hare she shot. In her 
description, she uses the adjective–noun pair huuuuuuge hare while 
simultaneously moving her hands apart, depicting the size of the animal. This 
multimodal expression is communicating perceptual content, in this case 
specifically relating to size. The manual component of this composite signal is an 
example of an iconic gesture, with gestural communication via iconicity being an 
important aspect of linguistic communication (Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Kendon, 
2004; McNeill, 1992). 
The phonetic lengthening of the adjective huge to huuuuuuge is another 
form of iconicity, what has been called either “iconic prosody” or “vocal gesture” 
(see Perlman & Cain, 2014; Perlman, Clark, & Johansson Falck, 2014). Such iconic 
prosody is perceptual imagery leaking through to vocal production. Perlman 
(2010) showed that English speakers reduce their speech rate when referring to 
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distances that take longer to traverse (see also Perlman et al., 2014). Another set 
of studies has found that when speakers describe a visually presented moving 
dot, they increase their speech rate if the dot is moving faster, and they raise their 
voice pitch if the dot is moving upwards (Shintel & Nusbaum, 2007; Shintel, 
Nusbaum, & Okrent, 2006). All of these are examples of perceptual attributes 
(duration, distance, vertical position) being mapped directly onto particular 
phonetic parameters of speech production, such as duration and pitch. 
 These phonetic forms of iconicity are not encoded in the lexicon. “Iconic 
prosody” is dynamic and happens in the moment of speech production, where 
an already existing word is altered to convey a particular perceptual sensation. 
However, perceptual information can also form a stable part of a language’s 
vocabulary via phonological iconicity (Fischer, 1999; Schmidtke, Conrad, & 
Jacobs, 2014; see also Dingemanse, Blasi, Lupyan, Christiansen, & Monaghan, 
2015), or what others have called “sound symbolism” (Hinton, Nichols, & Ohala, 
1994; see Ahlner & Zlatev, 2010 for a critique of the term “sound symbolism”). 
This type of iconicity is part of the phonological make-up of words; that is, 
specific phonemes or sequences of phonemes are directly linked to sensory 
meanings. 
When it comes to the spoken word, the sensory domain of sound is a 
prime target for phonological iconicity (Dingemanse, 2012; Winter, Perlman, 
Perry, & Lupyan, 2017; see also Chapter 15), as exemplified by such 
onomatopoetic words as bang and beep. The term “onomatopoeia” refers to those 
cases of phonological iconicity that depict sound with sound. For example, 
words describing the sounds of music instruments may harbor a considerable 
degree of onomatopoeia (e.g., Patel & Iverson, 2003), and many bird names in the 
world’s languages are derived from bird sounds (Berlin & O’Neill, 1981). When it 
comes to sensory adjectives, some cases of onomatopoeia are difficult to spot: 
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Vickers (1984) discusses how the word crispy is used to describe food products 
that create high-pitched sounds when being chewed, compared to the word 
crunchy, which is used to describe food products that induce low-pitched 
chewing sounds. This contrast is mirrored by the word itself, with crispy having 
relatively more high frequency acoustic components than crunchy (see also 
Dacremont, 1995; Dijksterhuis, Luyten, de Wijk, & Mojet, 2007). 
The following excerpt from a written review of the video game Thumper 
provides a particularly lively modern demonstration of onomatopoeia. In this 
review (from kotaku.com, http://kotaku.com/thumper-is-the-best-kind-of-music-
game-1787670750, accessed August 18, 2017), the video game journalist Kirk 
Hamilton describes the game’s unique interaction between sound and gameplay 
as follows: 
 
You’ll constantly be alternating between listening and executing. Glowing 
gems become the kick drum; hard turns become the handclap snare. 
BOOM… CLACK! … BOOM-CLACK! You burst through barriers and they 
play a hi-hat fill. Dat-da-dat-da-dat BOOM... CLACK! (emphasis in original) 
 
In the next paragraph, he provides the following description: 
 
The beat is spartan and precise, marching forward at a robotic medium 
tempo. Harmonies join the soundscape as frantic undulations rather than 
coherent chord progressions. It all channels the downbeat-heavy chug of a 
freight train: CHUG-a-chug-a CHUG-a-chug-a CHUG-a-chug-a CHUG-a-
chug-a. 
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 The italicized expressions exemplify onomatopoeia. Interestingly, these 
onomatopoetic forms are not integrated into sentences. The writer furthermore 
used italics to highlight the fact that these expressions are separate from the rest 
of the review. This fits the empirical observation that iconicity, when it is used 
expressively to convey vivid perceptual content, often lacks grammatical 
integration (Dingemanse & Akita, 2017). 
 But what if the sensory target domain is not sound? Phonological iconicity 
can also depict sensory meanings that are not directly related to sound. For 
example, in size sound symbolism, high and front vowels, such as /i/, are 
associated with small objects or animals; low and back vowels are associated 
with large objects or animals (Berlin, 2006; Diffloth, 1994; Fitch, 1994, Appendix 
1; Marchand, 1959, p. 146; Ohala, 1984, 1994; Sapir, 1929; Thompson & Estes, 
2011; Tsur, 2006, 2012, Chapter 11; Ultan, 1978). Phonological iconicity has also 
been established for other sensory qualities, including visually perceived speed 
of motion (Cuskley, 2013), luminance (Hirata, Ukita, & Kita, 2011), taste (Crisinel, 
Jones, & Spence, 2012; Gallace, Boschin, & Spence, 2011; Ngo, Misra, & Spence, 
2011; Sakamoto & Watanabe, 2016; Simner, Cuskley, & Kirby, 2010), and texture 
(Etzi, Spence, Zampini, & Gallace, 2016; Fontana, 2013; Fryer, Freeman, & Pring, 
2014; Sakamoto & Watanabe, 2018). 
Probably one of the most explored sensory target domains with respect to 
phonological iconicity is the domain of shape. In a highly seminal paradigm 
spanning decades of research, researchers have explored how made-up words 
such as kiki and takete are associated with spikier and more angular shapes than 
bouba and maluma (Ahlner & Zlatev, 2010; Bremner, Caparos, de Fockert, Linnell, 
& Spence, 2013; Davis, 1961; Fischer, 1922; Köhler, 1929; Kovic, Plunkett, & 
Westermann, 2010; Maurer, Pathman, & Mondloch, 2006; Monaghan, Mattock, & 
Walker, 2012; Nielsen & Rendall, 2011, 2012, 2013; Ramachandran & Hubbard, 
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2001; Usnadze, 1924; also see Cuskley & Kirby, 2013, pp. 885–888). The output of 
this long line of research suggests that speakers of many languages, including 
young children, reliably associate the speech sounds of made-up words with 
shape characteristics (but see Styles & Gawne, 2017). However, research on the 
kiki/bouba phenomenon has so far focused on nonce words without establishing 
whether angularity as a perceptual property is actually encoded in the 
perceptual lexicons of natural languages.1 
Ideophones, otherwise known as expressives or mimetics, are a special 
class of “marked words that depict sensory imagery” (Dingemanse, 2012, p. 654). 
Dingemanse (2018) says that ideophones are words that “show rather than tell” 
(p. 10) and whose meanings belong to “the domain of sensory imagery, evoking 
all sorts of perceptions and inner sensations” (Dingemanse, 2013, p. 143). 
Elsewhere, Dingemanse (2018) said that “a key feature of ideophones is that they 
evoke sensory qualities like motion, manner, texture, and colour” (p. 15). 
Ideophones can thus be seen as a specialized vocabulary for the depictive 
expression of perceptual content. 
Some languages have thousands of ideophones, such as Japanese, which 
has ideophones such as sara-sara for smooth surfaces, zara-zara for rough 
surfaces, puru-puru for soft surfaces, kachi-kachi for hard surfaces, gorogorogoro for 
‘rolling’, and pikapika for ‘shiny’ (Kita, 1997; Sakamoto & Watanabe, 2018; 
Watanabe, Utsunomiya, Tsukurimichi, & Sakamoto, 2012, p. 2518). Nakagawa 
(2012) describes a group of 32 “food texture verbs” in the Khoe language Gǀui 
that describe mouthfeel by mimicking chewing sounds. These verbs include 
ideophones such as χárù χárù ‘fresh tsamma melon’ and tsháǹ tsháǹ ‘tender fillet 
meat’. 
Dingemanse (2013, p. 148) recalls a situation in which a speaker of the 
African language Siwu (spoken in Ghana), describes what will happen if he sets 
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fire to two small portions of gunpowder. The speaker utters the equivalent of It'll 
go shû shû, where shû is an ideophone that depicts a flaring event via a “sizzling 
sound” and short duration. While the speaker does this, he moves both hands 
quickly upwards, depicting the flaring event simultaneously via gestural 
iconicity. This is an example of a composite multimodal signal, and corpus 
studies show that ideophones often co-occur together with gestures (Dingemanse 
& Akita, 2017). 
There are two constraints to the expression of sensory content via 
iconicity. First, iconic expression is always “selective” (see Clark & Gerrig, 1990; 
Hassemer & Winter, 2018); that is, only parts of the perceptual whole are 
represented, always at the expense of other parts. The resemblance between form 
and intended meaning is never perfect. Second, iconic expression is limited by 
the affordances of a language. Iconicity has to make do with what sounds and 
sound patterns a language makes available (see Styles & Gawne, 2017). Together, 
these two constraints explain why there are differences between languages even 
for onomatopoeia, the most direct form of iconic expression (Ahlner & Zlatev, 
2010, p. 312; Marchand, 1959, pp. 152–153). The sound of a rooster, for example, 
is cock-a-doodle-doo in English and kikeriki in German. This is because different 
languages make different choices about what to iconically represent, and 
different languages make use of different sound inventories. The same applies to 
the examples seen in the video game review above. An expression such as 
BOOM-CLACK! is highly onomatopoetic, but it only represents the intended 
sound concept partially, and only via using a constrained set of English sounds.  
 Regardless of these limitations, it should be emphasized that iconicity, 
more so than any other semiotic strategy, is directly connected to the sensory 
world. Fittingly, Dingemanse (2011, p. 299) calls ideophones “the next best thing 
to having been there.” In fact, Marks (1978, Chapter 7) likens phonological 
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iconicity to a form of synesthesia, a union between the auditory-acoustic sense 
(speech sounds) and sensory meaning (see also Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001; 
Sidhu & Pexman, 2017). Spence (2012) highlights the similarity between iconicity 
and crossmodal perception. Lockwood and Dingemanse (2015) review the many 
experimental effects that link particular perceptual sensations to speech sounds. 
Winter et al. (2017) showed that iconicity is more likely to occur on word forms if 
the words encode perceptual as opposed to abstract content (see also Sidhu & 
Pexman, 2018). Perlman, Little, Thompson, and Thompson (2018) replicated and 
extended this finding, showing that perceptual words are more iconic not only in 
English, but also in Spanish, American Sign Language, and British Sign 
Language. In fact, we may say that genuine iconicity has to be sensory in order to 
warrant the label “iconicity” because without perceptual content, there is nothing 
of which to be iconic. Abstract concepts devoid of sensory content are inimical to 
iconicity (Lupyan & Winter, 2018). 
 It has to be emphasized, however, that some perceptual qualities are more 
prone to iconic expression than others. Dingemanse (2012) reviews 
crosslinguistic evidence suggesting that ideophones most frequently encode 
sound, followed by movement, visual patterns, other sensory perceptions, and, 
finally, inner feelings and cognitive states. Winter et al. (2017) analyzed 3,000 
English words rated for iconicity, finding that sound and touch words are the 
most iconic, followed by taste and smell words. In their data, sight words were 
found to be the least iconic. Perlman et al. (2018) furthermore showed that 
relatively more tactile words were relatively more iconic in both spoken 
languages (English and Spanish) and signed languages (American Sign 
Language and British Sign Language). Words strongly associated with sound 
were found to be more iconic, but only in spoken languages. For olfaction, 
gustation, and vision, Perlman et al. (2018) obtained negative correlations 
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between perceptual strength and iconicity. This clearly shows that depiction as a 
semiotic strategy is more available for some sensory content than others, and this 
availability depends on the modality of expression (speaking versus signing). 
However, some perceptual qualities, such as color, are difficult to express 
iconically in any modality (Perlman et al., 2018). 
 
3.3. Identifying perceptual qualities with indices 
One of the most prototypical examples of an indexical sign is a pointing gesture, 
where there is a direct (projected) spatial relation to the signified object or person 
(Clark, 2003; Kendon, 2004, Chapter 11). Clearly, points can be used to identify 
perceptual aspects of the world around us. Points are, however, generally not 
about perceptual qualities, but rather about objects in the environment. In some 
constrained contexts, a point may actually be about a perceptual impression. For 
example, we may consider a situation with two bowls of water, one hot and one 
cold. In this case, a point could be used to signal temperature indirectly by 
pointing to either one of the bowls (example inspired by Dingemanse, 2013, p. 
148). However, this point is only about temperature if the communicative context 
is right—the point’s primary target is the object, not the perceptual impression. 
Humans can identify a perceptual quality indirectly via referring to its 
source, even in its physical absence. This is what is sometimes called a “source-
based strategy” or “source-based language” (e.g., Croijmans & Majid, 2016; 
Majid, Burenhult, Stensmyr, de Valk, & Hansson, 2018), exemplified by such 
expressions as It sounds like a blender, It tastes like chicken, or It smells like kimchi. At 
first sight, such expressions appear to be quite different from pointing gestures; 
however, there are two important similarities: First, both pointing gestures and 
source-based descriptions identify perceptual qualities only indirectly, via an 
object. Second, both communicative actions strongly rely on the speaker’s 
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“common ground” (Clark, 1996); in one case, the visual common ground; in 
another, shared background knowledge. 
 The similarity between pointing and source-based language becomes 
apparent when looking at the limitations of source-based language. Because the 
perceptual quality is not expressed directly, the intended perceptual quality has 
to be inferred when physical or verbal points are used (compare Levinson & 
Majid, 2014, p. 411; see also Fainsilber & Ortony, 1987, p. 241; Holz, 2007, p. 187). 
For example, the description It tastes like kimchi could refer to the dish’s pungent 
and spicy properties, the carbonated taste, or the fishy or garlicky overtones that 
some forms of kimchi have (Chambers, Lee, Chun, & Miller, 2012). Thus, even 
though the source, kimchi, is specified, there still is room for interpretation. The 
word kimchi itself is just a noun that refers to a particular food item. Only by 
embedding it in a phrase with a perception verb, such as It tastes like X, does the 
noun’s primary focus come to be a perceptual quality. Another limitation of 
source-based language is the reliance on common ground (see Levinson & Majid, 
2014, p. 410): The identified source (in this case kimchi) needs to be known by 
both speaker and hearer. The description It tastes like kimchi does not help those 
who have never tasted kimchi.2 
In the literature, discussions of source-based language most frequently 
come up in the context of taste and smell (e.g., Croijmans & Majid, 2016; Dubois, 
2007). Lehrer (2009, p. 249) states that “most expressions for describing smell are 
based on an object that contains the odor.” However, it has to be emphasized 
that source-based language comes up in the context of all senses.3 Sound, for 
instance, is another domain where source-based language is quite frequent: 
When asking the question What is that sound?, speakers may in fact expect an 
answer that identifies the source of the sound, such as It is a squirrel, rather than 
an answer that merely describes the sound, such as It is a cracking sound (Huumo, 
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2010, pp. 56–57). David (1997, reported in Dubois, 2007, p. 179) found that for 
noises, 70.5% of the descriptions given by participants were source-based. 
Source-based language may be particularly frequent in expert language, 
such as the language of wine and coffee experts (Croijmans & Majid, 2016; 
Lawless, 1984). This may have to do with the fact that source-based language, if 
the source is known, allows a lot of precision (Plümacher, 2007, p. 66). 
Alternatively, it may have to do with the fact that experts have more common 
ground with each other, often having undergone similar training. For example, 
expert descriptions of the quality of a wine may identify the chemical sources of 
a wine, such as hydrogen sulfide or acetaldehyde (e.g., Lehrer, 2009, p. 6). Such 
language use is entirely opaque to novices, who do not know the respective 
sources. Lee (2015) reports the results of a smelling test with speakers of the 
language Amis, an indigenous language of Taiwan from the Austronesian 
language. She finds that even though this language has a much larger vocabulary 
of abstract smell terms than English, speakers still predominantly talk about 
smells using source-based descriptions. 
Source-based language in English does not exclusively rely on the use of 
like; other morphosyntactical patterns are possible. For instance, source terms can 
be used to modify existing color adjectives, such as in tomato red, olive green, lemon 
yellow, or cobalt blue (Dubois, 2007, p. 175; Graumann, 2007, p. 136; Plümacher, 
2007, p. 62). New source-based sensory adjectives can furthermore be formed by 
derivational morphology, such as when adding the suffix –y to onion, forming 
oniony (Dubois, 2007, p. 175; Lehrer, 2009, p. 13), or to salt, forming salty 
(Ankerstein & Pereira, 2013, p. 313). Some source-based descriptions become 
conventionalized expressions that form a stable part of the English lexicon, as 
with adjectives such as caramelized, citrusy, and nutty. This, too, may more 
frequently occur in the domain of smell, with Lehrer (2009, p. 13) stating that 
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“almost all words for smells are based on a noun denoting something with a 
distinctive smell.” Examples of conventionalized source-based terms in the 
visual domain include orange, peach, and salmon. In some cases, sources may be 
entirely opaque. For instance, the English color words crimson and carmine both 
go back to the Arabic word qirmiz, which describes an insect, as well as the red 
dye that is produced from that insect. This is not known to most speakers of 
English, who are unaware that these adjectives ultimately have a source-based 
origin. 
Other languages may have additional morphological means available to 
create source-based descriptions, such as reduplication. In the indigenous 
Austronesian language Amis, spoken on Taiwan, speakers can reduplicate a 
noun to indicate the smell corresponding to the noun’s referent (Lee, 2015). For 
example, when the noun ʡisi ‘urine’ is reduplicated to form hala-ʡisi-ʡisi (hala- is a 
proclitic), the smell of urine is implied. The language isolate Yélî Dnye spoken on 
Rossel Island in Papua New Guinea similarly uses reduplicated nouns to convey 
color meanings (Levinson, 2000), such as when the word taa for ‘red sparrow’ is 
reduplicated (taa-taa) to convey redness, or when the word kpaapî ‘white 
cockatoo’ is reduplicated (kpaapî-kpaapî) to convey whiteness. 
 
3.4. Describing perceptual qualities with arbitrary symbols 
The final form of semiosis involves arbitrary symbols. This is what Clark (1996) 
paraphrases as “describing-as” (p. 187). In fact, most sensory words of English 
can be viewed as primarily belonging to the arbitrary encoding strategy. In the 
domain of sight, for instance, there are English words such as bright, blue, and 
shiny. There are also rough and smooth for touch, loud and quiet for sound, sweet 
and sour for taste, and musky and fragrant for smell. In each case, we can only 
know what these words mean by having learned the respective conventions. 
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However, once a word is known, sensory adjectives are both concise and precise. 
They directly relate to particular aspects of the sensory world, and in contrast to 
most source-based expressions, they do so using just one word. Moreover, 
conventionalized words are, by definition, an established part of the lexicon of a 
language. This means that they are understood by a larger portion of language 
users.4 
Just as with the other strategies, communicating via arbitrary symbols 
“never works alone” (Clark, 1996, p. 187), with sensory adjectives often being 
part of composite signals. The deverbal adjectives squealing and beeping, for 
example, are clearly part arbitrary, part iconic. The descriptors orange and citrusy 
are clearly part arbitrary, part source-based. In real human interactions, any of 
the abstract words may be combined with vocal and manual gestures, as in the 
above-mentioned case of the relatively arbitrary word form huge, which can be 
phonetically lengthened (huuuuuge) and accompanied by co-speech gestures that 
signal size. 
 
3.5. Technical language 
Technical language can also be used to talk about sensory perceptions. Examples 
of technical language include describing a sound as having a frequency of 440 
Hertz or a color as having a wavelength of 700 nanometers. Similarly, for 
anybody who knows hexadecimal codes, it is clear that #FF0000 means ‘red’, and 
that #0000FF means ‘blue’. Semiotically, technical language is largely based on 
abstract descriptors, including numbers. However, technical language is 
different from other abstract descriptors because it relies on identifying elements 
within a larger scientific system, such as the wavelength continuum for color and 
the frequency continuum for pitch. Likewise, hexadecimal codes are part of a 
larger system, and each hex code only makes sense with respect to that system.5 
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Moreover, technical language relies more heavily on cultural progress; it only 
works because humans have established knowledge about the physical 
characteristics of perception. 
While a lot of technical language requires expert knowledge (see Porcello, 
2004), some technical vocabularies have become common currency in the general 
population. English speakers can tell each other about time with reference to 
temporal measurement units such as seconds, minutes, hours, and days; and they 
can tell each other about distances by using spatial measurement units such as 
meters, feet, and inches. Crucially, just as is the case with the above-mentioned 
examples of visual wavelengths, acoustic frequencies, and hexadecimal codes, 
these words only make sense in relation to the entire system. To understand the 
expression The trip took 30 minutes, one needs to know the underlying scale of 
how time is counted in hours and minutes. Technical descriptions are always 
relative to a whole system. 
Another feature common to technical language is that the used systems 
often have language-external manifestations, such as visual representations of 
color spectrums or tables of hexadecimal codes. People who are familiar with 
such representations can refer to perceptual qualities by metaphorically talking 
about spatial locations or movements within such systems. This is very common 
in music (Pérez-Sobrino & Julich, 2014): For example, the circle of fifths is a 
(metaphorical) spatialization of a musical system that captures the relationship 
among the 12 tones commonly used in Western music, as well as their role in 
keys (major and minor). Given this system, a musical expert can say such things 
as a series of chromatically ascending tritones, or Lohengrin’s A major (..) stands the 
furthest away in the circle of fifths (Pérez-Sobrino & Julich, 2014, p. 305). Here, 
spatial language is used to refer to positions and movements within the 
established technical structure. 
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Interestingly, taste and smell appear to have no scientific representational 
systems that are grounded directly in physical facts (see Dubois, 2007, p. 171). 
Taste and smell arise from complex interactions of many molecules, with limited 
success in mapping the chemical structures of odorants to the psychological 
characteristics of odors (compare Agapakis & Tolaas, 2012). There are expert 
representational systems, such as the flavor wheels that are commonly used in 
wine discourse (e.g., Gawel, Oberholster, & Francis, 2000; Noble et al., 1987; see 
also Lehrer, 2009, Chapter 4), but in contrast to such systems as the circle of fifths 
in music or the wavelength description of color, these systems are largely 
intended to standardize description; they are less grounded in physical facts.6 
In part as a result of the lack of representational formats that allow the 
detailed characterization of smell, Sissel Tolaas developed the international 
language Nasalo (akin to Esperanto), consisting of words to communicate smells, 
such as dusbi for the smell of ‘dusty brick’ and isjfe for the ‘smell of cut grass’ 
(Agapakis & Tolaas, 2012, pp. 570–571). In fact, sensory vocabularies (albeit not 
all as creative as the one of Tolaas) are continuously being developed in order to 
meet the demands of the food industry. Almost every issue of the journal Journal 
of Sensory Studies contains a new lexicon for a specialized sensory domain, such 
as lexicons for the description of nail polish (Sun, Koppel, & Chambers, 2014), 
artisan goat cheese (Talavera & Chambers, 2016), or kimchi (Chambers et al., 
2012). These expert systems are designed to overcome some of the limitations of 
the everyday English sensory vocabulary. They are intended to establish 
common ground within a particular community of experts, as well as to 
standardize descriptions within this community (see Diederich, 2015). 
 
3.6. Metaphor 
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Metaphor is a very versatile strategy for conveying perceptual meaning. Words 
such as sweet and smooth appear to be primarily about taste and touch 
perceptions when seen in isolation. However, both words can easily be used to 
describe sensations more strongly related to other senses, such as when speaking 
of sweet melodies and smooth tastes. These expressions have been called 
“synesthetic metaphors” and are associated with a large literature (e.g., Shen, 
1997; Strik Lievers, 2015; Ullmann, 1959) that will be the topic of Chapters 6 
through 9. 
Sensory words are constantly used in a crossmodal fashion—that is, 
outside of their core sensory domain. In her discussion of wine language, Lehrer 
(1978, p. 106) says that “many of the terms used as wine descriptions involve 
extensions of meaning rather than standard senses” (see also Suárez-Toste, 2013). 
All word meanings, including sensory word meanings, are flexible and can be 
modulated by context as well as creatively used in entirely novel domains. 
Metaphor is one of the primary strategies to enrich vocabularies (Dirven, 
1985; Ortony, 1975), including sensory vocabularies. For example, a particular 
sound may be difficult to describe using sound words alone, so touch words can 
be used instead, as in sharp sound and abrasive sound (e.g., Day, 1996; Ullmann, 
1959; Williams, 1976). The language of sound (Barten, 1998; Porcello, 2004) and 
music is particularly replete with metaphors, including spatial metaphors such 
as high pitch and low pitch (Dolscheid, Shayan, Majid, & Casasanto, 2013). 
According to Pérez-Sobrino and Julich (2014), about 29% of all words used in 
academic discourse on music is metaphorical, which is higher than in other 
domains (cf. Steen et al., 2010). Over the last 200 years, the frequency of sensory 
metaphors has increased (Akpinar & Berger, 2015). Because metaphor is such a 
dominant strategy in talking about sensory perception, four entire chapters will 
be devoted to this topic (Chapters 6–9). 
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3.7. Summary 
Humans are expert meaning-makers that have a wide array of semiotic tools 
available to them, each of which is capable of conveying perceptual meaning. I 
will conclude by highlighting some of the dimensions that crosscut the different 
semiotic strategies and can be used to compare and contrast them. 
One such dimension is whether a perceptual quality is identified directly 
or indirectly. Conventionalized words can directly relate to perceptual qualities. 
Iconicity may be even more direct because it connects to a sensory meaning via 
resemblance. Yet, all other semiotic strategies are indirect. This is the case with 
source-based language, where speakers do not specify a perceptual quality 
directly, but they instead refer to the conditions that elicited a particular percept. 
This is also the case with technical language, where speakers refer to elements 
within a scientific system. And this is also the case with metaphor, where 
speakers borrow perceptual language from another domain to talk about a 
particular sensory concept. 
The directness of abstract words such as red and the directness of iconic 
forms such as squealing are, however, of a fundamentally different kind. Abstract 
words strip away from the particularities of experience and identify a percept as 
an instance of a general category. On the other hand, iconic forms—especially if 
they are prosodically modulated—stay closer to the particularities of experience. 
This is one of the reasons why it has been argued that iconicity and abstraction 
are incompatible (Lupyan & Winter, 2018). 
Another theme that ran through this chapter was the issue of common 
ground. Some semiotic encoding strategies are more reliant on knowledge that is 
shared between the speaker and hearer. This is the case particularly for source-
based language, and also for technical language. Conventionalized sensory 
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words and iconicity require less common ground. Thus, there is a 
correspondence between the directness with which an encoding strategy relates 
to perception and its reliance on common ground: More indirect strategies 
generally also require more common ground. 
Another dimension that crosscuts the different semiotic strategies is 
whether a particular form of sensory expression is encoded in the lexicon or not. 
Abstract words always are encoded in the lexicon; in fact, their conventionalized 
nature is definitional. On the other hand, iconicity may or may not be encoded in 
the lexicon (e.g., phonetic iconicity versus phonological iconicity, as in huuuuuge 
versus squealing), and the same applies to source-based language, which can be 
generated on the fly (It tastes like kimchi) or which forms a stable part of the 
English lexicon (the color word orange). 
Finally, it should be emphasized again that any analysis of sensory 
language has to keep the full system of semiotic strategies in mind. This is for at 
least two reasons: First, as was mentioned above, the different semiotic strategies 
are often employed in tandem (Clark’s composite signals). Second, speakers 
always select one encoding strategy in relation to all others. That is, speakers 
have a choice about which tool of their semiotic toolkit they want to employ. The 
trade-offs between different semiotic strategies are discussed in following 
chapter. 
 																																																								
1 The only empirical data for shape iconicity in word forms is that words for round objects across 
the world’s languages often contain the phoneme /r/ (Blasi, Wichmann, Hammarström, Stadler, & 
Christiansen, 2016). 
 
2  Another way to analyze source-based language linguistically is to view it as a form of 
metonymy (Cacciari, 2008, p. 426), which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. A 
comparison to an expression such as The White House has pardoned former sheriff Joe Arpaio is 
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useful. This expression involves a PLACE STANDS FOR INSTITUTION metonymy (names of common 
metonymies and metaphors are often presented in capitalized letters), where the expression 
White House (PLACE) is used to reference the related concept of the US government (INSTITUTION). 
This is structurally similar to the case of source-based language, where a perceptual quality is 
identified via reference to another concept, its source. Moreover, just like with source-based 
language, metonymy relies heavily on shared cultural knowledge. In the aforementioned case of 
the PLACE STANDS FOR INSTITUTION metonymy, the listener has to know that the White House is 
where the President of the United States resides and that the White House is where the seat of the 
government is. 
 
3 Fainsilber and Ortony (1987) discuss source-based language in the context of emotions, such as 
when a speaker characterizes a particular emotional state, such as embarrassment, by describing 
a particularly embarrassing episode. They say that “in such a case, the literal description would 
not describe the quality of the subjective state itself but would merely identify its eliciting 
conditions” (p. 241). 
 
4  As clarified by Plümacher and Holz (2007, p. 5), some abstract language about sensory 
perceptions is subject to additional constraints, such as the word blonde, which is a color term that 
can only be used to talk about hair. Moreover, some abstract language about sensory perceptions 
may have additional meanings, such as the expression green tomato, which may not only describe 
the color of a tomato, but also the fact that it is unripe. 
 
5 The arbitrariness of technical language becomes clear when we consider the fact that such 
dimensions as wavelength and acoustic frequency could have been defined via another 
numerical scale. Hexadecimal codes are particularly arbitrary and in fact, different color 
representation systems exist, such as RGB values in the 0–255 range. 
 
6 There are other differences between flavor wheels and such systems as the circle of fifths. The 
circle of fifths is continuous. Flavor wheels give the impression of a continuous scale, but they are 
in fact categorical and hierarchical (e.g., cut grass and dill may be co-hyponyms of the hyperonym 
fresh herbs, which itself is a hyponym of vegetal); see discussion in Lehrer (2009, Chapter 4). 
	40	
																																																																																																																																																																					
Perhaps as a result of their categorical nature, there is no work of which I am aware that has 
described speakers using metaphorical movement language within these systems, in contrast to 
the circle of fifths (Pérez-Sobrino & Julich, 2014). 
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Chapter 4. Ineffability 
4.1. Introduction 
Consider the following two examples that contain perceptual descriptions of 
kimchi taken from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies, 
2008). 
 
(1) No Korean meal is complete without kimchi, the pungent, piquant cabbage-
based side dish. 
(Vegetarian Times) 
 
(2) But pause before calling kimchi the Korean sauerkraut.... It's not just the red 
pepper, garlic and ginger that set kimchi apart from sauerkraut. 
(Austin American Statesman) 
 
Have you ever eaten kimchi? If yes, ask yourself: How would you describe 
the experience of eating kimchi to a friend who has never tasted it? If you have 
never eaten kimchi, ask yourself: How do you think kimchi tastes, given the 
descriptions listed above? How would it smell like? In fact, one may ask: Is there 
any linguistic description you or another English speaker could possibly give 
that would adequately capture the full delight of eating kimchi? 
The linguistic descriptions above provide a good starting point for getting 
an idea about kimchi, but none of them capture the richness the dish’s qualities. 
Even the standardized sensory lexicon of kimchi flavors (Chambers et al., 2012), 
detailing such characteristics as “crispness” and “tongue tingle,” is not able to 
convey all aspects of the multisensory kimchi-eating experience. In talking about 
how limited language is when it comes to expressing sensory perceptions, Moore 
and Carling (1988, p. 110) state that “if someone wants to know what caviar or 
kumquats taste like, better they taste some for themselves.” 
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This chapter goes into more detail about the difficulty of translating 
sensory perception into words. I will move from definitions of ineffability 
(Chapter 4.2) to discussing what exactly it is that is ineffable or not (Chapter 4.3). 
Then, I will discuss different explanatory accounts of ineffability (Chapter 4.4). I 
will conclude by revisiting the topic of ineffability from the perspective of the 
semiotic toolkit introduced in the last chapter. 
 
4.2. Ineffability and related notions 
Levinson and Majid (2014) define ineffability as “the difficulty or impossibility of 
putting certain experiences into words” (p. 408). Levinson and Majid’s notion of 
ineffability is really about the existence or absence of dedicated linguistic 
material for a given perceptual quality (p. 411). 
Levinson and Majid (2014) distinguish between weak and strong 
ineffability. Weak ineffability is language-specific; strong ineffability is absolute. 
Weak ineffability means that something can be expressed in one language, but 
not in another. For example, the Amazonian language Pirahã lacks some of the 
basic color terms that English has, such as red, green, and blue (Everett, 2005). The 
fact that English has words that Pirahã lacks shows that these perceptual 
concepts are principally codable. Conversely, the Maniq language spoken by 
hunter-gatherers in Thailand (Wnuk & Majid, 2014) has many more smell terms 
than English, including such words as caŋɛs for the smell of monkey hair and 
burnt animal hair. This means that this sensation is principally expressible; it just 
so happens that English lacks the corresponding word. On the other hand, strong 
ineffability means that something cannot possibly be said in any language. The 
only way to establish whether something is weakly or strongly ineffable is via 
crosslinguistic comparison. 
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Ineffability needs to be further distinguished from “efficient codability,” 
“communicative accuracy,” and “conveyability / indirect indication” (Levinson 
& Majid, 2014). Efficient codability is a psycholinguistic measure of the relative 
ease of expressing certain percepts. Brown and Lenneberg (1954) think of 
efficient codability as a multivariate concept that includes several indicator 
variables. According to them, sensory perceptions are more efficiently codable if 
speakers give shorter descriptions (i.e., less words are needed), if the words they 
use are shorter (i.e., no long words are needed), and if the words can be named 
more quickly (i.e., highly accessible and easily pronounceable words are used). 
For instance, speakers of the Austroasiatic language Jahai are faster and more 
succinct in describing odors than Dutch speakers (Majid et al., 2018), suggesting 
that smell is more efficiently codable in Jahai than in Dutch; that is, the Jahai 
people find odors easier to talk about than Dutch speakers. Brown and 
Lenneberg’s (1954) notion of codability also includes whether speakers agree on 
the same labels and whether a given speaker uses a label consistently across 
time. Majid and Burenhult (2014) show that in a smell labeling task, Jahai 
speakers agree more with each other than English speakers. 
An extension of Brown and Lenneberg’s (1954) notion of efficient 
codability is the notion of communicative accuracy, which measures whether the 
labels of one group of participants allows another group of participants to 
correctly identify the intended sensory stimulus (see discussion in Lucy, 1992, 
Chapter 5). 
Finally, conveyability refers to the fact that perceptual concepts having no 
dedicated words associated with them can always be paraphrased—for example, 
by using the source-based strategy (e.g., It tastes like kimchi; compare Cacciari, 
2008, p. 426). Levinson and Majid (2014) discuss conveyability in the context of 
Searle’s Principle of Expressibility, according to which anything that can be 
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thought can also be expressed (Searle, 1969). This principle is connected to the 
generative capacity of language. In any language, it is possible to say a sentence 
that has never been said before. 
 
4.3. Ineffability of what? 
We need to ask the question: What exactly is it that is ineffable or not? For 
example, is it possible to meaningfully speak of an entire sense, such as sight or 
smell, as more or less ineffable? Or is ineffability a feature of particular 
perceptual qualities within a given sensory modality? These questions will be 
discussed in (Chapter 4.3.1), followed by a discussion of perceptual 
characteristics that are shared between sensory modalities, so-called “common 
sensibles” (Chapter 4.3.2). Finally, I discuss ineffability of other aspects of 
sensory perception, in particular: 
 
 1. The ineffability of subjective experience (Chapter 4.3.3) 
 2. The ineffability of fine perceptual detail (Chapter 4.3.4) 
 3. The ineffability of the multisensoriality (Chapter 4.3.5) 
 
4.3.1. Differential ineffability of the senses 
It is generally thought that sight is the most codable sensory modality, with 
linguists having suggested that there is more lexical differentiation for visual 
concepts in the world’s languages than for the other senses (i.e., more distinct 
visual word types; Buck, 1949, Chapter 15; Viberg, 1983). Levinson and Majid 
(2014) say that “in English at least, it seems generally easier to linguistically code 
colors than (non-musical) sounds, sounds than tastes, tastes than smells” (p. 
415).1 Slobin (1971) already noted that there is “an inadequate vocabulary for 
expressing sensations of the proximity senses” (p. 108), which includes touch, 
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taste, and smell—in contrast to the so-called “distal” senses of sight and sound. 
The evidence from type frequencies suggests that indeed visual concepts are 
overall more effable in English, and that taste and particularly smell are 
relatively ineffable (see Chapter 12). Vision is also overall more efficiently 
codable, as evidenced by the fact that visual concepts have higher token 
frequencies (e.g., San Roque et al., 2015; Viberg, 1993; Winter et al., 2018) and are 
processed more quickly (Connell & Lynott, 2014). 
 Compared to vision, smell in particular has been argued to be relatively 
ineffable. Yeshurun and Sobel (2010) mention that if one were to subject their 
friends to a blind smelling test with food and beverage items from their own 
fridge, they would be incapable of identifying even those items they consume on 
a daily basis. While it is often easy for speakers to recognize particular smells, 
research has shown that labeling smells is difficult (Cain, 1979; Croijmans & 
Majid, 2016; de Wijk & Cain, 1994; Engen & Ross, 1973; Huisman & Majid, 2018; 
Yeshurun & Sobel, 2010). This is one example of the “persistent challenges” in 
“mapping odors to names,” which is why researchers have called smell a “muted 
sense” (Olofsson & Gottfried, 2015, p. 319). As stated by Lorig (1999, p. 392), 
“odor and language do not seem to work well together.” Smell is generally seen 
as the most ineffable sensory modality. 
However, Levinson and Majid (2014) also stress that ineffability does not 
apply to entire sensory modalities so as much as to particular perceptual 
qualities within a given modality. They say that “within the visual domain, 
object shapes seem easier to verbalize than faces..., while within the tactile 
modality textures seem easier than pain” (p. 415; for the difficulty of talking 
about faces, see Moore & Carling, 1988, Chapters 13–14). Within the auditory 
modality, it may be relatively easy to talk about loudness (loud, quiet) and tempo 
(say, of a musical piece; fast, slow), compared to talking about timbre and spectral 
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characteristics, for which speakers frequently use touch-related vocabulary 
(rough sound, harsh sound, abrasive sound). Within the modality of taste, there are 
dedicated words for basic tastes (sweet, sour, bitter, and salty) but source-based 
descriptors for many other gustatory experiences (oniony, nutty, vinegary). Also, it 
is the case that although the detailed descriptive characteristics of smells are not 
encoded in the English lexicon, perceived pleasantness is, as reflected in such 
words as aromatic and pungent. Thus, when we say that sight is overall more 
codable in English, what we actually mean is that sight has more distinct 
perceptual qualities that are codable.  
 
4.3.2. Proper and common sensibles 
When talking about what particular perceptual qualities are linguistically 
codable or not, it is important to distinguish between “proper sensibles” and 
“common sensibles,” a distinction which goes all the way back to Aristotle 
(Sorabji, 1971). Proper sensibles can only be perceived through one sensory 
modality; for instance, color is a proper sensible of vision. Common sensibles 
refer to properties that “can make themselves known through several sensory 
channels” (Marks, 1978, p. 12), such as distance, speed of movement, shape, or 
duration (Levinson & Majid, 2014, p. 412; see also discussion in Ronga et al. 2012, 
pp. 149–150). All spatial properties can be perceived through sight, touch, and 
sound. 
A special common sensible is magnitude. Levinson and Majid (2014) say 
that “lights, sounds, smells, tactile pressures, tastes, pains, emotions can all have 
low or high intensities” (p. 413). Walsh (2003) and Bueti and Walsh (2009) 
propose what they call ATOM (A Theory of Magnitude), according to which all 
kinds of sensory magnitudes (including numerical quantities) are processed by a 
crossmodal magnitude system (see also Winter, Marghetis, & Matlock, 2015). 
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According to this theory, magnitude as it is experienced via different modalities 
is actually the same underlying cognitive quality. 
To say that something is a common sensible does not mean that all senses 
have equal access to the given perceptual quality. In some tasks, two modalities 
may be nearly equivalent, as when the distance of rods is judged by touch and by 
sight (Teghtsoonian & Teghtsoonian, 1965). However, when the perception of a 
common sensible is tested on two modalities together, asymmetries may emerge. 
In a series of classic experiments, Rock and Victor (1964) and Hay and Pick (1966) 
showed that in shape perception, sight influences touch more than the other way 
around. Another asymmetry characterizes touch and sound. The perceptual 
quality of roughness is a common sensible to both touch and sound, but sound 
has little effect when surfaces can also be felt (Lederman, 1979). These 
asymmetries may carry over to language. For example, even though rough may 
also describe sounds, native speakers of English more strongly associate this 
word with touch (Lynott & Connell, 2009). Similarly, even though high and low 
describe spatial characteristics that are accessible to multiple senses, native 
speakers think of these words as primarily visual (Lynott & Connell, 2009). 
As a result of their intrinsic multisensoriality, common sensibles are less 
confined to the ineffability of any one sensory modality. Because of this, common 
sensibles are generally easy to express in language. For instance, length can be 
expressed with words such as long and short, but also through iconic gestures (as 
when extending the hands slowly to indicate a long duration), vocal gestures (as 
when lengthening the word looooong), and through specialized spatial language, 
such as measurement units (50 centimeters, 2 meters). Essentially, all strategies 
discussed in Chapter 3 can be applied to most common sensibles. 
The existence of common sensibles makes the measurement of ineffability 
difficult.2 When counting how many word types a sensory modality has, are 
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words such as large and rectangular treated as belonging to sight, to touch, or 
perhaps to no sense at all? Ronga et al. (2012, p. 159, Footnote 24) discusses how 
such “dimension words” are treated by Popova (2005) as touch-related, and by 
Williams (1976) as sight-related. Such mismatches are to be expected for common 
sensibles. In general, because common sensibles can be accessed through 
multiple sensory modalities, it is not clear what access modality is primarily 
encoded in a linguistic form. The perceptual ratings described in more detail in 
Part II of this book (specifically, Chapter 11) allow dealing with this 
multisensoriality in a principled fashion. For example, to look at whether a 
certain sensory modality is associated with more or less words, it is perhaps best 
to use the least multisensorial part of the vocabulary (as is done in Chapter 17). 
More generally, differences in classification of common sensibles (such as 
highlighted by Ronga et al., 2012) can be used by using standardized word lists. 
In the following sections, I move to a discussion of different types of 
ineffabilities. 
 
4.3.3. Ineffability of subjective experience 
Each and every one of us perceives the world in a slightly different fashion. This 
is perhaps most apparent in the case of the so-called “chemical senses,” taste and 
smell. For instance, Miller and Reedy (1990) report striking differences in how 
many taste buds people have on their tongue. In their small-scale study of only 
16 participants, the density of fungiform papillae (a particular type of taste bud) 
ranged from about 22 per square centimeter for some individuals to 74 per 
square centimeter for others, which also resulted in differences in subjective 
intensity thresholds for particular taste sensations. Taste and smell also vary as a 
function of age, gender, culture, and many other factors. Spence and Piqueras-
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Fiszman (2014) review many individual differences in flavor perception and 
conclude that “we all live in very different taste worlds” (p. 199). 
Similar things can be said about any other sense. For instance, there is 
great variety in the number of photoreceptors people have within their eyes 
(Curcio, Sloan Jr., Packer, Hendrickson, & Kalina, 1987), and there are several 
forms of color blindness, some of which are quite common in the general 
population (e.g., red-green color blindness affects about 4–8% of men, depending 
on the population studied; Birch, 2012). 
The linguistic system ignores many of these individual differences. 
Shepard and Cooper (1992) showed that when participants with varying forms of 
visual impairment are asked to perform similarity judgments on the color words 
red, orange, gold, yellow, green, turquoise, blue, violet, and purple, the resulting 
similarity space looks just like the similarity space that is created when fully 
sighted people make those judgments. Only when judgments are made on actual 
color stimuli do strong differences become apparent. Similarly, Landau and 
Gleitman (1985) show that even congenitally blind children can acquire the 
meaning of color words. This demonstrates how many differences between 
individuals may be masked by language. 
 Moore and Carling (1988) state that “the meanings of words are 
necessarily vague and necessarily variable in the minds of different individuals” 
(p. 44) and that “language is based on a tacit communal conspiracy whereby we 
assume, individually, that we mean broadly the same by the same words” (p. 
59). The fact that public language use is targeted at shared meanings necessitates 
disregarding genuinely subjective experience in linguistic encoding. Levinson 
and Majid (2014) say that “for a community to share the meaning of a word, they 
must all have direct or indirect access to the referent” (p. 420), which is not the 
case with those aspects of experience that are truly different between different 
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individuals. Holz (2007, p. 193) talks about the “apparently unclosable gap 
between the individuality of perception and the conventional, hence social and 
communicative character of language.” Thus, truly subjective sensations—what 
philosophers call qualia—may be truly ineffable in an absolute fashion. 
 
4.3.4. The ineffability of fine perceptual detail 
Even assuming that every speaker associates exactly the same meanings with 
perceptual words, there would still be a massive gap between what can be 
perceived and what is linguistically encoded. A case in point is the fact that 
humans can distinguish between millions of different colors (some estimates go 
up to 10 million distinct colors; Judd & Wyszecki, 1975), but languages generally 
have only very few basic color terms (Berlin & Kay, 1969; see discussion in Fahle, 
2007; Graumann, 2007, p. 129; Wyler, 2007). Humans can similarly distinguish 
thousands of different smells (see Agapakis & Tolaas, 2012; Yeshurun & Sobel, 
2010), but at least in English, there are very few smell words. In any sensory 
modality, the number of possible perceptual experiences vastly outnumbers the 
size of any semiotic toolkit (cf. Staniewski, 2017). This numerical mismatch 
means that linguistic labels necessarily have to be fuzzy; that is, fine-grained 
distinctions are hidden when speakers use sensory words (see Fahle, 2007). The 
word red, for instance, encompasses a whole range of wavelengths that speakers 
do not distinguish when they use the word. Technical language makes it possible 
to communicate fine perceptual detail more precisely (e.g., by specifying the 
exact wavelength of a color), but such technical language is generally not 
available to most language users. Wyler (2007) states that language as a social 
system does not “comply” with the “physiological precision” of actual 
perception (p. 116). Altogether, it looks as if the linguistic system ignores a 
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considerable amount of fine perceptual detail, no matter what sensory modality 
is involved. 
 
4.3.5. Ineffability of multisensory experience 
Finally, one has to consider the fact that perception always engages all of the 
senses in concert (Spence, 2011; Spence & Bayne, 2015). Spence (2012, p. 37) says 
that “most of our everyday experiences...are multisensory.” For example, let us 
consider the intense multisensoriality that goes into such a simple event as eating 
kimchi. This experience involves the salty and spicy mélange of pepper and 
garlic notes that excite the taste buds, on top of the fermented smell, the tingly 
mouthfeel and the crunchy chewing sound (compare Chambers et al., 2012). 
However, conveying this experience forces the use of decoupled sensory 
adjectives such as salty and crunchy, as is the case with my description above. The 
compression inherent in these words, each one singling out one aspect of 
experience, means that the simultaneity of the multisensory taste experience 
cannot be conveyed. The fact that flavor perception is perhaps “one of the most 
multisensory of our everyday experiences” (Spence & Piqueras-Fiszman, 2014, p. 
183; see also Spence, 2013, 2015) is impossible to communicate via the sequential 
format of language. 
 
4.3.6. Why ineffabilities are necessary 
It is possible to construe the ineffabilities discussed so far as disadvantageous. 
This sentiment is expressed by Cacciari (2008, p. 425), who says that “the 
informational richness of perceptual experiences is hardly rendered by linguistic 
expressions.” From this perspective, all sensory language is just a pale reflection 
of our sensory worlds; even the best writers or poets will never be able to 
communicate all of that which is perceivable. 
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However, it is possible to view the loss of subjective experience and fine 
perceptual detail, as well as the compression of multisensoriality, as 
advantageous traits. Moore and Carling (1988) say that “in using language we 
necessarily reduce and group and select” (p. 19). Selection means to highlight 
particular aspects of sensory experience, those aspects that are relevant to 
speakers and hearers within a given conversation. Grouping involves saying that 
a particular experience is a member of a more abstract category of experiences 
(Moore & Carling, 1988, p. 20). For example, in labeling a taste experience as sour, 
a speaker establishes similarity with other experiences, thus moving away from a 
particular experience to the general characteristics of sourness (Lupyan & Clark, 
2015, p. 283). Abstraction furthermore allows for intersubjectivity and sharability: 
All native speakers of English have an understanding of the word sour that is at 
least partially shared, precisely because speakers understand that the word sour 
is not about a particular perception that happens in a specific moment in time 
but about a general characteristic. 
 From this perspective, the sensory adjectives which will be the focus of 
Part II of this book, such as sour and greasy, can be seen as what I call 
“compression devices.” That is, sensory adjectives single out particular 
perceptual qualities at the expense of other qualities (Gärdenfors, 2014, Chapter 
7; Paradis, 2005). Givón (2001, p. 53) states that “the most prototypical adjectives 
are single-feature concepts, abstracted out of more complex bundles of 
experience.” In many ways, reducing the complexity of the perceptual world is 
the true purpose of sensory adjectives, which allows for abstraction, 
generalization, and intersubjectivity. However, the flipside of these advantages is 
that subjective experience, fine perceptual detail, and multisensoriality are truly 
ineffable. 
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In fact, Levinson and Majid (2014) implicitly link their notion of 
ineffability to the type of compression discussed here. According to them, saying 
that color is “codable” means that there are “words which code only the 
descriptive, abstract property of color and not other properties such as 
reflectance, texture, shape etc.” (p. 411). However, it should be emphasized that 
all of the semiotic strategies discussed in Chapter 3, including iconicity and 
source-based language, single out particular aspects of perceptual experience. All 
semiotic strategies involve compression. 
It furthermore must be pointed out that not all of the compression of 
multisensoriality happens at the linguistic stage. Some compression is 
prelinguistic and happens as a result of two processes: first, selective attention, 
which is the cognitive capacity to single out particular aspects of the perceptual 
world (Spence, 2010). Thus, our mind already filters out a lot of the perceptual 
morass humans are exposed to before linguistic compression even begins. 
The second prelinguistic form of compression results from the folk 
concepts of the senses. Speakers are generally unaware of the intense 
multisensoriality of their perceptual worlds; for example, most crossmodal 
correspondences (such as associations between brightness and pitch) are not 
consciously accessible (Deroy & Spence, 2013). Spence (2012, p. 37) reminds us 
that “introspection often tells us that we see color only with our eyes, that we feel 
softness exclusively with our fingertips, and that we taste...only with our 
mouths.” Humans can only communicate about that what is accessible to their 
conceptual world. Since we live under the illusion that our senses are separate 
(see also Auvray & Spence, 2008; Spence, Smith, & Auvray, 2015), it is this 
illusion that we communicate to others and becomes conventionalized in the 
lexicon. Pink (2011, p. 266) speaks of “a rather less culturally structured flow of 
neurological information” that “becomes differentiated into categories that we 
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call the senses.” She then says “we tend to communicate linguistically about our 
embodied and sensory perception in terms of sensory categories,” but warns us 
that “because one category is never enough to express exactly what we have 
actually experienced, the illusion of ‘separate’ senses...is maintained.” 
Thus, to conclude this section, the compression of the perceptual world 
happens in part due to the constraints of the linguistic system itself, e.g., due to 
the specialization of sensory words. However, in addition, there is a prelinguistic 
stage of compression (compare Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976, Chapters 1–2), 
stemming from selective attention as well as from folk categorizations of the 
sensory world. 
 
4.4. Explanations of the ineffability of the senses 
From now on, the focus will shift to what explains the “differential ineffability of 
the senses” discussed above. In particular, what explains the fact that certain 
perceptual qualities are associated with more word types than others? 
Levinson and Majid (2014, pp. 417–421) discuss two broad strands of 
explanations that try to account for such ineffability: “Cognitive-architectural” 
explanations, which focus on perception, and “limits of language” explanations, 
which focus on language. I will add to this a third explanatory approach, which 
is the one of “communicative need.” The three types of explanations cannot 
neatly be separated, but they will help to structure the following discussion. To 
elucidate the different explanations, the discussion will focus on sight and smell, 
because these are presumed to be the respective end points of ineffability in 
English, with sight being the most and smell being the least effable. 
 
 1. cognitive-architectural explanations (Chapter 4.4.1) 
 2. limits of language explanations (Chapter 4.4.2) 
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 3. communicative need explanations (Chapter 4.4.3) 
 
4.4.1. Cognitive-architectural explanations 
The defining feature of cognitive-architectural explanations is that they resort to 
extralinguistic facts, such as facts about perception or the brain. There are many 
possible cognitive-architectural facts that can be used to explain the differential 
ineffability of sight and smell. Lorig (1999) claims that both language and odors 
share complex temporal signatures, which means that they are competing for 
neural resources. Yeshurun and Sobel (2010) argue that the mental representation 
of odors is in terms of their emotional effects on the perceiver, ultimately 
yielding a representational format that is not very amenable to linguistic 
encoding. Olofsson and Gottfried (2015) argue that smell lacks the dedicated 
naming pathways that vision has, such as the ventral visual pathway. 
These explanations focus on the neural and cognitive mechanisms that 
link perception and language. Other cognitive-architectural explanations look at 
asymmetries between the senses more generally, with the idea that senses that 
are perceptually dominant will also be linguistically dominant. 
Much research suggests that vision dominates the other senses in a whole 
range of perceptual tasks, an idea called “visual dominance” (Stokes & Biggs, 
2015). As was discussed, vision dominates touch in shape perception (Hay & 
Pick, 1966; Rock & Victor, 1964). In the so-called “ventriloquist effect” (Pick, 
Warren, & Hay, 1969; Welch & Warren, 1980), vision dominates sound in 
location perception. Vision also has profound effects on taste: Morrot, Brochet, 
and Dubourdieu (2001) showed that dying white wine red led oenology 
undergraduates to use red wine terminology. Similarly, Hidaka and Shimoda 
(2014) showed that the coloring of a sweet solution affects sweetness judgments 
(see also Shermer & Levitan, 2014). More broadly construed, any advantage of 
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vision over the other modalities is part of visual dominance, including 
attentional advantages (Spence, Nicholls, & Driver, 2001; Turatto, Galfano, 
Bridgemann, & Umiltà, 2004) and the fact that vision arguably takes up more 
cortical space (Drury et al., 1996). 
Perhaps vision is also most advantaged when it comes to the perception of 
space, which helps us to navigate the world. Taste and smell appear to be 
inherently non-spatial (compare Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976, p. 27). Compared 
to touch and sound, sight makes more spatial information available in a 
simultaneous fashion, including complex relations between objects (see Stokes & 
Biggs, 2015). All of these are language-external factors that may bias language 
toward the visual modality, at the relative expense of the other senses. 
There also is evidence suggesting that when performing conscious mental 
imagery, people report being able to see what they imagine, but not to smell 
what they imagine (Arshamian & Larsson, 2014; Brower, 1947). Kosslyn and 
colleagues (Kosslyn, Seger, Pani, & Hillger, 1990) asked participants to jot down 
their experiences of mental imagery every hour of the day, finding that visual 
mental images occurred very frequently, especially when compared to olfactory 
images. This suggests that our inner world of mental imagery is biased toward 
the visual. 
As a final avenue toward explaining ineffability with recourse to 
cognitive-architectural factors, consider the fact that smell is intensely malleable 
and variable—more so than sight. Agapakis and Tolaas (2012) say that “much of 
the study of olfaction shows that even the simplest judgments of odor quality are 
highly context-dependent, changing and shifting depending on molecular, 
biological, emotional and social contexts” (p. 569). For example, participants that 
initially rated a sweet smell as positive perceived it to be less pleasant after being 
injected with glucose (Cabanac, Pruvost, & Fantino, 1973; see also Cabanac, 
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1971). The chemical substance indole was reported to smell more pleasant when 
it was labeled countryside farm as opposed to human feces (Djordjevic et al., 2008). 
Spence and Piqueras-Fiszman (2014) detail the many ways through which the 
actual sensory qualities of a food dish (including both taste and smell) can be 
influenced via the name of a dish and via its visual presentation. Even music 
playing in the background of a dining experience can change flavor perception 
(Crisinel et al., 2012). There also are strong individual differences in what odors 
are perceived as pleasant (Hermans & Baeyens, 2002; Köster, 2002). For instance, 
some people perceive the smell of skunk (the animal) as pleasant, a smell which 
others abhor (Herz, 2002, p. 161). 
The intense malleability and variability of smell may impede linguistic 
encoding because there are no stable perceptual targets to encode, and because 
linguistic communication, being about sharable phenomena, disprefers that what 
is subjectively variable. In comparison, sight appears to make more stable objects 
available to our consciousness, which we can use to coordinate with others via 
joint attention and thus use to establish common ground (e.g., San Roque et al., 
2015, p. 50). This stability, compared to the variability of smell, may explain part 
of why there are so many visual words compared to smell words. 
 
4.4.2. Limits of language explanations 
According to Levinson and Majid (2014), explanations of ineffability grounded in 
the limits of language start with the assumption that particular sensations are 
accessible but not coded for linguistic reasons. They say that “arguments about 
the limits of language are likely to focus on the general intrinsic limitations 
imposed by the design features of a natural language” (p. 419). The digital nature 
of language discussed above (that sensory words are compression devices for 
multisensory experience) is one factor that results in the ineffability of 
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multisensoriality. Vocabulary size may be an additional limiting factor, which 
restricts the range of sensory words (leading to ineffability of fine perceptual 
detail, discussed above). Limits of language explanations, however, are better for 
explaining such ineffabilities as the ineffability of multisensoriality and the 
ineffability of fine perceptual detail. They are not intrinsically well-suited to 
explain the differential ineffability of the senses. For example, vocabulary size 
limitations alone cannot tell us why it is particularly smell that is less lexically 
differentiated in English and not any other sense. 
 
4.4.3. Communicative need explanations 
Perhaps the simplest explanation of the visual dominance observed in English 
and other languages is that the speakers of these languages have a higher 
communicative need to talk about visual concepts as opposed to other concepts, 
particularly smell-related ones. Plümacher and Holz (2007, p. 2), for instance, talk 
about the “less developed cultural need to reflect odors” in language. According 
to Holz (2007), “we are very seldom confronted with the question of describing a 
smell by linguistic means” (p. 186). 
Communicative need has the advantage of accounting for two established 
facts about visual concepts in one swoop: first, the fact that visual concepts have 
higher type frequencies—that is, higher lexical differentiation (Chapter 12; Buck, 
1949, Chapter 15; Levinson & Majid, 2014; Strik Lievers & Winter, 2018; Viberg, 
1983; Winter et al., 2018)—and second, the fact that visual concepts have higher 
token frequencies (Chapter 15; Viberg, 1993; San Roque et al., 2015; Winter et al., 
2018). A correlation between type and token frequencies is exactly what is 
expected if communicative need is a driving force, since it shows precisely that 
the domains more frequently verbalized also afford more expressivity (Regier, 
Carstensen, & Kemp, 2016; Winter et al., 2018). However, this still leaves open 
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the question: What explains the increased communicative need to talk about 
visual concepts in the first place? 
To answer this question, one needs to distinguish the importance of a 
sense in perception from the desire of humans to talk about a sense. These two 
are at least logically independent; for example, is smell not important as a sense, 
or do humans not talk about smell despite its perceptual importance? 
Some authors have claimed that humans have a diminished sense of smell 
compared to other animals. Gilad and colleagues compared the human genome 
to other primates, finding that only human primates showed an increased loss of 
olfactory receptor genes, which constitute the basis for the sense of smell (Gilad, 
Man, Pääbo, & Lancet, 2003). Moreover, the fact that this loss coincides with the 
acquisition of full trichromatic vision in the primate lineage (Gilad, Wiebe, 
Przeworski, Lancet, & Pääbo, 2004) suggests that humans have traded olfactory 
ability for visual ability. 
On the other hand, several authors have pointed out that smell is, in fact, 
immensely important. For instance, smells affect mate choice (Havlicek & 
Roberts, 2009) and help us to avoid poisonous foods, both of which are vital to 
evolutionary success. Lorig (1999) uses the multi-billion dollar fragrance industry 
to argue for the importance of smells, saying that “the companies in this business 
sell products to scent shampoo, deodorants, tissues, soaps of all types, hand 
creams, leather products, toys, air fresheners, cleaning products, and many other 
commodities” (p. 391). According to Lorig, such high volume of spending would 
be unlikely if smell was, in fact, unimportant. Similarly, Agapakis and Tolaas 
(2012, p. 569) point out that “humans have a remarkably low opinion of the nose, 
neglecting to cultivate and educate the sense of smell while zealously 
deodorizing the world.” They furthermore note the ubiquity of smells, stating 
that “we take an average of 24,000 breaths per day, each inhalation swirling 
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countless molecules over our olfactory receptors to give us a smelly glimpse of 
the chemical world” (p. 569). 
It is clear that smell is evolutionary important, affects our daily behaviors 
in many different ways, and constantly surrounds us. This suggests that the 
infrequency with which odor concepts are verbalized probably does not 
exclusively stem from the inferiority of smell as a perceptual process. One 
possible explanation is then that speakers do not often consciously notice smells. 
Smeets and Dijksterhuis (2014, p. 7) talk of a “natural inclination” for most 
people “to pay more attention to visual than olfactory attributes of the 
environment.” Some experimental evidence suggests that participants frequently 
do not notice changes in odors (Mahmut & Stevenson, 2015; see also discussion 
in Lorig, 1999). Since humans can only verbalize what they are aware of, this 
may explain the lack of smell words.3 
Another option is that speakers notice odors just as much as everything 
else, but they choose to not talk about them as much, perhaps because of 
“cultural preoccupation” (Levinson & Majid, 2014, p. 421) such as a cultural 
disregard of smell, especially compared to sight.4 Many researchers have noted 
that vision is culturally dominant in the modern West, with cultural historians 
and anthropologists thinking of the West as having a vision-centric cultural 
complex (Classen, 1993, 1997). The converse of this is that smell, together with 
taste, is often disregarded and treated as inferior. Throughout history, smell has 
been described as primitive, unimportant, and animalistic by scientists, 
philosophers, and laypeople (see Classen, Howes, & Synott, 1994; Le Guérer, 
2002; Staniewski, 2017; Synnott, 1991). Agapakis and Tolaas (2012), for example, 
mention that smell has “been intellectually neglected by ancient philosophers 
and modern art critics alike” (p. 569). 
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In line with the idea that cultural preferences play a strong role, languages 
spoken in cultures that emphasize smell more than English-speaking cultures 
tend to verbalize smell experiences more often or have larger smell vocabularies 
(Howes, 2002; Lee, 2015; Majid & Burenhult, 2014; San Roque et al., 2015; Wnuk 
& Majid, 2014). In several cultures from the Andaman Islands, such as the Ongee 
(Classen, 1993), smell plays an important role in the cosmology and spiritual 
belief system: aromas are vital energies, death is conceptualized as the loss of 
one’s personal smell, and the year is conceptualized as a cycle of scents (Classen 
et al., 1994, pp. 95–96). Consistent with the relative importance of smell in their 
culture, smell occurs in many expressions that Ongee speakers use, such as a 
conventionalized greeting that translates to ‘How is your nose?’. Floyd, San 
Roque, and Majid (2018) describe the fact that the Barbacoan language Cha’palaa 
(spoken in Ecuador) has a grammaticized smell classifier –dyu. For instance, the 
smell terms pindyu ‘sweet smell’ or wishdyu ‘smell of urine’ are formed by the 
roots pin– and wish–, which crucially cannot stand alone but have to be used with 
the smell classifier. Classifier systems in the world’s languages tend to be for 
perceptual characteristics such as shape and type of material. So far, Cha’palaa is 
the only language described to have a grammaticized smell classifier, and, 
perhaps not surprisingly, smell seems to have special importance for the 
speakers of this language, who also frequently reference smell concepts in 
discourse (Floyd et al., 2018). Thus, it appears that cultures in which smell is 
regarded as more important also have special means to talk about smells.5 
Thus, when San Roque et al. (2015, p. 50) say that “it could be that there 
are simply more occasions to talk about visual objects than objects apprehended 
through the other senses,” one has to keep in mind that “more occasions” may 
arise because of perceptual factors (e.g., vision may be more consciously 
accessible as a perceptual modality) or cultural factors (e.g., vision may be 
	 62	
regarded as more important by speakers). Communicative need not only arises 
from the way humans perceive the environment directly, but also from how 
much they are attuned to certain aspects of the environment as a result of 
cultural belief systems. Currently, it is not known which of the different factors 
ultimately drives communicative need. However, because there is independent 
evidence for (a relative) lack of conscious access to smell, as well as independent 
evidence for the cultural disregard of smell in the West (e.g., Classen et al., 1994), 
it appears plausible that both perceptual and cultural factors create a diminished 
communicative need to talk about smell. 
 Finally, it must be noted that communicative need explanations are 
suitable for more than clarifying the differential ineffability of the senses; they 
also easily account for the ineffability of subjective experience, the ineffability of 
fine perceptual detail, and the ineffability of multisensoriality. Because language 
is for social coordination and achieving social and physical goals, the details of 
subjective experience are often communicatively irrelevant. Moreover, most of 
the time, it is appropriate for speakers to gloss over perceptual detail when 
talking to others. For example, different shades of the color ‘red’ can most often 
be simply labelled red without losing our communicative goals. Finally, there are 
many occasions where the intense multisensoriality of experience is simply 
irrelevant and we are better served by singling out those aspects of multisensory 
experience that are relevant to a given task. 
 
4.4.4. Evaluating explanations of ineffability 
The present discussion should have made it clear that it is currently unknown 
what causes the differential ineffability of the senses. This should make us wary 
of definite statements such as “the reason for the poverty of the lexicon of 
olfaction is a neurophysiological one” (Holz, 2007, p. 189). There is evidence for 
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the idea that olfaction is neurologically impoverished, and there is separate 
evidence for the idea that olfaction is linguistically impoverished (see also 
Chapter 12). However, we cannot make a causal claim based on this mere 
correspondence of two potentially independent facts. This is because there are 
multiple possible explanations, as reviewed by Levinson and Majid (2014) and as 
discussed here. It is at least plausible that phenomena such as the ineffability of 
smell have joint environmental, neurophysiological, cognitive, linguistic, and 
communicative causes. In fact, it is at present unreasonable to assume that there 
is any one cause; a pluralistic explanatory approach may be better suited (cf. 
Markman, 2008; Mitchell, 2004; Mitchell & Dietrich, 2006), at least as long as 
there is no definite evidence that lets us decide between the different causal 
mechanisms. 
 
4.5. Shifting semiotic strategies 
Coupling the discussion of the semiotic toolkit (Chapter 3) with the notion of 
ineffability allows us to see that ineffability is always relative with respect to a 
particular linguistic strategy. Some semiotic tools are better for some perceptual 
jobs than others. 6  What makes some semiotic tools more suitable in some 
situations? Of course, there are constraints that come from the modality of 
expression, such as limitations on what can be expressed with iconicity in spoken 
versus signed languages (e.g., Dingemanse, 2013, p. 157; Perlman et al., 2018). 
Here, however, I want to focus on the role of communicative task demands. 
Lu and Goldin-Meadow (2017) show how changing task demands lead to 
shifts in semiotic strategies (see also Lu & Goldin-Meadow, 2018). These authors 
asked native English speakers and native ASL signers to describe pairs of objects 
that differed in their degree of perceptual overlap. More perceptual detail needs 
to be communicated when the task requires differentiating between two highly 
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similar objects (such as two vases that differ subtly in shape), compared to 
dissimilar objects (such as a pot and a bowl). Lu and Goldin-Meadow (2017) 
found that when the task required detailed descriptions, both ASL signers and 
English speakers relied more strongly on iconic means of expression, and they 
used less abstract words. That is, iconicity replaced abstract encoding strategies 
as a function of task demands. This is a clear demonstration of how a particular 
semiotic strategy is preferred when fine perceptual detail is required. 
The results by Lu and Goldin-Meadow (2017) provide a nice 
demonstration of how the different semiotic strategies have to be considered as a 
whole: When one tool from the toolkit is not available or insufficient, another 
tool is chosen. Such trading relations were also seen in a communication game 
conducted by Roberts, Lewandowski, and Galantucci (2015), who showed that 
participants were less likely to innovate an abstract encoding strategy if a 
referent could be communicated iconically. Similarly, it has been observed that 
the use of abstract color labels in cosmetics publications decreased with the 
advent of high-fidelity photographing and printing techniques (see Wyler, 2007, 
p. 123). 
Such trade-offs are also discussed in the literature on metaphors. Strik 
Lievers (2016, p. 52) suggests that in the novel The Perfume, in which smell 
descriptions play a crucial role, the author Patrick Süskind has to resort to 
metaphor in order to make up for the lack of smell vocabulary. Many researchers 
think that metaphors are a tool that can be used to make up for lack of 
vocabulary in a particular perceptual domain (see also Abraham, 1987, p. 156; 
Engstrom, 1946, p. 10; Holz, 2007; Ronga, 2016; Ronga et al., 2012; Strik Lievers, 
2015, 2016; Suárez-Toste, 2013; Ullmann, 1959, p. 283; Velasco-Sacristán & 
Fuertes-Olivera, 2006). This is in line with Fainsilber and Ortony’s (1987) 
“inexpressibility hypothesis,” which states that “metaphors may enable the 
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communication of that which cannot be readily expressed using literal language” 
(p. 240). The inexpressibility hypothesis can be reconceptualized as a trading 
relation between semiotic strategies: If there are fewer abstract words for a 
particular perceptual quality, such as smell, then another strategy is needed, such 
as borrowing terminology from the other senses. 
The perspective of task demands also allows us to reconceptualize expert 
language, such as the language of sommeliers or the language of music critics. It 
has been noted that expert descriptions of sensory perceptions may show an 
increased frequency of source-based language (e.g., Croijmans & Majid, 2016) 
and metaphor (Barten, 1998; Caballero, 2007; Pérez-Sobrino & Julich, 2014; 
Porcello, 2004; Suárez Toste, 2007). This can now be seen as an adaptation of 
expert language to the frequency with which particular task demands arise—
namely, the demand of communicating fine perceptual information in detail. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed a fundamental problem of sensory linguistics, which is 
the question as to whether certain aspects of sensory experience are ineffable. 
The discussion focused on the notion(s) of ineffability discussed by Levinson and 
Majid (2014), essentially providing an update to their seminal paper and 
reconceptualizing some of the issues they raise. 
 The amendments to their discussion were as follows: It is important to 
avoid lumping different kinds of ineffabilities together. Each ineffability 
highlights a different way through which the sensory world is compressed in 
language use. It is furthermore important to distinguish the differential 
ineffability of the senses from other forms of ineffability. Whereas the differential 
ineffability of the senses is best characterized as a weak form ineffability (some 
languages have more words for certain senses than others), the ineffability of 
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subjective experience, the ineffability of fine perceptual detail, and the 
ineffability of the multisensoriality are most likely strong ineffabilities. That is, 
these three ineffabilities describe aspects of the sensory world that cannot be 
expressed in any language. Altogether, this discussion detailed the limitations of 
language, rendering more precise Moore and Carling’s (1988, p. 4) statement that 
“much of the time we expect too much of language.” 
This chapter discussed how the referential range of sensory words is 
simultaneously both narrow and broad. It is narrow when considering the 
particular type of perceptual sensation that is expressed (i.e., only a single 
perceptual characteristic is highlighted). It is broad when considering that within 
a given perceptual quality (such as color), most fine-grained perceptual 
distinctions that are perceivable are not encoded and perhaps not even codable. 
 At present, we have reason to believe that the differential ineffability of 
the senses has multicausal origins. For example, vision may be perceptually 
dominant, neurophysiologically dominant, and culturally dominant. This 
compels us to take a full suite of possible explanations into account when talking 
about ineffability, and further work is necessary to lend support to particular 
explanatory accounts. 
Finally, it was argued that whether something is ineffable or not depends 
on what semiotic strategy is considered, and the different semiotic strategies are 
weighted differently depending on task demands. The insufficiency of one 
semiotic strategy can be attenuated by employing a different strategy from the 
semiotic toolkit. If this happens habitually, expert language develops. 
Crucially, however, whatever the semiotic strategy, whatever the 
perceptual quality, there will always be things that are truly ineffable. Fine 
perceptual details and the genuinely subjective and multisensory aspects of 
experience are simply impossible to encode via language. 
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1 Interestingly, Levinson and Majid (2014) leave out touch in these descriptions, perhaps because 
it is difficult to classify touch vocabulary due to its high multisensoriality (e.g., Lynott & Connell, 
2009). 
 
2 In fact, common sensibles pose a problem for all of sensory linguistics, including research on 
iconicity. For example, the fact that shape characteristics are common sensibles means that it is 
impossible to know what sensory modality explains the kiki/bouba phenomenon discussed in 
Chapter 3. Visually presented shapes are reliably associated with kiki and bouba; the same effect is 
also obtained with shapes that are explored haptically, via touch alone (Fryer, Freeman, & Pring, 
2014; see also Fontana, 2013). Making matters worse, humans also have some capacity to 
determine shapes from sound alone (e.g., Kunkler-Peck & Turvey, 2000; Thoret, Aramaki, 
Kronland-Martinet, Velay, & Ystad, 2014). This opens up the possibility that when participants 
match kiki with spiky shapes, they might imagine the sound of an angular object when it falls to 
the ground. 
 
3 In fact, it is possible that speakers do not notice particular features of their environment because 
they do not have words for those features, or, conversely, that they pay more attention to those 
aspects of the world that are already verbalized. Thierry and colleagues (Thierry, 
Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering, & Kuipers, 2009) compared the performance of English and 
Greek speakers in a color detection task. The Greek language differentiates between a darker 
shade of blue called ble and a lighter shade of blue called ghalazio, both of which are labelled blue 
in English. Using a color detection task while simultaneously recording event-related brain 
potentials, these researchers found that Greek speakers exhibited a visual mismatch negativity 
(vMMN) for the different shades of blue that was absent in English speakers. Such a mismatch 
negativity is generally thought to indicate preattentive, automatic processing. This shows that 
Greek speakers subconsciously processed blue colors in line with language-specific conventions. 
Such results and other results in the emerging field of linguistic relativity research (e.g., 
Athanasopoulos & Bylund, 2013; Bylund, Athanasopoulos, & Oosendorp, 2013) open up the 
possibility that because there are more words for certain sensory experiences, speakers may be 
more attuned to paying attention to them. 
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4 Speaking of smell, Lorig (1999) proposes that “our limited language for odors may be a cause 
for our disregard of this sense rather than an effect of getting our noses off the ground” (p. 392). 
There is some plausibility to this proposal: Given the importance of language in our behavioral 
ecology, it would seem that speakers may come to be dissatisfied and even disregard smell 
because of the fact that it is difficult to talk about. 
 
5  Interestingly, Lee (2015) reports that even though the Amis have a relatively large smell 
vocabulary, they still exhibit the “tip-of-the-nose phenomenon” of finding it difficult or 
impossible to name certain smells (p. 344). This would point to the possibility that even when 
speaking a language with a large smell vocabulary, encoding smells is difficult, perhaps because 
of cognitive reasons (but see Majid & Burenhult, 2014). 
 
6 It should be emphasized that at present, no systematic quantitative comparisons of the different 
semiotic strategies involved in perceptual language has been done for controlled stimuli in 
multiple modalities, with the notable exception of work such as Dubois (2000, 2007). In order to 
truly know what semiotic encoding strategies are preferred or dispreferred, one needs to control 
the sensory stimuli experienced by participants. 
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Chapter 5. The Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis 
5.1. Introduction 
As the meaning of sensory words is of pivotal interest to sensory linguistics, it is 
important to talk about different theories of meaning. In particular, this chapter 
reviews the evidence for the idea that words trigger perceptual simulations, 
which serves as a motivation to look for correspondences between language use 
and the behavior of perceptual systems. I will start by talking about modal 
versus amodal lexical representations and how these are connected to the notions 
of embodiment, mental imagery, and mental simulation (Chapter 5.2). The 
evidence for language-induced perceptual simulation leads me to propose the 
Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis (Chapter 5.3), which I will compare and contrast 
with other theoretical frameworks in Chapter 5.4. Finally, Chapter 5.5 discusses 
the fact that not only perceptual representations, but emotional representations 
as well, are a core part of word meaning. The theoretical framework outlined 
here will serve as a guiding principle for the data analyses presented in Part II of 
this book. 
 
5.2. Embodiment, mental imagery, and perceptual simulation 
Meaning is one of the most elusive aspects of language, having incited debates 
for many centuries. The question of meaning turns out to be one of the most 
fundamental questions in cognitive science, philosophy, and the language 
sciences. The question of meaning is deeply connected to issues surrounding the 
nature of our conceptual systems. This chapter focuses on experimental evidence 
from cognitive science that any linguistic theory of meaning needs to address. 
The evidence reviewed here will lead me to propose what I call the Embodied 
Lexicon Hypothesis. 
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Within the study of meaning, one can distinguish between two major 
strands: the modal view and the amodal view. The former proposes that 
concepts in the mind are constituted by modal mental representations—that is, 
representations that are directly related to the underlying sensorimotor processes 
involved in perception and action. For instance, the concept of a blender is seen 
as being constituted, at least in part, by visual representations of a blender (akin 
to mental images), but perhaps also by auditory representations, such as memory 
traces of the sounds a blender produces. 
The modal view is in stark contrast to the amodal or symbolic view of 
meaning. According to this view, a word’s meaning is an abstract symbol in the 
mind, akin to the word itself. This suggests the notion of a dictionary filled with 
unique identifiers. A word such as bachelor, then, provides access to the 
dictionary entry for the corresponding concept. The dictionary entry itself may 
be composed of such relatively abstract features as [+MALE], [+YOUNG], and [-
MARRIED]. Amodal accounts form a natural union with modular approaches to 
the mind (Fodor, 1983), which see different cognitive faculties as informationally 
encapsulated. In line with this, amodal accounts view a conceptual 
representation as separate from processes of perception and action. When 
amodal accounts allow for connections between abstract symbols and 
sensorimotor processes, they do so on the assumption that these connections are 
much less direct (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) than posited by modal accounts. 
They do not regard sensorimotor processes as being at the core of semantic 
representation. 
The modal view of meaning will be endorsed in this book and supported 
by new evidence. The modal view forms a natural marriage with a particular 
theme discussed in the cognitive sciences: embodiment or embodied cognition 
(e.g., Anderson, 2003; Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Gibbs, 2005; Glenberg, 1997; Wilson, 
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2002). Gallese and Lakoff (2005, p. 456) characterize embodiment by stating that 
cognition and language are “structured by our constant encounter and 
interaction with the world via our bodies and brains,” which includes interaction 
with the world as it is mediated through the senses. The following definition of 
embodiment is provided by Evans (2007): 
 
The human mind and conceptual organisation are a function of the way in 
which our species-specific bodies interact with the environment we 
inhabit. In other words, the nature of concepts and the way they are 
structured and organised is constrained by the nature of our embodied 
experience. (p. 78) 
 
 Embodied approaches to cognition break down the barrier between what 
is sometimes called “low-level” perception and “high-level” cognition. Willems 
and Francken (2012, p. 1) say that “embodied cognition stresses that perception 
and action are directly relevant for our thinking, and that it is a mistake to regard 
them as separate.” 
Embodiment, however, is not as much a theory as it is a framework. 
Different researchers take embodiment to mean different things (see Meteyard, 
Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012; Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Golonka, 2013). 
Embodiment is dealt with in numerous subfields of cognitive science and the 
language sciences, many of which emphasize different aspects of the overarching 
framework. In experimental paradigms, diverse embodied effects have been 
found, often conceptually independent from one another. Furthermore, the 
embodied cognition framework bleeds into what researchers have variously 
called grounded cognition, situated cognition, distributed cognition, extended 
cognition, and dynamical systems approaches to cognition (see Spivey, 2007; 
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Wilson & Golonka, 2013). These other terms are sometimes used in a way that is 
synonymous with embodiment, sometimes they are used to emphasize different 
aspects of language–cognition–brain–body–environment interactions. 
The aspect of embodiment that is particularly relevant in the context of 
this present book are language-external influences on language. Nobody denies 
that language connects to perceptual processes in some fashion or other. However, 
embodied theories posit deeper interconnections between language and 
perception. Different theories commit to embodiment in different degrees, 
forming a continuum from strongly embodied to fully disembodied theories, or 
from theories that assume fully modal representation to fully amodal 
representations. Following Meteyard et al. (2012), we may distinguish between a 
“strong embodiment” view and a “weak embodiment” view. The strong view 
states that semantic representations are completely dependent on sensorimotor 
systems. The weak view states that semantic representations are influenced by 
sensorimotor systems, but they are not wholly constituted by them. According to 
the weak view, “sensory and motor information does not exhaust semantic 
content” (Meteyard et al., 2012, p. 799).  
Within modal accounts, the specific mechanism that is used to explain the 
access and retrieval of meaning is claimed to be mental simulation—the idea that 
language users mentally simulate what a piece of language is about, which 
involves partially reinstantiating the same neural activation patterns that are 
involved in actual perception and action (Barsalou, 1999; Bergen, 2012; Fischer & 
Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan, 2009). Language-induced mental simulation has sometimes 
been called the “indexical hypothesis” of language understanding (Glenberg & 
Robertson, 1999, 2000), but it has also been talked about in terms of “perceptual 
symbol systems” (Barsalou, 1999), or as being part of “grounded cognition” 
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(Barsalou, 2008). Bergen (2012) provides a particularly vivid introduction to 
mental simulation accounts of language processing. 
Mental simulation is often compared to a re-enactment of perceptual 
experiences. The proposal is that when language users process concrete 
language, they mentally activate specific sensory content—relating to vision, 
touch, hearing, taste, and smell—using the same brain areas that are also 
responsible for language-independent perception and action (González et al., 
2006; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller, 2005). For example, 
understanding property words such as loud and tart would be seen as involving 
the simulation of loudness and tartness experiences (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & 
Barsalou, 2003). Similarly, a perceptual simulation account would claim that 
understanding expressions such as stabbing pain or drilling pain involves the 
mental simulation of pain experiences (Semino, 2010). 
To understand what precisely is meant by mental simulation, it is useful 
to contrast it with mental imagery (Connell & Lynott, 2016; Bergen, 2012), which 
is often understood as the deliberate and conscious activation of perceptual 
content, as when one actively traces a path throughout one’s mental map of a 
city. The heydays of mental imagery research were the 1970s and 1980s, when a 
lot of the crucial early evidence for the importance of mental imagery was 
collected. Researchers have found, for example, that the purely mental rotation 
of 3D blocks has similar characteristics to physically rotating the same blocks 
(Shephard & Metzler, 1971), and mentally scanning a map with the mind’s eye is 
similar to visually scanning with the blanket eye (Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978). 
This has led to the hypothesis that mental imagery uses the same cognitive and 
neural resources as actual perception. 
Mental simulation is the less deliberate, less conscious, and less vivid 
version of mental imagery (cf. Connell & Lynott, 2016). When I ask someone to 
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imagine a jar of kimchi with their mind’s eye, then this is an instructed process 
that qualifies as imagery. On the other hand, mentioning the word kimchi in 
passing during a conversation without instructing someone to perform imagery 
may still trigger a simulation, a less vivid and less consciously accessible form of 
imagery. As understood here, mental simulation rests on our ability to perform 
mental imagery. 
The evidence presented in this book is framed in terms of simulation, 
rather than imagery. That is, I will focus on results that support the idea that 
sensorimotor processes play a role in undirected contexts where a language user 
may not be consciously performing imagery. 
 
5.3. The evidence for perceptual simulation 
There is a wealth of experimental evidence for sensorimotor processes playing a 
role in language understanding. In the following section, I will review a lot of the 
experimental and neuropsychological evidence for language-induced perceptual 
simulation. I should state from the outset that to motivate the Embodied Lexicon 
Hypothesis in Chapter 5.4 the precise details as to when and how perceptual 
simulation is involved are not as important as the fact that it is involved. Our 
focus will be on linguistic patterns, not on different theories of processing. Thus, 
when discussing the neuropsychological literature in particular, it is not 
necessary to go into the detailed methodology of each study. For present 
purposes, it suffices to say that there is a connection between language and 
perception. 
On the motor side of sensorimotor processes, studies have shown that 
reading or listening to words such as to kick or to push activates action 
representations in the brain that are related to what is actually involved in 
perceiving or performing these actions (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Hauk, 
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Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller, 2005; but see Papesh, 2015 and 
Tomasino, Fink, Sparing, Dafokatis, & Weiss, 2008). One strand of evidence 
comes from neuroimaging: The primary motor cortex of the brain is organized 
somatotopically, which means that there are is a leg-related area, a foot-related 
area, a mouth-related area, and so on. Hauk and colleagues (2004) conducted an 
fMRI study which showed that reading words such as kick increases blood flow 
in areas that are commonly associated with leg-related actions, while verbs such 
as to push or to hit lead to relatively more blood flow in hand-related areas. 
The sensory side of sensorimotor processes is more relevant for the 
present book. Here, vision has by and large received the most attention. In a 
classic experiment, Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) showed that participants reading 
a sentence such as John pounded the nail into the wall more quickly responded to a 
visual image of a nail that is horizontal, because pounding a nail into a wall 
implies a perpendicular orientation to a vertical wall. On the other hand, 
participants reading the sentence John pounded the nail into the floor responded 
more quickly to a visual image of a vertical nail perpendicular to a horizontal 
surface. This sentence–picture match effect was taken to suggest that reading a 
sentence activates the visual representation of a nail, which is specific enough to 
encode the spatial orientation implied by the sentence (for replication and 
extension studies, see Pecher, van Dantzig, Zwaan, & Zeelenberg, 2009, and 
Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). 
Similar match effects have also been obtained for color: Mannaert, 
Dijkstra, and Zwaan (2017, Experiment 1) asked participants to read sentences 
such as The driving instructor told Bob to stop at the traffic lights and The driving 
instructor told Bob to go at the traffic lights. Participants were faster to verify the 
visual image of a red traffic light for the “stop” sentence and the visual image of 
a green traffic light for the “go” sentence, suggesting that they had formed a 
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perceptual representation of color during reading. More evidence for the mental 
simulation of color is presented by Connell (2007) and Connell and Lynott (2009). 
Numerous other aspects of visual experience have been shown to matter 
in mental simulation. Besides color and spatial orientation, similar experiments 
have found evidence for the perceptual simulation of visual shape (Zwaan & 
Pecher, 2012; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002), direction of motion (Kaschak et 
al., 2005; Meteyard, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2007; Zwaan et al., 2004), distance 
(Vukovic & Williams, 2014; Winter & Bergen, 2012), size (de Koning, 
Wassenburg, Bos, & van der Schoot, 2016), and clear versus foggy or murky 
visibility conditions (Yaxley & Zwaan, 2007). 
What about the other senses? What evidence is there for language-
induced mental simulation for the non-visual modalities? For sound, Winter and 
Bergen (2012) showed that participants react faster to a relatively loud sound of a 
bleating sheep after reading The sheep walks up to you and bleats compared to a 
quiet sound, which participants respond faster to after reading The sheep wanders 
to the other side of the hill from you and bleats. Kaschak, Zwaan, Aveyard, and 
Yaxley (2006) further demonstrated that language comprehenders mentally 
simulate the direction of auditory motion. Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger, Grothe, and 
Hoenig (2008) found processing visually presented words that strongly relate to 
sound impressions, such as telephone, involved activity in the left posterior gyrus 
(pSTG) and middle temporal gyrus (pMTG). When participants in the same 
study attentively listened to recordings of sound events, such as animal sounds, 
the same pSTG/pMTG cluster was involved. This suggests that perceptual and 
conceptual processes converge on the same neuroanatomical regions. Moreover, 
comparison to a behavioral rating study showed that involvement of 
pSTG/pMTG increased linearly with the perceived relevance of acoustic 
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properties to the corresponding words (i.e., words that more strongly relate to 
sound more strongly engaged sound-related brain areas). 
For touch, a neuroimaging study by Lacey and colleagues found that 
reading metaphors involving texture-related touch words, such as She had a rough 
day, led to increased blood flow in texture-sensitive regions of somatosensory 
cortex (the parietal operculum) in comparison to reading similar literal 
expressions such as She had a bad day (Lacey, Stilla, & Sathian, 2012). 
Given that pain can be considered a sense (nociception), evidence for 
perceptual simulation also comes from studies of pain words: Reading pain-
related words such as drilling, excruciating, and grueling leads to increased blood 
flow in the brain’s pain matrix in comparison to other negative words such as 
disgusting or scary (Richter, Eck, Straube, Miltner, & Weiss, 2010). Osaka, Osaka, 
Morishita, Kondo, and Fukuyama (2004) furthermore investigated Japanese 
ideophones expressing pain, such as kiri-kiri to depict a stabbing pain, zuki-zuki 
for a throbbing pain, or chiku-chiku for an intermittent pain. These researchers 
found that listening to such words compared to nonsense syllables leads to 
increased blood flow in the anterior cingulate cortex, an area known to be 
involved in registering actual pain sensations (see also discussion in Semino, 
2010). Vukovic, Fardo, and Shtyrov (under review) found that reading literal 
descriptions of pain leads to increased sensitivity toward subsequent pain 
stimulation, especially for patients with chronic pain. 
There is also extensive evidence for gustatory simulation. Barrós-
Loscertales and colleagues found increased blood flow in primary and secondary 
gustatory cortices when Spaniards read taste-related words such as cerveza ‘beer’ 
and chorizo ‘spicy sausage’ in contrast to control words with little gustatory 
association, such as casco ‘helmet’ and piel ‘skin’ (Barrós-Loscertales et al., 2011). 
Citron and Goldberg (2014) found increased blood flow in primary and 
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secondary gustatory areas when Germans read metaphorical statements 
involving taste words (e.g., Sie bekam ein süsses Kompliment ‘She received a sweet 
compliment’) as opposed to corresponding literal statements (e.g., Sie bekam ein 
nettes Kompliment ‘She received a nice compliment’). 
More evidence for the involvement of gustatory brain areas in processing 
taste-related language comes from so-called property verification tasks, where 
participants are asked to answer questions such as “Can cranberries be tart?” 
Goldberg, Perfetti and Schneider (2006a) asked participants to verify when an 
object possessed a visual property (e.g., green), an auditory property (e.g., loud), a 
tactile property (e.g., soft), or a taste property (e.g., sweet). They showed that 
verifying gustatory properties led to increased blood flow in the left orbitofrontal 
cortex, an area previously shown to be involved in flavor processing. Similarly, 
retrieving tactile knowledge was associated with increased blood flow in 
somatosensory, motor, and premotor areas (see also Goldberg, Perfetti, & 
Schneider, 2006b). 
Evidence for the involvement of smell-related brain areas in processing 
smell-related words comes from González and colleagues (2006). These 
researchers found increased blood flow in the piriform cortex and the amygdala 
when Spaniards read odor-related words such as aguarrás ‘turpentine’ and orina 
‘urine’ as opposed to control words such as sierra ‘saw’ and mago ‘wizard’ 
(González et al., 2006). Importantly, the same brain areas were previously found 
to be involved in smelling odors (Zatorre, Jones-Gotman, Evans, & Meyer, 1992). 
Pomp and colleagues report increased blood flow in secondary olfactory areas 
(orbitofrontal cortex) when participants read metaphorical and literal sentences 
involving smell words; however, they did not find increased blood flow in 
primary olfactory cortex (piriform cortex; Pomp et al., 2018).  
	 79	
Some dissenting evidence for olfactory simulation comes from Speed and 
Majid (2018). This study involved two experiments: one looking at auditory 
simulation, another one looking at olfactory simulation. Findings showed that 
sounds were more likely to be remembered when paired with a congruent word 
(e.g., the sound of bees buzzing paired with the word bee). Moreover, when 
remembering sound words, recall was slower when paired with incongruent 
sounds (e.g., the word typhoon paired with a bee sound). These interactions 
between language and actual sound stimuli provide further evidence for the idea 
that language about sounds engages auditory simulations. On the other hand, 
Speed and Majid (2018) did not find similar effects when odor language was 
paired with actual odors (i.e., memory of words or odors was not impaired when 
the two mismatched). However, odor-related language did affect immediately 
following judgments of odor intensity and pleasantness, suggesting that there 
are perceptual representations at some level of cognitive analysis, albeit perhaps 
coarser ones than in the case of auditory representations for sound-related 
words.  
 The evidence for perceptual simulation presented so far involved 
neuroimaging and behavioral experiments. On the behavioral side, the 
experiments often relied on match or interference effects: The logic is that if 
language engages perceptual processes, language should be able to interact with 
behavior in a task that is purely perceptual in nature, either by facilitating task 
performance or by interfering with it (Bergen, 2007). However, there is a whole 
other class of experiments that provide evidence for the engagement of 
sensorimotor processes in language understanding, although in a less direct 
fashion. These experiments support embodied semantic representations by 
pointing to analogous behavior in perceptual and linguistic tasks. These 
experiments rely on what I call the “correspondence argument”: If sensory 
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language engages perceptual representations, then processing said language 
should mirror perceptual effects involving the described senses. 
An example of the correspondence argument is given by Connell and 
Lynott (2012), who found a tactile disadvantage in the conceptual processing of 
sensory words such as chilly and stinging. This psycholinguistic finding 
corresponds to independent perceptual evidence where a tactile disadvantage 
has previously been established for actual tactile stimulation (see Spence et al., 
2001; Turatto et al., 2004; see also Karns & Knight, 2009).  
Another example of the close correspondence between relatively high-
level phenomena and perceptual processes comes from Pecher, Zeelenberg, and 
Barsalou (2003). Again, participants were asked to verify whether an object has a 
certain property—for example, a blender can be loud (true) versus an oven can be 
baked (false). Pecher and her colleagues (2003) found that when participants 
verified a property in one modality, such as auditory (blender–loud), they were 
subsequently slower when performing a judgment in a different modality 
(cranberries–tart). There was no similar interference when performing a judgment 
in the same modality (leaves–rustling). Thus, the trial sequence “blender–loud → 
leaves–rustling” resulted in faster responses than the trial sequence “blender–loud 
→ cranberries–tart” (Connell & Lynott, 2011; Louwerse & Connell, 2011; Lynott & 
Connell, 2009; van Dantzig, Cowell, Zeelenberg, & Pecher, 2011; van Dantzig, 
Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2008). Importantly, this so-called “modality 
switching cost” is not confined to just words; it was previously shown to 
characterize switching between perceptual modalities in a purely nonlinguistic 
task (Spence et al., 2001; Turatto et al., 2004). For instance, hearing a beep after 
seeing a light flash results in slower detection of the light flash compared to 
seeing two light flashes in a row. Thus, there is a modality switching cost in 
perception as well as in the linguistic processing of perceptual words, which 
	 81	
provides indirect evidence for the idea that language engages modality-specific 
representations. 
 
5.4. The Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis 
The key proposal defended in this book is that the linguistic behavior of sensory 
words such as salty and silky can be partially explained by how the senses differ 
from each other in perception, and by how the senses interact with each other in 
the brain and behavior. This fundamental idea is nicely summarized in the 
statement that “properties of sensory experience wend their way through 
language—permeating that most human manifestation and expression of 
thought” (Marks, 1978, p. 3). 
The Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis is an adaptation of this general view. 
In its most general form, it says that language mirrors perception. More 
specifically, it involves the following two sub-hypotheses (compare Marks, 1978, 
p. 3): 
 
(a) Perceptual asymmetries result in linguistic asymmetries. 
(b) Perceptual associations result in linguistic associations. 
 
The only commitments of the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis are that (a) 
words activate sensory-motor representations, and (b) those sensory-motor 
representations partly determine word choice. As a result of this, (c) language 
comes to reflect sensory-motor processes in its structure, as well as in language 
use. Thus, the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis encompasses both processing and 
linguistic patterns that occur in natural language. However, because there is 
already a lot of evidence for simulation being involved in processing (as 
reviewed above), the present book focuses on establishing that linguistic 
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patterns, such as evidenced through analyses of corpora, also follow embodied 
principles. 
The Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis crucially rests on the correspondence 
argument and thus calls for looking at perceptual evidence in relation to new 
linguistic evidence. This was already discussed in the context of such findings as 
the “tactile disadvantage,” which was found in both word processing (Connell & 
Lynott, 2012) and perception (Spence et al., 2001; Turatto et al., 2004). The 
novelty here is to shift the focus of the correspondence argument to issues of 
linguistic structure and use. 1  The Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis accepts the 
evidence for the involvement of perceptual simulations in word processing, but 
it goes one step further by stating that this does not leave linguistic patterns 
untouched. That is, the ways that sensory words are used should reflect patterns 
independently observed in perception precisely because words engage perceptual 
processes. 
Trivially, every theory of meaning, modal or not, would agree that the 
things we perceive need to be encoded in the sensory vocabulary in some 
fashion. For example, English speakers have words for such properties as sweet 
and red because our perceptual apparatus is able to perceive these properties. 
The converse is true as well: We cannot have sensory words for things that we 
cannot perceive. Language focuses on the already filtered, relatively coarse 
aspects of the natural world that are the result of sensory perception, and the 
perceptual acuity of our sensory systems sets outer limits to the levels of detail 
that can possibly be encoded in language. From this perspective, the Embodied 
Lexicon Hypothesis is evidently true in a trivial fashion (i.e., language and 
perception have to be related somehow). However, the proposal goes beyond 
this, stating that the fit between language and perception is perhaps greater than 
some theories of language would admit. This book will showcase many 
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distributional patterns that are best explained with recourse to language-
external perceptual processes, in line with the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis. 
I should like to make clear that the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis does 
not state that language and perception are isomorphic. The mapping between 
perception and language is far from complete, as was already discussed in 
Chapter 4 regarding ineffability. In fact, the very idea of ineffability requires 
that the mapping between language and perception is not perfect. Compared to 
our subjective, multisensory, and high-resolution experience of the world, 
language is compressive, digital, and sequential. This means that language and 
perception can never be fully aligned. 
However, the lack of posited isomorphism between language and 
perception also means that the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis is, unfortunately, 
a very weak theory in a Popperian sense.2 It is difficult to falsify, and many of 
the findings that will be discussed as supporting the Embodied Lexicon 
Hypothesis are consistent with some versions of amodal symbol theories. 
Several authors have criticized how cognitive scientists deal with the evidence 
that supports embodied approaches to cognition, including those that fall 
within the embodied camp (Willems & Francken, 2012). 
Mahon and Caramazza (2008) argue that activation of sensorimotor 
systems is downstream in cognitive terms, meaning that the engagement of 
sensorimotor processes happens after symbolic or amodal processing. The idea 
here is that the concept of a tree may be an amodal symbol that ultimately links 
up with perception, but only after the fact. Embodied effects in processing are 
then explained away as being due to indirect links between amodal symbols 
and perceptual systems. This view renders embodied experimental results 
epiphenomenal. 3  It is impossible to craft an argument for the necessity of 
perceptual representations based on linguistic evidence alone. We can, however, 
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make a different (and somewhat weaker) argument, following the discussion in 
Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) and Zwaan et al. (2002): The amodal symbol 
systems account can only postdict the linguistic patterns discussed in this book, 
explaining correspondences between perception and language after the fact. The 
Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis is able to predict these correspondences.4 
The Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis presented here is furthermore 
“consilient” (Wilson, 1998), in the sense of being able to explain a diverse 
number of facts. In general, a theory that can explain more distinct classes of 
facts is to be preferred over one that explains fewer (Thagard, 1978). Amodal 
approaches leave large bodies of evidence hanging next to each other—namely, 
facts about perception next to highly related facts about the linguistic patterns of 
sensory words. It is neither parsimonious nor theoretically elegant to leave two 
large bodies of empirical evidence about similar (and obviously related) 
constructs without theoretical integration. Thus, at least in part, the Embodied 
Lexicon Hypothesis is aimed at synthesis of already existing results. 
 
5.5. Relations to other theories 
Several of the patterns discussed in this book under the banner of the Embodied 
Lexicon Hypothesis are in line with a particular branch of the language sciences 
that is called “cognitive linguistics” (Croft & Cruse, 2004; Evans & Green, 2006; 
Langacker, 1987, 2008; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Just like 
embodiment, cognitive linguistics is not a unified theory; it is a loose framework 
of interconnected theories and hypotheses that relate to each other through a 
shared set of assumptions. 
Among other things, cognitive linguistics sees meaning as embodied: 
Semantic structure is argued to be based on conceptual structures (Evans, 
Bergen, & Zinken, 2007), and conceptual structures are seen as directly relating to 
	 85	
perceptual structures and patterned interactions with the physical environment. 
For example, people talk of high numbers or rising prices because they have an 
embodied understanding of quantity in terms of the concrete physical concept of 
vertical space (Winter et al., 2015a). This understanding is embodied because it is 
presumed to have arisen through a lifetime of interactions with physical 
quantities, which literally pile up vertically (Lakoff, 1987, p. 276). 
The present book can be seen as being loosely affiliated with the tradition 
of cognitive linguistics. However, in contrast to many cognitive linguistic 
studies, the focus here is on large-scale quantitative aspects of lexical structure. 
Cognitive linguistics, like any subfield within the language sciences, focuses on a 
certain type of data and a certain style of analysis (such as the analysis of time 
metaphors, among many other topics). While perceptual language is occasionally 
discussed within cognitive linguistics (e.g., Caballero, 2007; Caballero & 
Ibarretxe-Antuñano, 2014; Ibarretxe-Antuñano, 2008; Matlock, 1989; Sweetser, 
1990; Yu, 2003), it is not always the primary focus. Thus, the present book can be 
seen as extending the core idea of embodiment—which is generally seen as part 
of the cognitive linguistic framework—to new empirical domains, such as the 
composition of the lexicon or the statistical patterns of word usage. The 
Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis thus forms a natural marriage with cognitive 
linguistic approaches to studying language. 
The Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis is furthermore related to certain 
theories within cognitive science. Several researchers who can be seen as part of 
the embodied tradition have begun to reintroduce a role for amodal, symbolic, 
or purely linguistic processes into their theories of language comprehension. 
This is the case with Barsalou and colleagues’ (2008) Language and Situated 
Simulation (LASS) framework, as well as in Louwerse’s Symbol 
Interdependency Theory (Louwerse, 2011; Louwerse & Connell, 2011; see also 
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Meteyard et al., 2012). These theories assume that when a word is read, 
associated words are immediately activated. Thus, a specific piece of language 
may not only be understood in terms of embodied representations, but also in 
terms of connections to other linguistic representations. 
In his Symbol Interdependency Theory, Louwerse (2011) argues that 
mental simulation results, such as Pecher et al.’s (2003) modality switching 
effect (discussed above), can partially be explained by linguistic associations 
rather than embodied associations. For example, the switch from leaves–rustling 
to blender–loud may be fast not because both properties are auditory, but because 
the corresponding words are mentally associated with each other (see evidence 
in Louwerse & Connell, 2011). Thus, according to Louwerse (2011), the fact that 
linguistic items are associated with each other influences language 
understanding above and beyond what comes from embodiment alone. 
However, it should be noted that the Symbol Interdependency Theory can 
only explain embodied cognition results via linguistic associations if those 
associations represent embodied information in the first place. Thus, 
embodiment influences processing two ways: first, directly through the 
activation of sensorimotor content in perceptual simulation, and second, 
indirectly via feedback from the linguistic system which has already encoded 
embodied patterns. The Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis focuses on how these 
linguistic associations arise, and whether they do indeed correspond to 
perceptual patterns. 
 In the next section, I will look at how ideas surrounding the Embodied 
Lexicon Hypothesis and mental simulation relate to another important 
dimension of meaning: the emotional dimension. 
 
5.6. Emotional meaning 
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The mental lexicon not only represents perceptual meaning, but also what I will 
loosely call “emotional meaning,” or the “emotionality” of taste words. There are 
many different cognitive models of emotion, as well as a host of accounts of how 
emotion (e.g., Wilce, 2003) and, more generally, evaluation (e.g., Hunston, 2010) 
are performed in language. In the context of this book, I will ignore distinctions 
between different emotional qualities (such as fear, anger, happiness, etc.) and 
consider only one aspect of emotion, defined as what is generally called 
“emotional valence” or merely “valence” in the psycholinguistic literature 
(Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013). Valence as used here is understood to 
be the positive–negative dimension of meaning—that is, whether a word 
generally expresses something good (pleasant, tasty, wonderful) or bad (disgusting, 
horrible, vile). Alternative words for “valence” could be “positivity” or 
“negativity.” Words that are more strongly positive or negative will be talked 
about as relatively more “valenced,” “emotional,” or “evaluative” words, 
compared to relatively more neutral words. I do not neglect the fact that there 
are other important aspects of emotional meaning, but for present purposes, it 
suffices to focus on the positive–negative dimension of evaluative and affective 
language (for further justification, see Chapter 10). 
Evidence for the fact that emotional meaning is encoded in lexical 
representations comes from the fact that a word’s emotional valence affects its 
processing speed in reading and naming tasks (Kousta, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 
2009; Kuperman, 2015; Kuperman, Estes, Brysbaert, & Warriner, 2014; Snefjella & 
Kuperman, 2016). For example, positive words are processed more quickly than 
negative words, and strongly positive and strongly negative words are overall 
processed more quickly than neutral words (Kuperman, 2015). Another task 
suggesting that valence is part of a word’s lexical representation is the 
phenomenon of affective priming, in which a positive word is read more quickly 
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after another positive word, and negative words are read more quickly after 
negative words (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; de Houwer & 
Randell, 2004). The evidence from affective priming suggests that emotional 
meaning is encoded in the lexical representations of words. 
There is also evidence suggesting that processing emotion-laden language 
may involve mental simulation of emotional reactions (for review, see Havas & 
Matheson, 2013). Havas and colleagues (2007) instructed participants to hold a 
pen in their mouth, either using just the lips to form a pouting face, or using just 
the teeth to form a smiling face. Previous research showed that the 
corresponding facial positions actually make people feel better (smiling 
condition) or worse (pouting condition; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988; but see 
Wagenmakers et al., 2016). Havas and colleagues (2017) showed that participants 
read pleasant sentences such as You and your lover embrace after a long separation 
faster in the teeth condition, when making a smiling face. 
More evidence for emotion simulation comes from Foroni and Semin 
(2009), who used electromyography (EMG) to show that muscles commonly 
involved in smiling were relatively more activated when reading positive words, 
andmuscles involved in frowning were more strongly activated for negative 
words. Subsequently, Havas and colleagues (Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, 
Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010) showed that paralyzing muscles involved in 
expressing emotions of anger and sadness selectively affected the comprehension 
of sentences involving these emotions compared to sentences about happy 
emotions. There is also considerable evidence from neuroimaging that reading 
emotional words involves increased blood flow in the amygdala (reviewed in 
Citron, 2012), a brain area also involved in emotion processing. Together, these 
studies suggest that any account of embodied semantics is incomplete without 
considering the role of emotion simulation, alongside perceptual simulation. 
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In addition to these general considerations, the fact that emotions are 
represented in the mental lexicon and engaged during language use is important 
for specific results that will be presented in this book under the banner of the 
Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis. First, I will show that differences in how the 
senses relate to emotional processes correspond to how sensory words are used 
evaluatively (Chapter 16). In particular, I will argue that the emotionality of taste 
and smell words can be explained with recourse to how taste and smell as 
perceptual processes are tied to emotional processes in the brain and in behavior 
(see also Winter, 2016). To account for this result, the Embodied Lexicon 
Hypothesis needs to allow for emotional meaning to be part of a word’s lexical 
representation, alongside perceptual meaning. 
In addition, considering the emotional dimension next to the perceptual is 
important because there may be a trade-off between the two dimensions in the 
English lexicon. Vigliocco, Meteyard, Andrews, and Kousta (2009) suggest that 
abstract words such as freedom, courage, government, and dignity are more strongly 
characterized by their emotional meaning than concrete words, which may not 
need emotional information as a crucial part of their representation because their 
meaning is already supported by perceptual representations. This view is 
corroborated by empirical evidence: Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, and 
Del Campo (2011) show that abstract words are more emotional than concrete 
words. Meteyard et al. (2012, p. 800) thus suggest that abstract knowledge may 
be “grounded in our internal experience,” including our emotions, whereas 
“concrete knowledge would be grounded in our experience with the outside 
world.” This trading relation between perceptual and emotional content has 
relevance for discussions of so-called “synesthetic metaphors” (Chapters 6–9). 
 In general, the evidence reviewed in this chapter clearly shows that both 
perceptual representations and emotional representations are part of word 
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meaning. The Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis recognizes these facts and describes 
how perceptual meanings relate to each other in language, as well as how 
perception and emotion are interrelated. Thus, engaging with the Embodied 
Lexicon Hypothesis calls for a joint consideration of both perceptual meaning 
and emotional meaning. 
 																																																								
1 Of course, processing and structure are not independent of each other, and they interact in 
many ways (e.g., Christiansen & Chater, 2008; Hawkins, 2004; O’Grady, 2005). 
 
2 In terms of Meteyard et al. (2012), the findings reported in this book that are used to argue for 
the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis are consistent with a strong embodiment view where semantic 
representations are completely dependent on sensory-motor systems, as well as with a weak 
embodiment view where semantic representations have partial dependence on those systems. 
Because the evidence discussed in this book is linguistic in nature, it will be impossible to 
distinguish between weak and strong embodiment, and distinguishing between these two 
proposals is not the main goal. 
 
3 It is important to note that there is already experimental evidence inconsistent with a fully 
epiphenomenal view of embodied representations, such as effects showing that language 
processing is influenced by perceptual processes (rather than the reverse, as is the case in the 
sentence–picture matching task); see, for example, Kaschak et al. (2005) and Pecher et al. (2009). 
Moreover, there are studies showing that changing the activation level of the motor system via 
transcranial magnetic stimulation of the brain influences the processing of action-related 
language, which further suggests a function role (e.g., Willems, Labruna, D’Esposito, Ivry, & 
Casasanto, 2011). 
 
4 Moreover, as a research program for sensory linguistics, the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis 
invites us to actively look for new perception-language correspondences, which is not something 
that is done within the amodal tradition. 
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Chapter 6. Synesthesia and metaphor 
6.1. Introduction to synesthesia 
A core topic in sensory linguistics is the fact that sensory words can be used 
flexibly, including in contexts that do not relate to their dominant sensory 
modality. This happens, for example, when an English speaker says that a 
particular sound is rough or smooth. These two adjectives are strongly associated 
with the tactile modality; hence, their application to the auditory modality is 
understood by many linguists and literature scholars to be metaphorical—a 
mapping between two distinct sensory modalities. Related examples include 
smooth taste (touch-to-taste), rough smell (touch-to-smell), sharp sound (touch-to-
sound), sweet melody (taste-to-sound), bright sound (sight-to-sound), and loud color 
(sound-to-sight). Such expressions have variously been labelled “synaesthetic 
metaphors” (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001; Strik Lievers, 2016), “linguistic 
synaesthesia” (e.g., Holz, 2007; Whitney, 1952), “verbal synaesthesia” (Strik 
Lievers, 2015), “literary synesthesia” (e.g., O’Malley, 1957), and “poetic 
synesthesia” (Shen, 1997, 1998). In literature studies, synesthetic metaphors are 
often just called “synesthesia” (Engstrom, 1946). 
 The term synesthesia is a combination of the Greek morphemes syn for 
‘together’ and aisthēsis for ‘sensation.’ Most generally, synesthesia refers to any 
union of the senses. Deroy and Spence (2013, p. 643) criticize the fact that the 
label synesthesia “acts as something of a placeholder with which to characterize 
the process (or processes) that underlie surprising reports of associations 
between two apparently disjoint sensations, categories, or sensory dimensions.” 
In the clinical literature, synesthesia is generally understood to be a 
relatively rare neuropsychological phenomenon where a stimulus from one 
sensory modality, called the inducer, automatically and involuntarily triggers 
sensations in another sensory modality, called the concurrent (Martino & Marks, 
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2001; Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001; Simner, 2006, 2012; Simner et al., 2012). 
Following Deroy and Spence (2013), this phenomenon will be called “canonical 
synesthesia” for the remainder of this chapter. An example of synesthesia is 
colored hearing synesthesia, where a synesthete sees colors in front of their inner 
eye when hearing certain sounds. Are such phenomena related to synesthetic 
metaphors, and if so, how? 
This chapter will move from more detail on synesthetic metaphors 
(Chapter 6.2) to a discussion of canonical synesthesia versus crossmodal 
correspondences (Chapter 6.3). After that, we are in a position to evaluate the 
connection between synesthetic metaphors and canonical synesthesia (Chapter 
6.4), if there is any at all. 
 
6.2. Characterizing synesthetic metaphors 
Ullmann (1959) is commonly cited as one of the most seminal studies on the 
extended meanings of sensory words. In his earlier 1945 paper, Romanticism and 
Synaesthesia, Ullmann analyzed expressions such as Taste the music of that vision 
pale (p. 815, from John Keats’ Isabella). According to Ullmann, this line involves 
two “transfers” that cross the senses—namely, from taste to sound (taste the 
music), and from sound to sight (music of that vision pale). 
The directionality of the transfer is gleaned from the grammatical 
construction. For example, the adjective–noun pair sharp sound is supposed to be 
a touch-to-sound mapping because the syntactic head of this noun phrase is 
sound-related and the modifying adjective is touch-related (see e.g., Ronga et al., 
2012, p. 145). Because sound is associated with the head of the adjective–noun, 
this expression is seen as being primarily about sound rather than about 
sharpness. Thus, semantically, sound is treated as the target of synesthetic 
transfer, and touch is treated as the source. Research in this field often focuses on 
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adjective–noun pairs and generally adopts the perspective of the adjective 
modifying the head noun, rather than the related perspective of the head noun 
narrowing down the sensory meaning of the adjective (cf. Abraham, 1987, p. 
161). 
Ullmann (1945) uses the term synesthesia as it is frequently used in 
literature studies, where synesthesia is seen as a particular type of figurative 
language—a trope that involves “transfers” from one sense to another. Below, I 
list a range of definitions from literature on these expressions: 
 
“Synesthetic metaphors...are expressions in which words or phrases 
describing experiences proper to one sense modality transfer their 
meanings to another modality.” 
(Marks, 1982a, p. 177) 
 
“Synesthetic metaphor employs the language of one sensory or perceptual 
domain to transfer meaning to another domain.” 
(Marks, 1982b, p. 15) 
 
“A synaesthesia is a metaphorical expression in which the source and 
target domains represent concepts belonging to two different modalities 
or senses.” 
(Shen & Cohen, 1998, p. 124) 
 
“A synaesthetic metaphor is a systematic relationship between elements 
from two distinct sensory modalities.” 
(Shen & Gil, 2007, p. 51) 
 
	 94	
“In synaesthetic metaphors, words that pertain to one sensory modality 
(e.g., vision) are extended to express another sensory modality (e.g., 
audition).” 
(Cacciari, 2008, p. 427) 
 
“...a perceptual experience related to one sense is described through 
lexical means typically associated with a different sense...” 
(Strik Lievers, 2015, pp. 69-70) 
 
“Linguistic synaesthesia is a particular form of metaphor, as it extends the 
meaning of an utterance from one sensory modality to another, through 
analogy.” 
(Ronga et al., 2012, p. 139) 
 
The reason why I list so many definitions is to highlight that there are 
certain assumptions inherent to most research on synesthetic metaphors. In 
particular, definitions tend to evoke some form of transfer or mapping between 
two sensory modalities, as when Yu (2003) says that a synesthetic metaphor is a 
“metaphor that maps across various sensory domains” (p. 20). In addition, the 
definitions frequently mention that there are two “distinct” sensory modalities. 
Other definitions highlight more strongly that there needs to be some 
incompatibility or perceived conflict between the two perceptual sensations that 
are combined with each other: 
 
“...synaesthesia is the syntactic relation between elements semantically 
incompatible, denoting sensations from different sensorial spheres.”  
(Erzsébet, 1974, p. 25) 
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 “...in synaesthetic expressions, syntactic links between sensory lexemes 
create connections that generate conflict at the conceptual level.” 
(Strik Lievers, 2016, p. 45) 
 
A useful distinction was introduced by Werning, Fleischhauer, and 
Beseoglu (2006) and Petersen, Fleischhauer, Beseoglu, and Bücker (2008), who 
differentiate between “weak” and “strong” synesthetic metaphors (see also 
Abraham, 1987, p. 179; Engstrom, 1946, p. 11). According to them, a weak 
synesthetic metaphor has a perceptual source and a relatively more abstract 
target (e.g., cold anger), whereas a strong synesthetic metaphor has both a 
perceptual source and a perceptual target (such as cold smell). Here, I will focus 
first and foremost on strong synesthetic metaphors. A defining feature of these 
metaphors is that both the source and the target are perceptual (see Shen, 2008, p. 
302). 
 It is important to stress that the term “synesthetic metaphor” has two 
components, “synesthetic” and “metaphor.” Each one of these components 
reflects certain assumptions about the underlying phenomenon. First, calling 
expressions such as rough sound and sweet fragrance “synesthetic” suggests that 
there is some connection to what psychologists and neuroscientists call 
synesthesia. Second, calling these expressions “metaphorical” reflects the 
assumption that there is a mapping between two distinct modalities. 
This chapter questions the assumption that synesthetic metaphors are 
synesthetic. The next chapter questions the assumption that synesthetic 
metaphors are metaphorical (see also Winter, in press). I will conclude that 
synesthetic metaphors are neither synesthetic nor metaphorical. 
 
6.3. The importance of terminology 
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From its outset, research on synesthesia was fraught with terminological 
confusion (see Deroy & Spence, 2013). O’Malley (1957) details some of the early 
work on synesthesia as a neuropsychological phenomenon, showing how the 
phenomenon has attracted much speculation and confusion in poetry, arts, and 
in psychology. Often, different researchers take the term “synesthesia” to mean 
different things. This point was also made by Martino and Marks (2001): 
 
Over the two centuries since strong synesthesia was first identified in the 
scientific literature, several heterogeneous phenomena have been labeled 
as synesthetic. These phenomena range from strong experiences..., on the 
one hand, to weaker crossmodal literary expressions, on the other. We 
believe it is a mistake to label all of these phenomena simply as 
synesthesia because the underlying mechanisms cannot be identical... (p. 
62) 
 
This quote also highlights why it may be important to worry about 
terminological confusion in this domain. Namely, shared terminology suggests 
shared mechanism; it suggests that two phenomena are more similar to each 
other than they are different from each other, which in turn may bias research in 
the direction of seeking similarities rather than differences (see Deroy & Spence, 
2013). 
Deroy and Spence (2013) highlight that not all sensory interactions qualify 
as synesthesia. In particular, they highlight the importance of distinguishing 
between canonical synesthesia on the one hand and crossmodal correspondences 
on the other. In contrast to canonical synesthesia, the term “crossmodal 
correspondence” (see Spence, 2011) refers to “the tendency for a feature, or 
attribute, in one sensory modality to be matched (or associated) with a sensory 
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feature, or attribute in another sensory modality” (Spence, 2012, p. 37). 
Crossmodal correspondences are perceptual associations that are widespread in 
the general population, may have environmental origins (e.g., repeatedly 
experiencing certain correlations between perceptual qualities, such as between 
small size and high pitch), and are not necessarily consciously accessible. An 
example of a crossmodal correspondence is the fact that people systematically 
match brighter visual stimuli to higher pitched sounds and darker visual stimuli 
to more lower pitched sounds (Marks, 1982a), without consciously perceiving 
sound sensations when seeing color (or vice versa). 
Deroy and Spence (2013) highlight the rarity of synesthesia in the general 
population and the role of consciousness in synesthetic perceptions as two 
factors that help demarcate synesthesia from crossmodal correspondences. This 
is reflected in the definition of synesthesia by Grossenbacher and Lovelace 
(2001), who describe it as “a conscious experience of systematically induced 
sensory attributes that are not experienced by most people under comparable 
conditions” (p. 36, emphasis in original). In contrast, crossmodal 
correspondences are experienced by everybody, and they are generally not 
experienced consciously. For some researchers at least, the rarity of synesthesia is 
almost definitional; that is, because crossmodal correspondences are perceived 
by most people, they do not qualify as genuine synesthesias. 
 
6.4. Canonical synesthesia and metaphor 
Unfortunately, researchers studying sensory language have not always been 
clear about how they interpret the term “synesthesia” in the context of metaphor. 
Different researchers take “synesthesia” as a linguistic phenomenon to be more 
or less related to “synesthesia” as a perceptual phenomenon, sometimes without 
explicitly stating where they stand (see already the discussion in O’Malley, 1957). 
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Moreover, researchers studying sensory language have often not been precise 
about what they mean by “synesthesia” on the perceptual side, often conflating it 
with crossmodal correspondences. 
It is interesting to note that several researchers studying metaphor 
introduce the term “synesthesia” followed by some form of hedging, or at least 
some clarification to differentiate it from canonical synesthesia as a 
neuropsychological phenomenon. Tsur (2008) states that “the term synaesthesia 
suggests the joining of sensations derived from different sensory domains,” and 
then follows this with a call to “distinguish between the joining of sense 
impressions derived from the various sensory domains, and the joining of terms 
derived from the vocabularies of the various sensory domains” (p. 283, emphasis 
in original). He then says that in synesthetic metaphors it is only the “terms that 
are derived from two sensory domains.” Engstrom (1946) stresses that the 
employment of “synesthesia” as a term for a stylistic trope in literature is 
disconnected from the psychological phenomenon. Ronga (2016), like many 
others before her, stresses that “linguistic synaesthesia has to be distinguished 
from perceptual synaesthesia” (p. 48, emphasis in original). She furthermore 
highlights that “the two synaesthetic phenomena are very different” (see also 
Cazeaux, 2002, pp. 3–4). In fact, all of these statements echo Ullmann (1945), who 
already stated that he “investigates synaesthesia first and foremost as a 
linguistic-semantic problem” (p. 812), in contrast to canonical synesthesia. 
Some researchers studying sensory language invoke a strong connection 
between synesthetic metaphors and perceptual sensations that are akin to 
canonical synesthesia. For example, even though Holz (2007) says that “we 
have...to distinguish between a neuropsychological and a linguistic 
phenomenon,” he also characterizes what he calls “linguistic synesthesia” as 
follows: “We may talk of a verbal simulation of synesthetic perception or of a 
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linguistic creation of cross-modality illusions” (p. 193, emphasis in original). This 
appears to indicate that Holz believes synesthetic metaphors may trigger actual 
synesthetic perceptions (“illusions”; see also Mendelson, 1984). Anaki and Henik 
(2017) argue that “the processes that characterize synesthesia mirror those in 
metaphor processing” (p. 142). 
 More generally, many researchers studying crossmodal uses of sensory 
language try to ground linguistic patterns in language-external perceptual 
phenomena. Researchers have sought to explain metaphorical asymmetries (see 
Chapters 8–9) with recourse to evolutionary asymmetries between the senses 
(albeit tentatively, in Williams, 1976); differences in the diffuseness or stability of 
different kinds of sensory impressions (e.g., Tsur, 2012); or differences in the 
concreteness, salience, or accessibility of particular sensory experiences (e.g., 
Shen, 1997; Shen & Aisenman, 2008; Shen & Cohen, 1998; Shen & Gadir, 2009; 
Shen & Gil, 2007). Given that extra-linguistic perceptual facts are frequently 
invoked to explain linguistic patterns, it becomes important to specify what 
exactly is meant by the term “synesthesia” in a psychological sense, and whether 
this is appropriate terminology to describe linguistic expressions at all. Thus, we 
may ask: Is canonical synesthesia really the appropriate reference concept for 
expressions such as sweet fragrance and rough sound? 
 In the following sections, I will present four arguments against the use of 
the term “synesthesia” in this domain. My argument will be based on the rarity 
of canonical synesthesia (Chapter 6.4.1), the types of cross-sensory connections 
commonly attested in synesthesia (Chapter 6.4.2), the degree of voluntary control 
(Chapter 6.4.3), and the lack of empirical evidence for a connection between 
synesthesia and metaphor (Chapter 6.4.4). 
 
6.4.1. The prevalence criterion 
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Estimates about the prevalence of canonical synesthesia vary widely, depending 
on assessment criteria and on which type of synesthesia is being investigated. 
However, whichever assessment criteria are used, the figures generally suggest 
rarity. Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) discuss estimates ranging from 1 in 20 
people having synaesthesia to 1 in 20,000. Sagiv and Ward (2006) state that about 
1 in 20 people have synesthesia; Cytowic (2002) says that it is 1 in 25,000. Simner 
and colleagues (2006) used stricter test batteries and tested 500 university 
participants at the University of Edinburgh. Her team found 22 synesthetes in 
this group (4%). Simner, Harrold, Creed, Monro, and Foulkes (2008) report that 
out of 615 children aged 6 to 7 from UK primary schools, only 1.3% had 
grapheme-color synesthesia (seeing letters in colors). Whichever estimate we 
choose, synesthesia is a rare phenomenon, and some even consider its rarity as 
definitional (see discussion in Deroy & Spence, 2013). 
This is in stark contrast to synesthetic metaphors, which have been argued 
to not be rare. Engstrom (1946) argues for their prevalence across many stylistic 
traditions in poetry and literature. Most researchers assume that the poetic 
version of synesthetic metaphors forms a continuum with such everyday 
expressions as sweet fragrance and rough smell (see discussion in O’Malley, 1957, 
p. 397–398). Engstrom (1946, p. 10) says that “our daily speech is full of 
synaesthetic expressions” and cites relatively mundane examples such as heavy 
perfumes and piercing cries. Marks (1982b, p. 15) says that “synesthetic 
combinations of words are much more common than most of us recognize” (see 
also Plümacher, 2007, p. 64; Strik Lievers, 2017, p. 84), with Whitney (1952, p. 
444) calling synesthetic metaphors “an accepted and generally unnoticed part of 
our general vocabulary.” 
To demonstrate that those expressions analyzed as synesthetic metaphors 
are indeed quite common, one may look at the adjective–noun pair sweet smell, 
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which combines a taste word with a smell word. This expression occurs 262 
times in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies, 2008), making it 
even more frequent than some corresponding literal expressions, such as sweet 
taste (105 tokens) and sweet flavor (101 tokens). 
 
6.4.2. Different mappings 
What specific crossmodal combinations are attested among those who qualify as 
synesthetes? There are many types of synesthesias that involve color, as with a 
case of a synesthete who experienced strong color sensations when in pain 
(discussed by Martino and Marks, 2001) and another synesthete reporting color 
sensations when experiencing bitter, sour, and sweet tastes (Engstrom, 1946, p. 
7). Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) discuss grapheme-color synesthesia as 
one of the most widespread forms, as does Cytowic and Eagleman (2009, p. 24). 
According to Simner et al. (2006), colored days of the week may be the most 
common form of synesthesia. 
Novich, Cheng, and Eagleman (2011) provide perhaps the most extensive 
survey of different synesthesia types. They analyzed survey data from more than 
19,000 participants and concluded that there is statistical support for five distinct 
subgroups of canonical synesthesia:  
 
(a) Colored sequences synesthetes, where color sensations are triggered by 
ordinal sequences, such as letters or days of the weeks.  
(b) Musical color synesthetes, who experience color sensations when exposed 
to particular types of music or sound.  
(c) Colored sensation synesthesia, where color sensations are triggered by 
such things as touch sensations or when particular emotions are felt.  
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(d) Non-visual synesthetes, where a smell, sound, touch or taste is triggered 
(e.g., sound to taste or sight to smell).  
(e) Spatial sequence synesthetes, who perceive sequences as being spatially 
extended, for example with numbers at certain spatial locations. 
 
The evidence presented by Novich et al. (2011) highlights the many 
differences between crossmodal connections involved in canonical synesthesia 
versus those involved in synesthetic metaphor. Whereas touch and sound are 
reported to be the most frequent source and target domains in the linguistic 
domain (Day, 1996; Strik Lievers, 2015; Ullmann, 1959; Williams, 1976), very few 
canonical synesthesias involve touch, and many involve color. There are also 
many synesthesias involving numbers and letters that have no reflection in the 
linguistic expressions used by the general population. 
Moreover, linguistic expressions that combine words appearing to stem 
from different sensory modalities generally involve modalities that are 
perceptually and environmentally coupled, an idea for which new evidence will 
be provided in Chapter 14 (see also Ronga, 2016). In contrast, canonical 
synesthesia is generally thought to involve inducer-concurrent pairings that are 
not based on environmental correlates (see Deroy & Spence, 2013, p. 652). 
One has to further distinguish between the general type of mapping (such 
as colored hearing) and the specific trigger-concurrent pairings (i.e., which 
specific tone goes together with which specific color sensation in colored 
hearing). It has been reported that even synesthetes growing up in the same 
family can have very different pairings. For example, in grapheme–color 
synesthesia, the letter “R” may be blue for one synesthete but red for another 
(Cytowic & Eagleman, 2009). Although some regularities have been found across 
synesthetes, specific trigger-concurrent pairings are generally idiosyncratic 
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(Deroy & Spence, 2013, p. 647). This, too, is different from metaphor, where 
expressions such as sweet smell are used by hundreds of people. 
 
6.4.3. Deliberate versus involuntary mappings 
Several authors have tried to differentiate synesthetic metaphors from canonical 
synesthesia with respect to whether crossmodal associations are voluntary or 
not. Canonical synesthesia is commonly described as an automatic inducer-
concurrent pairing that cannot be consciously altered. Most descriptions of 
synesthesia see automaticity as a defining feature of this phenomenon. Some 
synesthetes even describe their synesthesias as distracting. The same way that 
people cannot voluntarily stop seeing color, a synesthete cannot stop his or her 
concurrent perceptions. Some have claimed this to be different from synesthetic 
metaphor, which O’Malley (1957, p. 393) says “may imply a conscious, deliberate 
comparison of various sense qualities.” Similarly, Ronga et al. (2012, p. 139), 
reiterating claims made by Cytowic and Eagleman (2009, p. 172), say that in 
contrast to canonical synesthesia, which is “completely automatic,” synesthetic 
metaphors “require the voluntary association between words belonging to two 
different sensory domains.” Tsur (2007, p. 49) contrasts canonical synesthesia 
with literary “synesthesia” by saying that the latter “leaves room for great 
flexibility and creativity,” whereas the former is “involuntary and rigidly 
predictable.” 
While language use may be comparatively more deliberated and 
voluntary than the perception of synesthetic concurrents, the criterion of 
voluntariness does not allow a clear-cut distinction between the two phenomena. 
Many theories of language use, including those within cognitive linguistics, 
would maintain that most of the cognitive machinery that governs language use 
is outside the purview of voluntary and conscious control. Although it may be 
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the case that a speaker can choose to describe a smell as sweet or not, the fact that 
this word came to mind at all is due to subconscious processes.  
 
6.4.4. No evidence for a connection 
In their seminal paper on synesthesia, Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) call 
for investigating the connection between synesthesia and metaphor. However, so 
far, there is little to no empirical data that connects the two phenomena. In fact, it 
is not even clear what exactly one would predict if there was a strong connection 
between synesthesia and those expressions analyzed as synesthetic metaphors. 
Do we predict that synesthetes use more metaphors, or use metaphors 
differently? Do we predict that the expressions commonly used by speakers 
mirror common forms of canonical synesthesia? 
 Of course, metaphor and synesthesia are superficially connected in the 
following way: When synesthetes talk about their own synesthetic perceptions, 
such as describing pain as yellow (Martino & Marks, 2001), Wednesday as indigo 
blue (Eagleman & Cytowic, 2009), or the sound of a voice as azure (Engstrom, 
1946, p. 6), this appears metaphorical to others who do not share the same 
synesthetic perceptions. For the synesthete, such descriptions are, in fact, literal. 
Such expressions, however, bear little resemblance to the expressions that are 
generally discussed in the literature on synesthetic metaphors, such as smooth 
melody and sharp sound. 
 As far as I know, the only evidence for a connection between canonical 
synesthesia and synesthetic metaphors is provided by a series of experiments by 
Marks (1974, 1975), who found that associations between pitch and brightness 
reported for synesthetes can also be found as crossmodal correspondences in 
nonsynesthetes; furthermore, English speakers use expressions such as bright 
sound and dark sound (see also discussion in Anaki & Henik, 2017). More research 
	 105	
like this is necessary to allow the conclusion that canonical synesthesia and 
synesthetic metaphors are indeed related. However, even in the case of these 
pitch–brightness associations, synesthetic metaphors may be more strongly 
related to the widely shared crossmodal correspondences than to canonical 
synesthesia per se. 
 
6.5. Summary of differences 
Table 1 contrasts canonical synesthesia from synesthetic metaphors along several 
of the dimensions just discussed. 
 
Table 1 
Differences 
between canonical 
synesthesia and 
synesthetic 
metaphors  
Canonical synesthesia Synesthetic metaphors 
Prevalence rare ubiquitous 
Types of 
mappings 
unassociated modalities environmentally coupled 
modalities 
Specific 
mappings 
idiosyncratic widely shared, highly 
conventionalized 
Sensation 
vivid, automatic, and 
conscious 
no evidence for vivid and 
conscious perception 
Voluntary 
control 
comparatively little control comparatively more control 
 
Table 1 highlights that there are more differences than similarities 
between canonical synesthesia and synesthetic metaphors. The similarities are, if 
at all, very superficial: Both phenomena involve some association between 
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different senses. Otherwise, the marriage of the terminology of perceptual 
“synesthesia” and linguistic “synesthesia” is an uneasy one. 
Perhaps we should speak of “crossmodal metaphors” rather than 
“synesthetic metaphors.” Crossmodal correspondences may involve 
environmentally coupled modalities, are not necessarily perceived in a conscious 
fashion, and are widely shared in the general population. All of these features 
apply better to cases such as sweet smell and rough sound than the notion of 
canonical synesthesia. 
In a discussion of synesthetic metaphors from 1957, O’Malley already 
noted that the contrast between crossmodal correspondences (“intersense 
analogies”) and synesthetic metaphors is less stark than that between canonical 
synesthesia and these expressions. This argument was based on frequency: 
“Intersense analogy is ancient and theoretically accessible to the experience of all 
normal persons. Clinical synesthesia, on the other hand, has to do with abnormal 
or eccentric experience of various.” 
In fact, some researchers have proposed that crossmodal correspondences 
motivate crossmodal uses of sensory adjectives. For example, the fact that people 
reliably associate tones of a certain pitch or loudness with particular luminances 
(Marks & Stevens, 1966; Stevens & Marks, 1965) may motivate such expressions 
as bright sound and dark sound (Marks, 1982a, 1982b). 
This chapter has argued that the terminology of synesthesia has 
overstayed its welcome in metaphor research. I believe that adopting the 
terminology of synesthesia may have biased the research community in a certain 
way (for similar arguments, see Deroy & Spence, 2013). First, loose references to 
synesthesia as a mere union of the senses may have stopped linguists from 
fleshing out the precise mechanisms that characterize the connection between 
language and perception. Second, references to synesthesia may have biased 
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researchers toward trying to find perceptual explanations for the corresponding 
expressions at the expense of considering language-internal explanations, such as 
the role of word frequency or differential lexicalization of the senses (see Chapter 
15). Seeking perceptual explanations for linguistic regularities is a useful 
endeavor that is much in line with the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis presented 
in Chapter 5. However, such endeavors should not detract from testing other, 
non-perceptual explanations. In general, the field of metaphor research is not 
helped by vaguely alluding to synesthesia. 
To conclude: Synesthetic metaphors are not synesthetic. In the next 
chapter , I will argue that they are not metaphorical either. 
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Chapter 7. Synesthetic metaphors are not metaphorical 
7.1. Introduction 
The last chapter argued that synesthetic metaphors are not synesthetic. This 
chapter argues that they are not metaphorical. Strik Lievers (2017) states that it 
cannot be taken for granted that synesthetic metaphors are, in fact, metaphors. 
Following her lead, this chapter explores how expressions such as sweet smell and 
sweet melody fit into linguistic theory, and whether they are best characterized as 
metaphorical, metonymical, or literal language use. 
 The core question of this chapter is: What is the linguistic status of 
synesthetic metaphors? Do they fall within the domain of literal language use or 
figurative language use? If they are figurative, what type of trope are they? 
Chapter 7.2 begins by reviewing the basics of metaphor theory. Even though I 
will eventually argue that conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) 
is the wrong theory to apply to synesthetic metaphors, a detailed discussion of 
metaphor theory is necessary to introduce several important distinctions. After 
reviewing conceptual metaphor theory, I will look at different avenues for fitting 
synesthetic metaphors into the cognitive linguistic framework (Chapter 7.3). 
Then, in Chapter 7.4, I argue for a literal analysis of expressions such as sweet 
smell— that is, an analysis where no metaphorical mappings are posited. Finally, 
I will argue that an evaluation-based theory of metaphor use allows the literal 
analysis to cover cases that appear, at first sight, to be more genuinely 
metaphorical (Chapter 7.5).  
 
7.2. Conceptual metaphor theory 
Probably the single most influential publication in metaphor theory was Lakoff 
and Johnson’s (1980) Metaphors We Live By. This book is commonly credited with 
ushering in modern metaphor research, and it has created a theoretical 
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framework that is now frequently called “conceptual metaphor theory” (Gibbs, 
1994; Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999), which is now 
considered a core component of the larger framework of cognitive linguistics 
(Croft & Cruse, 2004; Evans & Green, 2006). Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (1999, 
p. 101) say that within cognitive linguistics, conceptual metaphor is “one of the 
central areas of research,” which is largely due to the success of Metaphors We 
Live By. 
Compared to earlier views, several key innovations characterize the 
conceptual metaphor theory view of metaphor. First, metaphor is seen as not 
being confined to poetry and fanciful language use; instead it characterizes 
everyday language use. In fact, some researchers have estimated that up to 10% 
or up to 30% of words are used metaphorically, depending on the type of 
discourse analyzed (Pérez-Sobrino & Julich, 2014; Pragglejaz Group, 2007). The 
view that metaphor is not just for rhetorical embellishment existed before the 
advent of conceptual metaphor theory (e.g., Ortony, 1975), but Lakoff and 
Johnson’s publication helped solidify this view. Second, within conceptual 
metaphor theory, metaphor is seen as a matter of thought, with language only 
reflecting underlying conceptual mappings. As expressed by Grady (1997, p. 
281), “metaphors are based on concepts, not words.” Third, Lakoff and Johnson’s 
(1980) theory, especially later versions of it (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), 
emphasized the role of embodiment more strongly. For example, as will be 
discussed below, conceptual metaphor theory states that many metaphors are 
motivated through embodied interactions with the physical world. 
The empirical evidence for conceptual metaphor theory is strong. Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999) discuss it as one of the prime cases of “converging evidence” 
in cognitive linguistics, a theory that is supported by diverse strands of evidence 
(see Chapter 10). Whereas early opponents of the theory criticized that the 
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evidence for conceptual metaphors was mostly linguistic (Murphy, 1996, 1997), 
there now is a wealth of evidence that gets at the conceptual nature of metaphor, 
including evidence from metaphors in gesture (Casasanto & Jasmin, 2010; Cienki 
& Müller, 2008; Walker & Cooperrider, 2016; Winter, Perlman, & Matlock, 2014), 
and from metaphors in pictures, adverts, and movies (Forceville, 2006, 2008; 
Forceville & Urios-Aparisi, 2009; Ortiz, 2011; Pérez-Sobrino, 2016; Winter, 2014). 
Moreover, there is a plethora of experiments supporting conceptual metaphor 
theory that are either completely or partially nonlinguistic (for reviews, see 
Casasanto, 2014, 2017; Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010; Winter et al., 2015b; Winter 
& Matlock, 2017). 
As an example of a metaphor that has received considerable experimental 
support, consider INTIMACY IS WARMTH (metaphors are commonly presented in 
capitals). This metaphor is linguistically reflected in such expressions as She has a 
warm personality. Experiments have shown that if participants hold a warm cup, 
this induces positive social feelings (Williams & Bargh, 2008; see also IJzerman & 
Semin, 2009). On the other hand, experiments have shown that having positive 
social feelings makes people think that a room’s temperature is warmer (Zhong 
& Leonardelli, 2008). These experiments provide nonlinguistic evidence for the 
idea that the metaphor INTIMACY IS WARMTH is based on an underlying 
conceptual mapping. 
Let us have a look at some more precise definitions of metaphor. Whereas 
Kövecses (2002, p. 4) states that “in the cognitive linguistic view, metaphor is 
defined as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual 
domain,” Dancygier and Sweetser (2014) provide the following, more detailed, 
definition: 
 
	 111	
A conceptual metaphor is a unidirectional mapping projecting conceptual 
material from one structured domain..., called the source domain, to 
another one, called the target domain... (p. 14, emphasis in original) 
 
 The source domain is generally thought to be more concrete and the target 
domain to be more abstract, although others have used familiarity, clarity, 
stability, accessibility, and frequency as ways of characterizing the difference 
between source and target domains (see e.g., Wolff & Gentner, 2011). It is often 
not precisely specified what exactly is meant by concreteness (Dunn, 2015), but 
for present purposes it suffices to characterize concreteness as “the degree to 
which the concept denoted by a word refers to a perceptible entity” (Brysbaert et 
al., 2014, p. 904). The fact that metaphors involve mappings from concrete 
sources to abstract targets is often treated as a definitional property of metaphors 
(see, e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 207; Kövecses, 2002, p. 6). 
Some researchers have criticized a simple notion of concreteness and 
reconceptualized metaphors as involving mappings from intersubjectively 
accessible and sharable domains to relatively more subjective and less publically 
accessible domains. Dancygier and Sweetser (2014) give the MORAL ACCOUNTING 
METAPHOR (You owe me, I’m deep in your debt, How can I repay you for your help?) as 
an example of this principle. Accounting is arguably more intersubjectively 
verifiable than is morality, a comparatively more subjective notion. The 
intersubjective accessibility of source domains is also thought to explain why 
physical perception is such a common source domain, such as when verbs of 
visual perception are metaphorically extended to indicate knowledge states—for 
example, when English speakers say I see to mean ‘I understand’ (Matlock, 1989; 
Sweetser, 1990). The objects of visual perception are generally accessible to 
anybody who is present in a given situation (for a discussion, see San Roque et 
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al., 2015), whereas mental states are by definition internal and hence inaccessible 
to others.  
 Notice that the above definition by Dancygier and Sweetser (2014) 
specifies a “unidirectional mapping.” Many researchers take metaphors to be 
mapping that are in some form unidirectional, asymmetrical, or nonreversible 
(e.g., Kövecses, 2002, p. 6). For instance, English speakers may more frequently 
talk about time in terms of space (Christmas is coming, We are approaching 
Halloween) rather than the other way around (see discussion in Casasanto & 
Boroditsky, 2008). Within conceptual metaphor theory at least, asymmetry (or 
unidirectionality) is taken to be definitional of metaphor, although there are 
researchers who disagree with this view, especially metaphor researchers who 
do not align as strongly with conceptual metaphor theory (e.g., Anaki & Henik, 
2017; Campbell & Katz, 2006; Katz & Al-Azary, 2017). 
Unfortunately, as pointed out by Bottini and Casasanto (2010, p. 1353), 
Winter et al. (2015b), and Shen and Porat (2017), metaphor research often glosses 
over the important distinction between unidirectionality and asymmetry. 
Unidirectionality says that for two domains A and B, B is exclusively understood 
or talked about in terms of A, never the reverse. On the other hand, asymmetry 
states that two domains are bidirectionally associated with each other, but the 
influence of the source domain onto the target domain is stronger than the other 
way around. 
 Lee and Schwarz (2012) report an experiment testing the conceptual 
metaphor lying behind such expressions as This smells fishy, where reference to 
smell is used to indicate suspicion. They find that fishy smells make people more 
suspicious, but they also find that suspicious thoughts lead to heightened 
detection of fishing smells. Based on this, they argue for the bidirectionality of 
metaphor (see also IJzerman & Koole, 2011; Porat & Shen, 2017). However, the 
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experiments do not allow a detailed look the asymmetry of the two domains (i.e., 
whether fishy smells trigger suspicious thoughts more strongly than the reverse). 
Another example of confusing bidirectionality and asymmetry is provided 
by Winter and Matlock (2013), who test the metaphor SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY 
(These two views are close) and show that spatial proximity influences perceived 
similarity, and perceived similarity influences spatial placements. The 
experiments do not allow for estimating whether the experimental effects of A > 
B are stronger than the effects of B > A, which means that the experiments have 
nothing to say about asymmetry. To establish genuine asymmetry over and 
above bidirectionality, controlled experimental conditions are necessary, where 
the two domains are on relatively equal grounds and can be compared directly 
within the same task (see, e.g., Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008, for an attempt to 
investigate SPACE IS TIME metaphors). The topic of asymmetry versus 
unidirectionality will recur in Chapter 8. 
 
7.2.1. Primary metaphor 
Contemporary conceptual metaphor theory recognizes the existence of primary 
metaphors as a distinct subcategory of conceptual metaphors (Grady, 1997, 1999, 
2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Primary metaphors are those metaphors that are 
believed to stem from embodied correlations in the environment (Casasanto, 
2014, 2017; Grady, 1997, 1999; Lakoff, 1987; Winter & Matlock, 2017). For 
example, in our world, there is a positive correlation between verticality and 
quantity, as stated by Lakoff (1987): 
 
Whenever we add more of a substance—say, water to a glass—the level 
goes up. When we add more objects to a pile, the level rises. Remove 
objects from the pile or water from the glass, the level goes down. The 
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correlation is over-whelming: more correlates with up, but less correlates 
with down. (p. 276) 
 
Constantly experiencing this correlation is thought to lead to the primary 
metaphor MORE IS UP, reflected in such expressions as high prices, low prices, and 
rising taxes. Other examples of primary metaphors include MORE IS BIGGER/SIZE IS 
QUANTITY (large sum, tiny number) and SOCIAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL 
DISTANCE/INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS (we are very close, they drifted apart). All of these 
are supposed to stem from embodied correlations—that is, persistent 
associations of the source and target domain in our everyday interactions (for 
reviews regarding the embodied nature of these metaphors, see Casasanto, 2014, 
2017; Winter & Matlock, 2017). Their embodied nature is thought to make 
primary metaphors universal (see Grady, 1997, p. 288); that is, all cultures should 
show evidence for these metaphors, at least in thought (they may not be 
verbalized). An important aspect to which I will return below is that in primary 
metaphor, the source is supposed to be a concrete domain, which can be 
experienced through the senses, and the target is supposed to be more abstract, 
not as accessible to direct sensory perception (see Grady, 2005, pp. 1605–1606).  
Primary metaphors can be contrasted with complex metaphors or 
compound metaphors, of which THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS is a prime example 
(Grady, 1997). Humans do not experience a strong correlation between theories 
and buildings. However, the metaphor rests on other metaphors such as 
COMPLEX ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and PERSISTENCE IS REMAINING 
ERECT (Grady, 1997, p. 273), which in turn may be motivated through embodied 
correlations. In contrast to primary metaphors, complex metaphors are relatively 
more culture-specific. In the case of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, a culture needs to 
have a concept of theories as well as a concept of buildings. 
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7.2.2. Metonymy 
Metaphor needs to be distinguished from metonymy. Kövecses (2002, p. 144) 
says that “in metonymy we use one entity, or thing..., to indicate, or to provide 
mental access to, another entity.” Metonymy is most often explained by 
comparison to metaphor, as Gibbs (1994) does in the following quote: 
 
Whilst metaphor is a process by which one domain of experience is used 
to refer to another unrelated domain of experience, metonymy is a process 
by which one aspect of a domain of experience is used to refer to another 
aspect of the same domain of experience. (p. 13) 
 
For example, a speaker may say I read Shakespeare where she uses the 
name of the author to ‘stand in’ for his works. This expression is figurative 
because one cannot literally read Shakespeare, the author. The expression I read 
Shakespeare can be analyzed as involving an AUTHOR STANDS FOR AUTHOR’S 
WORK metonymy. With metonymy, there generally is some form of connection 
between the source and the target—a spatial or temporal contiguity, or a causal 
relationship, as in the case of an author producing a particular piece of work. 
Thus, whereas metaphor is generally taken to describe mappings between quite 
different semantic domains, metonymy is understood to involve within-domain 
mappings (see, e.g., Littlemore, 2015). Pérez-Sobrino (2017, Chapter 1) provides a 
useful analogy for distinguishing metaphor and metonymy. She likens 
metonymies to icebergs, where the tip of the iceberg visible above sea level 
indexes the presence of a larger mass of ice that is hidden beneath sea level. In 
contrast, she likens metaphors to bridges, as metaphors connect between 
different domains. 
	 116	
Recently, a number of scholars have begun to analyze primary metaphors 
as having a metonymical core (e.g., Barcelona, 2003). For example, Kövecses 
(2013) discussed the primary metaphor SADNESS IS DOWN/HAPPINESS IS UP, 
reflected in such expressions as I’m feeling down today and She’s having a low day. 
This is a primary metaphor, posited to stem from the correlation of low vertical 
position with negative feelings. And indeed, people interpret downwards-
oriented head posture and gaze as indicators of sadness (e.g., Coulson, 2004). The 
mapping between sadness and low vertical position is supposed to be motivated 
by contiguity. In a concrete situation, a speaker can talk about a person’s low 
body position to index their “low” spirit because there is a causal relationship 
between the two (causal contiguity). Thus, Kövecses (2013) proposes that DOWN 
STANDS FOR SADNESS lies at the core of the primary metaphor SADNESS IS DOWN. 
A similar reasoning applies to MORE IS UP. In a concrete situation, such as when 
cookies literally pile up, there is causal contiguity (MORE leads to UP) and spatial 
contiguity (both MORE and UP are co-present). In such a case, using the 
expression high number can be seen as reflecting a metonymy UP STANDS FOR 
MORE. However, when the quantity referred to is relatively more abstract, such 
as taxes or interest, then the metonymical core of the primary metaphor is less in 
focus. 
 
7.3. What are synesthetic metaphors? 
Having reviewed different types of metaphors, we are now in a position to re-
evaluate the linguistic status of synesthetic metaphors. Strik Lievers (2016, p. 43) 
says that the different uses of “synesthesia” refer to “at least partially different” 
phenomena, including different linguistic phenomena. Expanding upon the 
discussion in Strik Lievers (2017), the following possible linguistic analyses have 
to be discussed:1 
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(a) Synesthetic metaphors are conceptual metaphors 
(b) Synesthetic metaphors are primary metaphors 
(c) Synesthetic metaphors are metonymies 
(d) Synesthetic metaphors are literal expressions 
 
It seems that the first theoretical construct, conceptual metaphor, is not 
appropriate for those expressions commonly discussed in the literature on 
synesthetic metaphor. For conceptual metaphors, there is generally an 
asymmetry in the concreteness of the source and target domain, as when English 
speakers talk about abstract theories in terms of buildings. In synesthetic 
metaphors, both source and target are sensory (e.g., Shen, 2008, p. 302; Strik 
Lievers, 2016, p. 46; though see Petersen et al., 2008; Werning et al., 2006). 
Moreover, crossmodal uses of sensory adjectives do not participate in the rich 
inferential structures and many-to-many mappings that are the hallmark of such 
conceptual metaphors as THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, where the premises and 
assumptions are the foundation of a theory, the major argument is its framework, a 
theoretician is an architect, and debunking a theory is equivalent to its collapse, et 
cetera (see Grady, 1997, p. 269). 
 It is possible that synesthetic metaphors are primary metaphors (Sullivan 
& Jiang, 2013). As emphasized before, expressions such as sweet smell often 
appear to involve highly interconnected sensory modalities (see also Chapter 14). 
In fact, several authors have pointed out that at least for some of these 
expressions, environmental and psychological contiguity relations play a role 
(Dirven, 1985; Marks, 1978, Chapter 8; Nakamura, Sakamoto, & Utsumi, 2010; 
Shibuya & Nozawa, 2003; Shibuya, Nozawa, & Kanamaru, 2007; Sullivan & 
Jiang, 2013; but see Taylor, 1995, pp. 139–140). Ronga (2016, p. 57), for example, 
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says that crossmodal expressions involving taste “seem to reproduce the 
complex set of experiences that happen in the mouth.” Similarly, expressions as 
warm color and cool color are presumably based on learned associations between 
color and temperature (e.g., ice and cool lakes are generally blue; fire and flames 
are relatively more red and yellow) (cf. Dirven, 1985; Marks, 1978, Chapter 8; see 
also Cacciari, 2008, pp. 429–430). Sullivan and Jiang (2013) and Shibuya et al. 
(2007) similarly argue that linguistic expressions that combine sight and touch 
(rough color, dull color) involve highly associated senses, not very dissimilar 
senses. If one is considering the role of learning through embodied experience, 
cases such as warm color appear to be similar to prototypical primary metaphors 
such as MORE IS UP (high number). 
However, the concept of primary metaphor does not apply fully to the 
concept of synesthetic metaphor: Grady (2005, pp. 1605–1606) stresses that the 
target domain of primary metaphors needs to be non-sensory. As was 
emphasized above, synesthetic metaphors are most commonly defined as 
involving sources and targets that are both sensory. Thus, there is no apparent 
asymmetry in concreteness which would qualify synesthetic metaphors as 
primary metaphors. Strik Lievers (2017, p. 97) says that crossmodal uses of 
sensory words “may be distinguished from other metaphors because the 
conflicting concepts are both sensory, referring to two conceptually separate 
senses.” Here, I would take her characterization to say that synesthetic 
metaphors are neither good cases of conceptual metaphors, nor good cases of 
primary metaphors. 
A metonymical analysis may be better-suited for dealing with some cases 
of synesthetic metaphors, as several researchers have proposed (such as 
Barcelona, 2008). For instance, rather than sweet fragrance expressing an 
underlying SMELL IS TASTE metaphor, it may express a TASTE STANDS FOR SMELL 
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metonymy. In this case, taste and smell are seen as part of the same conceptual 
domain, but English speakers use one sub-domain, taste, to stand in for the other 
related sub-domain, smell. 
I am much in favor of a metonymical analysis. At least compared to a 
metaphor-based analysis, a metonymical analysis recognizes that sources and 
targets are highly associated—so much, in fact, they can be considered part of the 
same semantic domain. This is in line with the evidence that will be presented in 
Chapter 14: Sensory words tend to combine with words of their own modality, 
and if they do not, they tend to combine with words of highly similar modalities, 
such as in the case of taste and smell. A metonymical analysis recognizes this 
affinity and states that speakers can use one aspect of a correlated experience to 
stand in for another. 
However, a metonymical analysis still has the problem of positing two 
distinct subaspects within the same domain. For example, within the joint 
domain of taste and smell, a metonymical analysis would say that speakers use 
taste to ‘stand for’ for smell. This assumes that taste and smell are separate (but 
correlated) qualities. 
A comparison to a prototypical metonymy is insightful here. In the 
LOCATION STANDS FOR INSTITUTION metonymy, exemplified by such statements 
as The White House pardoned Joe Arpaio, the location sense of White House is clearly 
separate from the institution sense. Can we say the same thing about an 
expression such as sweet smell? Are taste and smell separate enough from each 
other to warrant a ‘stands for’ relationship that connects two separate senses? Or 
is no such relation needed because the word sweet is, in fact, as much a smell 
word as it is a taste word? 
 
7.4. The extent of the literal 
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7.4.1. The role of multisensory perception 
Dancygier and Sweetser (2014) remind us that “thinking about figurative 
expressions requires that we develop hypotheses about how words can provide 
access to concepts which are not literally associated with them” (p. 13). This is 
directly related to the crux of this chapter: Both metaphor- and metonymy-based 
accounts assume that there are additional concepts “which are not literally 
associated” with a sensory word’s core meaning. For example, analyzing sweet 
fragrance as being a taste-to-smell metaphor (Shen & Gil, 2007) rests on the 
assumption that ‘smell’ is not already part of the meaning of sweet. In general, 
positing a mapping between two entities requires two separate entities to be 
mapped onto each other. However, this assumption may be at odds with the 
intense multisensoriality of sensory words. 
My argument in this section will revisit several points made by Marina 
Rakova (2003) in her book The Extent of the Literal, where she argues that sensory 
adjectives such as sweet and harsh have rich, highly supramodal semantic content 
with a much broader denotational range than is commonly assumed (see also 
Marks, 1982a, p. 192; Paradis & Eeg-Olofsson, 2013). In terms of lexical semantics, 
her work implies that the two expressions sweet taste and sweet smell do not 
reflect two separate polysemous senses, but two contextually modified 
applications of the same underlying meaning (vagueness or “lack of 
specification”; see Cruse, 1986; Zwicky & Sadock, 1975). Thus, Rakova’s (2003) 
proposal amounts to saying that the word sweet has just one meaning that 
denotes both taste and smell. 
 Rakova (2003) exemplifies her approach with the sensory adjective hot. 
This word appears to have two distinct meanings, one referring to temperature, 
as in hot stove, and another one referring to spiciness, as in hot chili paste. At first 
sight, temperature and spiciness appear to be two quite dissimilar perceptual 
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qualities. However, Rakova (2003) uses neurophysiological evidence to show 
that the two perceptual meanings actually correspond to the same underlying 
neural system. The evidence has to do with nociception, our sense of pain. One 
pain receptor, the so-called “TRPV1” receptor responds to both noxious heat 
(with a thermal activation threshold of ~43 °C) and to capsaicin, a molecule that 
is present in chili peppers (e.g., Basbaum, Bautista, Scherrer, & Julius, 2009; Julius 
& Basbaum, 2001). Physiological responses to hot food (in terms of temperature) 
and to spicy food are moreover experienced to be phenomenologically similar, 
including sweat and the sensation of heat on the skin. Rakova (2003) then 
surmises that the concept expressed by the word hot denotes both spiciness and 
noxious heat sensations. 
 One easy misunderstanding of Rakova’s account is to see it as requiring us 
to posit that words directly refer to underlying perceptual brain states without 
conceptual mediation. Even though some do indeed assume such a direct 
mapping from words to perception (see Fahle, 2007, p. 35), it has been argued 
that language does not refer to perception directly, but mediated through 
intervening cognitive steps (see, e.g., Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976).2  In fact, 
according to the discussion of “ineffabilities” in Chapter 4, this is a necessary 
component of perceptual language, which involves such conceptual procedures 
as categorization (grouping particular experiences together). When Rakova 
(2003, p. 42) says that the spicy–hot association “is grounded in the molecular 
constitution of our pain detecting mechanisms,” this does not necessitate us to 
posit an unmediated match between brain states and words. Rakova herself 
actually endorses the view of highly “supramodal” concepts (e.g., p. 142) that 
result from the underlying neural association. For instance, speakers may have a 
high-level supramodal concept of hotness–spiciness that results from the 
repeated experience of similar sensations. 
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If one posits that sensory words are connected to such supramodal 
conceptual representations in which several sensory modalities are associated, is 
this not the same as a primary metaphor- or metonymy-based analysis, which 
also emphasize embodied associations? The difference between a figurative and 
a literal analysis is that the latter does not require a mapping from temperature 
to spiciness in cases such as hot food. That is, English speakers do not use 
temperature to understand spiciness; both are recognized as equally basic. 
Instead, hot stove and hot chili paste are seen as contextual modulations of the 
same literal meaning. 
 One can similarly use neurophysiological evidence about other sensory 
systems to carry her analysis of the meaning of hot to other perceptual domains. 
The argument easily extends to taste and smell. Chapters 13 and 14 will provide 
new evidence for the idea that linguistically, these two domains are inseparable. 
Spence and Piqueras-Fiszman (2014, p. 188) cite Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin, 
who said that “smell and taste are in fact but a single sense, whose laboratory is 
in the mouth and whose chimney is in the nose.” In Ronga’s (2016) study of taste 
metaphors, she acknowledges that “it is not possible to disentangle” whether 
particular words “selectively refer to taste or olfaction” (p. 51). A similar point is 
made by Lehrer (1978, p. 98), who noted that “words denoting taste cannot 
always be separated clearly from those for feel and smell” (cf. Staniewski, 2017). 
Lehrer’s quote naturally leads to us to discuss the interconnection 
between touch and taste as another case of highly associated modalities that may 
motivate linguistic expressions such as smooth taste, rough taste, and sharp taste. 
Lehrer (1978, p. 119) noted: “Since we have touch receptors in our mouth, it is 
easy enough to understand how touch sensations could be transferred to taste.” 
There is a whole wealth of tactile sensations felt in the mouth (Lehrer, 2009, p. 7). 
Our sense of touch is a quintessential component of flavor perception, 
	 123	
participating in many behavioral interactions with taste and smell (see Auvray & 
Spence, 2008; Spence & Piqueras-Fiszman, 2014). 
The argument for a shared neural substrate motivating the various uses of 
sensory words also extends to pain words. Semino (2010) discusses corpus 
examples of the adjective-noun phrase sharp pain (p. 208). In her account, the 
expression sharp pain is often best analyzed as a metonymical expression, where 
the cause of a pain (e.g., a sharp knife) is used to describe the evoked sensation 
(e.g., what one feels when being cut by a sharp knife). Furthermore, when sharp 
pain is used to describe pain that does not result from the damage of external 
entities (e.g., sharp pain in my stomach), she analyzes sharp as metaphorical (see 
also Schott, 2004). According to her, “even when pain does not directly result 
from tissue damage, it tends to be described metaphorically in terms of a variety 
of causes of physical damage” (p. 223). However, the pain evoked from external 
stimuli and the pain felt via interoception (i.e., the sense of the internal state of 
the body; see Connell, Lynott, & Banks, 2018) have common neural pathways 
and may ultimately be represented mentally as an emotion (see Craig, 2003). 
Thus, words such as sharp may tap into highly general sensory concepts that 
encompass multiple types of pain, both internal and external, as well as the 
resulting emotional response. 
We may even extend the literal argument to expressions involving touch 
and sound, such as rough sound and abrasive sound. There is abundant evidence 
for deep interconnections between audition and touch (e.g., Guest, Catmur, 
Lloyd, & Spence, 2002; Jousmäki & Hari, 1998; Lederman, 1979; Levänen, 
Jousmäki, & Hari, 1998; Schürmann, Caetano, Jousmäki, & Hari, 2004; Suzuki, 
Gyoba, & Sakamoto, 2008), including single-cell recording studies showing that 
the macaque auditory cortex (and hence, presumably the human auditory cortex 
as well) has neurons that directly respond to both auditory and somatosensory 
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stimuli (Schroeder et al., 2001). Similar to the case of taste and smell, touch and 
sound are much closer than a metaphor-based account would suggest, and so, 
too, are touch and taste. Hence, touch words such as rough and abrasive may be 
referring to highly general and highly supramodal concepts that are rendered 
specific when used in contexts such as rough taste and rough sound. 
It is useful to compare the usage of words such as rough and sweet in 
different contexts to the usage of color words, such as red. There is a continuum 
underlying color perception, defined by the physical quantity of wavelength. 
Color words such as red demarcate particular points on this continuum. A 
wavelength of about 650 nanometers, for example, is associated with the label red 
in English. Small variations in this wavelength (say, 645nm and 655nm), are still 
within the color category denoted by the word red. When humans perceive such 
small variations in wavelength, slightly separate but largely overlapping clusters 
of neurons are activated. In some cases, the wavelength may even be quite 
different and a speaker would still label the color red, as in the case of a red brick, 
which in many countries (such as the US) is often more orange than red. A 
similar example is provided by Cacciari (2008, pp. 425–426), who mentions the 
fact that in a language such as English, the word blue is used to describe both the 
sky and the ocean, even though the chromatic characteristics of the 
corresponding percepts are quite different. Yet, in neither of these cases do we 
want to posit two separate senses, red1 (for red brick) and red2 (for red rose), or blue1 
(for blue sky) and blue2 (for blue ocean). Instead, we recognize that the word red has 
a fuzzy boundary.3 Given this, there is no need to invoke a mapping from one 
color to another color, be it metonymical or metaphorical. The expressions red 
rose and red brick are both analyzed as literal. 
The argument then is that using red to talk about a red brick is not 
qualitatively different from using sweet to talk about sweet smell. And it is not 
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qualitatively different from using hot to talk about hot food (with the meaning 
‘spiciness’). Just as different types of redness sensations activate slightly different 
but also partially overlapping neural circuits, so too do different types of 
multisensory taste–smell sensations and temperature–spiciness sensations. In 
both the color case and the taste–smell case, there are two gradations of one 
underlying concept, two nuances of the same meaning. Because of this, the same 
way that we do not consider red brick to involve a figurative application of the 
word red, we do not have to consider sweet in sweet fragrance to be figurative 
either (contrary to, e.g., Shen & Gil, 2007). 
 
7.4.2. Categorical intuitions 
On the other hand, our intuition tells us that sweet is a taste word. A supramodal 
account is not inconsistent with this intuition, as it allows for some meaning 
components to be more salient than others. The same way that the redness 
sensations denoted by red apple may be more prototypical than those denoted by 
red brick, the use of sweet in sweet taste may be more prototypical than the use of 
sweet in sweet smell. 
Moreover, one has to think about from where the intuition that sweet is a 
taste word comes. Crucially, this intuition is not devoid of cultural context, even 
if performed by a linguist. After all, most linguistic research either explicitly or 
implicitly assumes the five senses folk model (Chapter 2), which is first and 
foremost a cultural model. Classifying the word sweet as a taste word is not a 
culture-free process; it slots the word into a particular view of the sensory world. 
What is more, it should be noted that a question such as “Is sweet a taste 
word?” is a loaded question because it presumes categoricity. We similarly 
expect a categorical answer when someone asks “What type of sense is described 
by sweet?” Spivey (2007) discusses how particular behavioral tasks impose 
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categoricity, which may make cognitive processes that are actually continuous 
seem categorical. I would argue that this is exactly what happens when 
researchers treat sweet as categorically belonging to taste. In fact, Lynott and 
Connell (2009) show that when people are given a continuous scale and are 
asked to focus on each sensory modality separately, they actually rate sweet to be 
high in both gustatory and olfactory content. Thus, when using a different task, 
one arrives at a different view of the word sweet. Connell and Lynott (2016) show 
that when people consciously think about sensory words, they are unaware of 
the multisensory nature of these words unless particular sensory modalities are 
highlighted individually. 
Connell and Lynott (2016) also show that their multisensory measurement 
scale outperformed relatively more unisensory measurement scales in predicting 
performance in a word processing task. Similarly, in Chapters 15 and 16, I will 
demonstrate that continuous modality scales, rather than categorical 
classifications, are better at predicting linguistic patterns such as word frequency 
and evaluative language use. This suggests that in actual language use, 
categories do not matter as much as the continuity of the senses. 
To conclude this section: When Strik Lievers (2017, p. 93) says that 
“linguistic descriptors of sensory experience...tend to be classified as pertaining 
to one sense or another,” she is certainly right, but we have to ask the question: 
What compels us to classify? And who is doing the classifying? It appears to me 
that it is primarily linguists who do the classifying, primarily for the purpose of 
facilitating linguistic analyses that already assume distinct categories in 
adherence to the five senses folk model. When linguists classify an expression 
such as sweet fragrance as a taste-to-smell mapping, this analysis imposes 
categoricity and unisensoriality onto the word sweet in part because of the 
linguist’s own cultural belief systems, in part because he or she is looking at the 
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word in isolation, in part because he or she is asking a question that demands a 
categorical answer, and in part because the multisensory nature of sensory 
words is difficult to intuit (Connell & Lynott, 2016). Actual language use does not 
need to obey such categorization processes. 
 
7.5. Evaluation and conceptual conflict 
7.5.1. Conceptual conflict 
The argument presented so far only applies to uses of sensory words that involve 
perceptually associated modalities. Explanations based entirely on associated 
modalities do not explain the full scope of what people consider synesthetic 
metaphors, as highlighted by Lehrer (1978): 
 
In the case of touch, taste, and smell, it may be that simple association will 
do—the association of how foods and beverages taste and fell in the 
mouth and how they taste and smell. However, the transfers from touch, 
taste, and dimension to sound and color and the transfers between sound 
and color would seem to be genuine synaesthetic transfers, and they call 
for an explanation. (p. 121) 
 
Strik Lievers (2016, p. 45), invoking Prandi’s (2012) notion of conceptual 
conflict, provides a useful definition of synesthetic metaphors according to which 
they involve a combination of sensory lexemes that “generate conflict at the 
conceptual level.” The expression sweet melody would be analyzed as involving 
conceptual conflict because melody is an auditory construct that has no gustatory 
manifestation. For the argument presented so far, such examples are problematic 
because in contrast to cases such as sweet smell, it is not as easy to posit an 
experiential contiguity, or any strong perceptual association. Although there are 
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interactions between taste and sound (e.g., Crisinel et al., 2012), the involved 
brain structures do not appear as overlapping as in the case of taste and smell, 
which arguably form one shared neural system. Taylor (1995, p. 139) lists 
synesthetic metaphors such as loud color as expressions that “cannot reasonably 
be reduced to contiguity.” Following Strik Lievers’ (2016) notion of conflict, we 
may say that there are conflict-involving expressions (e.g., sweet melody) and non-
conflict-involving expressions (e.g., sweet smell). 
My argument presented so far only applies to non-conflict-involving 
expressions. So, are conflict-involving expressions genuine synesthetic 
metaphors? Here one needs to ask: What exactly is it that is supposed to be 
mapped in expressions such as sweet melody, if anything is mapped at all? Is it the 
case that sweet melody actually involves the mapping of specific gustatory context 
onto an auditory concept? 
 
7.5.2. The role of evaluation 
Many researchers have argued for a role of evaluative and emotional meaning in 
synesthetic metaphors (e.g., Barcelona, 2003, 2008; Lehrer, 1978; Marks, 1978; 
Mendelson, 1984, p. 350; Shibuya & Nozawa, 2003; Shibuya et al., 2007; Tsur, 
2012). Already Osgood (1963, pp. 346–347) surmised that evaluation may be 
what motivates metaphorical mappings, including synesthetic metaphors (see 
discussion in Lehrer, 1978, p. 121). In general, Lehrer (2009, Chapter 6) and others 
recognize that perception and evaluation are often inseparable. In the context of 
wine, she says, “Wine drinking is an aesthetic experience, and naturally, the 
evaluative dimension is important and permeates every other dimension, 
including the descriptive ones” (p. 7).  
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Lehrer (1978) provides an illustrative example of how something that 
appears to be synesthetic ceases to be so once one looks at it from the perspective 
of evaluation and emotions: 
 
Joseph Williams predicts that if someone were asked to run a wire brush 
over his hand and say whether it felt sweet or sour, he would have no 
difficulty judging. However, the response might not be synaesthetic but 
rather a transfer of the meanings ‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’. (p. 119, 
Footnote 12) 
 
In fact, in perceptual science—regardless of any linguistic 
considerations—researchers have begun to explain certain crossmodal 
correspondences as being based on emotional processes as well. Palmer, Schloss, 
Xu, and Prado-León (2013) provide experimental evidence that associations 
between music and color are not based on perceptual correspondences between 
music and color, but on emotional correspondences (e.g., between major mode 
and happiness). 
Within language, Barcelona (2003) and Tsur (2012) discuss the examples 
loud color and loud perfume, both of which appear to primarily involve the 
mapping of “annoyingness” onto the visual and smell domain respectively, 
rather than the mapping of specific auditory content. Similarly, Lehrer (1978, p. 
121) says that the expression sour note is used “not because the note sounds as if 
it would taste sour,” but because the feature “[Displeasing to the Senses]” is 
borrowed from the taste domain and applied to the description of a sound. 
Following the lead of these authors, my argument will be that in some cases, 
evaluation trumps perceptual content when it comes to word choice. That is, in 
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such expressions as sweet melody, the highly evaluative meaning of sweet may be 
the dominant factor, not the specific gustatory content of the word. 
 Clearly, speakers consider both denotational content and evaluative 
content when choosing words. An extreme example for this is the word spinster. 
Purely based on its descriptive meaning, one should be able to use the word to 
apply to all elderly unmarried women. However, the clearly derogative meaning 
of the word prevents usage in most contexts, even if there is denotational fit. 
 Words such as spinster and prototypical evaluative words such as good 
and bad are not the only words to have evaluation as a core part of their lexical 
representation. Lehrer (1978, p. 121) already noted that “perhaps the basic 
semantic features that permeate all sensory words are those of intensity and 
evaluation.” And indeed, as reviewed in Chapter 5, there is psycholinguistic 
evidence that evaluative meaning is a core part of a word’s lexical representation 
(e.g., de Houwer & Randell, 2004; Vigliocco et al., 2009; Warriner & Kuperman, 
2015). Unfortunately, the language sciences often have a denotative bias and do 
not consider the importance of evaluative meaning in lexical semantics and 
metaphor research. Yet, perceptual and emotional meaning together may explain 
how sensory words are used crossmodally. 
The analysis presented here is actually consistent with the idea that there 
is a trade-off between perceptual and evaluative meaning in a word’s lexical 
representation, as per Vigliocco et al. (2009), Kousta et al. (2011), and Meteyard et 
al. (2012). In fact, this trade-off between perceptual specificity and emotional 
involvement already came up when discussing smell terms in Chapter 4: Smell-
related adjectives such as fragrant, aromatic, pungent, and rancid do not specify 
olfactory content in a precise manner, but they are quite clearly either positive or 
negative (cf. Levinson & Majid, 2014; Majid & Burenhult, 2014). Ankerstein and 
Pereira (2013, p. 312) talk about a similar aspect of taste language: The highly 
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evaluative word sweet can describe various tastes that differ quite starkly from 
each other, “it does not offer a clear description of a particular taste.” The visual 
adjective blue on the other hand, is much more specific, and it is also 
comparatively more neutral. Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976, p. 356) discuss a 
similar trade-off, saying that evaluative adjectives such as good are much more 
semantically dependent on their head nouns than color adjectives. A trade-off 
between emotional and perceptual content was also proposed in the context of 
synesthetic metaphors by Shibuya et al. (2007), who state that crossmodal 
metaphors are grounded either in a perceptual connection between two words 
(e.g., taste and smell), or in an emotional connection (see also Shibuya & 
Nozawa, 2003). Both descriptive and evaluative uses of words co-determine their 
use in linguistic expressions, including in linguistic expressions that are analyzed 
as synesthetic metaphors. 
Chapter 17 will present additional empirical evidence for the emotion–
perception trade-off hypothesis. 
 
7.5.3. The metaphor way of dealing with evaluation 
Whereas most corpus linguists view evaluation as a core component of language 
(e.g., Hunston, 2010; Thompson & Hunston, 2000), researchers in the cognitive 
linguistic tradition have treated evaluation and emotional meaning, either 
explicitly or implicitly, as something special. In particular, researchers working 
in this tradition have posited conceptual metaphors for cases where a concept is 
“mapped” across domains for mostly evaluative purposes (see analysis of taste 
metaphors in Sweetser, 1990). 
To exemplify some of the problems inherent in a metaphor-based 
approach of dealing with the evaluative use of adjectives, let us have a look at 
Bagli’s (2016) analysis of how Shakespeare uses the words sweet, bitter, sour, tart, 
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salt, and spicy “metaphorically.” Bagli finds sweetness to be the most prolific 
source domain (p. 149), used in expressions such as Marry, sir, because silver hath a 
sweet sound (p. 151). This usage of sweet in sweet sound is analyzed by Bagli (2016) 
to reflect the metaphor HEARING IS SWEET. For other expressions, he posits such 
metaphors as CHILDHOOD IS SWEET (A mother only mock’d with two sweet babes), 
LOVE IS SWEET (steal love’s sweet bait), and RECOVERY IS SWEET (The sweetest sleep). It 
should be noted that many of the target domains appear to have positive 
connotations, which is reflected in Bagli’s analysis by assuming a more general 
PLEASURE IS SWEET metaphor from which the other metaphors spring. For the 
word bitter, Bagli (2016) posits such metaphors as DISPLEASURE IS BITTER, EVIL IS 
BITTER, and SORROW IS BITTER, all of which involve negatively connoted target 
domains. Among the metaphors involving sour, Bagli lists negatively connoted 
metaphors such as DANGER IS SOUR, DISPLEASURE IS SOUR, and SORROW IS SOUR. 
The fact that there is a consistent evaluative component running across 
several metaphors suggests that a simpler analysis may be possible, one which 
recognizes the inherent evaluative meaning of words such as sweet and bitter. 
Saying that For these bitter tears (p. 154) is SORROW IS BITTER and that The 
consequence will prove as bitter (p. 153) taps into a different DISPLEASURE IS BITTER 
metaphor does not appear to recognize the inherent evaluative similarity 
between these two uses. Moreover, in positing the conceptual metaphor 
DISPLEASURE IS BITTER, we state that there is a mapping between emotional 
valence (DISPLEASURE) and taste, even though the displeasing nature of the word 
bitter seems to be an inherent aspect of the word’s meaning. If, as Dancygier and 
Sweetser (2014) remind us (see above), figurative language indeed provides 
access to what is otherwise not literally associated with a word, positing the 
metaphor DISPLEASURE IS BITTER amounts to saying that bitter sensations are not 
generally associated with displeasing feelings. 
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 One can easily see that Bagli’s metaphor-based analysis, which is also 
reflected in such approaches as Barcelona’s (2003, 2008), would amount to a 
proliferation of metaphors. For example, ugly and attractive are both dominantly 
visual words according to the native speakers consulted in Lynott and Connell’s 
(2009) rating study. When someone says ugly smells or attractive sounds, is it 
necessary to specify new mappings for each of these uses? What about the 
gustatory adjective tasty, which would then seem to require something like a 
PLEASURE IS TASTY mapping for such uses as tasty boogaloo beats (example from 
Pang & Lee, 2004)? It must be recognized that in many contexts, words such as 
sweet and bitter do not behave much differently from words such as tasty, 
distasteful, palatable, and unpalatable. 
 
7.6. Conclusions 
Synesthetic metaphors are not metaphorical after all. In the case of expressions 
involving no conceptual conflict, such as sweet smell, it appears most plausible to 
assume highly supramodal lexical representations, following Rakova (2003). In 
conflict-involving cases, such as sweet melody, evaluation matters relatively more 
strongly. Others have made conceptually similar proposals. Thus, the 
phenomenon of synesthetic metaphor ceases to be metaphorical for two reasons: 
either there is no need to posit synesthetic metaphors because the involved 
perceptual modalities are highly integrated, or there is no need to posit 
synesthetic metaphors because crossmodal uses simply follow from word-
inherent evaluative meaning. 
Thus, synesthetic metaphors are grounded either in perceptual association 
or in the evaluative meaning of words (compare Shibuya & Nozawa, 2003; 
Shibuya et al., 2007). This view is also consistent with the fact that emotional 
meaning is part of a word’s lexical representation (Chapter 5) and there may be a 
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trade-off between abstractness and emotional meaning in the lexicon (Kousta et 
al., 2011). 
 It should be emphasized that the view expressed here, although it may at 
first sight appear to stand against certain commonly held beliefs in cognitive 
linguistics, is in fact fully embodied. Our emotional response to sweet, sour, 
bitter, and other tastes is fully embodied. It is this hedonic response that is 
connoted by the corresponding words, and this subsequently affects how the 
words denoting these tastes—sweet, sour, bitter—are used in context (cf. Bagli, 
2017, p. 46). The embodied account advocated for in this chapter recognizes 
lexical presentations come with emotional meaning, a view for which there is 
independent experimental evidence (see Chapter 5). 
 The approach advocated here is also embodied in the sense that it is 
compatible with the evidence for mental simulation. According to Gibbs (2006), 
Gibbs and Matlock (2008), Semino (2010), and many others, understanding a 
metaphor involves the perceptual simulation of a metaphor’s source domain. 
This view is consistent with the large bulk of evidence for perceptual simulation 
stemming from both behavioral and neuroscientific studies (reviewed in Chapter 
5), and it has also received direct support from studies on metaphor processing 
(e.g., Lacey et al., 2012; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). In line with the Embodied Lexicon 
Hypothesis, I fully acknowledge the evidence for mental simulation. However, I 
would go one step further and argue that because the simulations themselves are 
already multisensory, the notion of metaphor does not need to be evoked for 
such expressions as sweet smell and rough taste. Thus, my account is fully 
embodied and fully simulation-based, but it makes do without metaphor. 
In fact, following Rakova (2003), one might argue that the analysis here is 
even more embodied than metaphor-based or metonymy-based analyses of 
synesthetic metaphors. Paradoxically, it is precisely the linguistic literature that 
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is most directly devoted to dealing with the multisensoriality of sensory words—
the literature on synesthetic metaphor—that tacitly imposes unisensoriality on 
sensory words, a unisensoriality that is not grounded in perceptual facts. 
Research on synesthetic metaphor thus falls prey to the five senses folk model, 
which is incorporated into linguistic theorizing as if it is an established fact 
rather than a cultural assumption. The very notion of synesthetic metaphor 
stands against the continuity of the senses, because it implies mappings between 
discrete domains. Once we take evidence from sensory science and 
psycholinguistics into account, no such mappings need to be posited. Thus, 
although I have come from a slightly different angle, I conclude with Rakova 
(2003, p. 147) that “all meanings of synaesthetic adjectives are likely to be their 
literal meanings.” 
 
 																																																								
1 It should be noted it is possible not all linguistic expressions that are commonly thought to be 
synesthetic metaphors may be accounted for by just one analysis approach. Perhaps different 
types of expressions require different linguistic analyses. 
 
2  Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976, p. vii) say that the correlations they had noted between 
language and perception “were mediated by an enormously complex conceptual structure... 
Percepts and words are merely into and out of this conceptual structure. Any theory of the 
relation between perception and language must necessarily be a theory of conceptual thought.” 
Elsewhere they say “the notion that language is a process of associating vocal noises with 
perceptual stimuli seems too simple” (p. 177). 
 
3 Plümacher (2007) says that “we do not designate every shade which is visually identifiable, but 
confine ourselves to names with a wide range of application” (p. 61; see also Fahle, 2007, and 
Wyler, 2007). 
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Chapter 8. The hierarchy of the senses 
8.1. Introduction 
The last two chapters deconstructed the notion of synesthetic metaphor, arguing 
that synesthetic metaphors are neither synesthetic nor metaphorical. This section 
deals with the hierarchy of the senses, the idea that the senses can be ranked 
according to how frequently they are used to talk about the other senses. 
Ullmann (1945, 1959) proposed the following order: 
 
(a) touch  < heat  < taste  < smell  < sound  < sight 
 
Following this hierarchy, metaphorical mappings are understood to move 
from left to right. Modalities to the left of the hierarchy are presumed to be more 
likely sources. Modalities to the right are presumed to be more likely targets. 
Examples of hierarchy-consistent expressions are coarse voice (touch-to-sound), 
sharp taste (touch-to-taste), warm color (heat-to-sight), and sweet fragrance (taste-to-
smell). The hierarchy of the senses, if it is true, is striking: A complex web of 
inter-sensory relations (assuming five senses, at least 25 combinations), is 
reduced to a highly general and abstract linear hierarchy. 
The first pieces of evidence for the hierarchy came from an analysis of 
Byron and Keats, for which Ullmann (1945) noted a higher proportion of 
hierarchy-consistent expressions than hierarchy-inconsistent expressions. 
Ullmann (1959) later confirmed the same tendencies in literary works from other 
languages, including French and Hungarian. A higher proportion of upwards-
transfers was subsequently found in a number of Indo-European languages, 
including English, Italian, German, and Russian (Day, 1996; Callejas, 2001; 
Mendelson, 1984; Ronga et al., 2012; Strik Lievers, 2015; Williams, 1976), as well 
as in a number of non-Indo-European languages, including Hungarian, Chinese, 
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Japanese, Hebrew, and Indonesian (Erzsébet, 1974; Shen, 1997; Shen & Gil, 2007; 
Whitney, 1952; Williams, 1976; Yu, 2003). Detailed studies of particular 
modalities also corroborate the notion of a hierarchy. For example, Bagli (2017) 
uses data from the “Mapping Metaphor with the Historical Thesaurus” project to 
show that the sensory modality of taste is more frequently used as a source 
domain than as a target domain across the history of English. 
Experimental studies provide converging evidence for the hierarchy of the 
senses, showing that hierarchy-consistent examples such as sweet fragrance are 
more easily recalled in memory tests than hierarchy-inconsistent examples such 
as fragrant sweetness (Shen, 1997; Shen & Aisenman, 2008), and they are also 
judged to be more natural, accessible, and easier to interpret (Shen & Cohen, 
1998; Shen & Gadir, 2009; Shinohara & Nakayama, 2011; Werning et al., 2006). 
 
8.2. Different versions of the hierarchy 
In the literature on synesthetic metaphors, several modifications of Ullmann’s 
original hierarchy have been proposed (see Shinohara & Nakayama, 2011). One 
of the more complex hierarchies is presented by Williams (1976).1 This hierarchy 
is shown in Figure 1 with example expressions that identify each path. 
 
 
Figure 1. The sensory metaphor hierarchy according to Williams (1976, p. 463). 
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 There are a large number of differences between the hierarchy of Williams 
(1976) and that of Ullmann (1959). First, the two use different sense 
classifications, with Williams (1976) lumping Ullmann’s (1959) touch and heat 
categories together. This has generally been done in most studies of crossmodal 
expressions since then (but see Day, 1996; Ronga et al., 2012). Williams (1976) 
labelled the vision node “color,” which de-emphasizes visual characteristics such 
as brightness, saturation, and opacity and spatial characteristics such as shape. 
However, as pointed out by Ronga et al. (2012, p. 464), among the adjectives he 
considered, there are many non-color-related adjectives such as bright, brilliant, 
clear, dark, dim, faint, light, and vivid. These words denote visual characteristics 
other than hue, and hence, we can think of the color node in his hierarchy as a 
visual node. 
Williams (1976) captures the spatial dimension by adding a new category, 
dimension words, which describes such things as extent and shapes, such as the 
words acute, big, small, deep, empty, even, fat, flat, low, high, hollow, level, little, 
shallow, thin, thick, large, and full (p. 464). While it is plausible to separate these 
words describing common sensibles (see Chapter 4,) from other sensory words, 
Ronga et al. (2012) rightly points out that Williams’ (1976) classification of words 
as dimension words lacks explicit criteria (see also discussion in Lehrer, 1978). 
It must then be highlighted that Williams (1976) discusses a different set of 
crossmodal connections. In this model, sight and sound are bidirectionally 
connected, with expressions such as quiet color (sound-to-color) and bright sound 
(color-to-sound) exemplifying both paths. This aspect of Williams’ hierarchy was 
preshadowed by Ullmann (1959, Chapter 5.2), who already noted that the 
relative positioning of the visual and auditory modality is not necessarily clear. 
Based on his corpus evidence, Ullmann already noted that there appears to be a 
bidirectionality between sound and sight, something that has been found 
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repeatedly since then (e.g., Day, 1996; see also Marks, 1982a, 1982b). Although 
Ullmann’s visual representation of the hierarchy in tabular format lists sound 
before sight, his writing suggests that the two are actually in the same position 
within the hierarchy. Shen and colleagues have since then also treated sound and 
sight as equipositional (e.g., Shen & Gil, 2007). 
It should be noted that in the network of asymmetrical sense relations of 
Williams (1976), the domain of smell is an impasse: It borrows linguistic material 
from the other modalities, but it does not lend any material of its own (see also 
Sadamitsu, 2004). This was already present as a numerical trend in Ullmann’s 
data, where there were few cases of smell words used in the context of sound 
words (Tsur, 2008, p. 288). Finally, it should be noted that Williams’ (1976) 
hierarchy does not have a direct touch-to-smell connection (see also Lehrer, 
1978). 
The following simplified hierarchy is a representation of the hierarchy 
that most researchers in the field appear to adopt (e.g., the work of Shen and 
colleagues), what we might call a “consensus hierarchy” or “simplified 
hierarchy”: 
 
(b) touch  < taste  < smell  < sound / sight 
 
 We should ask whether the crossmodal “transfers” specified by the 
hierarchy are characterized by asymmetry or unidirectionality, an important 
distinction discussed in Chapter 7. That is, does one sense “transfer” to another 
but never the reverse (unidirectionality), or does one sense “transfer” to another 
more so than the reverse (asymmetry)? Given the already established evidence, it 
must be the case that the hierarchy of the senses is about metaphorical 
asymmetry rather than unidirectionality. This follows from the fact that Ullmann 
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(1959), Shen (1997), Strik Lievers (2015), and many others report cases that go 
against the hierarchy, but these cases are much less frequent.2 
However, once we are dealing with asymmetry rather than 
unidirectionality, we have to worry about the fact that the asymmetry may be 
stronger or weaker for particular combinations of sensory modalities. The visual 
representation of hierarchies such as (a), (b), and Figure 1 appears to suggest that 
all pathways between the senses are equally likely, despite corpus work showing 
that this is not the case. Among other things, several researchers (including 
Ullmann) found touch-to-sound “mappings” to be overrepresented (see Day, 
1996; but also see Whitney, 1952). Unfortunately, many publications in this field 
do not allow for assessing the strength of particular crossmodal connections 
because only summary data is presented. For example, Shen (1997, p. 50) says 
that of the 130 synesthetic metaphors in his Hebrew poetry corpus, 95 matched 
the hierarchy (73%), a figure that does not allow assessing which particular 
sensory associations are more or less dominant. This tradition of reporting was 
started with Ullmann (1945, 1959), who only listed detailed tabulations for Keats, 
Byron, and Gautier, but not for any of the other poets he analyzed, such as 
Longfellow and Wilde. 
 
8.3. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I discussed the notion of a hierarchy of the senses, of which there 
are multiple different versions. This hierarchy is supposed to govern 
asymmetries in how sensory words are combined. How can the idea of a 
hierarchy discussed here be reconciled with the idea, presented in the last 
chapter, that synesthetic metaphors do not really involve metaphorical 
mappings? It has to be recognized that the very idea of a hierarchy of the senses 
where different modalities are lined up in a linear fashion necessitates 
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differentiating the senses to begin with; that is, we can only talk about touch 
being at the lowest position in the hierarchy if we take touch to be a well-
demarcated “thing” that can occupy a clear position in an ordered list, separate 
from the other modalities. The hierarchy of the senses thus rests on the 
assumption of the five senses folk model: Only by assuming five sensory 
modalities can we position these modalities with respect to each other. It would 
seem that if we dispense of the five senses folk model and the idea that 
synesthetic metaphors involve metaphorical mappings, the hierarchy of the 
senses falls apart. 
 The idea of specific crossmodal uses of sensory words being more 
frequent than others is, in fact, compatible with a more continuous view of how 
words are associated with sensory modalities. It is possible to maintain that sweet 
is both gustatory and olfactory while at the same time observing that it may 
appear to be primarily a taste word when one deliberates the word’s meaning in 
isolation (see Chapter 7). The question then is not about whether there is a 
“transfer” of taste meaning to smell meaning, but whether words whose 
semantic prototypes are relatively more taste-related occur in linguistic contexts 
that are relatively more smell-related. There still can be empirically observed 
asymmetries in how the sensory vocabulary is deployed in language use, but 
these asymmetries are then about words with multiple meaning dimensions that 
get shifted in emphasis when they occur in specific contexts. The only thing 
avoided is the assumption of a discrete process of understanding one clearly 
delineated sensory domain in terms of another clearly delineated sensory 
domain. Chapters 14 and 17 will demonstrate that crossmodal language use can 
be analyzed continuously. 
For the sake of discussion, we will temporarily accept the existing 
evidence for the hierarchy (but see Chapter 17 for new evidence and 
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qualifications) so that we can move to a discussion of what explains the hierarchy. 
In the next chapter, the hierarchy of the senses will be discussed from a 
multicausal perspective, looking into several of the factors that may contribute to 
asymmetries in the usage of sensory words. 
 
 																																																								
1 The evidence presented by Williams (1976) is slightly different from many other studies on 
synesthetic metaphors. Whereas most other research looks at corpus frequencies, Williams 
looked at dictionary data and word etymologies. 
 
2 Once asymmetry (as opposed to unidirectionality) is at stake, one needs to consider whether a 
piece of asymmetry stems from a preference for being hierarchy-consistent or a dispreference for 
being hierarchy-inconsistent. A preference for A > B or a dispreference for B > A could lead to the 
same observed pattern, even though they would reflect different underlying mechanisms. 
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Chapter 9. Explaining the hierarchy of the senses 
9.1. A multicausal approach 
The last chapter introduced the hierarchy of the senses. This chapter looks at 
factors that may explain the observed asymmetries between sensory words. An 
overview of explanatory accounts is shown in Table 2. These accounts are not 
mutually exclusive, although a given study most often focuses on only one 
account. Research on synesthetic metaphors generally does not emphasize the 
possibility that metaphorical asymmetries may arise from multiple conjoining 
factors (for notable exceptions, see Ronga et al., 20120; Strik Lievers, 2015; Tsur, 
2008, 2012). 
 
Table 2 
Summary of different explanatory accounts of the hierarchy  
Account Explanation 
Perceptual 
Language-internal asymmetries arise from 
perceptual asymmetries 
Lexical Asymmetries arise from differential ineffability 
Evaluative Evaluative adjectives are more likely sources 
Gradability Gradable adjectives are more likely sources 
Iconic Iconic adjectives are less likely sources 
Idiosyncratic 
Asymmetries arise from individual preferences 
and/or cultural fashions 
 
 
 One should distinguish between global and local accounts of explaining 
the hierarchy, which is a distinction that runs across the different explanatory 
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accounts. Global accounts try to explain the entire hierarchy with one principle 
or a small set of principles that span across the different sensory modalities. 
Local accounts focus on specific crossmodal mappings—for example, providing 
a separate explanation for the asymmetry between taste and smell than for the 
asymmetry between touch and taste. 
Chapter 9.2 will review the different approaches, and Chapter 9.3 will 
evaluate these different approaches. In Chapter 9.4, I will draw some interim 
conclusions and argue for the idea that the hierarchy may have multicausal 
origins rather than monocausal ones. 
 
9.2. Overview of explanatory accounts 
9.2.1. Perceptual accounts 
By far the most common explanatory accounts are perception-based. Perhaps the 
most dominant account that links metaphorical asymmetries to perceptual 
asymmetries comes from Shen and his colleagues, who have proposed what they 
have variously labelled the “directionality principle” (Shen & Gil, 2007), the 
“cognitive principle” (Shen & Aisenman, 2008), and the “conceptual preference 
principle” (Shen & Gadir, 2009). Shen and Cohen (1998) talk about a “cognitive 
constraint,” according to which a “mapping from a more accessible concept onto a less 
accessible one is more natural than its inverse” (p. 123, emphasis in original). Across 
Shen’s body of work, this notion of accessibility has also been referenced to as 
conceptual preference, concreteness, or salience (Shen, 1996, 1997, 2008; Shen & 
Aisenman, 2008; Shen & Cohen, 1998; Shen & Gadir, 2009; Shen & Gil, 2007). 
Shen and Aisenman (2008, pp. 111–113) characterize their notion of 
accessibility as follows: Touching, tasting, or smelling an object entails being 
close to it. 1 Vision and audition, on the other hand, are relatively more distal (i.e., 
humans can use them to experience objects from very far away).2 This makes 
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touch and taste in particular very “direct,” because these two modalities involve 
immediate contact with an object. In addition to the criterion of distance, the 
directionality principle is thought to be grounded in phenomenological 
differences in the felt experience of the different sensory modalities. 
Experiencing something through vision and hearing is argued to be more object-
based; that is, the object external to one’s body is understood by the experiencer 
as the cause of his or her sensation (see also Shen, 2008, p. 302). Touch, taste, and 
smell, on the other hand, are argued to be relatively more subjective. These three 
senses are phenomenologically experienced as physiological sensations that are 
more directly connected to one’s body rather than to external objects. These ideas 
are echoed by Pasnau (1999, p. 314), who says that “only sight and hearing 
perceive things as being out in the world, at a distance from the body.” 
A defining feature of the directionality principle is that accessibility (or its 
sister notions of concreteness and salience) is understood to allow separating the 
sensory world into “lower” and “higher” senses. As such, the hierarchy is 
monolithic, in that one principle (accessibility) is thought to account for the entire 
hierarchy. Rather than focusing on specific pairs of senses, Shen and colleagues 
seek to ground the hierarchy of the senses in a one-size-fits-all principle. This 
makes the directionality principle a global explanatory account of the hierarchy, 
not a local one. 
 Along with Shen and colleagues, other researchers have also proposed 
explanations that are based on perceptual asymmetries. Williams (1976, pp. 464–
465) talks about more or less “differentiated” sensory modalities. Similarly, Tsur 
(2008) talks about the need for poetry to achieve “undifferentiatedness” (p. 286). 
He argues that because visual shapes are stable and differentiated, they “resist 
smooth synaesthesia” (p. 288). 
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The perceptual accounts discussed so far attempt to account for all or 
many different asymmetries in one swoop. A different approach is to look at the 
specifics of each pair of crossmodal connections (such as taste/smell or 
touch/taste) and see whether there is any evidence for asymmetry in perception. 
These are local accounts that explain only specific subparts of the hierarchy. 
Lehrer (1978), for example, explains the asymmetry between touch and taste as 
follows: 
 
Since we have touch receptors in our mouth, it is easy enough to 
understand how touch sensations could be transferred to taste. On the 
other hand, since we can touch things with receptors all over our skin and 
do not have taste receptors all over, it makes somewhat less sense to talk 
about something feeling sweet or sour. ( p. 119) 
 
Shibuya et al. (2007, p. 217) think that touch-to-sight asymmetry comes 
from the fact that “tactile sense often involves the use of the visual sense,” but 
not vice versa. They say that “looking at a chair gives one some visual 
information about the object, but it does not provide any tactile information.” To 
explain touch-to-sound asymmetry, Ronga et al. (2012, pp. 141–142) allude to the 
fact that there are asymmetries between touch and audition in perception, with 
touch affecting auditory perception more than the reverse (e.g., Caclin, Soto-
Faraco, Kingstone, & Spence, 2002; Soto-Faraco, Spence, & Kingstone, 2004; see 
also Schürmann et al., 2004). 
Perceptual explanations are by far the most dominant in research on 
synesthetic metaphors. Very few researchers even consider that the causality 
between language and perception may be reversed; perhaps language creates 
rather than reflects crossdomain mappings (see Levinson & Majid, 2014, p. 415). 
	 147	
There is some evidence at least that metaphorical language may influence 
nonlinguistic thought (Dolscheid et al., 2013), so the idea that the causal chain 
goes the other way—from language to perception—should at least be 
entertained. 
 
9.2.2. Lexical composition and ineffability 
Ullmann (1959, p. 283) considered the possibility that at least part of the observed 
metaphorical asymmetries could be explained through lexical differentiation (i.e., 
the fact that there are fewer lexical distinctions for some sensory modalities; see 
Chapter 4). To explain Ullmann’s reasoning, it is useful to consider the 
connection between vision and audition. Ullmann (1959) observed in his data 
that “the acoustic field emerges as the main recipient” in crossmodal metaphors 
(p. 283). He also noted that more visual terms are used to talk about auditory 
concepts (e.g., bright sound, pale sound, dark voice) rather than the other way 
around (e.g., loud color). His explanation of this fact was as follows: 
 
Visual terminology is incomparably richer than its auditional counter-
part, and has also far more similes and images at its command. Of the two 
sensory domains at the top end of the scale, sound stands more in need of 
external support than light, form, or colour; hence the greater frequency of 
the intrusion of outside elements into the description of acoustic 
phenomena. (Ullmann, 1959, p. 283) 
 
 Similarly, Engstrom (1946) says that “vocabulary limitations often enforce 
the use of intersensal terms when there is need for discriminating between 
impressions on the same sensory level” (p. 10). He discusses the apparent lack of 
differentiation in the color vocabulary of Ancient Greeks, arguing that this in 
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part explains why they used fewer metaphors based on colors (p. 18). The notion 
that the use of perception-related metaphors is motivated by the richness (or 
poverty) of vocabulary within a particular semantic domain is held by many 
researchers (see also Abraham, 1987; Holz, 2007; Ronga et al., 2012; Strik Lievers, 
2015; Velasco-Sacristán & Fuertes-Olivera, 2006). Metaphor is generally seen as 
one of the primary ways to extend meanings in order to widen the range of 
concepts that can be expressed (Dirven, 1985; Ortony, 1975; cf. Lehrer, 2009, p. 
19). Researchers have argued that pain, which is a “subjective and poorly 
delineated experience that is difficult to express satisfactorily in language” 
(Semino, 2010, p. 206), may need metaphors to be conveyable (Semino, 2010; 
Schott, 2004). The idea that metaphor can compensate for limited vocabularies is 
perhaps most clearly stated in Fainsilber and Ortony’s (1987) inexpressibility 
hypothesis, which “proposes that metaphors may enable the communication of 
that which cannot be readily expressed using literal language” (p. 240). 
 It is not only the number of source terms that needs to be considered, but 
also the frequency with which speakers feel the need to talk about the target 
domain, which harkens back to the discussion of communicative need in Chapter 
4. Abraham (1987, p. 162) uses the German word “Differenzierungsbedürfnis” 
(‘need to differentiate’) to explain why people want to use sensory words 
crossmodally. Strik Lievers (2017, p. 92) says that “the dominant role of sight and 
hearing in human perception...may help explain why in many languages these 
two modalities are the most frequent targets of synaesthetic transfers.” Tsur 
(2007, p. 34) says “the richer the sensory domain, the more it ‘borrows’; the 
poorer the domain, the more it ‘lends’.” If indeed sight and sound are more 
important to humans, then we expect that they will be more frequently 
verbalized, which is what the evidence suggests (Chapter 15). Given frequent 
reference to visual and also sometimes auditory concepts, and given a basic 
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linguistic need to be expressive and occasionally even extravagant in one’s 
descriptions (see Haspelmath, 1999), we expect that speakers would have to 
innovate visual and auditory vocabulary more frequently. This would create a 
drive for borrowing lexical material from the other senses to allow continued 
expressivity (compare Engstrom, 1946, p. 10). 
 
9.2.3. Evaluation 
As was already mentioned in Chapter 7, many researchers have discussed a 
potential role of affect and evaluation in the crossmodal use of sensory words 
(Barcelona, 2003, 2008; Lehrer, 1978; Marks, 1978, pp. 216–218; Osgood, 1981; 
Popova, 2005; Sakamoto & Utsumi, 2014; Tsur, 2008, Chapter 10). Tsur (2012, p. 
230) discusses that for the expression loud perfume, the negative meaning of 
obtrusiveness is more salient than the sensory impression of loudness (cf. 
Barcelona, 2003, 2008; Tsur, 2008). As was argued in Chapter 7, expressions that 
combine seemingly dissimilar sensory modalities, such as sweet melody, may be 
motivated by the evaluative nature of sweet. Perhaps the high emotionality of 
taste words (see Chapter 16) explains why taste vocabulary is often used to talk 
about the other senses. 
 
9.2.4. Gradability 
Scalar gradability characterizes concepts which can be conceived of as being 
more or less. For example, a surface can be more or less rough. On the other 
hand, a color term such as blue is not gradable. It is possible to say that one color 
is more blue than another color, but in doing so the word more is used to indicate a 
shift toward a more prototypical blue, rather than an increase in the quantity of 
‘blueness’ (Gärdenfors, 2014, p. 136). O’Malley (1957, p. 394) already said that 
	 150	
“rough scalar arrangements of sense qualities” may motivate “intersense 
analogies” (see also Abraham 1987, p. 163). 
Werning et al. (2006) conducted a naturalness rating study with German 
crossmodal expressions. Petersen et al. (2008) noted that color terms were less 
acceptable in crossmodal expressions, which they link to the lack of gradability 
of color words. Ronga et al. (2012) observed that shape descriptors such as round 
are also not gradable, stating that “an object may or may not be round, but it 
cannot be more or less round” (p. 148; see also Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976, pp. 
355–357).3 The fact that vision is associated with many non-scalar concepts may 
explain why vision is positioned at the top of the hierarchy. The same goes for 
sound, which also appears to have many non-scalar terms, such as squealing and 
barking. 
 Popova (2005) proposed that touch words are more gradable, saying that 
expressions such as soft voice come with an “implicit degree of intensity” (p. 410). 
According to Popova (2005), touch has more affordance for gradability because 
the manual exploration of surfaces is a piecemeal affair in which information is 
arrived at in a sequential fashion (cf. Bartley, 1953, p. 401; Ullmann, 1959, p. 283; 
see also Ronga et al., 2012, p. 148). 
Temperature terms are also gradable and can be arranged in a linear 
fashion, such as hot, warm, lukewarm, cool, and cold (see Koptjevskaja-Tamm, 2015; 
Lehrer, 1978, p. 100). Abraham (1987, p. 186) notes in passing that temperature as 
a perceptual domain has more graded terms than other domains. Perhaps as a 
result of their graded nature, temperature terms are also frequently used 
crossmodally, such as with the expressions warm color, cool color, warm sound, and 
cool sound. Correspondingly, Ullmann (1959) positions temperature (separately 
from touch) at the bottom of the hierarchy of the senses. 
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Thus, altogether there is some suggestion that those sensory modalities at 
the bottom of the hierarchy (particularly touch) are associated with more scalar 
terms than those at the top of the hierarchy, which may have an overall higher 
number of non-scalar terms. 
 
9.2.5. Iconicity 
Adjectives are intrinsically underspecified, requiring a head noun to gain full 
meaning (Diederich, 2015, Chapter 4; Paradis, 2000). Some researchers have 
argued that crossmodal uses of sensory words require semantically malleability 
(compare Abraham, 1987, p. 158; Baumgärtner, 1969, pp. 16–17). For example, the 
fact that the word sweet can be used in very different kinds of contexts (such as 
sweet taste compared to sweet melody) suggests that the word is semantically 
malleable. 
It is possible that this malleability may be restricted through iconicity 
(Lupyan & Winter, 2018). Words such as squealing, hissing, and booming are very 
strongly tied to particular auditory impressions because they are depictive (i.e., 
the sound of these words is highly evocative of the actual percept). This may 
explain why such expressions as squealing color, hissing taste, and beeping smell do 
not appear to be felicitous. The auditory word loud is arguably less iconic than 
the words squealing, hissing, and booming. Correspondingly, it is easier to use this 
word in crossmodal expressions such as loud perfume and loud color (Barcelona, 
2003; Taylor, 1995, p. 139; Tsur, 2012). The idea that spoken iconicity restricts 
crossmodal use goes back to Classen (1993), who wrote that “auditory terms are 
too echoic or suggestive of the sounds they represent to be used to characterize 
other sensory phenomena” (p. 55). This idea will be tested in Chapter 17. 
 
9.2.6. Idiosyncratic explanations 
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Ullmann (1959, Chapter 5.2) also considered the role of “the mental make-up, 
temperament, and synesthetic leanings and experiences of the individual” (p. 
286, emphasis in original), the use of stimulants (such as hallucinogenic drugs), 
and “contemporary fashions, literary and artistic models, and current modes of 
vision” (p. 288, emphasis in original). Tsur (2007) discusses the many ways 
writers and poets may violate certain expectations in what he calls “literary 
synesthesia” to create witty effects. However, as a stylistic device, this trope is 
not without its critics (Engstrom, 1946), and its use differs across literary 
traditions. Earlier work on the crossmodal uses of sensory words focused more 
strongly on highlighting differences between poets and stylistic traditions 
(Engstrom, 1946; Erzsébet, 1974; Ullmann, 1945, 1959; Whitney, 1952) than 
modern work (but see Day, 1996; Popova, 2003; Strik Lievers, 2016). Some 
scholars even outright rejected the idea that there are lawful principles in 
crossmodal language (Abraham, 1987, p. 162). 
 
9.3. Evaluating the different explanatory accounts 
Let us take stock of the various explanatory accounts discussed in this chapter. 
How plausible is each account? And to what extent has each account already 
been supported by empirical evidence? 
 
9.3.1. Evaluating perceptual accounts 
When Williams (1976) discussed parallels between language-external aspects of 
perception and linguistic hierarchy, he said the following about his own 
speculations: “It should be strongly emphasized that the following are presented 
only as striking parallels, to pique interest. No cause-effect relationship whatever 
is claimed” (p. 472).  
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In fact, the same reasoning applies to all arguments based on language-
external factors, so long as no experimental link between metaphor usage and 
perceptual factors is directly established. A host of experimental and 
neurophysiological findings link different senses with each other (e.g. Spence, 
2011), often in context-dependent and phenomenon-specific ways. There are 
myriads of differences between the senses, and there are many different 
experimental findings that suggest various forms of asymmetries between the 
senses. 
Any account based on language-external perceptual facts is open to attack 
from an argument based on an alternative set of facts. Consider that Shibuya et 
al. (2007) argue for a linguistic touch-to-sight asymmetry based on the fact that in 
perception, vision dominates touch (e.g., Hay & Pick, 1966; Rock & Victor, 1964) 
wheareas Ronga et al. (2012) provide a related argument, but they apply the 
opposite logic. These authors cite experimental results where touch dominates 
sound in perception (e.g., Caclin et al., 2012) to argue for a linguistic touch-to-
sound asymmetry. What is more, both researchers only address aspects of the 
asymmetry between perceptual modalities. The dominating sense in perception 
depends on the task and the particular qualities investigated. For example, it has 
been found that vision dominates sound with respect to spatial perception, but 
sound dominates vision with respect to temporal perception (Morein-Zamir, 
Soto-Faraco, & Kingstone, 2003). Which of these perceptual asymmetries shall be 
taken to motivate linguistic asymmetries? It is impossible to answer this question 
without further evidence. 
Perceptual accounts of the monolithic nature (global accounts) are even 
more problematic, particularly the above-mentioned idea put forth by Shen and 
colleagues that the more “accessible” senses are mapped onto the less 
“accessible” ones. Rakova (2003) remarks that their notion of accessibility is 
	 154	
“suspect” (p. 113). Indeed, it appears to be at odds with most empirical work on 
accessibility. Psycholinguistically, this construct is generally operationalized in 
terms of speed of processing. Perceptual experiments show that people are 
quicker at processing visual and auditory information than tactile information 
(Spence et al., 2001; Turatto et al., 2004), and the same applies to visual and 
auditory words, compared to touch words (Connell & Lynott, 2010; see also 
Connell & Lynott, 2014). Sometimes, the notion of accessibility is operationalized 
in terms of word frequency (e.g., Harmon & Kapatsinski, 2017), in which case 
vision would seem to be the most accessible sense because it is the most frequent 
(see Chapter 15). Paradis and Eeg-Olofsson (2013, p. 37) and Caballero and 
Paradis (2015) state that the directionality principle is at odds with the 
crosslinguistic literature on the evidentiality hierarchy, according to which vision 
is the most accessible sensory modality (which explains why visual terms often 
form the basis of grammaticalization processes that lead to evidential markers). 
In general, the notion that the sensory world can be categorized into lower 
and higher senses is not grounded in any neuropsychological facts. Most 
scientists working on the senses do not accept this division, and some have 
vehemently argued against it.4 Furthermore, the notion that some senses are 
more or less differentiated than others—seen in such proposals as Williams 
(1976) and Tsur (2008, 2012)—also does not map straightforwardly onto anything 
in sensory science; there is no widely accepted empirical measure of perceptual 
differentiatedness. The vagueness of such overarching concepts is illustrated by 
Rakova (2013, p. 113), who says that touch might just as well be the most rather 
than the least differentiated sense, given that it is associated with numerous 
different perceptual dimensions (pressure, pain, temperature), each with its own 
type of physiological subsystem. 
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However, a deeper problem with the work of Shen and colleagues (e.g., 
Shen, 1997; Shen & Cohen, 1998; Shen & Gil, 2007, etc.) on the directionality 
principle is that linguistic evidence is treated as evidence for a particular 
perception-based explanatory account without actually incorporating any 
genuine perceptual evidence. For example, Shen and Cohen (1998) see their 
cognitive constraint confirmed by a series of experiments showing that 
participants perceived hierarchy-consistent metaphors to be more adequate than 
hierarchy-inconsistent metaphors, and participants also found the latter more 
difficult to understand. Similarly, Shen and Aisenman (2008) discuss 
experiments showing that hierarchy-consistent metaphors are judged to be more 
natural and more memorable. They see this as further evidence for the 
directionality principle (p. 110), although the observed effects would be 
consistent with many different explanatory accounts.5 There is nothing wrong 
with this experimental evidence per se, which does in fact lend further support to 
the hierarchy as a descriptive generalization. However, nothing in these 
experiments actually necessitates the assumption that the asymmetries are 
grounded in perceptual accessibility.  
Similarly, Shen and Cohen (1998) cite the exclusively linguistic evidence in 
Williams (1976) as “supporting the claim that lower sensory domains are more 
accessible” (p. 129), even though the study of Williams (1976), which only looked 
at lexicographical evidence, has nothing to say about accessibility as a cognitive 
notion. Shen and Cohen’s reinterpretation of Williams (1976) deviates from his 
own carefully chosen words that “no cause-effect relationship whatever is 
claimed” (p. 472). 
The linguistically and psycholinguistically observed asymmetries may 
well be grounded in some form of accessibility, but the evidence presented by 
studies such as Shen and Cohen (1998) and Shen and Aisenman (2008) alone 
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does not allow this conclusion. Amassing more evidence for asymmetries in 
corpus frequencies or asymmetries in psycholinguistic processing speaks to the 
generality of the hierarchy as a descriptive generalization, but it does not speak 
to any one explanatory account, such as the alleged directionality principle. In 
contrast to conceptual metaphor theory, for which there is abundant 
nonlinguistic evidence (see, e.g., Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto & 
Boroditsky, 2008; Landau et al., 2010), a lot of research on synesthetic metaphors 
has not addressed the circularity concerns that haunted early work on conceptual 
metaphors (cf. Gibbs, 2007; Murphy, 1996, 1997) and continues to haunt cognitive 
linguistics to this day (Dąbrowska, 2016a). 
With some noteworthy exceptions (such as Ronga et al., 2012), research on 
the hierarchy of the senses does not engage in a deep fashion with experimental 
evidence from other fields to supports its claims. Sensory modalities are claimed 
to be more or less “concrete,” “differentiated,” “stable,” or “distant”—none of 
which are concepts that are widely accepted in psychological work on the senses. 
In fact, research on synesthetic metaphors incorporates cultural categories such 
as the five senses folk model and the idea of “higher” and “lower” senses into its 
explanatory accounts without questioning whether and how these cultural 
categories map onto sensory perception. 
I am only aware of one attempt to directly link linguistic and perceptual 
evidence experimentally. This attempt specifically addresses the connection 
between sound and sight, as revealed in such expressions as the murmur of the 
gray twilight and the sound of coming darkness (from Edgar Allan Poe; taken from 
Marks, 1982b, p. 16). Marks (1982b) showed that participants reliably matched 
such expressions as dark cough and bright sneeze to the loudness of an auditorily 
presented sound stimulus or to the brightness of a visually presented light 
stimulus. In addition, brightness and loudness judgments were correlated with 
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each other. This corresponds to independent perceptual evidence that people 
reliably match brightness to loudness in perception (Marks, 1978; Marks & 
Stevens, 1966; Stevens & Marks, 1965). This evidence thus links expressions such 
as dark cough and bright sneeze to an underlying crossmodal correspondence. This 
explanation is a local one, however, only accounting for audiovisual language. 
In sum, there are numerous problems with perception-based accounts, 
including the lack of incorporation of actual perceptual studies, the lack of 
theoretical constraints on positing language-perception connections, and the 
problem of circular reasoning. Only carefully conducted experiments that link 
language with actual perceptual stimuli, such as conducted by Marks (1982b), 
can be used to support perception-based accounts. 
 
9.3.2. Evaluating ineffability-based accounts 
Tsur (2012, p. 227) is skeptical of Ullmann’s original explanation that differential 
lexicalization may be a driving factor behind metaphorical asymmetries, calling 
the proposal “not very convincing” because “poverty of terminology is not the 
only (or even the main) reason for using metaphors in poetry” (see also Tsur, 
2007, p. 33; Tsur, 2008, p. 285). First, it must be emphasized that it was never in 
question whether “poverty of terminology” was the only or even the main 
reason for asymmetries in crossmodal language use. Researchers such as Strik 
Lievers (2015), for example, have considered the possibility that poverty of 
terminology is one of many contributing factors. 
In fact, there is already initial empirical evidence for a role of lexical 
differentiation in explaining metaphorical asymmetries: Strik Lievers (2015, pp. 
86–88) showed for her English, Italian, and German datasets that modalities 
associated with a high number of adjectives were more likely sources in what she 
calls “synaesthesia,” whereas modalities associated with a high number of nouns 
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were more likely targets. A similar observation was made by Ronga and 
colleagues (2012). These authors replicated the frequently observed touch-to-
sound correspondence for Italian, but they also observed that this may stem from 
an already-existing asymmetry in the lexicon: In their dataset, touch had more 
adjectives and fewer nouns than sound (Ronga et al., 2012). 
It should furthermore be noted that an explanation of the hierarchy 
grounded in already existent imbalances in the sensory lexicon is consistent with 
numerous already established facts. First, Fainsilber and Ortony (1987) provide 
experimental evidence showing speakers use more metaphors when they 
describe phenomena that are otherwise difficult to describe. Second, there is 
evidence suggesting a greater communicative need to talk about visual concepts 
in English (Winter et al., 2018), which may lead to an increased frequency of 
borrowing from other perceptual domains. Third, there is evidence suggesting 
that sound in particular has few adjectives, consistent with the fact that these 
adjectives are infrequently used in crossmodal constructions (Strik Lievers, 2015; 
Strik Lievers & Winter, 2018; Ronga, 2016). On the other hand, touch is 
frequently found to have many adjectives, consistent with the fact that touch 
vocabulary is frequently borrowed. Smell, another modality that is infrequently 
used as a source, has also been reported to have few adjectives (as noted by Tsur, 
2008, p. 288). Fourth and finally, Chapter 17 will provide new evidence for the 
idea that the differential ineffability of the senses plays a role in the hierarchy of 
the senses. I will show that differential lexicalization alone can create patterns 
that look almost exactly like the patterns that are commonly used to support the 
hierarchy of the senses. 6 
So, contrary to Tsur, we may conclude that even highly creative and 
expressive poets such as Byron are constrained by the limits of their language. 
When poets generate those linguistic expressions that literature scholars call 
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“synesthesia,” they have to make do with what the language has to offer to them. 
In fact, given the discussion of ineffability in Chapter 4, it is almost a logical 
necessity that Byron and other poets, just like any other language user, will 
experience some constraints when expressing sensory meaning, which then 
necessitates finding “poetic” means around these constraints. 
 
9.3.3. Evaluating evaluation-based accounts 
Several pieces of data support an evaluation-based account. The evidence 
presented Winter (2016) and Chapter 16 shows that taste and smell words are 
overall more emotional compared to descriptors from the other modalities. For 
vision in particular, there is a larger proportion of neutral words (e.g., yellow). 
Given that evaluation may be a driving factor in crossmodal language, as was 
argued in Chapter 7, this observation fits the fact that taste and smell are at the 
bottom of the hierarchy as likely sources. 
In addition, an evaluation-based account is broadly consistent with the 
increasing recognition that metaphors in general may be more emotionally 
engaging (see Citron & Goldberg, 2014; Citron, Güsten, Michaelis, & Goldberg, 
2016; but see Pomp et al., 2018), and that crossmodal language use also has 
emotional effects (Sakamoto & Utsumi, 2014). Edwards and Clevenger (1990), for 
example, provide experimental evidence showing that when speakers have 
stronger emotional engagement with a topic, they are more likely going to use 
metaphors to describe it. Chapter 17 will provide additional evidence for a direct 
link between the evaluative meaning of words and their propensity to be used in 
crossmodal expressions. 
 
9.3.4. Evaluating gradability-based accounts 
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Although several researchers have informally observed that gradable adjectives 
are more likely used crossmodally (Petersen et al., 2008; Popova, 2005), I am not 
aware of any quantitative evidence that supports this position. Gradability-based 
accounts are, however, quite plausible given that in perception (independent of 
language) people find it easy to match perceptions from different modalities 
based on graded scales of intensity and magnitude (Marks, 1978; Stevens, 1975; 
see also Winter et al., 2015b). 
 
9.3.5. Evaluating iconicity-based accounts 
There is a clear correspondence between the fact that sound concepts are unlikely 
sources in crossmodal expressions and the well-established fact that sound 
concepts are more iconic (Dingemanse, 2012; Perlman et al., 2018; Winter et al., 
2017; see also Chapter 15); however, these two facts have so far not been directly 
related. This will be achieved in Chapter 17. 
 The iconicity-based account is furthermore consistent with ideas explored 
under the banner of the “double mapping constraint” in sign language linguistics 
(Emmorey, 2014; Meir, 2010; see also Lupyan & Winter, 2018). It has been 
observed that the particular iconic mapping a sign selects may block certain 
metaphorical expressions. For example, Israeli Sign Language and American 
Sign Language are reported not to have the metaphorical expression Time flies 
because in both languages, the sign for the concept ‘flying’ involves mimicking 
bird fly. Thus, the iconicity of this sign depicts only a particular type of flying, 
and this type of flying is incompatible with the idea of time flying. Consistent 
with the general idea that iconicity restricts semantic extension (e.g., via 
metaphor), Lupyan and Winter (2018) show that iconicity ratings are negatively 
correlated with measures of contextual diversity (i.e., how many different types 
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of contexts a word occurs in): Relatively more iconic words occur in less distinct 
text types. 
 
9.3.6. Evaluating idiosyncratic explanations 
Canobbio (2004; discussed in Strik Lievers, 2015, p. 73) examines the poetic 
works of Corrado Govoni, noting that in this poet’s work, most crossmodal uses 
of sensory words disobey the hierarchy. This is a demonstration of a particular 
writer whose work is not in line with the hierarchy of the senses, showing that 
individual and stylistic factors are important. However, while individually and 
stylistically contingent factors are clearly relevant, they will not be considered 
here since they do not allow for strong generalizations about usage patterns that 
are found in the general population. 
 
9.4. The multivariate road ahead 
In a paper on metaphors and perception, Marks (1996) writes the following: 
 
Even if some perceptual metaphors end up being mediated linguistically, 
their origins appear to be wholly in perception itself, starting within 
perceptual processes before being overlaid and dominated by linguistic 
ones. (p. 59) 
 
The problem with this perspective is that it makes the claim about the 
relative strength of two factors, perception on the one hand, and language on the 
other, without any direct empirical evidence about the relative import of these 
two factors. There simply are no empirical assessments that actually test the 
strength of one explanatory account against the strength of another. In fact, since 
most researchers have focused on perceptual accounts, there currently is no 
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quantitative evidence for many of the hypothesized linguistic factors, such as 
iconicity and adjective scalarity. Given this scarcity of empirical evidence, it is 
perhaps prudent, for the time being, not to deem any one explanatory account 
dominant. However, Chapter 17 will provide novel empirical evidence 
establishing that at least three different factors conjointly play a role. These 
factors are: the composition of the sensory vocabulary, emotional valence, and 
iconicity. 
This is not to say perception-based explanations should not be 
investigated, let alone ruled out. In fact, if the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis 
(Chapter 5) is true, we would expect to find correspondences between perceptual 
asymmetries and asymmetries in crossmodal metaphor use. However, given the 
many different crossmodal connections involved in the hierarchy, it is important 
not to jump to conclusions and to await further testing. Moreover, language-
internal explanations should be explored alongside perception-based 
explanations. 
It should be noted that although Ullmann’s original work (1945, 1959) is 
generally cited as evidence for a monolithic hierarchy, his writing actually 
reflects a willingness to consider a multitude of explanatory factors that has since 
been lost in much subsequent work. Few researchers (including Ronga et al., 
2012; Strik Lievers, 2015; Tsur, 2008, 2012) consider the possibility that there may 
be multiple factors involved. 
Mitchell (2004, p. 81) states that “there will never be a single account that 
can do all the work of describing and explaining complex phenomena.” 
Similarly, Markman (2008, p. 247) states that “it is often easier to envision a 
complete architecture for cognition emerging from the merger of approaches.” 
Thus, rather than focusing on a monolithic hierarchy, a more productive research 
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strategy may be to ask the question: What multitude of factors cause 
asymmetries in the crossmodal uses of sensory words? 
Even given the present lack of evidence, it is already apparent that some 
aspects of the hierarchy may best be explained by a combination of explanatory 
approaches. For example, many of the different factors stated in this chapter 
conspire against sound being used as a source. Most sound concepts appear to be 
non-scalar (e.g., squealing) as well as highly iconic (e.g., beeping), both of which 
may bias against their crossmodal use. In addition, sound concepts are also not 
particularly differentiated, as Chapter 12 will show. These facts are consistent 
with a multi-causal view of the hierarchy of the senses, but a formal test of these 
different factors still awaits. 
 																																																								
1 There are slight differences in how the notion of accessibility has been characterized across the 
body of Shen’s work. Shen (1997) also included the criterion of whether there is a dedicated 
sensory organ associated with a particular sensory modality. In Shen’s (1997) notion of 
accessibility, part of the evidence for touch being “low” is that it “does not use a special organ” 
(p. 54). This, however, is wrong since touch does have a special organ, the skin (cf. Carlson, 2010; 
Møller, 2012). This point was already made by Rakova (2003), who said the following in response 
to Shen (1997): “The fact that the sense of touch is realized by cutaneous receptors which cover 
the entire body surface does not entail that there is no special organ for touch” (p. 113). 
 
2  Already Aristotle criticized the proximal versus distal criterion, observing that all sensory 
perception involves contact (Aristotélēs, De Anima, 423b1, in Macpherson, 2011): 
 
The problem, then, is: does the perception of all objects of sense take place in the same 
way, or does it not, e.g. taste and touch requiring contact (as they are commonly thought 
to do), while all other senses perceive over a distance? The distinction is unsound; we 
perceive what is hard or soft, as well as the objects of hearing, sight, and smell, through a 
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medium, only that the latter are perceived over a great distance than the former; that is 
why the facts escape our notice. (p. 56) 
 
The idea that vision is more distal than the other senses is not universally agreed upon. 
Dominy and colleagues (Dominy, Lucas, Osorio, & Yamashita, 2001) describe how for primates 
living in arboreal environments, both hearing and smelling are more far-ranging than sight. On 
the other hand, Speed and Majid (2017) find mental simulation effects consistent with the idea 
that olfaction is mentally represented as close to the body. 
 
3 Shape descriptors are rated to be primarily visual by the native speakers in the Lynott and 
Connell (2009) study. 
 
4 Shen and Cohen (1998) state that a linear scale of the senses (from low to high) is “commonly 
assumed” (p. 125), citing authors such as Ullmann (1957), Tsur (1992), and Williams (1976). 
However, all these authors are language researchers. Many researchers outside of linguistics 
actually do not assume a linear scale of the senses, including anthropologists (Classen, 1993; 
Howes, 1991). 
 
5 In fact, the very existence of hierarchy-consistent asymmetries in corpus data poses problems 
for the interpretation of these experiments. The fact that participants perceive hierarchy-
consistent metaphors to be more natural may stem from the increased frequency of these 
expressions. 
 
6 A further hypothesis to be maintained is that the differential lexicalization of the senses has 
downstream behavioral effects. In particular, it is quite plausible that because some modalities 
have more adjectives associated with them, language users become accustomed to borrowing 
terminology from these modalities. 
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Part II. 
A case study of sensory adjectives 
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Chapter 10. Methodological foundations 
10.1. Theory and method 
Methods form the bedrock of science. Werner Heisenberg (1958, p. 58) famously 
said: “We have to remember that what we observe is not nature in itself but 
nature exposed to our method of questioning.” Method and theory depend on 
one another, and “no method...is neutral with regard to theory” (Hunston, 2000, 
p. 250). 
 Methods also form the bedrock of interdisciplinary work. Researchers 
from different fields can only collaborate with each other if they achieve their 
respective standards of evidence. Sharing a common methodological foundation, 
such as established statistical techniques that are employed across the sciences, 
permits the building of bridges between scientists from different backgrounds 
and different research traditions. The connection between methods and 
interdisciplinary work is especially important for sensory linguistics because of 
its intrinsically interdisciplinary nature. 
 Among other things, this book sets out to introduce new methods for 
studying natural language data. Because the history of the language sciences has 
repeatedly shown that work can easily be disregarded because of differences in 
method, this entire chapter is devoted to outlining the book’s methodological 
commitments. The empirical chapters that follow will adhere to these 
commitments. 
 Perhaps Goldinger et al. (2016) exemplifies how important work within 
the language sciences can be ignored because of methodological differences. 
These authors argue that embodied cognition is irrelevant for the cognitive 
sciences based on a review of the experimental literature on cognitive processing 
in which they ignore all of cognitive linguistics. Most classic research in cognitive 
linguistics (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Langacker, 1987, 2008) relies exclusively 
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on the intuition of the researcher, something that Dąbrowska (2016a) has called a 
“deadly sin” of cognitive linguistics. Perhaps as a result of this, cognitive 
psychologists (such as Goldinger et al., 2016) do not pay enough attention to the 
body of work in this domain (for discussion, see Gibbs, 2007). 
This chapter proceeds as follows. To start this discussion of methods, 
Chapter 10.2 introduces the three commitments of cognitive linguistics, which 
also form guiding principles for sensory linguistics. Chapter 10.3 introduces a 
new commitment, the Reproducibility Commitment, which will be illustrated 
with two problematic cases in Chapter 10.4. One solution to the problematic 
cases, and one way of furthering reproducibility in the language sciences, is to 
incorporate already existing data from rating studies (“norms”) into linguistic 
analyses (Chapter 10.5). How such norms fit into general concerns for theory-
building is discussed in Chapter 10.6. Finally, the statistical software used 
throughout Part II of the book will be described in Chapter 10.7. 
 
10.2. Cognitive linguistic commitments 
One way to characterize cognitive linguistics is by detailing the methodological–
theoretical commitments it adheres to. Following Lakoff (1990) and Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999), three different principles or “commitments” form the bedrock of 
any methodological considerations in this book: The Cognitive Reality 
Commitment, The Convergent Evidence Commitment, and The Generalization 
and Comprehensiveness Commitment. These commitments are generally taken 
to be core commitments for cognitive linguistics, guiding principles for both 
theorizing and data collection. However, in many ways they form desiderata for 
the language sciences in general. The following descriptions of the commitments 
are taken straight from Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pp. 79–80): 
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The Cognitive Reality Commitment: “An adequate theory of concepts and 
reason must provide an account of mind that is cognitively and neurally 
realistic.” 
 
The Convergent Evidence Commitment: “An adequate theory of concepts and 
reason must be committed to the search for converging evidence from as 
many sources as possible.” 
 
The Generalization and Comprehensiveness Commitment: “An adequate theory 
must provide empirical generalizations over the widest possible range of 
phenomena.” 
 
The Cognitive Reality Commitment requires that theories in the language 
sciences are consistent with relevant existing work, such as work on 
psycholinguistic processing and cognitive processing more generally. In essence, 
the Cognitive Reality Commitment expresses a very fundamental property of all 
of science, which is that “all relevant knowledge should be brought to bear on 
interesting problems” (Dienes, 2008, p. 7). Linguistic theories cannot and should 
not be sitting in a void, aloof from the rest of science. 
Sensory linguistics needs to pay special attention to the Cognitive Reality 
Commitment; it relies heavily on insights from such fields as psychophysics, 
cognitive psychology, neurophysiology, and anthropology. Unfortunately, 
researchers working in the domain of sensory linguistics often only pay lip 
service to results from other fields, or they only incorporate extralinguistic 
evidence sparingly into their theories (for notable exceptions, see Lehrer, 2009; 
Levinson & Majid, 2014; Ronga, 2016; Ronga et al., 2012). Often, when linguists 
investigate sensory language, the perceptual science does not go beyond 
common knowledge about the senses, and often models that are not based on 
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science (such as the five senses folk model) are tacitly incorporated into linguistic 
theories as if they were established facts. 
Dąbrowska (2016a) criticizes cognitive linguists for not taking the 
Cognitive Reality Commitment more seriously. According to her, the relation of 
cognitive linguists toward the Cognitive Reality Commitment is best described 
as “believing but not practicing” (p. 482). She calls for cognitive linguists to 
engage more deeply with more current strands of psychological and 
neuroscientific evidence. This call is taken seriously here by paying special 
attention to the nonlinguistic literature on sensory modalities. 
 The Convergent Evidence Commitment is another foundational 
commitment of cognitive linguistics. Gries, Hampe, and Schönefeld (2005) 
characterize it as follows: “Hypotheses and constructs should be backed up by 
converging evidence from multiple sources” (p. 636). This is important because 
each method comes along with its own set of constraints and assumptions. By 
using several different approaches, it is possible to show that a specific set of 
findings is not just due to the particularities of one particular method. As stated 
by Dąbrowska (2016b), “when it comes to understanding something as complex 
as human language, it will be most productive to use every method that is 
available” (p. 57). The seminal volume Methods in Cognitive Linguistics (Gonzalez-
Marquez, Mittelberg, Coulson, & Spivey, 2007) showcases how cognitive 
linguistics can use a wide array of methods to support its theories, including 
corpus analysis, psycholinguistic experiments, gesture research, and 
neuroscience. 
The idea of converging evidence not only means that results should be 
triangulated via different methods, but also via different datasets. For example, 
Winter (2016) analyzes the evaluative functions of sensory words and observes 
that taste and smell words are overall more emotional (see also Chapter 16). 
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Crucially, emotional meaning was operationalized in three different ways, using 
emotional valence data collecting from a human rating study (Warriner et al., 
2013), as well as valence data that was generated using dictionary-based or 
corpus-based methods. Statistical analyses of the three different datasets 
converged on the same result. 
The final commitment put forth by Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) is The 
Generalization and Comprehensiveness Commitment. As stated by Markman 
(2008), “theories that cover a broader range of data are to be preferred to those 
that cover a narrower range of data” (p. 247). The Generalization and 
Comprehensiveness Commitment is related to, but slightly different from, the 
Convergent Evidence Commitment, which is about the same theory supported 
by multiple different methods. The Generalization and Comprehensiveness 
Commitment states that a given theory should be able to account for as many 
facts as possible, and preferably for as many different classes of facts (see 
Thagard, 1978). 
The next section will introduce an additional commitment, the 
Reproducibility Commitment, which is especially important for the work 
undertaken in Part II of this book. 
 
10.3. The Reproducibility Commitment 
The Reproducibility Commitment is formulated here as follows: 
 
The Reproducibility Commitment: “An adequate theory of linguistics needs 
to be supported by evidence that can be reproduced by other linguists 
who did not conduct the original study.” 
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In many different areas of science, there is currently a great push toward 
increasing reproducibility (Gentleman & Lang, 2007; Mesirov, 2010; Munafò et 
al., 2017; Peng, 2011), which needs to be distinguished from replication. The 
latter refers to the process of conducting a new study following the procedures 
laid out by a previous study. On the other hand, reproducibility means that the 
entire process of conducted research can be reproduced, including study design, 
data collection, data processing, and statistical analysis. At its minimum, 
reproducibility requires that a different researcher, given the same data, can 
reach the same conclusions. This requires making both the data and the analysis 
code publicly available. Such reproducibility is often not adhered to in the 
language sciences. For example, Winter (2011) found that statistical reporting in 
phonetics was so insufficient that it was impossible to even verify whether some 
of the most basic statistical assumptions (such as the independence assumption) 
were violated or not. Often p-values were reported without even stating which 
test was used, making it impossible for other researchers to reproduce the 
statistical analyses. 
There is a myriad of decisions an analyst must make in a given data 
analysis—what Gelman and Loken (2013) talk about as the “garden of forking 
paths” and Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2011) describe as “researcher 
degrees of freedom.” A particularly striking demonstration of the effects of 
researcher degrees of freedom was conducted by Silberzahn et al. (2017). These 
authors gave the same dataset to 29 analysis teams. All were given the same 
research question. Twenty teams found a statistically reliable support for the 
research hypothesis in question; 9 found no such support. In addition, those 
teams that did find statistically reliable effects reported quite varying effect sizes. 
Because statistical analysis is a subjective process (McElreath, 2016, p. 95) that 
involves theoretically guided analysis decisions that may differ between 
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researchers, there is no “best analysis” in an objective sense. Consequently, 
researcher degrees of freedom are unavoidable. Rather than trying to eliminate 
them, they should be laid open. 
It is important that reproducible quantitative research exists alongside 
qualitative approaches to studying language, and the two are not mutually 
exclusive. The Reproducibility Commitment says that ultimately, as few claims 
as possible should be based only on qualitative analysis or only on single 
judgments made by a single human annotator, particularly if the annotator is 
himself or herself a language scientist. The words “ultimately” and “as few ... as 
possible” are important hedges in the above statement, intended to allow for 
wiggle room. The demand is not, of course, that everybody has to do 
quantitative work and follow a reproducible research workflow. As highlighted 
by Fiedler (2017): 
 
Science is a pluralistic endeavor that should not be forced into the corset 
of one specific format. If science is to flourish and to achieve progress, 
there must be room for competing theories, methods, and different 
conceptions of what science is about. (p. 57) 
 
However, at some point, phenomena that have been sufficiently explored 
via qualitative analyses should be supplemented with more objective and 
rigorous approaches that are more easily shared with researchers within the 
language sciences and across the disciplines. 
 
10.4. Reproducibility: Two examples 
In this section, I will give two specific examples to illustrate the issue of 
reproducibility in the language sciences. 
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10.4.1. Synesthetic metaphors 
As was discussed in Chapter 8, researchers studying crossmodal language use 
have proposed that there is a hierarchy of the senses governing which senses can 
be used to talk about which other senses; for example, sweet fragrance is a more 
appropriate expression than fragrant sweetness (Shen & Gil, 2007). I will use 
Stephen Ullmann’s original data to illustrate some problems with reproducibility 
in this field of research. His work is very old (dating back to the 1940’s and 
1950’s), so it is perhaps natural that given the methodological standards of the 
time, reproducibility in the modern sense is not assured. The purpose of this 
discussion is not to disqualify the truly visionary work of Ullmann, a lot of which 
has been replicated in more rigorous studies (e.g., Ronga et al., 2012; Strik 
Lievers, 2015), but to highlight certain methodological principles that still affect 
research on crossmodal language use to this day. Ullmann’s inspirational work 
can be used to reflect on possible avenues for methodological improvements, 
which will be followed through in Chapter 17. 
Table 3 is taken from Ullmann (1945, p. 814) and lists how often a sensory 
term from a given modality is used to modify a sensory term from another 
modality in the writings of the poet Lord Byron. Source modalities are 
represented as rows (i.e., they are the sensory descriptors used to modify a 
particular sensory target). The target modalities are represented as columns (i.e., 
they are the perceptual impressions being described). An expression such as to 
sweeten the sounds (Ullmann, 1945, p. 814) would add one data point to the cell 
that is in the taste row and the sound column. 
 
Table 3 
Crossmodal uses of sensory adjectives by Lord Byron  
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Touch Heat Taste Smell Sound Sight Total 
Touch (-) 8 3 3 76 31 121 
Heat 2 (-) 2 - 11 9 24 
Taste 1 - (-) 1 7 8 17 
Smell - - - (-) 3 2 5 
Sound - - - - (-) 11 11 
Sight 5 3 - 1 21 (-) 30 
Total 8 11 5 5 118 61 208 
 
 
 All cells in the upper-right triangle of this crosstabulation are counted as 
being consistent with the hierarchy of the senses. All cells in the lower-right 
triangle are counted as inconsistent (see Chapter 17). Thus, Table 3 suggests that 
this dataset from Lord Byron supports the hierarchy of the senses (but see 
Chapter 17). 
Let us now turn to issues regarding the evidence for Ullmann’s original 
proposal—especially since some of these issues still have not been resolved in 
more modern research on crossmodal language. The first issue with Table 3 is the 
question as to where the counts come from—what is the source of data? We 
know that the data comes from Lord Byron, but we do not know which specific 
examples are treated as “metaphorical” or not. This is particularly problematic 
because Ullmann (1945) gives himself a lot of freedom with respect to what is or 
is not counted as metaphorical. He says that he only analyzed “examples of clear 
synaesthesia” that are “vividly felt as such,” excluding “stale epithets” such as 
sweet sound and soft color (p. 814). We cannot know what Ullmann did or did not 
take to be “clear” or “stale” cases of synesthetic metaphor. Moreover, given that 
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he searched Byron’s texts by hand, Ullmann could have easily missed certain 
occurrences or picked examples in a way that was biased by his theory. 
We also do not know whether the table represents type or token 
frequencies; that is, if the word sweet was used multiple times to modify the 
word melody, were these counted as separate instances? By not distinguishing 
between type and token counts in data summaries such as Table 3, it is 
impossible to know whether the results perhaps overly depend on a few highly 
conventionalized lexical items (see discussion in Ronga, 2016). For instance, 
could it be that all counts in the taste-to-sound column involve the adjective 
sweet, such as sweet melody, sweet music and sweet voice? If that is the case, then 
this would considerably reduce our confidence in there being a general 
asymmetry between taste and sound.1 
 A final problem with the data presented in Table 3 has to do with how the 
analyst associates particular words with specific sensory modalities. For 
example, Day (1996) lists the adjective–noun pair heavy explosion as a touch-to-
sound mapping—even though the adjective heavy is a general magnitude term 
and even though explosion is a noun that denotes something that can be seen, 
heard, felt, and smelled. Perhaps it was determined by Day (1996) that heavy 
explosion was a touch-to-sound mapping in the particular use context, but this is 
impossible to tell without actually being able to look at the linguistic contexts 
from which this example was picked. Similarly, consider the fact that Sakamoto 
and Utsumi (2014, p. 2) classify the adjective open as not being perceptual at all, 
even though the common sensible ‘openness’ denoted by this adjective can 
clearly be perceived through vision and touch and would probably be treated as 
a dimension word in William’s (1976) study. Unfortunately, the fact that the data 
behind Table 3 is not accessible means that we do not know how cases such as 
wide, narrow, and large, or highly multisensory words such as harsh, have been 
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dealt with. Because different researchers may classify sensory words differently 
(as discussed in Ronga, 2016), they may approach the same dataset, such as Lord 
Byron’s writings, and come to different conclusions. Chapter 11 will introduce a 
wordlist of modality norms (collected via human ratings) that alleviates these 
concerns. 
 Again, it should be stated that it is easy to criticize old work that was truly 
revolutionary for its time but might not be able to live up to modern standards of 
linguistic methodology, especially given the fact that reproducibility is a 
relatively recent topic in science (Gentleman & Lang, 2007; Mesirov, 2010; 
Munafò et al., 2017; Peng, 2011). However, it must be acknowledged that given 
these methodological concerns, we are now somewhat less certain as to whether 
a hierarchy of the senses is, in fact, supported by the data. Luckily, some 
researchers have found converging evidence for the hierarchy using more 
rigorous methods. Ronga et al. (2012), Strik Lievers (2015), and Ronga (2016) start 
with a list of sensory terms that was assembled before approaching the corpus. 
This makes it explicit which words have been classified as belonging to which 
sense, and the existence of a pre-specified word list makes it possible for a 
different researcher to approach the same dataset and reach the same 
conclusions. Moreover, assembling a list of sensory words ahead of time reduces 
theoretical bias at the analysis stage. 
 
10.4.2. Semantic prosody 
Another problematic case for reproducibility involves the notion of “semantic 
prosody,” which will be the topic of Chapter 16. This term is associated with the 
British tradition in corpus linguistics and was first proposed by Louw (1993), 
following Sinclair (1991). The idea of semantic prosody is that a word is imbued 
with meaning by its collocates, the frequent contexts in which it occurs (for 
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different interpretations, however, see Hunston, 2007; Morley & Partington, 2009; 
Whitsitt, 2005; see also discussion in Stewart, 2010). A classic example of this 
phenomenon is the phrasal verb to set in, which often collocates with bad things 
in naturally occurring language, such as the words rot and decay (Sinclair, 1991). 
The verb to cause is similarly said to have negative semantic prosody by virtue of 
collocating with overarchingly negative words such as war, damage, destruction, 
and chaos (Stubbs, 2001, p. 65). A subtler case of semantic prosody is discussed in 
Louw (1993), who notes that in a large set of texts, the plural noun days appears 
to connote nostalgia, a longing for the past, as in his babying days are over, or The 
big beer drinking days are gone (p. 36). 
Semantic prosody as a phenomenon has been very important for corpus 
linguistics because it led to a number of counterintuitive results that could only 
be revealed by looking at large quantities of natural language data. The fact that 
cause, for example, has negative semantic prosody is not immediately intuited 
when the word is presented in isolation. Only when looking at many linguistic 
contexts does the word reveal its semantic prosody. Thus, cases such as cause, set 
in, and days seemed perfectly suited to demonstrate the utility of corpus 
linguistics. For the case of set in, Whitsitt (2005, p. 287) discusses the surprise 
factor that was involved in the “discovery” of its semantic prosody as follows: 
“A phrasal verb, whose meaning and use was apparently familiar to all, was 
revealing things about itself that had not been known before.” 
 What methods can be used to establish semantic prosody? The dominant 
approach in corpus linguistics, including studies on semantic prosody, is to look 
at concordance lines—that is, lines of text showing the head word (such as set in) 
with its surrounding contexts (see Huston, 2002, Chapter 3). This approach is 
seemingly more objective than what is done in other fields, such as cognitive 
linguistics and Chomskyan/generative linguistics, where researchers often 
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investigate made-up examples that do not come from naturally occurring data. 
However, Hunston (2000, p. 65) clearly stresses that “concordance lines present 
information; they do not interpret it. Interpretation requires the insight and 
intuition of the observer.” This is because, “strictly speaking, a corpus by itself 
can do nothing at all, being nothing other than a store of used language” 
(Hunston, 2000, p. 3). There always is an additional step of interpretation, which 
is usually done by the corpus linguist herself, as also stressed by Grondelaers, 
Geeraerts, and Speelman (2007): 
 
...corpus research is neither automatic, nor necessarily free from the 
hermeneutic, interpretative features that are typical of a non-objectivist 
methodology... Corpus research, in fact, neither denies nor ignores the 
necessity of interpretations, but it takes on a helix-like structure of gradual 
refinement of interpretations through a repeated confrontation with 
empirical data. (p. 150) 
 
 The manual annotation of concordance lines is particularly problematic in 
the case of semantic prosody. Whether something is good or bad is intrinsically 
subjective; emotional meaning is notoriously difficult to pin down. Bednarek 
(2008, p. 122) notes that it is “difficult to establish objectively” whether a given 
lexical item is positive or negative. Stewart (2010, p. 91) states that “classifying 
co-occurrences as favourable or unfavourable is anything but straightforward, in 
part because what is one analyst’s meat is another analyst’s poison.” 
Because of this inherent subjectivity, concordance-based research needs to 
be completed with work that does not rely on manual annotation. In the case of 
semantic prosody, a concordance-free corpus linguistics could use established 
emotional valence datasets. There are by now dozens of datasets that quantify 
	 179	
the extent to which a word is positive or negative (Baccianella, Esuli, & 
Sebastiani, 2010; Esuli & Sebastiani, 2006; Kiritchenko, Zhu, & Mohammad, 2014; 
Liu, 2012, Chapter 6; Mohammad & Kiritchenko, 2015; Pang & Lee, 2008, Chapter 
7; Warriner et al., 2013). However, only very few researchers have investigated 
semantic prosody with the help of such datasets (Dilts & Newman, 2006; 
Snefjella & Kuperman, 2016; Winter, 2016). Doing so advances the 
reproducibility of semantic prosody research because given the same corpus and 
the same valence dataset, different researchers will come to the same 
conclusions. 
Moreover, a reproducible workflow would allow semantic prosody 
research to address a common critique raised against it—namely, that the field 
has overly focused on a handful of isolated examples, such as set in and cause (see 
Stewart, 2010; Whitsitt, 2005). The manual interpretation of concordance lines 
impedes research progress in the domain of semantic prosody because it means 
that the analysis of many linguistic examples cannot be streamlined, precluding 
general statements about the vocabulary of English. 
 
10.5. A manifesto for norms 
Given problematic cases such as the above-mentioned examples of synesthetic 
metaphors and semantic prosody, what are we to do? Paradoxically perhaps, my 
solution to the abundance of introspection in linguistics will be to incorporate 
even more introspection into linguistic analysis. However, I will do so 
differently, using rating studies. 
To justify my approach, it is important to start with the existing criticism 
of introspective judgments. Much ink has been spilled about the role of intuition 
in the language sciences, and researchers have rightly pointed out the limitations 
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of introspective judgments, especially when the conclusions of entire theories 
rest on the intuitions of individual linguists.2 
The problem of overly relying on individual intuitions has been explored 
extensively in the literature on grammaticality and acceptability judgments. To 
give just a few examples, experiments have shown that grammaticality 
judgments by linguists deviate from those of nonlinguists (Spencer, 1973; see also 
Dąbrowska, 2010). Linguistic judgments change further through repeated 
exposure to particular sentences, as well as through sentence context (Nagata, 
1988, 1989). There are also anchoring effects (Nagata, 1992), where the perceived 
grammaticality of a sentence depends on whether it was presented alongside 
ungrammatical sentences. Perhaps one of the most pressing problems is 
theoretical biases: Schütze (1996, p. 187) rightly says that “one cannot find a more 
biased subject than the investigator” (see also Dąbrowska, 2016b, p. 57; Gibbs, 
2007, pp. 3–4; see also Gibson & Federenko, 2010). 
Many researchers have discussed or problematized the role of intuitive 
judgments in the language sciences, for many more reasons than the ones just 
listed (Carrol, Bever, & Pollack, 1981; Cowart, 1997; Dąbrowska, 2010, 2016a, 
2016b; Edelman & Christiansen, 2003; Featherston, 2007; Ferreira, 2005; Gibbs & 
Clark, 2012; Gibson & Fedorenko, 2013; Marantz, 2005; Myers, 2009; Pullum, 
2007; Schu ̈tze, 1996; Sprouse & Hornstein, 2013; Wasow & Arnold, 2005). Yet, 
many researchers also believe that it is impossible to completely disband the role 
of intuitions when studying language. Gries and Divjak (2010, p. 336) state that 
“no scientist in the humanities or social scientists would deny that some degree 
of intuition plays a role in nearly any study.” This is particularly the case when 
the content of conceptualization needs to be probed. As stated by Dąbrowska 
(2016b, p. 56), introspective judgments “provide the most direct source of 
information about some aspects of language, notably meaning.” 
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This is where rating studies enter. The term “norms” is frequently used by 
psycholinguists to refer to rating data that is subsequently used in experiments 
(it should be kept in mind that there is nothing “normative” about norms). 
Rather than relying on a single linguist’s intuition about a linguistic construct, 
we are better off aggregating over many intuitions from laypeople. By using 
norms, intuitions are treated more carefully, using the wisdom of the crowd. This 
also addresses Dąbrowska’s (2016a) plea for cognitive linguists to pay more 
attention to individual differences. There is an increasing amount of evidence for 
people differing in their linguistic and conceptual systems (Dąbrowska, 2012, 
2015). Precisely because of this, it is necessary to aggregate over the responses 
from different individuals when trying to achieve highly generalizable claims. 
We cannot just rely on just one individual’s intuitions, especially if that 
individual is a linguist. 
Norms generated by native speaker ratings have been around for a long 
time (e.g., Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968), 
but recently there has been an influx of massive studies that normed thousands 
of English words for many different dimensions, including iconicity (Perry, 
Perlman, & Lupyan, 2015; Perry, Perlman, Winter, Massaro, & Lupyan, 2018), 
age of acquisition (Kuperman et al., 2012), concreteness (Brysbaert, Warriner, & 
Kuperman, 2014), emotional valence (Warriner et al., 2013), sensory modality 
(Connell, Lynott, & Banks, 2018; Lynott & Connell, 2009, 2013; Speed & Majid, 
2017; van Dantzig et al., 2011; Winter, 2016), as well as more specific dimensions 
such as a word’s association with pain, manipulability, color, sound, and motion 
(Amsel, Urbach, & Kutas, 2012; Medler et al., 2005), or whether a word describes 
rough and smooth surfaces (Stadtlander & Murdoch, 2000). Many of these norms 
were collected with psycholinguistic experiments in mind. However, nothing 
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prevents using them together with corpora (Chapters 14, 15, & 17), or studying 
norms in their own right (e.g., Chapters 12–13). 
I believe that the potential for norms is not recognized enough by 
linguists, particularly by cognitive linguists and corpus linguists. Here is a list of 
key advantages of a norm-based approach: 
 
• Norms are collected from hundreds of individuals; because people differ 
in their judgments and their understanding of language (Dąbrowska, 
2012, 2015), aggregation over multiple ratings affords better generalization 
of common patterns. 
 
• Norms are collected from naïve language users and thus help to reduce 
bias from linguistic theories (e.g., Dąbrowska, 2016a, 2016b, p. 57; Gibbs, 
2007; Schütze, 1996, p. 187; Spencer, 1973). 
 
• Norms are collected before an actual investigation takes place, 
independent of that investigation (e.g., a particular corpus analysis); as 
such, the collection of norms cannot be biased by the research question at 
hand; this also means that there can be no ad-hoc additions or 
subtractions of linguistic items to or from datasets, such as may occur 
when manual corpus annotation is performed. 
 
• To allow the collection of norms, participants need precise instructions 
(e.g., what is it exactly that should be rated?); this forces researchers to 
operationally define their linguistic constructs more explicitly. 
 
• Depending on how the rating task was set up, norms make continuous 
data available—for example, words can be rated on a scale from positive 
to negative (e.g., Warriner et al., 2013); because meaning is flexible and 
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graded (e.g., Croft & Cruse, 2004), this captures shades of meaning more 
accurately. 
 
• The numerical format of linguistic norms makes additional statistical 
analyses possible (see Chapters 12–17) 
 
• A norm set collected for one study can be used later for another analysis; 
sharing norm sets within the community streamlines future research and 
also allows comparisons across studies; through this, norms allow to build 
“sufficient common ground for a stringent comparison of competing 
models” (Grondelaers, Geeraerts, & Speelman, 2007, p. 167) 
 
• Norms provide a means out of the circularity trap that haunts much of 
cognitive linguistics; that is, one cannot argue for conceptual explanations 
of linguistic patterns based on linguistic evidence alone (Dąbrowska, 
2016a; Gibbs, 2007; Murphy, 1996, 1997); since norms are collected 
separate from an analysis of linguistic patterns (such as of corpus data), 
they provide an alternative access to conceptualization. 
 
Thus, there are many advantages to using norms. At a bare minimum, it 
must be acknowledged that norms are better than what they are supposed to 
replace: the subjective judgments of individual linguists with theoretical 
predispositions. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that norms are still introspective 
judgments performed on linguistic items. Norms are, after all, subjective; they 
are a form of self-report. Time and time again, psychological research has shown 
that self-report can differ substantially from actual behavior (e.g., Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1997). Spence and Piqueras-Fiszman (2014) rightly remark that “as 
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psychologists, we are highly reticent about putting too much weight on the 
unconstrained self-report of participants” (pp. 18–19). Because of this, it has to be 
kept in mind that the judgments we collect are metalinguistic, differing from 
actual language use. This was actually already discussed in Chapter 7, where I 
argued that when the word sweet is seen in isolation, it is judged to be primarily a 
taste word, even though it could be a smell word in actual use. The judgments 
that are included in norms are decontextualized, whereas actual language use 
always happens in context. Some of these limitations can be dealt with by re-
contextualizing norms in combination with corpora, as will be done in Chapters 
14, 15, and 17. 
To conclude, norms are essential for the language sciences, and compared 
to the high preponderance of work relying on introspective judgments of 
individual linguists, norms are under-utilized. Hunston (2002, p. 22) states that 
“although an over-reliance on intuition can be criticised, it would be incorrect to 
argue that intuition is not important.” This chapter argues for making intuitions 
take a position within linguistic research that is even more center stage, but to do 
so in a way that is more reliable and more scalable. 
 
10.6. “Fuck nuance”? 
How do norms fit with the theoretical demands of the language sciences? In his 
programmatic article “Fuck nuance,” Healy (2017) outlines what he calls “nuance 
traps” in theory-building. Healy criticizes that many social scientists tend to 
make their theories ever more complicated by incorporating ever more nuanced 
aspects of a studied phenomenon:  
 
By calling for a theory to be more comprehensive, or for an explanation to 
include additional dimensions, or for a concept to become more flexible 
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and multifaceted, we paradoxically end up with less clarity. We lose 
information by adding detail. (2017, p. 122) 
 
Healy (2017, p. 123) also calls for abstraction, saying that “Theory is 
founded on abstraction, abstraction means throwing away detail for the sake of a 
bit of generality, and so things in the world are always ‘more complicated than 
that’—for any value of ‘that’.” Ever more complex theories become ever more 
difficult to understand, and ever more complex theories become ever more 
difficult to falsify. Complexity is certainly needed in some cases, but it can also 
work against generalizability in others. We want generalizable theories, and we 
want theories that are easy to understand. We sometimes need to shed the 
complexities of a study topic to reach higher levels of abstraction. 
In semantic research, the incorporation of norms achieves such 
abstraction. Each rating study operationalizes only one aspect of meaning, 
deliberately ignoring everything else. As characterized by Dienes (2008, p. 3), “an 
operational definition defines the meaning of a concept in terms of the precise 
procedures used to determine its presence and quantity.” Thus, the analyst may 
carve up the lexicon into dimensions of interest, each dimension being precisely 
defined, with ratings for each dimension ascertained in a rigorous and 
reproducible manner. By collecting more norms for more dimensions, linguistics 
can begin to get a deeper understanding of language. 
The above-mentioned research on semantic prosody is a great example of 
how more nuance may impede progress in theorizing. It is clear that the notion 
of semantic prosody cannot be fully reduced to the positive/negative dimension 
(Bednarek, 2008; Hunston, 2007). However, part of the problem of semantic 
prosody research is that it has perhaps paid too much attention to the nuanced 
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shades of meaning of specific examples, at the expense of characterizing large 
chunks of the lexicon in more abstract and generalizable terms. 
In Chapter 16, I will operationally define semantic prosody in terms of the 
positive/negative dimension (compare Morley & Partington, 2009), using the 
emotional valence norms from Warriner et al. (2013). The pay-off of this 
approach is that the analysis of semantic prosody becomes reproducible (and less 
open to such attacks as those by Whitsitt, 2005, and Stewart, 2010). Moreover, 
using a quantitative approach that deliberately simplifies the complex world of 
human emotions means hundreds of words can be analyzed in an automated 
fashion (see also Snefjella & Kuperman, 2016), thus yielding highly generalizable 
results. A final advantage of this approach is that the particular view of semantic 
prosody endorsed here is more precisely specified thanks to being 
operationalized via the valence scale. 
The points Healy (2017) makes also apply to sensory words. As discussed 
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 7, I am highly critical of blind applications of the five 
senses folk to perceptual language. Nonetheless, I am adopting the five senses 
folk model in the analyses that follow. This is because lumping the senses 
together into five big categories (rather than splitting the sensory world into 
many smaller subcategories) allows for making highly general claims with a high 
degree of abstraction. Moreover, in Chapter 11, I will present a dataset in which 
the five senses are precisely specified in terms of five numerical scales. This 
precise operationalization actually makes it possible to criticize the five senses 
folk model with empirical data. Thus, temporarily adopting the five senses folk 
model allows falsification. Sometimes it is best to operate within a theory to 
prove it wrong. 
 
10.7. Comparison to other approaches in empirical semantics 
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Any methodological choice needs to be defended against other choices that could 
have been made. Therefore, in this section I will look at other ways through 
which sensory meaning could be quantified. Specifically, what other approaches 
allow studying sensory meaning empirically? Here, I want to compare the norm-
based approach to two alternative approaches to measuring meaning: first, 
experimental approaches within the literature on embodied cognition, and 
second, distributional semantics. 
 As reviewed in Chapter 5, there is by now a large body of evidence 
showing that understanding language involves some form of perceptual, 
motoric, or emotional simulation. According to simulation-based accounts, 
performing a mental simulation of the content of an utterance is meaning 
(Bergen, 2012). Take, for example, a study by Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley (2002) 
who looked at how language users mentally simulate visual shapes. These 
researchers showed that processing an image of an eagle with its wings extended 
(rather than tucked in) was faster after reading the sentence The ranger saw the 
eagle in the sky compared to the sentence The range saw the eagle in the nest. By 
pairing nonlinguistic visual stimuli with linguistic stimuli, this experiment 
avoids the circularity trap of trying to infer conceptual content directly from 
linguistic patterns (see discussion in Dąbrowska, 2016a; Gibbs, 2007). 
 However, experimental approaches to word meaning are limited in their 
scalability when it comes to making generalizations about large-scale linguistic 
patterns, such as the structure of the mental lexicon. The just-mentioned study on 
the perceptual simulation of shape characteristics assessed a total of 24 sentence-
picture pairs (Zwaan et al., 2002), a figure that is representative of this literature. 
The experiment is designed to assess a particular theory of linguistic processing; 
the approach cannot easily be extended to large numbers of sentences or words. 
Running experiments on so many linguistic stimuli is simply infeasible. On the 
	 188	
other hand, the norm-based approach has impressive scalability. Norms are 
generated from quick judgments on linguistic stimuli and can hence be collected 
for thousands of words, as attested by recent so-called “megastudies” such as the 
concreteness norms for ~40,000 English words by Brysbaert et al. (2014) and the 
emotional valence norms for ~14,000 English words by Warriner et al. (2013). 
 Scalability is also afforded by distributional-semantic approaches to 
meaning. These approaches infer meaning from language use, such as whether 
words occur together in the same contexts. For instance, one could infer that 
nurse is semantically related to doctor by looking at whether these two words co-
occur together, or whether they occur in similar types of linguistic contexts (e.g., 
Miller & Charles, 1991). A large amount of work in corpus linguistics, 
computational linguistics, and natural language processing attests to the 
usefulness of inferring meaning from contexts. However, as stated by 
Dąbrowska (2016a, p. 489), “while distributional features provide important 
clues to meaning, adequate semantic descriptions must make use of other 
methods as well.” Distributional approaches can easily yield reliable estimates of 
the semantic similarity of such words as doctor and nurse, but they do not tell us 
what these words ultimately mean. 
 In contrast to distributional approaches, norms provide direct access to 
what words mean, albeit only to highly circumscribed parts of meaning, such as 
whether the meaning is concrete or not (Brysbaert et al., 2014), whether it is 
positive or not (Warriner et al., 2013), or how the word relates to the five senses 
(Lynott & Connell, 2009). Without any external input, distributional semantics is 
limited to quantifying semantic similarity between linguistic items, rather than 
any features that directly relate to the item’s meaning itself. 
 Neither psycholinguistic experiments, nor distributional semantics, nor a 
norm-based approach can be considered optimal with respect to the study of 
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meaning. Instead, each approach has its own set of advantages and 
disadvantages. Moreover, each approach is used to answer different kinds of 
questions. When it comes to studying perceptual language, however, norms 
provide an ideal way of forming a big-picture view of the sensory lexicon of a 
language, such as English. It should also be pointed out that the three 
approaches outlined here can be combined in fruitful ways. This will be done in 
Chapters 14 and 17, where I use norms to look at word usage in context, 
investigating patterns of co-occurrence between different types of sensory words. 
 Besides making novel theoretical contributions, this book shows how far 
we can take the norm-based approach. 
 
10.8. Limitations 
Any investigation should be clear about its limitations. The analyses that follow 
this chapter focus on sensory adjectives at the expense of considering other parts 
of speech, such as nouns, verbs, or ideophones. Moreover, the following analyses 
are focused on synchronic data only. Although there is clearly a historical 
dimension to sensory language (e.g., Williams, 1976), the analysis of diachronic 
data will have to be left for future studies. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized 
that the methods introduced in the following chapters are very useful for 
quantitative historic analyses as well. 
 My main focus will be on investigating the highly conventionalized part 
of the sensory vocabulary in a fairly abstract manner, neglecting how sensory 
words are used in particular discourse contexts. At present, my aim is not to 
provide a detailed qualitative description of how sensory words are used in 
situated interactions or specific types of discourse;I want to characterize the 
broad characteristics of the sensory vocabulary. It is hoped that this “big picture” 
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of the English sensory vocabulary facilitates future qualitative research in the 
domain of sensory language. 
 Throughout all empirical chapters of this book (Chapters 11-17), I will 
adopt a “cultural tool” perspective, focusing on the inventory of sensory words 
and how this inventory is deployed in use. Clark (1996, p. 56) distinguishes 
between the product tradition of studying language and the action tradition of 
studying language. Whereas the former focuses on language as a set of entities, 
the latter focuses on real cases of language use. An important difference between 
the product and the action tradition is that the product tradition is confined to an 
analysis of potential uses, whereas the action tradition looks at actual uses. In this 
book, we will both look at potential and actual uses, but our analysis of actual 
uses is only aimed at making statements about the toolkit of sensory words. It 
clearly is important to consider language as a form of action (Clark, 1996; Wilce, 
2009: 20-21), but this will not be the focus adopted here. 
Another caveat has to do with the focus on individual words as the units 
of analysis. This focus should not be taken to suggest that I endorse a fully 
lexically based model of language. Many corpus linguists correctly point out that 
the real units of speech and writing are not individual words, but larger-than-
word units (Sinclair, 1996; Stubbs, 2001), or “patterns” (Hunston & Francis, 2000). 
However, to understand how sensory language is employed in context, isolated 
sensory words such as spotted, amber, glittery, tangy, smooth, and prickly form an 
ideal starting point to investigate what linguistic resources for expressing 
perceptual content the English language makes available to its speakers. 
The final limitation is that the analyses presented in Part II exclusively 
deal with English. Future work needs to conduct similar analyses in other 
languages. The methods introduced in the following chapters can easily be 
extended to the study of other languages. 
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In short, I will only focus on English, only focus on adjectives, and only on 
the present. However, despite these limitations, the analyses presented in the 
following chapters deal with foundational issues in sensory linguistics, such as 
how the senses are connected in the lexicon and how sensory language is used 
for evaluative purposes. Many of the topics I will cover are also relevant to 
crosslinguistic or historical analyses, and to the analyses of other types of word 
classes, such as perception verbs. To this extent, the findings reported in the 
following chapters are relevant to all of sensory linguistics. 
 
10.9. Statistics 
Because each chapter uses very different statistical techniques, explanations for 
particular approaches will be given within each chapter. For all chapters with 
data (Chapters 12–17), the following GitHub repository contains analysis code 
and raw data: 
 
 https://github.com/bodowinter/sensory_linguistics 
 
 The R statistical programming environment version 3.3.1. was used for all 
analyses (R Core Team, 2016). The tidyverse packages (Version 1.1.1.) were 
used for data processing (Wickham, 2017b) and the stringr package version 
1.2.0 was used for character processing (Wickham, 2017a). The packages 
GISTools 0.7-4. (Brunsdon & Chen, 2014), png 0.1-7. (Urbanek, 2013), and 
plotrix 3.6.5. (Lemon, 2006) were used for visualization. Hartigan’s dip test 
(Chapter 12) was performed with the diptest package version 0.75-7 
(Maechler, 2015). Gaussian mixture models (Chapter 13) were performed with 
the mclust package version 5.2 (Fraley, Raftery, Murphy, & Scrucca, 2014). 
Linear mixed effects models (Chapter 17) were computed with the lme4 package 
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version 1.15.6 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015a, 2015b). Negative 
binomial regressions (Chapter 14) were computed with the MASS package 
version 7.3.45 (Venables & Ripley, 2002). Variance inflation factors (Chapters 15–
16) were computed with the car package version 2.1.3 (Fox & Weisberg, 2011). 
 The sense icons used throughout the figures of this book are taken from 
freepik.com: https://www.freepik.com/free-vector/five-senses-icons_837465.htm 
 																																																								
1 Ignoring the type/token distinction characterizes work on synesthetic metaphors to this day (but 
see Ronga, 2016). For example, Shen (1997) lists counts that are based on tokens (Shen, personal 
communication), but this is not stated as such in his paper. 
 
2  Stewart (2010) rightly points out that intuition and introspection are not the same thing. 
However, for present purposes, this distinction is irrelevant.	
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Chapter 11. Norming the senses 
11.1. Classifying sensory words 
Other works have focused on how speakers of different languages talk about the 
act of perception, as is the case when speakers use verbs such as to see, to hear, to 
feel, to taste, and to smell (Evans & Wilkins, 2000; Nakagawa, 2012; Sweetser, 1990; 
Viberg, 1983). Languages have dedicated communicative tools to talk about 
perception as an activity, something that humans do. However, languages also 
have dedicated means to talk about the results of this activity, the content of 
perception. Part II of this book focuses on how the English language expresses 
perceptual content, rather than perceptual activity. This motivates the focus on 
sensory adjectives, which are specifically about sensory properties, such as color, 
texture, and taste. 
To study sensory language empirically, one first needs to assemble a 
sizeable list of sensory terms (Ronga, 2016; Ronga et al., 2012; Strik Lievers, 2015). 
Lehrer (1978) already mentioned that for investigating language and perception, 
“what is needed is a study of something like a random sample of lexical items” 
(p. 95, emphasis in original). When doing sensory linguistics, a random sample 
of words may not actually be what we want. A random sample of words might 
include many words that are not strongly related to the senses at all, such as 
freedom and governance. Instead, we want a word list that allows us to address 
questions specifically relating to the senses, which means that we have to zoom 
in on perceptual vocabulary. More important than obtaining a random sample of 
words, a word list must be assembled independently from the theory one wants 
to test (see Chapter 10). Only by having an unbiased word list of sensory words 
can one confirm or disconfirm a theory about language and perception. 
To study differences between the five senses, the word list furthermore 
needs to be classified according to some perceptual dimension, such as to which 
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sensory modality each word relates. This latter step is complicated by the already 
mentioned fact that some sensory words are highly multisensory (Diederich, 
2015; Fenko et al., 2010; Lynott & Connell, 2009; Paradis & Eeg-Olofsson, 2013); 
that is, they evoke more than just one sensory modality. For example, how are 
we to classify adjectives such as barbecued and fishy? Do these terms describe 
perceptual properties? And if so, are they gustatory, olfactory, or both? What 
about the word crunchy (cf. Diederich, 2015), which is treated as auditory in 
Ronga (2016, p. 57)? Does this word not equally well describe something that is 
also tactile, and perhaps also gustatory? Finally, what about common sensibles 
(Chapter 4.3.2)? (see Levinson & Majid, 2014, pp. 412–413; Marks, 1978, Chapter 
2; Ronga et al., 2012, pp. 149–150; Sorabji, 1971). Tekiroğlu, Özbal and 
Strapparava (2014, p. 1) state that “connecting words with senses…is a 
straightforward task for humans by using commonsense knowledge.” The 
existence of multisensory words (such as harsh) and words describing common 
sensibles (such as large) shows that this is not so straightforward a task at all.  
This book advocates for the use of modality norms in sensory linguistics. 
There are by now many rating studies that have collected such norms, such as 
Lynott and Connell (2009, 2013), van Dantzig et al. (2011), Winter (2016), and 
Speed and Majid (2017). 
The first researchers to collect sensory modality norms for all five senses 
were Lynott and Connell (2009).1 These researchers asked 55 native speakers of 
British English to rate how much a given property is experienced “by seeing,” 
“by hearing,” “by feeling through touch,” “by smelling” and “by tasting.” For 
each of the modalities, participants responded on a scale from 0 to 5. This not 
only allows quantifying the degree to which a word corresponds to a specific 
sense, but, as we will see shortly, it also offers ways of quantifying the degree to 
which a word is multisensory. Notice a crucial assumption of the Lynott and 
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Connell (2009) rating study: Modality association is a continuous quality. That is, 
a word can be more or less visual, more or less auditory, and so on. 
Lynott and Connell (2009) collected norms for a total of 423 object 
properties. The list was assembled partly based on previous research on sensory 
words and partly based on dictionary searches. The adjectives were selected with 
psycholinguistic experiments in mind. Importantly, the list is not a random 
sample of sensory words. 
Table 4 shows two example words, yellow and harsh, with their 
corresponding average perceptual strength ratings (one mean averaged over all 
participants per modality). 2  The rightmost column specifies each word’s so-
called “modality exclusivity.” This measure is defined as the range of perceptual 
strength ratings divided by the sum. The resulting proportion is then multiplied 
by 100 so that exclusivities can be expressed as percentages. An exclusivity of 0% 
would mean that a word has exactly the same rating for all sensory modalities— 
that is, it is maximally multisensory. An exclusivity of 100% represents the 
maximum possible unisensoriality—only one sense is rated above zero. The 
word yellow has a considerably higher exclusivity (95.1%) because the only 
modality rated as very high in perceptual strength was the visual one. The word 
harsh has a much lower exclusivity (11.6%) because the perceptual strength 
ratings are distributed across all five senses. The fact that continuous perceptual 
strength ratings enable the calculation of the modality exclusivity measure shows 
the utility of having a numerical scale; it allows dealing with the 
multisensoriality of perceptual vocabulary in a principled manner. 
 
Table 4 
Modality norms for ‘yellow’ and ‘harsh’ 
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Visual Tactile Auditory Gustatory Olfactory Exclusivity 
yellow 4.9 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 95.1% 
harsh 3.2 2.5 3.3 2.3 1.8 11.6% 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of modality exclusivity scores. The most 
unisensory adjective in the Lynott and Connell (2009) dataset is brunette (98%); 
the most multisensory word is strange (10%). The average modality exclusivity is 
46%, which indicates that many adjectives are multisensory. This fact alone 
should be a reason to consult modality norms rather than relying on hard-cut 
sensory classifications, where a word can only be associated with one sensory 
modality (see discussion in Lynott and Connell, 2009). 
	  
Figure 2. Kernel density estimates of modality exclusivity ratings for adjective 
norms. Data shows 423 adjectives from Lynott and Connell (2009); the x-axis 
represents the modality exclusivity with the least unisensory words to the left 
and the most multisensory words to the right; the y-axis represents how many 
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words there are for a given exclusivity; density curves are restricted to the 
observed range; solid vertical line indicates the mean exclusivity of 46%. 
 
 The highest perceptual strength ratings in their respective categories were 
assigned to the words bright (sight), barking (sound), smooth (touch), citrusy 
(taste), and fragrant (sound). A word’s highest perceptual strength rating 
determines what Lynott and Connell (2009) call “dominant modality.” In Table 4, 
yellow is classified as visual because its visual strength rating is higher than its 
other perceptual strength ratings. The word harsh is classified as auditory 
because its maximum perceptual strength rating belongs to the auditory 
modality. However, the word barely passes as an auditory word: Vision has 
almost the same perceptual strength rating, and the other senses receive 
relatively high ratings for the word harsh as well. The contrast between the 
adjectives yellow and harsh clearly shows that classifying words according to 
dominant modalities is inherently more meaningful for words that are relatively 
more unisensory. Because of their difference in modality exclusivity, the 
classification of yellow as visual appears to be more adequate than the 
classification of harsh as auditory. 
For each dominant modality, Table 5 lists the most and the least frequent 
words, as well as the most and the least exclusive words (frequency data was 
taken from the SUBTLEX movie subtitles corpus, Brysbaert & New, 2009). 
 
Table 5 
Example adjectives by sensory modality 
Modality Frequent Infrequent Unisensory Multisensory 
Visual little, big vegetal, craggy brunette strange 
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Tactile hard, cool bristly, brackish* stinging brackish* 
Auditory quiet, crying soundless, sonorous echoing harsh 
Gustatory sweet, delicious honeyed, orangey bitter mild 
Olfactory fresh, burning burnt, reeking perfumed burning 
 
Note. The two most frequent and infrequent adjectives for each sensory modality 
based on the SUBTLEX movie subtitle corpus (Brysbaert & New, 2009) and the 
most and least exclusive adjective; data from Lynott and Connell (2009); *the 
word brackish has been classified as predominantly tactile by the participants of 
this study even though dictionaries commonly define this word as “slightly 
salty”. 
 
In a second norming study, Lynott and Connell (2013) collected 
perceptual strength ratings from 34 native speakers of British English for a set of 
400 randomly sampled nouns. Although the focus here is on sensory adjectives, I 
must also discuss noun norms. These are important as a point of comparison to 
the adjective norms, and they will become important when looking at adjective–
noun pairs in Chapters 14 and 17. Table 6 gives several examples from the 
norming study of Lynott and Connell (2013). 
 
Table 6 
Example nouns by sensory modality 
Modality Frequent Infrequent Unisensory Multisensory 
Visual want (n.), back (n.) provision, builder reflection quality 
Tactile feel (n.), hold (n.) strain, item hold (n.) item 
Auditory help (n.), God socialist, quarrel sound heaven 
Gustatory honey, food sauce, supper taste (n.) treat (n.) 
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Olfactory air, breath - - - 
 
Note. The two most frequent and infrequent nouns for each sensory modality 
(based on SUBTLEX) and the most and least exclusive noun; data from Lynott 
and Connell (2013). 
 
Among the nouns, smell is severely underrepresented, with only two 
nouns (air and breath). Moreover, these nouns do not directly relate to smell so as 
much as they relate to the sensory organs of the nose and the mouth. With an 
average exclusivity of 39%, the nouns are more multisensory than the adjectives 
(46%), a difference that is statistically reliable (unpaired Wilcoxon rank sum test: 
W = 103270, p < 0.0001). Lynott and Connell (2013) argue that this is because 
nouns are used to refer to objects, events, and actions, which can generally be 
perceived through multiple modalities. For example, food can readily be seen, 
smelled, and tasted. Adjectives, on the other hand, highlight specific properties 
of objects and actions, and as such, they are more likely to single out specific 
content from a particular modality (e.g.,	 Givón, 2001, p. 53). Whereas the noun 
food is highly multisensory (18% exclusivity), the expressions fragrant food and 
tasty food highlight modality-specific sensory aspects of the food. The observation 
that nouns are more multisensory than adjectives fits Gärdenfors’ (2014) “general 
single-domain thesis” according to which “words in all content word classes, 
except for nouns, refer to a single domain” (p. 239, emphasis added). 
Another potential reason for the lower exclusivity scores of the noun 
norms from Lynott and Connell (2013) might have to do with abstractness: 
Nouns such as information, fact, and socialist denote concepts that cannot easily be 
experienced directly through any of the senses. With these highly abstract 
concepts, the dominant modality classification is often questionable; indeed, it is 
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overall questionable whether perceptual strength ratings are appropriate for 
such concepts. For instance, the noun welfare is listed in Lynott and Connell 
(2013) as having vision as its dominant modality, but this word received 
relatively low perceptual strength ratings overall. Because it is not a very sensory 
word in the first place, the question as to which modality it belongs does not 
carry much weight. 
One has to be careful, however, in comparing the noun and adjective 
norms. The nouns were randomly sampled (Lynott & Connell, 2013), but the 
adjectives were not. This difference in how the word lists were created may affect 
the results: Winter (2016) collected perceptual strength ratings for verbs using 
two lists: one compiled using a dictionary search procedure based on typical 
perception verbs (to see, to hear etc.), and the other compiled using random 
sampling. The manually constructed list had higher exclusivity (57%) than the 
random sample (44%). Thus, the exclusivity difference between the Lynott and 
Connell (2009) adjectives and the Lynott and Connell (2013) nouns cannot be 
taken at face value. In particular, precisely because the adjective list in Lynott 
and Connell (2009) was constructed with psycholinguistic experiments on 
sensory language in mind, the words are expected to be high in specific sensory 
content relative to many other adjectives that could have been in the dataset, 
such as stupid, intelligent, rich, and poor. Thus, it is not entirely clear at present 
whether the lower modality exclusivity of the nouns is indeed due to a difference 
in lexical category, or due to a difference in sampling. 
Although I strongly advocate for using modality norms in sensory 
linguistics, it should be noted that the present datasets are not without their 
flaws. Some problems include straightforward misunderstandings of the 
meaning of particular words. For example, firm (n.) in the Lynott and Connell 
(2013) noun rating study received the highest perceptual strength rating for the 
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tactile modality, presumably because participants were not thinking of the noun 
firm (as in meaning ‘company’) but of the adjective firm, which relates more 
directly to a felt impression. In Lynott and Connell (2009), participants rated 
clamorous to be higher in tactile strength (2.9) than in auditory strength (2.4), even 
though most dictionary definitions emphasize the auditory meaning of this 
word. Another problematic classification is brackish (see Table 5 above), which 
had a higher tactile strength (3.0) than gustatory strength (1.5) and olfactory 
strength (1.5), despite dictionary definitions being about salty water, which is 
arguably more related to taste. It is noteworthy that both clamorous and brackish 
are very infrequent words (SUBTLEX frequencies 0 and 4 respectively), which 
suggests that the meaning of these words was perhaps not sufficiently known to 
the participants of the Lynott and Connell (2009) rating study. However, all in 
all, these minor problems pose no threat to the conclusions reported in this book: 
A few isolated cases are unlikely to skew a result that is based on a total set of 
423 words. 
 
11.2. Avoiding circularity 
A bigger methodological issue has to do with the following question: How did 
participants actually perform the modality rating task—that is, on what were the 
participants in Lynott and Connell (2009) basing their judgments? Remember 
that participants were asked how much a given property, say yellow, was 
experienced “through vision” or “through hearing” and so on. In simple cases of 
making judgments on unisensory words this appears to be straightforward: 
Yellow is clearly visual. But in the case of relatively more multisensory words, 
how did participants decide how each modality should be rated? One likely 
strategy that participants may have adopted is to generate linguistic examples: 
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For instance, to determine what the modality of harsh should be, a participant 
may have thought of linguistic examples such as harsh sound or harsh taste. 
If such a linguistic strategy had been adopted by the participants in Lynott 
and Connell (2009), the modality norms would be problematic when combined 
with corpora. For instance, Chapter 14 finds that touch ratings and sight ratings 
correlate with each other in corpus data. However, if the ratings are themselves 
influenced by language, then this finding would be circular, perhaps even 
inevitable. Simply put, if participants used a context-retrieval strategy when 
performing the rating task in Lynott and Connell (2009), then these ratings 
cannot be used to also analyze linguistic contexts in corpora. 
A modality norming study conducted by van Dantzig and colleagues 
(2011) can be used to address this concern. In this study, each property label was 
presented in the context of two objects. For instance, the property described by 
the word abrasive was assessed as it pertains to lava and sandpaper. Participants 
then provided perceptual strength ratings, as in the Lynott and Connell (2009) 
study. Pairing adjectives with nouns gives participants specific examples to 
consider, thus binding their property ratings to particular objects. This 
presumably restricts the influence of spontaneously generated linguistic 
examples. 
Finding that the results from van Dantzig et al. (2011), which had contexts, 
are similar to the results from Lynott and Connell (2009), which had no contexts, 
would alleviate the concern of circularity. For the 365 words that are overlapping 
between the two datasets, 82% share the same dominant modality classification. 
Moreover, the mean perceptual strength ratings of the two studies correlate 
reliably (all p’s < 0.05) with very high Pearson’s correlation coefficients, ranging 
from r = 0.81 for vision to r = 0.92 for audition.3 The modality exclusivity scores 
from the Lynott and Connell (2009) dataset also correlate reliably and very 
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strongly with the van Dantzig et al. (2011) exclusivities, with r = 0.75 (t(363) = 
21.69, p < 0.0001). 
To compare the degree to which words present in both lists are similar 
overall (across all five modalities), we may compute the cosine similarity 
between the modality vectors of each word. Each word in the modality norm 
dataset can be represented as a vector of five numerical values, one for each 
sensory modality. The word abrasive for example, can be represented as A = [2.9, 
3.7, 1.7, 0.6, 0.6] (sight, touch, sound, taste, smell). This vector encapsulates what 
one may call the “modality profile” of this word. The word abrasive also has a 
modality vector in the van Dantzig et al. (2011) dataset, which turns out to be B = 
[3.6, 3.6, 1.8, 0.3, 0.2]. The two vectors for the word abrasive are highly similar to 
each other: Modalities that have relatively high numbers in one rating study also 
tend to have high numbers in the other; and vice versa for low numbers. For two 
vectors A and B, the cosine similarity is defined as follows: 
 
   (E1) 
 
The resulting metric ranges from 0 to 1. If the adjectives from two datasets 
are exactly the same with respect to all five senses, the cosine will be exactly 1 
(maximally similar). Maximally different adjectives would have a value of 0. The 
average cosine similarity for the words present in both datasets is 0.97. The 
cosine values ranged from 0.74 to 0.99. This indicates a very high fit between the 
Lynott and Connell (2009) ratings and the van Dantzig et al. (2011) ratings. 
Throughout this book, the Lynott and Connell (2009) dataset will be used 
because it is more extensive than the van Dantzig et al. (2011) dataset (423 as 
opposed to 387 words). 
similarity = cos(θ ) = A ⋅BA ⋅ B
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11.3. Comparison to other approaches 
Using norms generated by native speakers is not the only method for generating 
a word list of sensory terms. To explain my reason for using modality norms as 
opposed to other methods, a comparison to other approaches is necessary. 
Many researchers use dictionaries to generate a list of sensory terms (e.g., 
Bhushan, Rao, & Lohse, 1999; Ronga et al., 2012; Strik Lievers, 2015). With this 
approach, a set of seed words that appear to clearly correspond to a particular 
modality is selected, such as the verb to hear for audition. Then, this initial set is 
enlarged by considering all the synonyms of the seed words. For example, the 
Collins Dictionary lists to listen to and to eavesdrop as synonyms of to hear. Thus, 
eavesdrop and listen are added to the list of auditory terms. For this approach to 
always yield a trustworthy modality classification, synonyms of a perceptual 
word from one particular sensory modality need to always be from the same 
sensory modality. However, this clearly is often not the case. For instance, 
Collins lists to attend to as a synonym of to hear, even though this word does not 
actually strongly relate to the auditory modality—one can attend to the 
subjective impression of taste and smell just as much as one can attend to a 
sound. An even more problematic example is the fact that to perceive comes up as 
a synonym of most perception verbs. In general, the thesaurus-based approach 
always needs an additional step of modality classification because not all words 
unequivocally belong to a particular modality. 
Strik Lievers (2015) used dictionaries and thesaurus lists to compile a 
dataset of sensory words, which she subsequently hand-annotated for the 
particular sensory modality involved. We can compare her list to the native 
speaker ratings from Lynott and Connell (2009). For those 96 words represented 
in both datasets, 92% of them have the same modality classification in both. 
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Some differences in classification include burning and pungent, which are 
classified as haptic/tactile in Strik Lievers (2015), but as being predominantly 
olfactory in the modality norms. Similarly, acrid, aromatic, and smoky are 
classified as gustatory in Strik Lievers (2015), but as predominantly olfactory in 
the study by Lynott and Connell (2009). I am not stating that either one of these 
classifications is more correct than the other. However, in contrast to Strik 
Lievers’ word list, the modality norms allow dealing with multisensoriality in a 
more principled fashion. In the Lynott and Connell (2009) norms, words such as 
aromatic and pungent are treated as belonging to multiple sensory modalities. 
Moreover, the modality exclusivity measure itself makes interesting data 
available that can be studied in its own right to investigate the properties of the 
sensory lexicon (Chapter 12). Because of the lack of a continuous rating scale, the 
multisensoriality of sensory words, as quantified through exclusivity, cannot be 
studied with the Strik Lievers (2015) word list. 
Tekiroğlu and colleagues (2014) constructed a word list in an automatic 
fashion using various techniques from natural language processing that were 
applied to a range of sources, including FrameNet, WordNet, and the GigaWord 
corpus. Because the approach was automatic and did not rely on tedious (and 
expensive) human judgment, their list is much larger than any other sensory 
word list so far, containing 22,684 entries. The core idea behind the Sensicon’s 
way of classifying the senses is that a word’s meaning can be inferred through 
the types of contexts in which a word occurs. For example, we may expect that 
taste words occur together with other taste words, such as when a speaker or 
writer talks about food. The Sensicon considers a local context of four content 
words before and after the candidate word.  
The resulting dataset, however, has several odd classifications. For 
instance, the three most visual adjectives are indicated to be federal, large, and 
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blue; the three least visual adjectives are salty, teen, and sour. What exactly is 
visual about the word federal, in particular when compared to the allegedly non-
visual word teen? The three most olfactory adjectives in this dataset are rich, 
musky, and hot; the three least olfactory “adjectives” (using the part-of-speech 
labels provided within the Sensicon) are federal, republican, and likely. The adverb 
likely is erroneously classified as an adjective, and the words hot and rich are 
treated as relating strongly to smell, presumably because they frequently occur in 
food-related contexts. Even more counterintuitive classifications characterize the 
auditory modality: The ten “adjectives” classified as most auditory are derisory, 
assisted-suicide, non-proliferation, dmcneely, fast-selling, fractional, guffawing, held, 
b.s., and litton-made. Not only are many of these words not adjectives, but their 
status as being auditory is highly questionable. In general, besides dubitable 
sensory classifications, the Sensicon also includes a lot of inconsistent part-of-
speech tags, such as domestic-sales, ski-slope, two-out, and serial-killer being treated 
as adjectives. 
Compared to the Sensicon classifications, the Lynott and Connell (2009) 
norms can be regarded as a human gold standard. Of the 423 sensory adjectives 
from Lynott and Connell (2009), 412 are also contained in the Sensicon. Of these, 
only 161 (39%) have the same modality classification. Conversely, this means that 
251 (61%) have mismatching dominant modality classifications. In particular, the 
Sensicon classifies many more words as gustatory. For instance, the words 
rectangular, cloudy, and ugly are classified as dominantly visual in the Lynott and 
Connell (2009) norms but as gustatory in the Sensicon. Pairwise correlations 
between the Sensicon and the modality norms are really low, with Pearson’s r = 
0.37 for sight, r = 0.27 for touch, r = 0.32 for sound, r = 0.51 for taste, and r = 0.58 
for smell. 
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Is it at all appropriate to use co-occurrence information for sensory 
classification? Chapter 16 shows that taste and smell language specializes in 
evaluative functions. As a result, words may be classified as gustatory purely 
because they are evaluative. In fact, the word bad is classified as gustatory in the 
Sensicon. Moreover, taste and smell words are associated with each other, as are 
sight and touch words (Louwerse & Connell, 2011; Lynott & Connell, 2009; see 
also Chapters 13–16). This means that any approach purely based on text co-
occurrences will have difficulty distinguishing between these two modality pairs. 
Co-occurrence based approaches have further problems disentangling metaphor 
and literal uses of sensory words, such as when using the touch word sharp to 
talk about sounds (Tekiroğlu, Özbal, Strapparava, 2015). Moreover, associations 
between sensory words are contingent on text type, as shown by Strik Lievers 
(2015). This would suggest that different corpus choices will lead to different 
classifications. In general, any co-occurrence based method is highly susceptible 
to the data from which co-occurrence statistics are computed.4 
One may think that the human ratings in Lynott and Connell (2009) are 
more subjective than the seemingly objective automatic technique used to 
construct the Sensicon. However, it needs to be pointed out that the Sensicon is 
still based on subjective judgments—namely, based on the introspection of the 
lexicographers who compiled FrameNet and WordNet, which were used to 
construct the seed list based on which co-occurrence statistics were computed. 
Given this, one could argue that the Lynott and Connell (2009) norms are a more 
direct and transparent reflection of intuitions. Furthermore, the Sensicon norms 
cannot be used for corpus analyses precisely because the norms are corpus-
based, which would lead to circularity.  
Finally, compared to any other word list, the existing modality norm set 
by Lynott and Connell (2009) has the advantage that their utility has been 
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validated in several psycholinguistic experiments, including Connell and Lynott 
(2010, 2012, 2014, 2016). For example, Connell and Lynott (2012) showed that the 
maximum perceptual strength value of the norms is a better predictor of word 
processing times than comparable concreteness and imageability ratings. Finally, 
Connell and Lynott (2011) showed a modality switching cost (Pecher et al., 2003) 
in a concept creation task using words classified according to the norms 
considered here. Connell and Lynott (2014) also used the modality norms to 
show that lexical decision and reading-aloud tasks direct attention to vision, but 
reading-out tasks additionally direct attention to audition. For additional 
experimental demonstrations of other norm sets that are structurally equivalent 
to the presently considered norms, see van Dantzig et al. (2011), Connell and 
Lynott (2016), and Speed and Majid (2017). For word lists such as those by Strik 
Lievers (2015) or the Sensicon, no such empirical demonstrations exist. 
To conclude, there is a wealth of advantages to relying on native speaker 
ratings and, in particular, the dataset of 423 adjectives from Lynott and Connell 
(2009). This dataset, in addition to other datasets of modality norms, is an 
important component of the methodological toolkit of sensory linguistics. Its 
many uses will be demonstrated throughout the remainder of this book. 
 																																																								
1 In fact, Medler et al. (2005) gathered the first modality norms that I am aware of, but they only 
normed the dimensions of sound and color, among other semantic dimensions that do not have 
anything to do with the five senses. 
 
2 The rating responses were not normalized within participants. When asked to rate something, 
participants often use the rating scale differently; for example, while some tend to use the whole 
scale (from 0 to 5), others selectively focus on the central part of the scale (e.g., from 1 to 4). 
Therefore, when averaging the ratings between participants, some information might be lost. It 
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would be interesting to see how the results presented here compare to a normalized scale and 
whether there are systematic individual differences between participants that relate to sensory 
linguistics. 
 
3 Similar to the task in Lynott and Connell (2009), participants in the study by van Dantzig et al. 
(2011) had to rate each conceptual pair for each of the five sensory modalities. This yields a data 
structure that mirrors the one of Lynott and Connell (2009), with visual strength ratings, auditory 
strength ratings, et cetera—except each adjective now has two such ratings, one for each noun it 
was combined with in the stimulus set (e.g., abrasive lava, abrasive sandpaper). For the van Dantzig 
et al. (2011) norms, the average of the responses for each of the two contexts was computed. In 
the case of the tactile modality and abrasive this would be 3.59, based on the mean of abrasive 
sandpaper (4.81) and abrasive lava (2.37). 
 
4 The amount of data going into the computation for each word is another issue to consider as 
well. Although the classifications in the Sensicon are based on a normalized form of pointwise 
mutual information, they are still susceptible to how much data is available for each word. A 
corpus gives more information about co-occurrence statistics for high frequency words than for 
low frequency words. It is possible this may actually impact the results; for sight, the correlation 
between the Sensicon values and the modality norms from Lynott and Connell (2009) is lower for 
low frequency words (using a median split and word frequency data from SUBTLEX, sight HF: r 
= 0.40, LF: r = 0.30). For taste (HF: r = 0.38, LF: r = 0.66) and smell (HF: r = 0.43, LF: r = 0.67), the 
pattern is the reverse. Here, low frequency words in the Sensicon have much higher correlation 
with human ratings. Touch (HF: r = 0.29; LF: r = 0.23) and sound (HF: r = 0.34; LF: r = 0.36) are 
inbetween. 
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Chapter 12. Dominance relations and specialization of sensory words 
12.1. Introduction 
This chapter delves more deeply into the modality norms by Lynott and Connell 
(2009). The first part of this chapter focuses on overall dominance relations 
between the senses (Chapter 12.2). The second part focuses on the degree to 
which sensory words are multisensory (Chapter 12.3). 
 Several of the analyses presented here and in the following chapter 
recapitulate analyses already conducted by Lynott and Connell (2009, 2013), as 
well as by Winter et al. (2018) and Strik Lievers and Winter (2018). Repeating 
some of these analyses serves to familiarize the reader with the 423 adjectives 
that will be used throughout the remainder of the book. These chapters also go 
beyond existing work by introducing new analyses, such as analysis of the 
precise distributional characteristics of the different perceptual strength rating 
measures. Moreover, I will reconceptualize some of the work that Lynott and 
Connell (2009, 2013) have conducted on these norms. 
Two theoretical topics will be investigated: First, the ratings will be 
investigated with respect to visual dominance and smell inferiority (see Chapter 
4). Second, the idea that sensory words are compression devices that single out 
modality-specific perceptual content will be tested with the rating data (see 
Chapter 4). 
 
12.2. Dominance relations between the senses 
12.2.1. Predictions 
As was discussed in Chapter 4, a lot of research suggests that vision is the 
dominant sense not only in perception, but also in human language, and the 
opposite is true for smell (Levinson & Majid, 2014). Therefore, it is expected that 
the ratings from Lynott and Connell (2009) exhibit visual dominance as well as 
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smell inferiority. The other senses are expected to pattern in between. Crucially, 
because the rating dataset is a rich multidimensional dataset, dominance 
relations between the senses may surface in a variety of ways. The following 
aspects of visual dominance (and smell inferiority) will be explored in this 
chapter: 
 
(a) visual dominance in continuous perceptual strength ratings (Chapter 
12.2.2) 
(b) visual dominance in categorical word counts (word types) (Chapter 
12.2.3) 
(c) visual dominance in the distributional characteristics of the perceptual 
strength ratings (Chapter 12.2.4) 
 
12.2.2. Dominance in perceptual strength ratings 
When looking at the continuous perceptual strength ratings, the following 
ranking emerges: Sight received the highest ratings overall (M = 3.6, SD = 1.2), 
followed by touch (M = 2.2, SD = 1.6). By comparison, sound (M = 1.5, SD = 1.6), 
taste (M = 1.3, SD = 1.6) and smell (M = 1.2, SD = 1.5) had much lower ratings. 
These means are depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Average perceptual strength ratings per modality from Lynott and 
Connell (2009). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of the respective 
means. For more detailed distributional information, see Figure 4. 
 
Are these perceptual strength ratings reliably different from each other? 
To assess this, a series of paired Wilcoxon signed rank tests was used, one for 
each modality pair (such as sight versus smell, sight versus taste, etc.).1 This 
showed that sight had reliably higher ratings than any of the other modalities (all 
Dunn-Šidák corrected p’s < 0.05). Moreover, touch had reliably higher ratings 
than sound, taste, and smell. Taste and smell were not reliably different from 
each other (V = 26106, corrected p = 0.11), and neither were sound and smell (V = 
47900, corrected p = 0.12), or sound and taste (V = 46980, corrected p = 0.57). These 
results suggest a split between sight and touch on the one hand, and taste, smell, 
and sound on the other. 
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12.2.3. Dominance relations in categorical word counts 
The categorical modality classifications, which are based on each word’s 
maximum perceptual strength rating (see Chapter 11), can be used to further 
explore dominance relations between the senses. This allows us to count how 
many words there are for each sense and whether some senses have more words 
than others. The analyses of categorical word counts presented in Winter et al. 
(2018) and Strik Lievers and Winter (2018) will be repeated here for the sake of 
exposition. It should be borne in mind, however, that these discrete word counts 
ignore the fact that sensory words are multisensory. 
Using the dominant modality classifications, there are 205 sight adjectives, 
70 touch adjectives, 68 sound adjectives, 54 taste adjectives, and 26 smell 
adjectives (see Lynott & Connell, 2009). A simple Chi-Square test indicated these 
counts to be reliably different from each other (χ2(4) = 228.8, p < 0.0001). Adjusted 
standardized Pearson residuals can be used to assess which senses were reliably 
overrepresented, and which were reliably underrepresented (using |2| as a cut-
off for significance, see Levshina, 2015, pp. 220–221). Sight was reliably 
overrepresented (+14.6). Smell was the most underrepresented (–7.1), followed 
by taste (–3.7). Sound was reliably underrepresented as well (–2.0), and touch 
was found to be neither reliably overrepresented nor reliably underrepresented 
(–1.8). 
 
12.2.4. Dominance in distributional characteristics 
So far, these analyses looked at the overall perceptual strength ratings, either 
using the continuous ratings (Chapter 12.2.2) or treating the ratings in a 
categorical fashion (Chapter 12.2.3). However, dominance relations may also 
express themselves in the characteristics of the perceptual strength rating 
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distributions. In particular, it has to be borne in mind that participants had a 
continuous range available to classify sensory words, ranging from 0 (no 
modality association) to 5 (maximal modality association). Because the scale is 
continuous, participants are free to use any one part of the range. It could be that 
participants’ responses are clustered around certain values, and this degree of 
clustering may differ between the five senses. 
Figure 4 shows the distributions of the perceptual strength ratings for each 
modality. The x-axis corresponds to the perceptual strength ratings (from 0 to 5). 
The y-axis corresponds to the density, reflecting how many words there are for a 
particular value of the scale. The solid vertical lines indicate the means of each 
distribution. 
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Figure 4. Kernel density estimates of perceptual strength ratings for the Lynott 
and Connell (2009) adjectives. Density curves are restricted to the observed 
range; solid vertical lines indicate means. The curves show clear bimodality (two-
peakedness) for all senses except for sight. 
 
In part, Figure 4 shows what was also seen in the average perceptual 
strength ratings, with overall higher sight ratings than ratings for the other 
modalities (see solid vertical lines). However, Figure 4 also shows that the 
perceptual strength rating distributions differ in shape between the five senses. In 
particular, touch, sound, taste, and smell appear to be two-peaked (i.e., they are 
bimodal distributions). This says something meaningful about the sensory 
vocabulary of English: For all non-visual modalities, there are dedicated pockets 
of lexical material. For example, the words quiet and mumbling strongly relate to 
sound, and they form a cluster of sound words together with words such as 
groaning, thunderous, and purring. However, there are many more words that do 
not relate to sound at all, and these form a separate cluster with its own peak in 
the distribution visualized in Figure 4c. Sight words are not similarly restricted 
to small pockets of lexical material, which is suggested by the fact that the visual 
strength ratings have only one peak. The lack of a two-peaked distribution for 
visual strength ratings suggests that all words in the study of Lynott and Connell 
(2009) are somewhat visual. This can be interpreted to show that vision is less 
restricted within the sensory vocabulary of English. 
Hartigan’s dip test (Hartigan & Hartigan, 1985) revealed statistically 
reliable bimodality for touch (D = 0.03, corrected p = 0.004), sound (D = 0.04, p = 
0.0001), taste (D = 0.04, p = 0.0009), and smell (D = 0.04, p = 0.0009), but not for 
sight (D = 0.02, p = 0.99).2 This finding can be interpreted as visual dominance in 
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the distributional characteristics of perceptual strength ratings: All non-visual 
modalities are restricted to small dedicated portions of the sensory lexicon. 
Taking all results on dominance relations together, Chapter 12.2 showed 
visual dominance in the form of overall perceptual strength ratings (Chapter 
12.2.2), word type counts (Chapter 12.2.3), and rating distributions (Chapter 
12.2.4). On the other hand, this chapter has also shown evidence for the linguistic 
inferiority of taste and smell in English. In addition, the results suggest an 
asymmetry between touch and sound, with touch ratings higher than sound 
ratings and with more touch than sound words. The sound ratings also exhibited 
more bimodality than the touch ratings, which can be taken to suggest that 
sound is more restricted to a small pocket of highly exclusive lexical material. 
This composition of the sensory vocabulary has to be taken into account, for 
example, when performing studies of crossmodal language use (see Chapter 17). 
 
12.3. Modality exclusivity 
12.3.1. Specialization of sensory vocabulary 
The last section discussed dominance relations between the senses. This section 
looks at the degree to which words specialize into any one sensory modality. As 
was discussed in Chapter 4, sensory words can be seen as compression devices 
that single out particular aspects of our perceptual worlds. On the other hand, I 
have also argued that perception is intensely multisensory. In their original 
rating study, Lynott and Connell (2009) highlight that property words are 
multisensory, citing the fact that the average modality exclusivity of all words 
was 46% as evidence for this claim. 
 However, it is possible that the figure 46% is mathematically inevitable. It 
could be that randomly picking perceptual strength ratings would result in an 
average exclusivity close to 46%. One has to consider the fact that noise in the 
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ratings would show up spuriously as multisensoriality. For example, if 
participants did not know a word very well, they might merely guess when 
performing the rating task. This is going to lead to the appearance of 
multisensoriality because on average, the ratings will be about equal for all 
modalities. In general, what is a high or low modality exclusivity to begin with? 
That is, what acts as an appropriate baseline for this figure and hence, for 
assessing the degree of multisensoriality in property words? 
 
12.3.2. A baseline for modality exclusivity 
One way to construct a meaningful baseline is to compute the modality 
exclusivity of the average word. This hypothetical average word is what was 
visualized in Figure 3. Mathematically, this word is represented by the modality 
vector [3.6, 2.2, 1.5, 1.3, 1.2], with average perceptual strength values in 
respective order of sight, touch, sound, taste, and smell. The modality exclusivity 
of this hypothetical word is 24% (range divided by sum times 100).3 This number 
can be used as a hypothetical baseline against which to compare the observed 
exclusivity values from the Lynott and Connell (2009) dataset. A one-sample 
Wilcoxon signed rank test showed that this was indeed the case (V = 88342, p < 
0.0001). 
In substantive terms, this means the following: Although adjectives are 
clearly multisensory, they are actually more exclusive than is expected by chance 
alone. This is exactly what we would expect if sensory adjectives preferentially 
express content from a particular sensory modality. Lynott and Connell (2009) 
rightly pointed out that adjectives are rarely ever specialized in just one sense. 
However, the degree of multisensoriality is not unlimited, and the exclusivity 
ratings do suggest some specialization of sensory adjectives. 
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12.3.3. A better baseline for modality exclusivity 
The results presented in the last section are already suggestive of specialization; 
however, the statistical baseline used was not optimal. In particular, the averages 
represented by the vector [3.6, 2.2, 1.5, 1.3, 1.2] ignore the distributional 
characteristics visualized in Figure 4. A more adequate baseline would compare 
the observed exclusivity values against hypothetical exclusivity values that obey 
the distributional characteristics of the data. This can be done via using a 
permutation-based approach. 
 In general, permutation-based approaches work by reshuffling a dataset 
to create a statistical baseline. In this case, I shuffled the lists of perceptual 
strength ratings separately for each modality. This means that each word has a 
random set of perceptual strength values. However, all the original perceptual 
strength values are still represented within the dataset, just not paired with the 
correct words. Then, the exclusivity was computed for each word. Following 
this, the average exclusivity was computed for all of these random words. The 
result is a single modality exclusivity value for a randomly generated sensory 
vocabulary. In this reshuffled data, each perceptual strength measure has the 
same distribution as seen in Figure 4, but the perceptual strength values do not 
match up between the senses the same way they do in the real dataset. This 
procedure is then repeated 1,000 times, each time storing the chance-based 
modality exclusivity of each hypothetical sensory vocabulary. This generates a 
distribution of hypothetical modality exclusivity values against which we can 
compare the average exclusivity value that is actually observed in the adjective 
dataset—that is, the figure 46%. 
 Figure 5a plots the distributions of the permutation-based modality 
exclusivities, based on repeatedly shuffling the adjective data. For comparison, 
Figure 5b shows the same approach used on the noun data from Lynott and 
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Connell (2013). The dashed vertical lines are positioned at the observed average 
exclusivity values for each dataset. 
 
 
Figure 5. Kernel density estimates of randomly permuted exclusivities. Vertical 
dashed lines indicate the observed exclusivity for each dataset. 
 
 Figure 5a shows that the average exclusivity value of 46% is higher than 
all of the permuted exclusivities. The average of all permuted exclusivities was 
44%, which is more multisensory than the actually observed exclusivity. In this 
case, the permutation-based p-value is exactly 0.00; that is, there is no single 
permuted exclusivity that is higher than the actually observed exclusivity. This 
can be interpreted to mean the following: Sensory adjectives are reliably less 
multisensory than what is expected based on a chance baseline; that is, they are 
unexpectedly exclusive. In contrast, Figure 5b shows that the average exclusivity 
of the nouns (39%) is lower than all baseline exclusivity values, which has a 
mean of 41% (p = 0.00). Thus, this analysis indicates nouns to be reliably more 
multisensory than what is expected by chance alone. These results provide 
further evidence for the idea that sensory adjectives specialize in particular 
modalities. 
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This analysis thus suggests that the figure 46%—the average exclusivity of 
all sensory adjectives taken together—is potentially deceiving. While Lynott and 
Connell (2009) interpret this figure to indicate that sensory adjectives are 
multisensory, the present analyses suggest that despite this multisensoriality, 
there is a drive toward specialization, or what was under the banner of 
“compression” in Chapter 4. 
 
12.3.4. Modality exclusivity differences between the senses 
Lynott and Connell (2009) already noted that the senses differ in the degree to 
which they are exclusive or not. When splitting up the data by dominant 
modality, sound words have overall higher modality exclusivities (57%) than 
sight words (49%), followed by smell words (42%), touch words (37%), and taste 
words (35%). A Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that these average exclusivities are 
reliably different from each other (χ2(4) = 97.09, p < 0.0001). 
 The permutation-based approach can also be used to see whether there is 
evidence for an emphasis on specialization or multisensoriality within each set of 
sensory words. To do this, the permutation-based approach was repeated for 
subsets of words based on their dominant modality (i.e., separately for the 205 
sight adjectives, for the 70 touch adjectives, the 68 sound adjectives etc.). The 
results are shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Kernel density estimates of randomly permuted exclusivities per 
modality. Vertical dashed lines indicate the average exclusivity of the observed 
data for each sense. 
 
To interpret Figure 6, one needs to compare the position of the permuted 
distributions to the dashed lines, which indicate the average exclusivity values 
for each sensory modality that are actually observed in the data. As can be seen, 
observed averages were very similar to the permutated values for sight, sound, 
and smell. For these sensory modalities, there was no evidence that the observed 
exclusivity differs from chance expectation. Only for touch (permutation-based 
p-value = 0.0) and taste (p = 0.02) did the permuted distributions differ markedly 
from the observed average exclusivity. In both cases, the permuted distributions 
had higher exclusivities than the observed average (i.e., random words were less 
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multisensory). This indicates that the actually observed exclusivities of touch and 
taste words are indeed unexpectedly low (i.e., specifically these two modalities 
are highly multisensory). 
 
12.4. Conclusions 
I have presented two sets of results in this chapter. The first set of results showed 
not all senses are created equal. The perceptual strength ratings exhibited 
evidence of visual dominance, as well as clear evidence for smell ineffability. 
Taste and sound words also showed somewhat weaker signs of ineffability. 
We can take the word type counts of dominant modality classifications as 
a measure of lexical differentiation. The type counts corroborated the view that 
there is visual dominance in the English lexicon (Buck, 1949; Levinson & Majid, 
2014; Viberg, 1983; Winter et al., 2018). Having the most unique word types, sight 
is the most differentiated sense in English. This also means that speakers can 
make more fine-grained semantic distinctions in the visual modality compared to 
the other modalities. It should furthermore be noted that the chemical senses 
were the most underrepresented in type counts, particularly smell. The 
distributional analysis (see Figure 4) additionally reflected visual dominance: 
Whereas the other senses are confined to small pockets of lexical material, there 
is no such restriction for sight. 
It is noteworthy that sound was not particularly dominant in the present 
analyses. For example, an analysis of the perceptual strength measures failed to 
find a statistically reliable difference between the perceptual strength ratings for 
sound and the perceptual strength ratings for smell. That is, sound did not have 
higher ratings than smell, a modality that is generally thought to be one of the 
“lower” senses. This seems to stand against the idea, often expressed in research 
on synesthetic metaphors (see Chapter 8), that sound is a “higher” sensory 
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modality. We also saw that sound vocabulary is the most restricted in the Lynott 
and Connell (2009) dataset. This is not only evidenced by high modality 
exclusivity values, but also by the fact that sound ratings exhibited the most 
pronounced bimodality, with a small pocket of dedicated sound words against a 
backdrop of many words devoted to the other senses. 
Another contribution of this chapter was to quantify and contextualize the 
idea that sensory words are multisensory. This was achieved by investigating the 
modality exclusivity measure, which was first introduced by Lynott and Connell 
(2009). A re-analysis of their measure showed that even though sensory 
adjectives are multisensory, they are actually more exclusive than what is 
expected by chance. This indicates specialization into modality-specific 
perceptual content. Sensory adjectives carve up the perceptual world into 
smaller, more manageable chunks. This means that each sensory word tends to 
focus on one sensory modality, or a particular set of perceptual qualities, at the 
expense of the other modalities or other perceptual qualities (Chapter 4). This 
finding, together with the evidence for multisensoriality, suggests that sensory 
adjectives are neither fully multisensory nor fully specialized. They can be seen 
as occupying a sweet spot between these two extremes. 
In further analyses, I looked at modality exclusivity separately for each 
sensory modality. As was already reported in Lynott and Connell (2009), touch 
and taste emerged as the most multisensory domains. Sensory words associated 
with these modalities had the lowest average modality exclusivity. This finding 
corresponds to the observation that taste and touch words are particularly prone 
to being used crossmodally (Chapter 8). 
The next chapter looks at inter-relations between the perceptual strength 
ratings. How do the senses work together in this set of sensory adjectives?  
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1 Wilcoxon tests were used with continuity correction; p-values are Dunn-Šidák corrected for 
performing multiple comparisons (10 tests for each modality pair). 
 
2 Because Hartigan’s dip test was applied five times to five different datasets, all p-values were 
corrected for five tests (Dunn-Šidák correction). 
 
3  Given the observed means in the dataset, this exclusivity is actually the lowest average 
exclusivity that could possibly be observed. Particular individual words may be below this value 
(such as the word strange [9.6%] or harsh [11.6%]), but it is unexpected that the average exclusivity 
across all words would go below 24%. 
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Chapter 13. Correlations and clusters 
13.1. Introduction 
This chapter continues the analysis of the modality norms provided by Lynott 
and Connell (2009). Chapter 11 discussed how native speakers had to rate each 
word on each of the five senses separately. This would suggest that the 423 
adjectives are structured in terms of the five senses folk model. However, is it 
actually the case that a description of this dataset in terms of five senses is the 
best we can do? Moreover, does the dataset actually provide evidence for five 
subgroups of words that are neatly packaged into the five senses? Or is there 
statistical evidence for smaller or larger groupings? 
This chapter looks at correlations and clusters within the modality norms. 
These analyses speak directly to the question of whether the five senses folk 
model can be applied straightforwardly to the sensory vocabulary of English 
(Chapter 2). The chapter is structured as follows: 
 
(a) correlations, uncovering larger subgroups (Chapter 13.2) 
(b) clusters, uncovering smaller subgroups (Chapter 13.3) 
 
13.2. Correlations between the senses 
Lynott and Connell (2009) used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the 
matrix of perceptual strength ratings to look at interrelations between the senses. 
PCA is a dimensionality reduction technique. Dimensionality reduction is best 
explained in analogy with the night sky: Physical space has three dimensions, 
but the night sky presents itself to us as a two-dimensional plane. This means 
that three-dimensional space is projected (reduced) onto two dimensions. 
Celestial bodies that are millions of lightyears away from each other along the 
third dimension, the dimension of depth, appear next to each other on the night 
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sky. Nevertheless, the night sky does capture some of the major relations 
between celestial bodies that are of interest to us as humans. Even just two 
dimensions give us considerable information about the relative positioning of 
certain galaxies and stars. 
 Similar to projecting three-dimensional physical space onto a two-
dimensional night sky, PCA projects a multidimensional dataset into a lower-
dimensional space. Elements of the data that reliably vary together will be 
projected onto the same dimensions, called components. In the present case, this 
can be used to project the “space” spanned by the five modality vectors (one for 
each sense) onto a lower-dimensional space. Essentially, this is asking the 
question: Is it possible to capture the major relations between sensory words 
with less than five senses? 
To answer this question, a PCA (using singular value decomposition) was 
run on a matrix of the z-scored perceptual strength ratings.1 Table 7 shows how 
each of the five senses loads onto each component. 
 
Table 7 
Principal components, loadings, and variance explained 
Modality C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
Sight +0.3 –0.6 –0.5 +0.6 0.0 
Touch +0.2 –0.5 +0.8 0.0 –0.2 
Sound +0.3 +0.6 +0.3 +0.7 –0.1 
Taste –0.6 –0.1 +0.2 +0.4 +0.7 
Smell –0.6 –0.1 0.0 +0.2 –0.7 
Variance 42% 75% 88% 96% 100% 
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To interpret this table, one needs to look at the sign and the strength of 
each loading. This reveals that the first component distinguishes sight, touch, 
and sound from taste and smell. This component accounts for 42% of the 
variance in ratings. The second component distinguishes sight and touch from 
sound (taste and smell do not load strongly onto this component). This 
component accounts for an additional 33% off the variance in ratings. Together, 
the first two components account for 75%. 
The third component separates sight from touch (13%). The fourth 
component has high loadings for sight and sound (8%). Finally, the fifth 
component separates taste and smell (4%). It is interesting to note that the 
separation of taste and smell words from each other describes the least variance, 
whereas the separation of taste and smell words from the rest describes much 
more variance. This suggests that the chemical senses of taste and smell are 
strongly associated with each other in the sensory vocabulary; separating the two 
modalities from each other does not help as much in describing this dataset. 
Similarly, the PCA indicates touch and sight ratings to be correlated with each 
other, with the distinction between these two modalities being comparatively 
less important (they have strongly different loadings only for the third 
component). 
Figure 7 shows the variable correlation plot for the first two components. 
In this plot, each sensory modality is represented as a vector. If two vectors have 
similar angles (i.e., pointing in the same direction), the corresponding ratings are 
highly correlated with each other. By moving from left to right along the x-axis, 
we move from words that are both taste and smell to words that are sight, touch, 
and sound-related. Moving along the y-axis (from top to bottom), we 
differentiate sound from touch and sight. Taste and smell do not load heavily 
onto the second component. This plot makes it immediately apparent that sound 
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points in a direction away from the other sensory modalities, which speaks to the 
exclusivity of this sensory modality. 
 
 
Figure 7. Variable coordinate plot for the first two components of the Principal 
Components Analysis. Vectors pointing into the same direction indicate 
variables that are highly correlated with each other. 
 
Figure 8 shows a scatter plot of all sensory words within the two-
dimensional space spanned by the two components. Each data point represents a 
single word, colored according to the dominant modality classification. This 
visualization clearly shows that in the two-dimensional projection, taste and 
smell, as well as touch and sight, are not clearly distinguished. Most of the taste 
words and smell words belong to what visually presents itself as just one cluster; 
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the same applies to sight and touch. The logos representing each sense (nose, 
mouth, etc.) are located at the x,y means of the respective dominant modalities. 
 
Figure 8. Scatter plots of words within the two-dimensional space spanned by the 
first two principal components. Each data point represents a word; sense logos 
are located at the means of each dominant modality. 
 
The PCA furthermore suggests that sound is quite distinct from the other 
senses. Its correlation vector in Figure 7 points away from all other sensory 
modalities. This was also observed by Lynott and Connell (2009) and replicated 
by Lynott and Connell (2013): Sound concepts appear to be quite exclusive; they 
are heavily tied to their own modality. This pattern will be revisited in Chapter 
14. 
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This section looked at meaningful macrostructures within the modality 
space spanned by the five senses. Correlations between the senses helped us to 
uncover larger groupings. The resulting clusters crisscross the five senses folk 
model: Taste and smell belong together, and so do touch and sight. Sound 
appears to form a group by itself. In the next section of this chapter, we move 
from uncovering larger subgroups to uncovering smaller subgroups. In total, this 
set of analysis looks at the rich multidimensional data provided by Lynott and 
Connell (2009) from multiple different lenses to uncover hidden structures at 
various levels of granularity. 
 
13.3. Clustering the senses 
Applying a cluster algorithm to the perceptual strength ratings allows the 
detection of latent classes (groups of words that have similar perceptual strength 
ratings). Cluster analysis attempts to find groups of data points that have similar 
numerical characteristics. There are several different methods available for 
cluster analysis. Here, Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) will be used.2 A series 
of such models was run on the matrix of perceptual strength ratings (z-scored). 
Bayesian Information Criterion scores (BICs) were used to assess which number 
of clusters provided the optimal fit to the data. It turned out that the data best 
supported a 12-cluster solution.3 This means that there is statistical evidence for 
12 distinct subgroups that have highly related perceptual strength ratings. 
 In the remainder of this section, I will go through the clusters one by one. 
In doing so, it has to be borne in mind that each cluster is just a statistical 
construct—a set of words that hang together based on similar ‘profiles’ of their 
perceptual strength ratings. Whether the words lumped together form 
meaningful groupings can only be determined later by means of human 
interpretation. To keep track of the twelve clusters, I labelled them in a heuristic 
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fashion, using verbal labels that serve to summarize the essential characteristics 
of each cluster. 
Figure 9 shows the first two clusters. The barplots show average 
perceptual strength ratings, which can be interpreted as a snapshot of the 
modality profile of each cluster. The examples below each barplot list the ten 
adjectives that were most strongly associated with each cluster (they are ranked 
according to the certainty of cluster association). 
 
 
Figure 9. Clusters 1 and 2. from the Gaussian mixture model. Words are ranked 
by the degree of certainty with which they associated with each cluster (i.e., the 
words that are most certainly a member of this cluster are mentioned first). 
 
 The “pure sight” cluster contains 41 words. The bar plot of the perceptual 
strength ratings clearly shows that the words in this cluster are similar to each 
other by virtue of having very high visual strength ratings and low ratings for all 
of the other senses. Given this specialization into sight, it also comes as no 
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surprise that the words in this cluster are highly exclusive (79%). Among the 
pure sight words, there are color terms, such as gray, red, and brown, and words 
that indicate brightness or visibility conditions, such as shadowy and cloudy. 
The “shape & extent” cluster contains 39 words that have overall less 
exclusivity (53%). These words appear to refer to shapes (triangular, conical, 
circular), edginess (curved, bent, straight) or extent (little, small). The words in this 
cluster are reminiscent of the dimension-word category by Williams (1976; 
Chapter 4.3.2; Chapter 8.2). These words describe the gross dimensions of objects 
in terms of shape and size. Since any perceptual characteristic that directly 
relates to physical space is a common sensible for sight and touch (see Marks, 
1978, Chapter 2; Stokes & Biggs, 2015), the “shape & extent” cluster has high 
ratings for both sight and touch. Louwerse and Connell (2011, p. 384) say that 
“any object that can be touched can be seen.” The fact that shape and extent are 
common sensibles also explains the relatively low exclusivity of this cluster 
(53%). Interestingly, the “shape & extent” cluster has overall higher sight than 
touch ratings. This suggests that to native speakers of English at least, spatial 
words first and foremost appear to be visual.  
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Figure 10. Clusters 3 and 4. Words are ranked by their certainty 
 
Figure 10 shows the next two clusters. The “gross surface properties” 
cluster contains 52 words. The “motion, touch, & gravity” cluster contains 40 
words. With average exclusivities of 37% and 47%, both clusters are considerably 
more multisensory than the other two clusters discussed so far. The descriptors 
in cluster 3 are all labels that would easily apply to things in a garage or a 
toolshed. These words describe the general shape and texture of physical objects. 
These terms are similar to the “shape & extent” cluster, but they appear to 
involve more words that involve irregular surfaces (crinkled, bristly, prickly, 
bumpy, wiry), and their focus seems to be overall more on surface properties 
(solid, hard), with comparatively fewer genuine size words (large, big). The words 
in the “motion, touch, & gravity” cluster can be characterized along various 
dimensions. They may have a component of motion (ticklish, swinging, scratchy). 
And they may relate to gravity, such as declining (low), or being light (downy). 
Many of the words in this cluster also have a subjective feel to them, such as the 
0
1
2
3
4
5
Cluster 3, "gross surface properties"
37% exclusive, N = 52
Examples:
crinkled, bristly, prickly, big, sharp, 
bumpy, wiry, solid, hard, large
R
at
in
g
0
1
2
3
4
5
Cluster 4, "motion, touch, & gravity"
47% exclusive, N = 40
Examples:
craggy, ticklish, low, swinging, branching, 
scratchy, tapering, motionless, downy, feverish
	 234	
words ticklish, scratchy, and craggy. However, these words are difficult to 
interpret as a coherent set because of their multisensory nature. 
 
Figure 11. Clusters 5 and 6. Words are ranked by their certainty 
 
 Figure 11 shows the next two clusters. The “skin & temperature” cluster 
contains 15 words (average exclusivity 43%). The words in this cluster appear to 
describe properties that one can feel via one’s skin, such as tingly, including 
temperature (lukewarm, tepid, cool, warm, chilly, cold). They also relate to liquidity 
and viscosity, such as clammy, humid, and sticky. The fact that words in this 
cluster have high touch ratings appears intuitive—we associate touch with the 
skin, and the skin is also the primary medium through which we experience 
temperature. It is remarkable that temperature-related words stick out from the 
other touch words. In some works on synesthetic metaphors, temperature is 
treated as separate from touch (Day, 1996; Ronga et al., 2012; Shinohara & 
Nakayama, 2011; Ullmann, 1945, 1957; Whitney, 1952); in others, touch and 
temperature are lumped together (e.g., Shen, 1997; Strik Lievers, 2015). 
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The way words in the “skin & temperature” cluster are differentiated 
from the other touch-related clusters is by having comparatively lower sight 
ratings and comparatively higher taste ratings. Although the visual ratings are 
still high, the fact that they are overall lower than for other touch-related clusters 
appears to correspond to the fact that temperature is something that is not 
always visually apparent. After all, we need warning lights on stoves precisely 
because it cannot easily be seen whether a surface is heated or not. But what 
explains the relatively high taste ratings of this cluster? We commonly experience 
the properties of temperature, liquidity, and viscosity in the context of food. This 
association with food may be what drives gustatory ratings up for this cluster. 
Perhaps participants in the rating study of Lynott and Connell (2009) used a 
heuristic whereby they judged all words related to food as gustatory. 
 The “chemical senses” cluster contains only 23 words (average exclusivity 
41%). The words in this cluster describe properties that can be perceived through 
taste and smell. Properties such as malty and antiseptic may be experienced 
through ingestion or sniffing, and this may help explain why this cluster has 
both high gustatory ratings and olfactory strength ratings. Several of the words 
in this cluster have negative connotation (acrid, bitter, antiseptic, putrid, astringent) 
(see Chapter 16). 
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Figure 12. Clusters 7 and 8. Words are ranked by their certainty 
 
 Figure 12 shows the next two clusters. The “taste” cluster contains 35 
words strongly relating to taste. The “smell” cluster contains 12 words strongly 
relating to smell. The taste cluster is more multisensory (exclusivity 31%) than 
the smell cluster (55%). This may, in part, be because the taste cluster is 
associated with food terminology, such as cheesy, chocolatey, alcoholic, coconutty, 
oniony, caramelized, and meaty. Whether something is caramelized or chocolatey can 
not only be tasted and smelled, it can often also be seen. This high 
multisensoriality of taste words also corresponds to the exclusivity analyses seen 
in Chapter 12 and the fact that taste words are frequently used in crossmodal 
expressions (Chapters 6–9). 
Just as would be expected based on the Principal Components analysis 
earlier in this chapter, taste and smell words cluster together. However, there are 
also signs of asymmetry between the two senses: The chemical senses cluster has 
overall higher taste than smell ratings, and the smell cluster is much smaller than 
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the taste cluster. This suggest that taste is more lexically differentiated than smell 
(Chapter 12). It should also be noted that whereas at least some of the taste 
words single out specific taste properties—such as sweet, cheesy, and alcoholic—
the words in the smell cluster are much vaguer. As stated by Majid and 
Burenhult (2014, p. 266), terms such as “stinky or fragrant appear to denote the 
evaluative experience of the participant rather than the quality of the smell.” 
Using a word such as sweet, even though it is also evaluative, gives a clear 
impression of a particular taste. The odor word perfumed, however, is only 
evaluative and has little precise perceptual content; this word could be used to 
describe many very different kinds of odors. These facts may be connected to the 
observation that “gustatory terms, such as sour, sweet, or pungent, usually 
double for olfactory terms” (Classen, 1993, p. 52; see also Classen et al., 1994, p. 
109), as was already discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
Figure 13. Clusters 9 and 10. Words are ranked by their certainty 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
Cluster 9, "sound 1"
66% exclusive, N = 32
Examples:
noisy, deafening, bleeping, silent, whistling, 
beeping, screaming, audible, whining, mumbling
R
at
in
g
0
1
2
3
4
5
Cluster 10, "sound 2"
53% exclusive, N = 32
Examples:
sonorous, squeaking, melodious, muffled, creaking, 
purring, booming, buzzing, rhythmic, jingling
	 238	
Figure 13 shows the next two clusters, both of which relate to sound and 
contain 32 words each. Both sound clusters are relatively exclusive (66% and 
53%). The difference between these two clusters is difficult to interpret. Perhaps 
the “sound 1” cluster is more related to sounds that machines (beeping, bleeping) 
or humans (screaming, whistling, whining, mumbling) would produce. Words 
within the “sound 2” cluster are sounds that animals can produce (creaking, 
purring, squeaking). Many of the properties within this cluster also appear to 
relate to music (melodious, rhythmic, jingling, sonorous). The properties in the 
“sound 1” cluster appear to be more directly measurable, referring perhaps more 
strongly to loudness and pitch. In contrast, the properties in the “sound 2” 
cluster appear to be more related to impressions or the effects of sounds on the 
perceiver. That said, the differences between these two sound clusters are 
particularly subtle when compared to some of the other clusters, which more 
obviously differ from each other. 
 
 
Figure 14. Clusters 11 and 12. Words are ranked by their certainty 
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 Figure 14 shows the final two clusters. The “impression-related” cluster 
contains 30 words and is relatively multisensory (43%). Words in this cluster 
appear to relate to impressions that can be gleaned primarily through vision, but 
also through the other modalities, such as stormy, crackling, radiant, misty, and 
amber. Some of the words also appear to characterize a certain level of intensity 
(stormy) or lack thereof (mellow). 
The “multisensory” cluster has an average exclusivity of 28%, the lowest 
of all clusters. With 72 words it is also the biggest cluster. At least, words ranked 
highly in terms of certainty of cluster association (see Figure 14), appear to have a 
strong evaluative character—such as beautiful and gorgeous, which are very 
positive, or grotesque, strange and dirty, which are relatively more negative. 
Words in this cluster appear to be related to qualities that relate to our physical 
condition (such as being dirty, clean, sweaty) or our looks (beautiful, gorgeous, 
grotesque). Given its size (72 out of 423 words is 17% of the entire adjective 
dataset), this cluster is, however, a relatively mixed bag of words. 
 To conclude this section on cluster analysis, it is useful to relate the 
obtained clusters to the idea of ineffability discussed in Chapter 4. How many 
words are there within each cluster? This addresses Levinson and Majid’s (2014) 
claim that ineffability is not necessarily about entire senses, but about perceptual 
qualities. We can interpret each cluster to be about a particular domain of 
experience. The number of words within each cluster can then be understood as 
an indicator of how differentiated the vocabulary for the expression of this 
domain is. Ordered in terms of word types, the “multisensory” cluster was the 
most differentiated (with 72 words), followed by “gross surface properties” (52), 
“pure sight” (41), “motion, touch, & gravity” (40), “shape & extent” (39), “taste” 
(35), “sound #1” (32), “sound #2” (32), “impression-related” (30), “chemical 
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senses” (23), “skin & temperature” (15), and “smell” (12). These type counts 
reinforce the low degree of lexical differentiation for smells in English, especially 
in comparison to the “taste” cluster. These counts furthermore suggest that there 
is low lexical differentiation for “skin & temperature” words. The counts also 
suggest that a large number of sensory words characterizes the gross dimensions 
of the world we live in, including shape, extent, and gross surface properties. 
Space is immensely important for humans, and thus it comes as no surprise that 
the vocabulary for space is fairly differentiated. 
The word type counts for the different clusters also reflect some degree of 
visual dominance: The “pure sight” cluster is quite lexically differentiated (with 
41 words). The relatively large size of this cluster is particularly noteworthy 
because this cluster is also quite unisensory (very high average exclusivity). It is 
comparatively easier for multisensory clusters to be large in size. Moreover, 
many of the clusters that relate to surface properties and extent are rated to be 
highest in visual strength. This also suggests that English speakers appear to 
associate the spatial characteristics of our perceptual world most strongly with 
sight and less so with touch. 
 
13.4. Revisiting the five senses model 
In the Lynott and Connell (2009) rating study, participants were asked to rate 
each word with respect to each of the five sensory modalities. Despite this 
constraint, participants could not help but make more fine-grained distinctions, 
as well as form larger groupings. This serves to show that the constraining 
nature of the rating task does not prevent us from investigating more detailed 
structures, given the right statistical tools for uncovering said structures 
(compare Chapter 10). This is an important methodological point: Ratings can 
uncover conceptual structures that are not directly measured (see also Troche, 
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Crutch, & Reilly, 2017). This is not only important for sensory linguistics, but also 
for the study of lexical semantics more generally. Lexical semanticists often 
group words (such as words for particular types of events or particular types of 
motion) based on either intuition or intuition-based linguistic tests (e.g., tests for 
aspectual classes). The methods presented in this section show that it is a 
worthwhile endeavor to also investigate which lexical groupings emerge from a 
bottom-up statistical approach when it is applied to rating data. Future research 
needs to extend this methodology to other semantic domains. 
What do these results say about the five senses folk model? When 
zooming out to take a big picture perspective of the Lynott and Connell (2009) 
dataset, there is clear evidence for less than five groups, with taste/smell and 
touch/sight patterning together, both of which are separate from sound (Chapter 
13.2). However, when zooming in, there is clear evidence for more than five 
groups, including groups that relate to temperature-related properties and 
groups that relate to the spatial dimensions of the environment. Just as the larger 
groupings, most of these smaller groupings crosscut the five senses, which is 
evidenced by the fact that there were relatively few unisensory clusters (such as 
the “pure sight” cluster and the two clusters related to sound). 
Crucially, however, both the micro and the macro perspective suggest that 
the five senses model does not provide a full picture of English sensory 
adjectives. When looking at microstructures, it is necessary to draw more 
distinctions than just five. When looking at macrostructures, there are fewer 
groups than the five senses. Both of these perspectives are equally true. Clusters 
and correlations provide two complementary perspectives of the same dataset. 
One focuses on microstructures, the other one on macrostructures. 
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1 Standardized PCA yields different results from unstandardized PCA and has been argued to 
improve the signal-to-noise ratio (Eklundh & Singh, 1993). 
 
2 In contrast to such heuristic techniques as k-means, Gaussian mixture modeling is a model-
based technique where the data is assumed to come from a mixture of Gaussian probability 
densities. In this case, using mixture models is preferred over k-means clustering because it 
allows fuzzy associations to clusters. Mixture models are also less constraining in the geometrical 
shapes that are allowed for clusters. One should keep in mind, however, that different cluster 
analysis techniques will yield different cluster solutions. The clusters presented in this chapter 
thus are an abstraction that is specific to a cluster analysis using Gaussian mixture models. 
 
3  In a first run, I applied mixture models to the two-dimensional space that resulted from 
applying PCA to the raw modality norms. In this case, the data best supported an 8-cluster 
solution. If mixture models were run on the uncompressed raw data, the data supported a 12-
cluster solution. The resulting clusters are qualitatively similar to the 8-cluster solution, but the 
12-cluster solution turned out to be more interpretable. The fact that the additional clusters were 
readily interpretable suggests that they represent meaningful additional subgroupings. Thus, I 
chose to report the 12-cluster solution. 
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Chapter 14. Semantic preferences of sensory words 
14.1. Introduction 
An extensive number of studies show that sensory experience is fundamentally 
multisensory (O’Callaghan, 2015; Spence & Bayne, 2015) and there is a vast array 
of crossmodal interactions between different sensory modalities (Deroy & 
Spence, 2013; Spence, 2011, 2012, 2013). But when it comes to language about the 
senses, do all the senses work together equally well? 
 Chapter 12 reported noteworthy relations between the senses when 
looking at just the perceptual strength ratings. In this chapter, I will look at how 
these sensory relations pan out in naturally occurring text, following Firth’s 
(1957, p. 179) famous credo that “you shall know a word by the company it 
keeps.” When it comes to adjectives, the most relevant “company” are the head 
nouns they modify (e.g., Givón, 2001, p. 53; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976, p. 355). 
Adjectives are intrinsically underspecified, requiring a head noun to gain full 
meaning (Paradis, 2000). A sensory linguistic analysis may gain a deeper 
understanding of the sensory vocabulary of English by looking at how the senses 
are related with each other in adjective–noun pairs. 
 All the findings discussed in this chapter provide quantitative evidence 
for a core concept in corpus linguistics: the idea that words may have what is 
called “semantic preference” (e.g., Partington, 2004; Stubbs, 2001). Hunston and 
Francis (2000, p. 137) say that “a word may be said to have a particular semantic 
preference if it can be shown to co-occur typically with other words that belong 
to a particular semantic set.” Semantic preference is related to the concept of 
collocation, which is “the statistical tendency of words to co-occur” (Hunston, 
2002, p. 12). Semantic preference, then, is collocation at the level of concepts. We 
can use the term “modality affinity” to describe the semantic preference of 
sensory words in terms of which other senses they tend to co-occur with. 
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There are different ways of analyzing modality affinity. The first way 
pertains to the overall fit between the adjective and the noun; that is, do words 
with a particular sensory modality profile occur together with words of a related 
sensory modality profile? The second way of addressing the notion of modality 
affinity is by looking at correlations between particular sensory modalities. For 
instance, given the results presented in the last chapter, taste and smell words are 
expected to be used together in text. The following gives an overview of this 
chapter: 
 
(a) cosine similarity analyses (Chapter 14.2) 
(b) correlation analyses (Chapter 14.3) 
 
Whereas the first set of analyses is targeted at gross modality affinity, 
disregarding specific sensory modalities, the second set of analyses is targeted at 
uncovering the inter-relations between the senses, looking at specific pairs of 
sensory modalities. Together, both analyses show that there is structure to how 
sensory words are used in natural language. Even though there is intense 
multisensoriality, it is not the case that “anything goes.” 
 
14.2. Cosine similarities 
This section asks the question: Is there modality affinity for adjective–noun 
pairs? Do adjectives stick to nouns with highly related modality profiles? This 
puts the first and most general constraint on how sensory adjectives are used in 
context. To assess this, the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA, 
Davies, 2008) will be analyzed in conjunction with the Lynott and Connell (2009) 
adjective and the Lynott and Connell (2013) noun datasets (see Chapter 11). This 
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large register-balanced corpus includes over 450 million words from magazine, 
news, academic writing, fiction, and spoken language. 
All adjective–noun pairs containing one of the 423 adjectives from Lynott 
and Connell’s study were extracted. This yielded nearly 150,000 adjective-pair 
types (N = 149,387), with over a million adjective–noun pair tokens (N = 
1,023,851). To investigate modality affinity, the adjective norms will be related to 
the noun norms from Lynott and Connell (2013). All adjective–noun pairs that 
did not feature a noun from Lynott and Connell’s (2013) list were excluded, 
which resulted in a dataset that contained about 14,000 unique adjective-noun 
pair types (N = 13,685; 183,533 adjective-noun pair tokens). 
Cosine similarity (see Chapter 11) can be used to quantify the degree to 
which an adjective’s sensory modality profile is similar to a noun’s sensory 
modality profile. The formula for cosine similarity is repeated here. 
 
 (E2) pair	similarity = 	cos 𝜃 = 	 /01∗3453/01 ∗ 3453  
 
The vectors represented by “adj” and “noun” in the above formula are the 
modality vectors of the two words being compared. A word can be 
conceptualized as a vector that is located within a five-dimensional modality 
space, defined by its ratings. For example, a highly sight-related adjective such as 
hazy points strongly into the direction of sight. In the space spanned by the five 
senses, adjectives and nouns with dissimilar modality profiles point in different 
directions. Adjectives and nouns with similar modality profiles point in similar 
directions. The similarity of two words can thus be quantified by the angle 
between the two vectors (using the cosine). The cosine similarity ranges from 0 
(adjective and noun are maximally different, vectors are exactly perpendicular to 
	 246	
each other) to 1 (adjective and noun are maximally similar, vectors are parallel to 
each other). The cosine thus quantifies the fit between an adjective’s modality 
profile and a noun’s modality profile. 
Table 8 shows two adjective–noun pairs, abrasive contact and sweet music, 
with their corresponding perceptual strength values and the resulting cosines. It 
is instructive to compare the perceptual strength rating of each adjective with 
each noun. This shows that abrasive and contact share high sight and touch 
ratings, and they are also both low on sound, taste, and smell ratings. 
Correspondingly, the cosine similarity of this adjective–noun pair is very high 
(0.91). In contrast, the adjective sweet has a very different modality profile from 
the noun music. Whereas sweet has high ratings for taste and smell, music has 
high ratings for sound. As a result, the cosine similarity value for this adjective–
noun pair is much lower (0.31). The difference in cosines between the two pairs 
indicates that the modality fit between abrasive and contact is higher than between 
sweet and music.  
 
Table 8 
Modality profiles of the adjective-noun pairs ‘abrasive contact’ and ‘sweet music’ with 
the corresponding cosine similarity 
  Sight Touch Sound Taste Smell Similarity 
abrasive 2.89 3.68 1.68 0.58 0.58 
 
contact 3.41 3.53 2.53 1.06 1.12 0.91 
sweet 2.19 0.57 1.19 4.86 3.90 
 
music 2.24 1.24 4.94 0 0.06 0.31 
 
	 247	
 The cosine similarity between the adjective and the noun was computed 
for all 14,000 adjective–noun pairs that were attested in COCA. The average 
cosine similarity was 0.81. This figure is relatively far away from the lowest 
possible cosine similarity of zero. Thus, the figure 0.81 indicates that adjectives 
combine with nouns that have similar modality profiles. This is quantitative 
evidence for modality affinity. 
 However, we have to rule out that the figure of 0.81 is not mathematically 
inevitable. It should be kept in mind that Chapter 12 found many words to be 
high in sight ratings and low in taste, smell, and sound ratings. Given this, it is 
entirely possible that simply combining adjectives and nouns at random would 
lead to a high cosine similarity. In particular, the following question has to be 
asked: Is a cosine value of 0.81 actually higher than what is expected by chance? 
In essence, we need a statistical baseline for the figure of 0.81. Only if this 
empirically established cosine similarity is higher than a chance baseline is the 
concept of modality affinity supported by this data. 
 To address these concerns, I compared the difference in modality fit 
between those adjective–noun pairs that are attested in COCA to those adjective–
noun pairs that are hypothetically possible, but that are actually unattested. The 
set of 14,000 adjective–noun pairs analyzed above is only a small subset (8%) of 
the set of possible adjective–noun pairings that could be generated with the two 
sets of norms. In particular, with 423 adjectives and 400 nouns from the two 
rating studies, there are at least 423 * 400 = 169,200 possible combinations. For 
instance, the pairs laughing liquid, garlicky promotion, scratchy fortune, solid spirit, 
forked provision, thumping welcome, greasy sergeant, shrieking money, and moldy grace 
are part of the 92% of possible pairs (N = 155,515) that are not attested in COCA. 
These unattested pairs serve as a hypothetical baseline for comparison with the 
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actually attested pairs. Figure 15 shows the distributions of the attested (a) and 
unattested (b) pairs. 
 
 
Figure 15. Kernel density estimates (over word types) as a function of cosine 
similarity of (a) adjective–noun pairs that are attested in COCA (N = 13,685) and 
(b) unattested adjective–noun pairs (N = 155,515); solid lines indicate means; 
density curves are restricted to observed range. 
 
 As can be seen in Figure 15, both the attested and unattested distributions 
have negative skew, with the tail tapering off toward lower values. That is, both 
distributions have many data points with relatively high cosines. This shows that 
indeed, given the distributional structure of the modality ratings, a high cosine 
similarity is to be expected (this may be, for example, because most adjectives 
and nouns are relatively high in visual content). However, crucially, the cosines 
of the attested and unattested pairs are reliably different from each other 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction, W = 931,630,000, p < 0.0001), 
with the average cosine similarity of the unattested adjective–noun pairs being 
0.76, lower than the average cosine similarity of the attested pairs (0.81). Thus, 
the actually observed adjective–noun pairs have a higher modality fit than what 
would be expected given all possible combinations of adjective and noun pairs 
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from the two datasets. This provides quantitative evidence for the idea that 
sensory words tend to combine with words that have similar perceptual 
characteristics. 
 
14.3. Correlations within adjective–noun pairs 
14.3.1. Predictions 
So far, this chapter has looked at the overall modality fit between adjectives and 
nouns, ignoring differences between the senses. I now turn to looking at pairwise 
correlations. Which specific senses correlate with which other specific senses in 
natural language data? 
 First, Chapter 14.3.1 will generate predictions following from the 
Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis (Chapter 5). Then, Chapter 14.3.2 will test those 
predictions. In particular, I argue that two predictions can be made for 
crossmodal relations in adjective-noun pairs: First, taste and smell should 
associate with each other. Second, sight and touch should associate with each 
other. Previous chapters have touched on these specific crossmodal connections. 
This chapter will discuss taste/smell and touch/sight integration in more detail. 
 There is a wealth of evidence for taste/smell integration. Eating necessarily 
involves smelling (Mojet, Köster, & Prinz, 2005), in part because humans not only 
smell through the nose, the so-called “orthonasal pathway,” but also through the 
so-called “retronasal pathway,” a passage to the olfactory bulb at the back of the 
oral cavity. Smell perceived through both channels interacts with taste in 
determining flavor. Behavioral experiments found, for example, that caramel 
odor can suppress the sour taste of citric acid (Stevenson, Prescott, & Boakes, 
1999), or that flavor and smell intensities and detection thresholds change 
depending on how taste and smell are combined (Dalton, Doolittle, Nagata, & 
Breslin, 2000; Delwiche & Heffelfinger, 2005; Pfeiffer, Hollowood, Hort, & Taylor, 
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2005). Taste and smell are also neurally integrated, sharing overlapping brain 
networks (de Araujo, Rolls, Kringelbach, McGlone, & Phillips, 2003; Delwiche & 
Heffelfinger, 2005; Rolls, 2008). In fact, taste and smell are so highly integrated 
and mutually interdependent that it is legitimate to ask whether they are actually 
distinct senses (see discussion in Spence et al., 2015). If taste and smell words 
follow these perceptual patterns, they should combine together in text. 
What is the evidence for touch/sight integration? Touching generally also 
involves seeing (Walsh, 2000). Actions such as manually reaching for an object 
involve a concerted interplay between vision and touch. Determining shape via 
touch appears to involve visual mental imagery (Klatzky, Lederman, & Reed, 
1987). Throughout human development, touch calibrates the size perception of 
vision, and vision calibrates the orientation perception of touch (Gori, Del Viva, 
Sandini, & Burr, 2008; Gori, Sandini, Martinoli, & Burr, 2010). 
There is abundant evidence for neural integration of sight and touch as 
well: The occipital cortex, specifically the parietal-occipital fissure, shows 
increased blood flow when participants make visual judgments as well as tactile 
judgments of the orientation of grating patterns on surfaces (Alivisatos, Jacobson, 
Hendler, Malach, & Zohary, 2002; Sathian & Zangaladze, 2002; Sathian, 
Zangaladze, Hoffman, & Grafton, 1997; Sergent, Ohta, & MacDonald, 1992). 
Furthermore, Zangaladze and colleagues used transcranial magnetic stimulation 
over the occipital portion of the scalp and showed that this interfered with the 
tactile discrimination of grating orientation (Zangaladze, Epstein, Grafton, & 
Sathian, 1999). A previous study has shown that stimulation via a magnetic coil 
over the same region also interferes with the visual recognition of letters 
(Amassian et al., 1989). The intraparietal sulcus shows increased blood flow 
when performing mental rotation in both the visual domain and the tactile 
domain (Cohen et al., 1996; Prather, Votaw, & Sathian, 2004). More generally, 
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large regions of the visual cortex also respond to somatosensory stimuli 
(Casagrande, 1994; Haenny, Maunsell, & Schiller, 1998; Hagen et al., 2002). If 
touch and sight words follow these neurophysiological and behavioral patterns, 
they should combine together in text. 
Ronga and colleagues (2012) state that the usage of sensory words in 
context “follows the same tendencies governing the perceptual integration of 
different sensory modalities” (p. 155). According to Marks (1978), “interrelations 
among the senses that appear in perception will also find their way into speech 
and writing” (p. 3). These ideas will be explored here by showing there is a 
semantic preference for taste words to associate with smell words (and vice 
versa), as well as for sight words to associate with touch words (and vice versa). 
Before I continue, the following question must be asked: Why not make 
similar predictions for other crossmodal interactions? Given the myriad of 
possible interactions between the senses (as reviewed in Spence, 2011), why stop 
at taste/smell and touch/sight integration? For instance, a pattern of crossmodal 
integration between sight and sound is also particularly dominant. There is 
abundant evidence for audiovisual integration (see Spence, 2007), just as is the 
case for taste/smell and touch/sight. For example, the McGurk-MacDonald effect 
shows that when participants see a video of somebody speaking, their auditory 
speech perception is affected by the precise execution of the lip and jaw 
movements (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976). The ventriloquist effect shows that 
vision can “pull” audition toward a particular spatial percept (Alais & Burr, 2004; 
Pick, Warren, & Hay, 1969; Welch & Warren, 1980). On the other hand, temporal 
ventriloquism shows that audition can pull vision toward a particular temporal 
percept (Morein-Zamir et al., 2003). The sound-induced flash illusion 
furthermore shows that hearing two beeps makes participants see a single light 
flash as two light flashes (Shams, Kamitani, & Shimojo, 2002). Audition and 
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vision are also neurally integrated (e.g., Baumann & Greenlee, 2007). Given these 
manifold interactions between sight and sound, shouldn’t the corresponding 
sensory words be associated with each other as well? 
There are at least three reasons that speak against the prediction that 
audiovisual integration should lead to a predominance of audiovisual language. 
It is insightful to contrast audiovisual integration with the case of taste/smell and 
touch/sight interactions. First, objects that look rough or smooth also generally 
feel rough or smooth. The same goes for objects that smell sweet, which often 
(but not always) taste sweet as well. That is, the integration of touch/sight and 
taste/smell is bound to objects. The same cannot be said for sound, which is 
event-based, not object-based (see Strik Lievers & Winter, 2018). When someone 
uses the adjective barking in a description, such as I heard a barking sound, this 
barking “property” is a less stable characteristic of the object. Philosophers since 
Aristotle have emphasized the inherent dynamicity of sound in our 
phenomenology (O’Callaghan, 2009; O’Callaghan & Nudds, 2009). Sound 
language may be different from the other modalities by virtue of the inherent 
dynamicity of sound. Moreover, precisely because sound-related adjectives such 
as squealing, barking, beeping, howling, and whistling describe events rather than 
properties, these adjectives are likely going to be used together with different 
nouns, compared to other sensory words. 
A second reason for not predicting a sight/sound association is that words 
such as shrill, mumbling, and thumping have an onomatopoetic feel to them, a 
topic that I will revisit in Chapter 15 (see also Perlman et al., 2018; Winter et al., 
2017). As was already mentioned in Chapter 9.2.5, the iconicity of these words 
may tie them more strongly to the auditory modality, which is another factor 
that makes sound words more exclusive in usage (see also discussion in Lynott & 
Connell, 2013; Lupyan & Winter, 2018). 
	 253	
Together, the two reasons stated (the lack of stable object binding and 
iconicity in word formation) explain why I predict linguistic touch/sight and 
taste/smell interactions, but not sight/sound interactions—despite evidence for 
sight and sound interacting in perception. 
Thus, I make three predictions for the following correlation analysis: First, 
sight-related adjectives should modify touch-related nouns and vice versa. 
Second, taste-related adjectives should modify smell-related nouns and vice 
versa. Third, sound words should be exclusive; they should not pattern together 
with words from the other senses. 
 
14.3.2. Correlation analysis 
This section re-uses the 14,000 adjective–noun pairs from Chapter 14.2—that is, 
the adjective–noun pairs from COCA for which both adjective and noun 
modality data exists. For each adjective and each sensory modality, the mean 
perceptual strength of the noun contexts was computed. For example, the word 
abrasive modifies the nouns contact, dust, and paper, among many other nouns). 
These three nouns have visual strength ratings of 3.4, 4.2, and 4.4, respectively. 
For the example of these three values only, this yields an average noun visual 
strength of 4.0 for the adjective abrasive. Such averages were computed in a 
frequency-weighted fashion (i.e., adjective–noun pairs with higher token 
frequencies contributed more towards the mean). 
Figure 16 visualizes the correlations between adjectives and nouns. The 
direction of the arrows is to be interpreted as follows: An arrow that points from 
sight to touch, for instance, describes the correlation between the visual strength 
of the adjective and the tactile strength of the noun (in this case, r = 0.37). 
Conversely, an arrow pointing from touch to vision describes the correlation 
between the tactile strength of the adjective and the visual strength of the noun 
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(in this case, r = 0.33). The figure only shows correlations which were indicated to 
be reliably different from zero after Bonferroni correction for performing 25 tests 
(p < 0.002). For the sake of simplicity, the visual representation omits one 
statistically reliable negative correlation (between an adjective’s visual strength 
rating and a noun’s taste rating).1 
 
 
Figure 16. The correlational structure of multisensoriality. Data from 13,685 
adjective-noun pairs; solid arrows indicate statistically reliable correlations 
(corrected for performing 25 comparisons), dotted arrows indicate statistically 
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reliable anti-correlations; the arrow heads point “from the adjective to the noun,” 
i.e., the vision-to-touch arrow indicates that the visual strength of an adjective is, 
on average, correlated with the tactile strength of the noun with r = 0.37. A weak 
negative correlation between an adjective’s visual strength and the gustatory 
strength of the noun (r = –0.22) is not shown in this figure. 
 
First, let us focus on the within-modality associations shown in Figure 16. 
For each modality, there were statistically reliable correlations with itself. This 
means that adjectives like to pair with nouns that have high perceptual strength 
ratings for the same modalities. This finding corroborates the cosine analyses 
reported above (Chapter 14.2). Moreover, it should be noted that all of the 
correlations are far from 1.0, the highest possible correlation. While part of this 
could be due to measurement error (a word’s modality rating cannot be 
measured perfectly, which is going to drive correlations down), this can also be 
interpreted as evidence for multisensoriality in adjective–noun pairs: Adjectives 
do not only go together with nouns from the same modality, they are also used 
crossmodally. Moreover, the degree to which adjectives are used crossmodally 
differs between the dominant modality considered: Touch has the lowest intra-
modal correlation (r = 0.33), suggesting that touch words are most likely used in 
contexts that are outside of their own modality. This is followed by smell (r = 
0.46), sight (r = 0.56), taste (r = 0.66), and sound (r = 0.77). The fact that sound has 
the highest intra-modal correlation fits the predicted pattern of auditory 
exclusivity: Sound words are most likely to be used in the context of other sound 
words. 
Next, let us look at the correlation between sight and touch. The fact that 
there are arrows pointing both ways means the following: First, sight adjectives 
modify nouns that can also be felt, such as is the case with shiny belt, shiny body, 
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and shiny glass, all of which are attested adjective–noun pairs. Second, touch 
adjectives modify nouns that can also be seen, such as rough blanket, rough cotton, 
and rough landscape. A similar bidirectional relationship characterizes taste and 
smell words.2 For example, the highly olfactory word smoky (which is also quite 
gustatory) occurs in such expressions as smoky taste, smoky food, and smoky sauce. 
Similarly, the highly gustatory word sweet occurs in such highly olfactory pairs 
as sweet whiff, sweet rose, sweet balsam, and sweet cologne. 
Finally, Figure 16 clearly shows that sound is anti-correlated with 
everything else. This means that sound adjectives are not frequently used to 
modify nouns from the other senses. The auditory adjectives squealing, booming, 
and muffled, for instance, tend to modify such auditory nouns as sound and music, 
and not nouns such as sauce (taste), cotton (touch), and picture (sight). Moreover, 
adjectives from the other sensory modalities do not frequently modify sound 
nouns. The words music and sound, for instance, are predominantly described 
with auditory adjectives and much less so with non-auditory adjectives.3 
 
14.4. The structure of multisensoriality 
In this chapter, I have presented several results that point to the idea that words 
with similar modality profiles stick together. This result was established for 
adjective–noun pairs only, but similar principles are expected to hold for other 
types of sensory expressions as well. Chapter 14.2 showed that compared to 
unattested adjective–noun pair types, attested pairs were characterized by a 
strong modality fit. Moreover, those adjective–noun pair types with high 
modality fit had higher token frequencies. Chapter 14.3 furthermore showed that 
taste/smell and touch/sight words are associated with each other in adjective–
noun pairs. Together, these findings provide quantitative evidence for the 
corpus-linguistic notion of semantic preference extending to the domain of the 
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senses. Words preferentially combine either with words from their own sensory 
modality, or with words from highly related modalities. This phenomenon was 
referred to here as modality affinity, a subtype of semantic preference. 
The only modality that stood out from the rest was sound, which was 
found to be anti-correlated with all other senses (Chapter 14.3). Words such as 
warbling, hoarse, and growling are perfectly fit for describing sound sensations, but 
they are much less apt for describing other sensory phenomena. Similarly, highly 
auditory nouns such as laughter, voice, and harmony are not frequently described 
using non-auditory words such as yellow, oniony, or odorous. 
Together, these findings suggest that the multisensoriality of sensory 
words is structured. It is not the case that “anything goes” with respect to the 
distributional patterns of sensory words. There are clear indications of affinity 
between some senses—such as taste/smell and sight/touch—but also clear 
indications of aversion between others, particularly between sound and the rest. 
This structure was in part predicted by the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis 
(Chapter 5) based on the fact that taste/smell and touch/sight are also associated 
with each other in perception. Knowing about how the senses play together in 
perception allows predicting, at least to some extent, how the corresponding 
sensory words behave in language. That is, linguistic association is predictable 
from perceptual association. 
The results of this chapter also have important implications for corpus 
linguistics. First, the analyses used here showcase a new methodological 
approach to quantifying the notion of semantic preference. In particular, it is 
possible to combine data collected in a decontextualized rating task with corpus 
data to quantify the degree to which words of similar semantic profiles stick 
together, in this case words of similar sensory modality profiles. Second, the 
results from this chapter need to be compared to the results of the preceding 
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chapter. In particular, Chapter 13 uncovered crossmodal relations that looked 
much like what was found in the corpus analysis of this chapter: Chapter 13 
showed that taste and smell ratings were correlated with each other, and so were 
touch and sight ratings. Very similar relations were found when looking at 
adjective–noun pairs in corpora. This similarity in findings, in fact, shows that 
native speaker intuitions obtained in a decontextualized task meaningfully 
correspond to how sensory words are used in context. 
The close correspondence between decontextualized ratings and 
contextualized usage is an important result because corpus linguists generally 
argue against an over-reliance of native speaker intuitions. For example, 
Hunston (2002) states that “...the main argument in favour of using a corpus is 
that it is a more reliable guide to language use than native speaker intuition is” 
(p. 20). This statement may well be true, but this chapter has presented evidence 
demonstrating what people think about language in a decontextualized task is 
predictive of contextual use. This is in line with Miller and Charles (1991), who 
showed that similarity ratings on isolated word pairs were predictive of corpus-
based contextual similarity. The close correspondence of the results in this 
chapter with the results of the preceding chapter shows that sensory words can 
be meaningfully studied in isolation as well as in context, and the two analyses 
can inform each other. 
To conclude, this chapter revealed clear structure to the crossmodal ways 
with which sensory words are employed by speakers of English. To use William 
James’s description, there is no “great blooming, buzzing confusion” of sensory 
words; but the analyses of this chapter also show that there are no crisp divisions 
between the senses either. Sensory words are neither fully constrained nor fully 
flexible with respect to the contexts in which they occur. Sensory words can be 
said to occupy a sweet spot of multisensoriality. 
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1 Adjective visual strength ratings were anti-correlated with noun gustatory strength ratings 
(t(394) = 4.4, p < 0.001), with a negative Pearson’s r of –0.22. This reveals that sight-related 
adjectives are not used frequently in highly taste-related contexts. This is perhaps surprising 
because visual descriptors and color terms such as yellow can clearly be used in food-related 
contexts, such as the following expressions that occurred in the corpus: yellow food, yellow liquid, 
and yellow sauce. However, sight-related words appear much more frequently in contexts that 
have nothing to do with taste, such as yellow shirt, yellow hat, and yellow eye. Clearly, English 
speakers use visual words in the context of food to describe how food looks, but the frequency of 
these food contexts does not outweigh the frequency of non-food contexts. This may be the 
reason why the visual strength of the adjective is anti-correlated with the gustatory strength of 
the noun. A similar view is, in fact, expressed by Ronga (2016): 
 
When we eat, we perceive the taste of our food and simultaneously its fragrance and 
texture, but we are not able to look at the food in our mouth. This may be the reason why 
synaesthetic pairings composed of visual modifiers are rare. (p. 57) 
 
However, one should also not overstate this result because it is the weakest of all the 
correlations found. 
 
2 Taste and smell are often co-lexified on the same lexical items also in other languages. For 
example, some varieties of German (such as Swiss German) use the same word schmecken to 
describe the experience of tasting and the experience of smelling. 
 
3 It is noteworthy that all correlations ‘from’ sound to the other modalities (sound adjectives 
modifying other-modality nouns) are lower, rather than the other way around. This pattern 
conceptually relates to what is observed in synesthetic metaphor research (Chapters 6–9; Chapter 
17), where sound concepts are particularly infrequent as descriptors of other sensory perceptions. 
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Chapter 15. Frequency, semantic complexity, and iconicity 
15.1. Introduction 
Up to this point, every chapter has exclusively dealt with the modality norms 
and the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Chapter 14). This means 
that we have almost exclusively looked at inter-relations between the five senses. 
To further understand the sensory vocabulary of English, the list of sensory 
adjectives needs to be related to other linguistic patterns. This will be done here, 
where I use word frequency data (Chapter 15.2), dictionary meaning counts 
(Chapter 15.3), and iconicity norms (Chapter 15.4) to gain a deeper 
understanding of the sensory vocabulary of English. 
 I will also continue the theme of exploring the extent to which the five 
senses folk model is supported by linguistic data (Chapter 2). Throughout this 
chapter, I will repeatedly perform three types of statistical analyses in parallel. 
For each of the different datasets (word frequency, emotional valence, etc.), I will 
assess whether they are best described in terms of any of the three following 
types of models: 
 
(a) Cluster model: Regression of the dependent variable (frequency, valence, 
etc.) onto the factor Cluster, which comprises 12 levels (one for each 
cluster from Chapter 13) 
 
(b) Categorical model: Regression of the dependent variable onto the factor 
Dominant Modality, which comprises five levels taken from the modality 
norms 
 
(c) Continuous model: Regression of the dependent variable onto the five 
continuous perceptual strength measures taken from the modality norms 
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The comparison of these three models allows us to assess which way of 
carving up the sensory world best accounts for linguistic patterns. How far can 
we take the five senses folk model? How much is gained by taking finer-grained 
distinctions into account? Finally, are sensory words best treated in a categorical 
or a continuous fashion? 
 
15.2. Word frequency 
Chapter 12 found that vision was the most differentiated sense, having the most 
unique word types. I will now explore whether visual concepts are verbalized 
more frequently. Type and token frequency are logically independent from each 
other (Regier et al., 2016; Warriner & Kuperman, 2015). 
 Some evidence already suggests that English speakers verbalize visual 
concepts more frequently (San Roque et al., 2015; Viberg, 1993), but this has so 
far only been shown for perception verbs such as to see. Does visual dominance 
in word frequencies extend to sensory adjectives? In this section, I will repeat 
some of the analyses conducted in Winter et al. (2018). The analyses will be 
extended to allow comparison of the three different models discussed above. 
 I will analyze word token frequencies from the SUBTLEX corpus of 
American English (Brysbaert & New, 2009). This corpus has approximately 51 
million words from over 8,000 different American English movies and TV 
shows.1 SUBTLEX word frequencies have been argued to correspond particularly 
well to human behavior, such as reaction times in psycholinguistic experiments 
(see Brysbaert & New, 2009). Four hundred thirteen words from the Lynott and 
Connell (2009) dataset were also represented in SUBTLEX (98%).  
Figure 17 depicts a boxplot of the logarithmically transformed frequencies 
(log10) for each of the clusters introduced in Chapter 13. Boxplots are colored in 
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terms of the sense that had the highest average ratings. It should be kept in mind, 
however, that several of the clusters were highly multisensory. 
 
Figure 17. Log10 frequency from SUBTLEX by cluster. Boxplots are colored in 
terms of the dominant modality for each cluster and ordered by modality and 
frequency within each modality. Clusters are taken from Chapter 13. The boxes 
cover 50% of the data, with the middle line indicating the median. The whiskers 
cover the largest or smallest value within the interval of 1.5 times the 
interquartile range. 
 
 A look at Figure 17 suggests that sight, touch, and sound words are 
overall quite frequent in the SUBTLEX corpus. Words within the “skin & 
temperature” cluster are also relatively more frequent than words in the “gross 
surface” cluster. There appear to be no major frequency differences between the 
different visual clusters. On the other hand, taste and smell words occur less 
frequently in SUBTLEX. There also is a notable frequency asymmetry between 
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the taste cluster, which is more frequent than the clusters for the chemical senses 
and the cluster for smell. 
A simple one-way ANOVA with the 12-level Cluster predictor (cluster 
model) revealed a reliable effect on log frequencies (F(11, 401) = 3.3, p = 0.0002), 
which described about 6% in variance (adjusted R2 = 0.06).2 
 How does the cluster model compare to a model that predicts frequencies 
based on the dominant modality classifications? A simple one-way ANOVA with 
the 5-level Modality predictor (categorical model) revealed a reliable effect (F(4, 
408) = 7.1, p < 0.0001), which also described about 6% in variance (R2 = 0.06). Sight 
adjectives were the most frequent (log mean = 2.2), followed by touch (M = 2.1), 
sound (M = 1.9), taste (M = 1.6), and smell (M = 1.6). In terms of raw frequencies, 
sight adjectives occurred on average 2,018 times in the corpus. Touch words 
occurred 1,036 times. Sound words occurred 347 times. Taste words occurred 267 
times. And smell words occurred 248 times. 
 How do these two analyses fare against the continuous perceptual 
strength ratings from each modality? A multiple regression model was fitted on 
log frequencies with five continuous predictors, one for each modality.3 Taken 
together as a set, the continuous perceptual strength ratings reliably predicted 
log frequencies (F(5, 407) = 13.3, p < 0.0001) and described 13% of the variance (R2 
= 0.13). A look at the regression coefficients revealed positive frequency slopes 
for all perceptual strength measures except for smell. Only the sight (estimate: 
+0.32, SE = 0.05, p < 0.0001) and sound (+0.14, SE = 0.03, p < 0.0001) slopes were 
reliably different from zero. 
 Finally, how do the cluster model, the categorical model, and the 
continuous model compare? The relative performance of each statistical model to 
the frequency data can be assessed using Bayesian Information Criterions (BICs). 
This measure balances model complexity and model fit. Relatively lower BIC 
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values indicate better model performance.4 The continuous model had the lowest 
BIC (1102), followed by the categorical five senses model (1130), followed by the 
clusters model (1164). Thus, BICs suggest that the continuous model performed 
best. 
The cluster model and the categorical model both regressed frequencies 
onto a categorical data structure. The two models accounted for a similar amount 
of variance, but the categorical model did so in a much more parsimonious 
fashion, using five rather than twelve distinctions. The relatively poor 
performance of the cluster model is also apparent in Figure 17: The different 
clusters within each dominant sense did not differ much in terms of word 
frequency, with the notable exception of the “skin & temperature” cluster and 
the “taste” cluster. 
 
15.3. Dictionary meaning counts 
In this section, I will use dictionary meaning counts to test the idea that different 
classes of sensory words differ in terms of their semantic complexity. Sight and 
touch (and perhaps sound as well) should be higher in semantic complexity than 
taste and smell. This is to be expected for several reasons. First, frequency is 
correlated with the number of dictionary meanings (Baker, 1950; Köhler, 1986; 
Thorndike, 1948; Zipf, 1945, 1949), and speakers prefer to semantically extend 
frequent as opposed to infrequent forms (Harmon & Kapatsinski, 2017). 
Therefore, any differences in word frequency (Chapter 15.2) should be associated 
with differences in semantic complexity. 
Moreover, Viberg (1983) and Evans and Wilkins (2000) have argued that 
sight, touch, and sound are relatively more prone to semantic extension than 
taste and smell (see also Sweetser, 1990). 5  For example, metaphors for 
intelligence frequently derive from the tactile modality, such as describing 
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somebody as acute, keen, sharp, or as having a penetrating mind (Classen, 1993, p. 
58; Howes, 2002, pp. 69–71). Others have stated that sight is particularly prone to 
acquiring metaphorical meanings denoting mental content (Caballero & 
Ibarretxe-Antuñano, 2014; Caplan, 1973; Matlock, 1989; Sweetser, 1990; though 
see Evans & Wilkins, 2000; see also San Roque, Kendrick, Norcliffe, & Majid, 
2018), as in the English expression I see meaning ‘I understand’. The same goes 
for many verbs of hearing, such as I hear you also meaning ‘I understand’ (see 
Sweetser, 1990, p. 41). We may also expect touch to be particularly high in 
semantic complexity because of the observation that it is a frequent source 
domain in crossmodal language use (Chapter 8), as in sharp pitch, rough voice, 
abrasive tone, and smooth melody. 
 I used dictionary meanings from WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998; Miller, 1995). 
Dictionary meaning data was available for 370 of the 423 adjectives (87%). 
Although dictionary meanings do not directly reflect the semantic structure of 
the mental lexicon (e.g., Croft & Cruse, 2004; Elman, 2004), they have been shown 
to correspond meaningfully to psycholinguistic behavior (Gernsbacher, 1984; 
Jastrzembski & Stanners, 1975; Johnson-Laird & Quinn, 1976; Jorgensen, 1990), 
and they have successfully been used as shorthand for semantic complexity in 
other works (e.g., Zipf, 1945, 1949; see also Baayen & del Prado Martín, 2005). 
 Figure 18 shows a boxplot of dictionary meaning counts per cluster. The 
shape of the boxplot clearly reveals positive skew, which is to be expected from a 
count variable (the data was additionally analyzed with negative binomial 
regression to show that the results are robust; see online supplementary 
materials). Logarithmically transformed sense counts (log10) were regressed on 
the Cluster factor, while simultaneously controlling for frequency. This analysis 
revealed a reliable effect of Cluster (F(11, 354) = 5.4, p < 0.0001; R2 = 0.07). In 
addition, there was a reliable effect of Log Frequency (F(1, 354) = 285.5, p < 
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0.0001), thus replicating the known finding (e.g., Köhler, 1986; Zipf, 1945, 1949) 
that frequent words have many dictionary meanings (unique multiple R2 = 0.41).  
 
 
Figure 18. Log10 dictionary meaning counts by cluster. 
 
 Dictionary meaning counts also differed reliably by dominant modality 
while simultaneously controlling for Log Frequency (F(4, 361) = 11.84, p < 0.0001; 
R2 = 0.04). On average, touch words had 4.8 dictionary meanings, followed by 
sight words with 3.8 meanings, smell words with 2.5 meanings, taste words with 
2.3 meanings, and sound words with 1.7 meanings. Finally, dictionary meaning 
counts were also reliably affected by the five continuous perceptual strength 
measures (controlling for Log Frequency, F(5, 365) = 7.36, p < 0.0001; R2 = 0.05).6 
For three sensory modalities, the regression coefficients were indicated to be 
reliably different from zero. For touch, there was a positive relationship to 
semantic complexity (+0.03, SE = 0.007, p < 0.0001). There were negative 
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relationships for sound (–0.03, SE = 0.008, p = 0.003) and sight (–0.03, SE = 0.01, p = 
0.02). 
How do the three different classes of models (clusters, categorical, 
continuous) compare against each other? Again, the continuous model had the 
lowest BIC (–113), followed by the categorical model (–111), followed by the 
cluster model (–90). Thus, semantic complexity is another linguistic variable for 
which it helps to know to which sensory modality a word belongs. 
 
15.4. Iconicity 
Finally, let us investigate whether form–meaning correspondences differ 
between the senses. In particular, given the discussion in Chapter 3, we expect a 
preference for sound concepts to be encoded in an iconic fashion. Many 
researchers have noted that sound concepts are often onomatopoetic, such as 
Sweetser (1990, p. 35): “Words for physical sound have most commonly an 
onomatopoetic origin.” And indeed, just looking at the list of sound adjectives 
from Lynott and Connell (2009), there appear to be many onomatopoetic 
adjectives, such as meowing, moaning, murmuring, rustling, thudding, and 
thunderous. 
A heightened degree of iconicity appears to characterize deverbal sound 
adjectives in particular. Adjectives that do not derive from verbs—such as loud, 
quiet, and mute—do not appear iconic. Perry et al. (2015) and Winter et al. (2017) 
found that verbs are rated to be more iconic than adjectives in English, so it is 
plausible that deverbal adjectives may be more iconic as well. Here, we want to 
establish whether the senses differ in their iconicity, and, if so, whether this 
depends on a word’s association with the verbal domain. 
How can iconicity be quantified? One approach is to use native speaker 
judgments about whether a word is iconic or not. This method was first used for 
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signed languages, including German Sign Language (Grote, 2013, Chapter 3.3) 
and British Sign Language (Vinson, Cormier, Denmark, Schembri, & Vigliocco, 
2008). Perry, Perlman, and Lupyan (2015) were the first to collect iconicity ratings 
for spoken language, for a set of 592 English and Spanish words. The English 
part of this dataset was extended by Perry et al. (2018) and Winter et al. (2017), 
which yielded a total of 3,001 English words normed for iconicity. 
Participants rated each word on a scale from –5 (“words that sound like 
the opposite of what they mean”) to +5 (“words that sound like what they 
mean”). Examples of words with high iconicity ratings are humming (+4.47), click 
(+4.46), and hissing (+4.46). Examples of words with low iconicity ratings are 
miniature7 (–1.83), hamster (–1.9) and innocuous (–1.92). Similar to other constructs 
in this book, iconicity was thus treated as a continuous quality, with some words 
being relatively more iconic and some words relatively less (cf. Thompson & 
Estes, 2011). Iconicity ratings exist for 422 of the 423 adjectives (99%). The ratings 
are shown for all clusters in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Iconicity ratings by cluster. 
 
 As can be seen, the two sound clusters have the highest iconicity values. 
The clusters associated with taste and smell have the lowest. The sight-related 
clusters also have relatively low iconicity ratings overall. Within the tactile 
modality, the “gross surface” cluster is higher in iconicity than the “skin & 
temperature” cluster. This corresponds to the observation that words involving 
active touch (i.e., haptic exploration) actually have a very high degree of iconicity 
in English (see Winter et al., 2017), and in other languages (e.g., Dingemanse, 
2011; Dingemanse & Majid, 2012; Essegbey, 2013). There are also many 
experimental studies showing connections between touch-related concepts and 
speech sounds (Etzi, Spence, Zampini, & Gallace, 2016; Fryer, Freeman, & Pring, 
2014; Moos, Simmons, Simner, & Smith, 2013; Perlman & Cain, 2014). 
Modelling iconicity ratings using the cluster model yielded a reliable 
effect (F(11, 410) = 8.3, p < 0.0001), which described around 16% of the variance in 
ratings. The categorical model showed that the five-fold division was also 
statistically reliable (F(4, 417) = 21.4, p < 0.0001), describing 16% variance. 
Iconicity scores were highest for sound (2.3), followed by touch (1.8), sight (1.2), 
smell (1.0), and taste (0.8). Finally, continuous perceptual strength ratings also 
had a statistically reliable on iconicity ratings (F(5, 421) = 17.8, p < 0.0001), 
describing 17% of the variance. The only two iconicity slopes that were reliably 
different from zero were sound (+0.27, SE = 0.04, p < 0.0001) and touch (+0.1, SE = 
0.04, p = 0.006). 
The dominant modality model had the lowest BIC (1254), followed by the 
continuous model (1257) and the cluster model (1290). This is the first dataset 
explored in this chapter where the categorical model beats the continuous model, 
although the two models are quite similar in their BICs. 
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The auditory modality in particular has many deverbal adjectives, which 
may stem from the fact that sound concepts are more lexically differentiated in 
the verbal domain (Strik Lievers & Winter, 2018). To assess whether deverbal 
adjectives are indeed more iconic, etymologies from the Oxford English 
Dictionary (www.oed.com) were consulted. Of the 68 sound adjectives, 50 traced 
back to verbs (74%), and only 5 traced back to nouns (7%). The remaining 13 
adjectives were adjectives from their first time of attestation. Denominal 
adjectives were excluded due to their low numbers, allowing for a direct 
comparison of adjectives and deverbal adjectives. Indeed, deverbal adjectives 
had higher iconicity ratings (+2.6) than adjectives (+1.2), a reliable difference 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test, W = 121, p = 0.0005).8 
 
15.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I used various additional datasets to “make sense” of the sensory 
adjectives from Lynott and Connell (2009). First, it was shown that English 
speakers verbalize visual sensations more frequently than sensations associated 
with the other sensory modalities (Chapter 15.2). This finding suggests that 
speakers have a greater communicative need to talk about sight compated to 
touch, sound, taste, and smell. As stated before, this aspect of visual dominance 
could be due to many different factors; however, the results are at least 
consistent with the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis (Chapter 5) because there is 
independent evidence for visual dominance in perception, as reviewed in 
Chapter 4. From this perspective, a perceptual asymmetry is reflected in a 
linguistic asymmetry. The correspondence between type counts (Chapter 12) and 
token counts (this chapter) suggests that the sensory lexicon is well-adapted to 
the needs of its speakers: There are more words precisely for those perceptual 
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domains that are more frequently talked about (see Regier et al., 2016; Winter et 
al., 2018). 
 This chapter reported two more results. First, touch words were found to 
be high in semantic complexity, as operationalized through dictionary meanings. 
This is in line with the observation that touch is frequently used crossmodally, 
and that touch also frequently metaphorically extends into the mental world (cf. 
Classen, 1993, Chapter 3; see also Sweetser, 1990). Sound words had particularly 
low dictionary meaning counts, perhaps because they are more exclusive 
(Chapter 12) and more restricted in their usage patterns (Chapter 14). 
 Finally, this chapter showed that knowing about a word’s sensory 
modality is also predictive of form–meaning correspondences. Differences 
between the senses go all the way down to sound structure. In particular, sound 
words received high iconicity ratings. Touch words also received relatively high 
ratings. Taste, smell, and (to some extent) sight were much lower in iconicity. 
This shows that the sensory vocabulary of English, even when just looking at 
adjectives, differs with respect to the semiotic strategies identified in Chapter 3. 
Certain senses prefer certain semiotic strategies. 
 This set of findings relates to what Dingemanse (2013) calls the “iconicity 
question”: “What are the structural properties of form and meaning such that 
they afford iconic mappings between the two?” Besides the obvious fact that it 
may be easier to encode sound with sound due to the overlap in modality 
(Perlman et al., 2018), the temporal dimension of sound may play a role in the 
heightened iconicity of words for this sensory modality. Compared to the other 
modalities, sound is much more dynamic, with sound concepts being about 
actions and events that are temporally bounded or time-varying (see arguments 
presented in Strik Lievers & Winter, 2018). This differs from the other modalities, 
for which there may be a higher number of relatively more static concepts, such 
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as color and shape. The relatively static nature of these non-auditory perceptual 
features may make it difficult to depict them with speech, which is a dynamic 
medium after all. 
Strik Lievers and Winter (2018) review the evidence for an intrinsic 
connection between sound and time, which they suggest may lie behind the 
increased lexical differentiation of sound specifically in the verbal domain, 
compared to adjectives and nouns. Here, I showed that the among the sound 
concepts from Lynott and Connell (2009), there are many deverbal adjectives. 
These deverbal adjectives received higher iconicity ratings than adjectives that 
were not deverbal. This is consistent with observation that verbs are rated to be 
more iconic than adjectives (Perry et al., 2015; Winter et al., 2017). This finding 
additionally suggests that the most “dynamic” adjectives are the most iconic. 
Winter et al. (2017) propose that dynamicity may also explain why touch 
words received relatively high iconicity ratings, since touch often involves the 
haptic exploration of surfaces, which is a temporally extended process. As stated 
by Carlson (2010, p. 248), “unless the skin is moving, tactile sensation provides 
little information about the nature of objects we touch.” Although this remains 
speculative for the time being, it is possible that the dynamicity of touch affords 
its iconic expression in the dynamic medium of speech. Future research needs to 
measure the theoretical construct of “dynamicity” directly to provide a 
quantitative test of these ideas. However, at this stage, the difference between 
adjectives and deverbal adjectives is already indirect support for the idea that it 
is precisely the time-varying nature of sound that may make it easier to encode 
sound concepts in an iconic fashion.9 
It is worth highlighting that the three variables investigated in this 
chapter—word frequency, semantic complexity, and iconicity—are each studied 
in their own right. Thus, an achievement of this chapter is to show that the senses 
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matter when considering these variables. Knowing about a word’s sensory 
modality is partially predictive of various different linguistic patterns. 
Finally, let us take a step back and take stock of the evidence for the five 
senses model. For all datasets considered in this chapter, the continuous model, 
the categorical model, and the cluster model described linguistic patterns in a 
statistically reliable fashion. Each model shows that knowing about a word’s 
sensory modality lets us predict different aspects of a word’s linguistic 
properties, ranging all the way from usage frequencies over semantics to sound 
structure. However, model comparison (using BIC values) showed that treating 
the senses continuously performed better than treating them categorically in at 
least two out of three cases. This does not mean that the five senses model or the 
clusters uncovered in Chapter 13 are wrong in any sense. Instead, it means that 
for word frequency and dictionary meanings (but not for iconicity), using 12 
categorical clusters or five categorical senses does not give additional leverage as 
opposed to treating perceptual association in a continuous fashion. 
The fact that the continuous model consistently performed well has 
theoretical implications; it suggests that for the linguistic system, discrete labels 
that are imposed by the analyst do not matter as much. Instead, the continuous 
degree to which a word is associated with certain modalities appears to be a 
more important factor. Humans operate within a sensory continuum, and this 
carries over to sensory language. This is, in fact, another facet of the Embodied 
Lexicon Hypothesis. To the extent that sensory continuity characterizes actual 
perception, we should see this characterizes sensory language as well. Humans 
live in a world characterized by perceptual continuity, and so do their sensory 
words. 
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1  A concern of the analyses presented in this section is that I have only looked at word 
frequencies from SUBTLEX, a corpus that is, after all, based on movies and TV shows, which may 
be biased in terms of which sensory words occur. However, similar results are obtained using 
COCA, and in fact, many commonly used corpora show evidence for visual dominance in word 
frequencies (Winter et al., 2018). 
 
2  Word frequencies are a categorical count variable (positive integers) best analyzed using 
Poisson regression, or negative binomial regression in the presence of overdispersion (see, Zuur, 
Ieno, Walker, Saveliev, & Smith, 2009). It should be noted that for a similar dataset, Winter et al. 
(2018) fitted negative binomial models instead of linear regressions on log frequencies. This 
analysis yielded overall similar results. For the present data, supplementary analyses with 
negative binomial models are presented in the online scripts (see Chapter 10.7). For all models 
presented in this chapter, I assessed compliance with the normality and homoskedasticity 
assumption via residual plots and Q-Q plots. For most models, visual inspection revealed no 
major problems with these assumptions, except for the continuous semantic complexity model. 
 
3 Variance inflation factors, however, revealed no major issue with collinearity (all VIF’s < 3). 
 
4 BICs are similar to the more commonly used AICs (Akaike Information Criterion); however, 
they penalize complex models more strongly. 
 
5 But see Nakagawa (2012), who argues that the Khoe languages ǂHaba, Gǀui, and Gǁana exhibit 
semantic extensions of taste verbs to touch and hearing. 
 
6 The slopes of the continuous model were reliably positive for touch (+0.028, SE = 0.007, p < 
0.0001). The slopes were reliably negative for sound (–0.03, SE = 0.009, p = 0.003) and, perhaps 
surprisingly, also for sight (–0.03, SE = 0.01, p = 0.02). If Log Frequency is taken out of the 
continuous model, there was a reliable positive effect for sight (+0.04, SE = 0.01, p = 0.006), 
suggesting that the high number of dictionary meanings for sight largely stem from the 
frequency of sight words. Put differently, there is no “extra” in semantic complexity for being a 
visual word once frequency is taken into account. 
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7 The fact that miniature was rated to be one of the least iconic forms is surprising given that the 
morpheme mini– has two high front vowels, which could be taken as an instance of size sound 
symbolism, especially when contrasted with the form macro–. The odd rating for this particular 
word is probably due to the instructions given to participants. To make sure participants 
understood the task, several examples of iconic and arbitrary words were presented prior to the 
task. The demonstration of iconicity emphasized word length and used Hockett’s example (1982 
[1960], p. 6), who stated that microorganism is a long word for a small animal, whereas whale is a 
short word for a small animal. 
 
8 In an additional analysis, I looked at whether word forms used more frequently as verbs than 
adjectives are more iconic. For this, the SUBTLEX part-of-speech tags (Brysbaert, New, & 
Keuleers, 2012) were used. Indeed, there was a reliable difference between verb and adjective 
usage (W = 195, p = 0.0002) in the predicted direction: The 42 word forms that were used more 
frequently as verbs had higher iconicity ratings (+1.5) than the 22 word forms that were used 
more frequently as adjectives (+2.8). 
 
9 The fact that crosslinguistically, ideophones often encode motion (Dingemanse, 2012, 2018) is 
consistent with the idea that there is a connection between the time-varying nature of actions and 
events and a heightened degree of iconicity. 
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Chapter 16. The evaluative dimension 
16.1. Introduction 
Wilce (2009, p. 3) says that “nearly every dimension of every language at least 
potentially encodes emotion” (see also Majid, 2012). Given this, it should come as 
no surprise that sensory words are also connected to the emotional dimension of 
language. It is clear that sensory words such as shiny and fragrant are used often 
not only to describe perceptual characteristics, but also to perform evaluation 
(e.g., Lehrer, 1978, 2009). Sensory linguistics needs to consider both perceptual 
and evaluative meaning, as well as how the two dimensions interact. 
 This chapter explores how senses as perceptual modalities differ in the 
degree to which they engage with emotional processes. In particular, taste and 
smell as purely perceptual modalities are highly emotional. The two modalities 
have deep cognitive and physiological ties to the human reward system in the 
brain (e.g., Volkow, Wang, & Baler, 2011; see also Rolls, 2008), and they share 
close connections with general brain areas for emotional processing (Phillips & 
Heining, 2002; Rolls, 2008; Royet, Plailly, Delon-Martin, Kareken, & Segebarth, 
2000). For example, the olfactory bulb projects directly to the amygdala (Price, 
1987; Turner, Mishkin, & Knapp, 1980), a brain area known to be involved in 
emotional processing (e.g., Halgren, 1992; Richardson, Strange, & Dolan, 2004). 
Perceiving pleasant or unpleasant odors and tastes is associated with increased 
blood flow in the amygdala (Zald, Lee, Fluegel, & Pardo, 1998; Zald & Pardo, 
1997), more so than for similar visual and auditory stimuli (Royet et al., 2000). 
Odor classifications are structured along the dimension of pleasantness 
(Berglund, Berglund, Engen, & Ekman, 1973; Schiffmann, Robinson, & Erickson, 
1977; Zarzo, 2008). Behavioral studies show that odors are particularly strong 
cues for emotionally laden autobiographical memories (Chu & Downes, 2000; 
Herz, 2004, 2007; Herz & Engen, 1996; Herz & Schooler, 2002; Willander & 
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Larsson, 2006) or nostalgia (Waskul, Vannini, & Wilson, 2009). Herz (2002) says 
that “memories evoked by odors are distinguished by their emotional potency, 
as compared with memories cued by other modalities” (p. 169). Phillips and 
Heining (2002, p. 204) conclude that taste and smell stimuli are “processed to a 
significant extent in terms of their emotional content, even if not presented in an 
emotional context” (see also Yeshurun & Sobel, 2010). Extending from this 
evidence base, I predict that taste and smell words should also be more 
emotional. This prediction also follows from the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis 
(Chapter 5). 
 In this chapter, I will begin by reviewing the existing evidence for taste 
and smell emotionality in language (Chapter 16.2). Then, I will analyze sensory 
words, first in terms of their overall emotional engagement (Chapter 16.3), then 
more specifically with respect to positive and negative meanings (Chapter 16.4). 
In both cases, I will compare the three types of models already introduced in 
Chapter 15—the categorical model (five senses), the cluster model (twelve 
subgroups), and the continuous model—to assess the degree to which evaluative 
language can be predicted by the five senses model. 
 
16.2. Existing linguistic evidence for taste and smell emotionality 
The idea that taste and smell language is more emotional, personal, or subjective 
has repeatedly been expressed within the language sciences (Staniewski, 2017). 
Lehrer (1978, p. 98, emphasis in original) observed that “sweet means ‘pleasant’ 
while sour and bitter connote unpleasantness” (compare Bagli, 2016, 2017). 
Backhouse (1994, Chapter 1.2) reviews crosslinguistic evidence showing that if a 
language has only two taste terms, these distinguish between pleasant and 
unpleasant flavors. Dubois (2000) found that odors are often described with 
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fairly personal language, highlighting the speaker’s own involvement rather than 
an objective description of the odor. 
Taste and smell are also embedded in emotionally laden discourse 
practices. Allan and Burridge (2006, Chapter 8) note how taste and smell are 
inextricably linked with the culturally loaded domain of food, which gives the 
corresponding vocabulary special meaning. Backhouse (1994) says that “taste 
perception is geared towards activities of eating and drinking which, in humans, 
are pre-eminently culturally channelled activities” (p. 13). An example of this is 
how people from different cultural groups stereotype, mock, or insult 
individuals from other groups via their food practices, as when using the term 
Krauts to refer to Germans. Even within a particular country, food and drink 
items are often subject to heated debate between different cultural subgroups. 
For example, Germans from Düsseldorf mock people from Cologne for their 
local beer, Kölsch. In turn, Germans from Cologne mock people from Düsseldorf 
for their respective local beer, Altbier.1 
The English taste vocabulary is also connected to the emotionally laden 
domain of sexual desire: “Both food and bodies whet the appetite, stimulate the 
juices, make the mouth water, activate the taste buds, excite, smell good, titillate, allure, 
seduce” (Allan & Burridge, 2006, p. 194, emphasis in original). Similarly, Jurafsky 
(2014, p. 102) points to the use of sexual words to talk about food, such as when 
describing a molten chocolate as an orgasm on a plate, or marshmallows as nearly 
pornographic. Finally, Velasco-Sacristán and Fuertes-Olivera (2006) talk about the 
fact that perfume ads are replete with sexual and romantic symbolism, rather 
than actual smell descriptions. 
Describing something using color terms such as yellow is fairly neutral in 
most contexts. Something can be yellow without necessarily being attractive or 
unattractive. However, describing something as fragrant or smelly is inherently 
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evaluative, which was already observed by Buck (1949) in his dictionary of Indo-
European synonyms: “Words for ‘smell’ are apt to carry a strong emotional 
value, which is felt to a less degree in words for ‘taste’ and hardly at all in those 
for the other senses” (p. 1022). 
There clearly are emotionally valenced terms for the other senses as well; 
for instance, the word ugly describes a negative visual quality. However, for 
olfaction and gustation, the evaluative component appears to be more obligatory 
(Levinson & Majid, 2014, p. 411). Evaluative meaning is optional or less 
pronounced for sight, sound, and touch. Even seemingly neutral expressions 
involving taste and smell have positive or negative connotations. Krifka (2010) 
points out that in German, a sentence such as Der Käse schmeckt (literally: ‘the 
cheese tastes’) has a positive connotation, whereas Der Käse riecht (‘the cheese 
smells’) has a negative connotation. This is despite the fact that the two verbs are 
the most basic perception verbs for the respective modalities, the German 
equivalents of to taste and to smell (cf. Dam-Jensen & Zethsen, 2007, p. 1614). 
 
16.3. Absolute valence of sensory words 
As discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 10, my analysis of evaluative meaning 
will exclusively focus on the psycholinguistic construct of “emotional valence,” 
the pleasantness of a word in terms of positive and negative meaning (Warriner 
et al., 2013; compare Morley & Partington, 2009). I will talk of “evaluative” words 
as those words that are either very positive, or very negative. As discussed in 
Chapter 10, it should be kept in mind that by focusing on valence only, the 
following analyses deliberately ignores the role of specific emotions (such as 
happiness, joy, disgust, anger and sadness) and additional shades of evaluative 
meaning (see Bednarek, 2008; Hunston, 2007) to achieve a higher level of 
abstraction. 
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The emotional valence of taste and smell words is very obvious in some 
cases (stinky, smelly, fragrant, sweet, tasty, unpalatable), but not in others (peachy, 
mushroomy, chewy, musky). The subtlety of emotional meaning suggests that an 
objective measure of valence is required. There are several ways of quantifying 
the valence of words (Liu, 2012, Chapter 6; Pang & Lee, 2008, Chapter 7; see also 
Taboada, 2016). The most transparent results are obtained with the native 
speaker judgments from Warriner et al. (2013), which have been mentioned 
several times in this book. These authors asked native speakers of English to rate 
on a scale from 1 to 9 whether a word made them feel “happy, pleased, satisfied, 
contended, hopeful,” or “unhappy, annoyed, unsatisfied, melancholic, 
despaired, bored.” Norms were collected for 13,915 English lemmas. The word 
with the highest valence value is vacation (8.53), followed by happiness (8.48) and 
happy (8.47); the word with the lowest value is pedophile (1.26), preceded by rapist 
(1.30) and AIDS (1.33). 
To quantify a word’s involvement in evaluative language regardless of 
whether it is positive or negative, one can compute a word’s “absolute valence” 
(see also Winter, 2016). This was done by z-scoring the valence distribution and 
taking the absolute value of these z-scores.2 What happens when doing this can 
be demonstrated with the words sweet and moldy. Whereas sweet is about two 
standard deviations above the average valence (+2.1z), moldy is about two and a 
half standard deviations below the average valence (–2.4z). When taking the 
absolute value of –2.4z, the negative sign of moldy is dropped and the word 
assumes a value that is close to sweet (+2.4z.) This corresponds to the fact that 
both words are highly evaluative, even though one specializes into positive 
evaluation, and the other specializes into negative evaluation. Thus, the absolute 
valence measure expresses a word’s distance to the mean valence (most neutral 
words). Whereas low values indicate neutral words, high values are either very 
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positive or very negative. The absolute valence measure ranged from 0 (neutral 
words with exactly average valence) to 2.7 (highly valenced words that were 2.7 
standard deviations above the mean). 
 
 
Figure 20. Absolute valence by cluster. 
 
 Figure 20 shows the absolute valence measure for the twelve clusters of 
sensory words. As can be seen, the three clusters associated with taste and smell 
are especially high on this measure. This reflects the fact that taste and smell 
words are almost obligatorily positive or negative. The “pure sight” cluster and 
the “shape & extent” cluster are especially low on this measure. This reflects the 
fact that words for basic spatial properties have a distinctly neutral feel to them 
(e.g., circular, compact, conical, triangular, narrow), as do many color words in the 
“pure sight” cluster (e.g., beige, blue, khaki, transparent). The high absolute valence 
for the cluster of multisensory “impression-related” words corroborates the 
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suspicion voiced in Chapter 13 that words within this cluster have evaluative 
functions, including such words as bloody, cute, colossal, handsome, murky, ugly, 
and spotless. It is also interesting that although sound words have overall lower 
absolute valence, the two sound clusters that were established by the mixture 
models in Chapter 13 appear to be differentiated along the axis of absolute 
valence: Words in the “sound 1” cluster are more evaluative, including such 
negative words as noisy and shrill. 
 Fitting the cluster model (F(11, 246) = 3.7, p < 0.0001; adjusted R2 = 0.10) 
and the continuous model (F(5, 257) = 7.9, p < 0.0001; R2 = 0.12) on the absolute 
valence scores revealed reliable effects in each case.3 For the continuous analysis, 
there was only one absolute valence slope that was reliably different from zero, 
namely the slope of smell (+0.19, SE = 0.04, p < 0.0001). The positive slope 
indicates that words with high olfactory strength also had high absolute valence. 
The categorical model was not indicated to describe absolute valence in a 
reliable fashion (F(4, 253) = 2.05, p = 0.09; R2 = 0.02). On average, smell words had 
the highest absolute valence (M = 1.3, SD = 0.5), closely followed by taste words 
(M = 1.0, SD = 0.6). Touch words (M = 0.9, SD = 0.5) and sight words (M = 0.9, SD 
= 0.6) had similar absolute valence. Finally, sound words were the most neutral 
(M = 0.7, SD = 0.5). 
The continuous model performed better (BIC = 463) than the categorical 
model (487) or the cluster model (494). 
However, these results have to be treated with caution because there is 
relatively little overlap between the Lynott and Connell (2009) norms and the 
Warriner et al. (2013) norms (only 61%). This is particularly problematic for the 
cluster model. For example, only seven words in the “sound 2” cluster have 
absolute valence scores (23% of the 31 words in this cluster), which perhaps 
makes this result overly dependent on a few isolated words. 
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16.4. The semantic prosody of sensory words 
To circumvent the scarcity of data, one can go beyond looking at the emotional 
valence of the word itself to the valence of the contexts in which a word occurs. 
This is related to semantic prosody (Chapter 10.4.2). Snefjella and Kuperman 
(2016) used the valence norms from Warriner et al. (2013) to compute a measure 
of context valence based on the average valence of the five content words 
preceding and following a given head word in the 7 billion token USENET 
corpus (Shaoul & Westbury, 2013). 
In this section, Snefjella and Kuperman’s (2016) context valence measure 
will be used. Because this measure is context-based, words that were not, in fact, 
normed in the original Warriner et al. (2013) rating study are now associated 
with a measure of context valence. This means that this measure affords 
increased descriptive coverage, with 412 of the sensory adjectives being 
associated with valence data (97%). A measure of absolute valence can also be 
computed for the context valence, following the procedure described in Chapter 
16.3. Thus, what I call “absolute context valence” measures the extent to which a 
word occurs in contexts that are overall highly evaluative, regardless of whether 
the evaluation is positive or not. This measure ranged from 0 (words that tend to 
occur in neutral contexts) to 2.4 (words that tend to occur in highly valenced 
contexts). Figure 21 shows the absolute context valence for all twelve clusters. 
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Figure 21. Absolute valence from contexts per cluster. 
 
 As can be seen, the clusters associated with taste and smell have the 
highest absolute context valence. Some of these words did not have particularly 
high ratings in the Warriner et al. (2013) study. For example, the word tangerine 
in the “taste” cluster was only mildly positive in the rating study (+1.37) but it 
was the most positive word in terms of context valence (+1.99). Other words in 
this cluster with high absolute context valence were lemony, delicious, tasty, and 
fruity—all of which are highly positive. Highly valenced words in the “smell” 
cluster include fragrant, reeking, smelly, scented, stinky, perfumed, and musky. 
Within the touch and sight modalities, the “impression-related” cluster 
and the “skin & temperature” cluster have relatively higher context valence. 
Words with high absolute context valence in the “impression-related” cluster are 
lilting, cute, colossal, glamorous, clamorous, bloody, happy, mellow, radiant, and 
elegant. Words with high absolute valence in the “skin & temperature” clusters 
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are stinging, tingly, cool, warm, chilly, humid, tepid, cold, clammy, and fat. The 
“shape & extent” cluster is still among the lowest in absolute valence. The 
“motion & touch” cluster and the “gross surface” cluster also have low context 
valence. Compared to the valence ratings that were not context based, the “pure 
sight” cluster has relatively high absolute context valence. The words with the 
highest absolute context valence in this cluster are bright, silver, blonde, dazzling, 
brunette, blue, sunny, colorful, cloudy, and shimmery.  
 The cluster model reliably predicted absolute context valence (F(11, 400) = 
5.2, p < 0.0001), which described 10% of the variance in this measure (adjusted 
R2). The categorical model reliably predicted absolute context valence as well 
(F(4, 407) = 8.7, p < 0.0001) and described 7% of the variance. Taste words 
assumed the highest values for the absolute context valence measure (M = 1.0, SD 
= 0.6), closely followed by smell words (M = 0.9, SD = 0.6). The other three senses 
had lower absolute context valence values (sight M = 0.6, SD = 0.5; sound M = 0.6, 
SD = 0.5; touch M = 0.5, SD = 0.4). 
Finally, there was a statistically reliable effect for the continuous model 
(F(5, 411) = 16.4, p < 0.0001), which described 14% of the variance. For the 
continuous analysis, three modality slopes were reliably different from 0, namely 
sight (–0.06, SE = 0.03, p = 0.01), touch (–0.07, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001) and sound (–
0.05, SE = 0.02, p = 0.01). The slopes for taste (+0.03, SE = 0.03, p = 0.22) and smell 
(+0.03, SE = 0.03, p = 0.34) had positive slopes, but these did not differ reliably 
from zero. This suggests that in the continuous model for the absolute context 
valence measure, touch, sound, and sight appear to have a dispreference for 
occurring in emotionally valenced contexts. This dispreference is absent for taste 
and smell. 
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Comparisons of these models showed that the continuous model 
performed best (BIC = 601), followed by the categorical model (627), followed by 
the cluster model (649). 
It should be further noted that modality differences described more 
variance of the context valence measure from Snefjella and Kuperman (2016) 
than of the decontextualized valence ratings from Warriner et al. (2013). This 
suggests that the evaluative differences of sensory words are more directly 
revealed through looking at word usage in context. In particular, when looking 
at valence in isolation, taste and smell words do not appear that different from 
sight, touch, and sound words. When one looks at a context-based measure of 
evaluative language use, the differences between the chemical senses and the 
non-chemical senses is more pronounced. 
 
16.5. Positive versus negative valence 
The absolute valence measure allowed us to establish that taste and smell words 
are overall more emotionally valenced. In doing so, we neglected the distinction 
between positive and negative meaning, which will be analyzed in this section. 
Many researchers have noted that languages exhibit negative 
differentiation with respect to smell (Jurafsky, 2014, p. 96; Rouby & Bensafi, 2002, 
pp. 148–149): There are more words for malodors (such as body odors and the 
odors of rotten things) than words for pleasant smells, such as the smell of fresh 
food. This pattern appears to also characterize languages with larger smell 
vocabularies than English, such as the Austronesian language Amis, which also 
exhibits an asymmetry in its smell vocabulary with a relatively larger number of 
negative words (Lee, 2015). It has been observed by many researchers that even 
relatively neutral smell words may have negative meaning in context (Alan & 
Burridge, 2008, Chapter 8; Dam-Jensen & Zethsen, 2007; Krifka, 2010). Lehrer 
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(2009) observed that the words “smell and odor are pragmatically negative unless 
modified by positive adjectives, as in pleasant odor, nice smell” (p. 249, emphasis in 
original). 
There certainly are a few positive smell adjectives, such as fragrant and 
aromatic. However, across the board, there may be a statistical tendency for smell 
adjectives to be more negative than taste adjectives. This idea can be tested using 
the raw emotional valence score (without taking the absolute value) from 
Warriner et al. (2013). For this measure, there was no reliable effect for the cluster 
model (F(11, 246) = 1.64, p = 0.09, R2 = 0.03). However, there was a reliable effect 
for the categorical model (F(4, 253) = 3.27, p = 0.01, R2 = 0.03). Taste and sight 
words had the most positive valence (taste M = 0.2, SD = 1.2; sight M = 0.2, SD = 
1.1). Sound and touch words had slightly negative valence (sound M = –0.2, SD = 
0.9; touch M = –0.3, SD = 1.0). Smell words were the most negative (M = –0.5, SD 
= 1.3). 
There also was a reliable effect for the continuous model (F(5, 257) = 3.6, p 
= 0.004, R2 = 0.05). There were only two slopes that reliably differed from zero, 
which was the sight slope (+0.24, SE = 0.07, p = 0.001) and the touch slope (–0.13, 
SE = 0.04, p = 0.002). 
The categorical model (796) and the continuous model (797) performed 
similarly in terms of BIC, and both performed better than the cluster model (829). 
It should be noted that the amount of variance described by these models 
was much lower than that explained by the absolute valence measure. This 
finding suggests that the differences between sensory words are better 
characterized in terms of overall valence than in terms of positive versus 
negative valence. That is, when it comes to sensory language, the different senses 
differ more with respect to the dimension of neutrality/emotionality than with 
respect to the dimension positivity/negativity. 
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How is specialization in positive and negative meanings manifested by 
the context valence measure by Snefjella and Kuperman (2016)? Here, the cluster 
model (F(11, 400) = 3.6, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.07) and the categorical model (F(4, 407) = 
9.7, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.08) reliably predicted context valence. Descriptive averages 
show that taste words occurred in the most positive contexts (M = 0.7, SD = 0.9), 
followed by sight (M = 0.2, SD = 0.7), touch (M = 0, SD = 0.7) and sound (M = –0.1, 
SD = 0.8). Smell words occurred in the most negative contexts (M = –0.2, SD = 
1.0). 
There also was a statistically reliable effect for the continuous model (F(5, 
411) = 8.0, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.08). For the continuous model, there were statistically 
reliable effects for taste and smell in the predicted direction: Whereas taste had a 
positive slope (+0.18, SE = 0.04, p < 0.0001), taste had a negative slope (–0.10, SE = 
0.04, p = 0.02). Thus, the more strongly a word was associated with taste, the 
more likely it occurred in positive contexts; the opposite is true for smell. The 
slope for touch also differed reliably from zero (–0.10, SE = 0.03, p = 0.0002). 
Again, it must be noted these valence models described less variance than 
the absolute valence models reported above. This suggests that even when 
looking at contexts, differences between the modalities are more pronounced 
when looking at a sensory word’s overall participation in evaluative language, as 
opposed to a sensory word’s participation in specifically positive or negative 
language. Moreover, just as was found for absolute valence before, the 
comparison of context valence to the decontextualized valence ratings shows that 
the evaluative nature of sensory words is better revealed through looking at how 
a word is actually used in context. 
To specifically test the notion that smell is more negative than taste, I 
performed a planned post-hoc comparison between these two modalities (using 
the dominant modality classifications). For the valence ratings by Warriner et al. 
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(2013), there was no reliable difference between taste and smell (W = 224.5, p = 
0.09), although there was a numerical trend in the right direction, with taste 
words being on average +0.2 standard deviations above the valence mean and 
smell words being on average –0.5 standard deviations below the mean. The 
difference between taste and smell words was more reliably revealed through 
looking at the context valence measure, for which there was a reliable effect (W = 
819, p = 0.0005). On average, the five-word contexts of taste words are +0.7 
standard deviations above the valence mean; the contexts of smell words –0.2 
standard deviations below the valence mean. 
 
16.6. Conclusions 
This chapter showed that the sensory words differ in their evaluative potential. 
In particular, the analyses presented converging evidence for the idea that the 
chemical senses, taste and smell, are overall more evaluative. This evidence was 
found using emotional valence ratings in isolation, but, crucially, it was also 
found when these ratings were contextualized with a corpus-based measure of 
context valence (Snefjella & Kuperman, 2016). 
 It is illustrative to compare the models for absolute valence and absolute 
context valence discussed in this chapter so far (cluster model, categorical model, 
continuous model) with an even simpler model that merely distinguishes 
between the chemical senses (taste and smell) and all other senses. For the 
absolute valence measure, this model had a BIC of 473, which indicates better 
performance than the corresponding categorical model (487) and the cluster 
model (494), but not the continuous model (463). The same ranking appeared for 
the absolute context valence measure, for which the model that only 
distinguishes the chemical senses (611) also performed better than the categorical 
model (627) and the cluster model (649), but not the continuous model (601). This 
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is an interesting observation: Just distinguishing between the chemical senses 
and the other senses leads to better model performance than incorporating more 
fine-grained categorical distinctions, such as involved in the five senses folk 
model. Thus, when it comes to evaluative language, we do not get any extra 
leverage from distinguishing sight, sound, and touch, and we similarly do not 
get much leverage out of distinguishing taste and smell from each other. 
There are two aspects of the results presented in this chapter that are 
overall in line with the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis. Following the 
correspondence argument (Chapter 5), it should be apparent that there is 
abundant language-external evidence for the involvement of taste and smell in 
emotional processes in brain and behavior (see above). This chapter 
demonstrated this perceptual emotionality corresponds to the emotional 
qualities of taste and smell language. Both the word-inherent meaning (as 
gleaned from the decontextualized rating study) as well as the context-based 
measure suggested a more pronounced emotionality for taste and smell words, 
in line with the language-external evidence. The second correspondence between 
language and perception uncovered here harkens back to the discussion of 
crossmodal connections in Chapter 14, where it was observed that taste and 
smell pattern together in corpora. The analyses presented in this chapter 
highlight another way in which taste and smell are quite similar to each other, 
namely, by virtue of their shared emotional qualities. Taste and smell words not 
only receive similar modality ratings (Chapters 12 and 13), they also receive 
similar emotional valence ratings; and taste and smell words not only have 
similar modality profiles in actual language use (Chapter 14), but also similar 
evaluative profiles. 
 The fact that there was some correspondence between valence ratings 
from a decontextualized rating task (Warriner et al., 2013) and valence in context 
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(taken from Snefjella & Kuperman, 2016) is also relevant to corpus linguistics 
research. Many researchers have pointed out that the semantic prosody of a 
word cannot easily be intuited (e.g., Louw, 1993; see also Whitsitt, 2005), but 
some researchers rightly objected that the mismatch between intuition and 
contextualized use has never been explicitly tested (Stewart, 2010). The results 
from this chapter show that contextualized usage can, at least to some extent 
(and in an admittedly noisy fashion), be intuited. In fact, a correlation test shows 
that decontextualized valence and context-based valence are fairly strongly 
correlated with each other (Pearson’s r = 0.65, t(256) = 13.6, p < 0.0001), as was 
shown for a larger dataset in Snefjella and Kuperman (2016). This result is in line 
with what was found in Chapter 14, which showed that corpus correlations 
between modality ratings mirrored the correlations that were established in 
Chapter 13 on the basis of decontextualized modality rating data. Yet again, we 
find that considerable leverage can be gained from looking at ratings in their 
own right, and that it is useful to study both contextualized and 
decontextualized uses together. 
 The present analyses thus produce two important results for research on 
semantic prosody. First, they show semantic prosody can be quantified (using 
data from Snefjella & Kuperman, 2016). Second, the correlation between isolated 
and contextualized ratings suggests semantic prosody can be intuited across the 
board. Of course, there are difficult cases to intuit. For example, in the 
decontextualized rating study, the word spicy received a rating that was one 
standard deviation above the mean of the valence norms. However, it is used in 
many positive contexts according to the Snefjella and Kuperman (2016) norms, 
which gives it an even higher context valence score (about two standard 
deviations above the average context valence). The word mild is the opposite. In 
isolation, it received a somewhat positive rating (+0.7 SDs above the mean). 
	 292	
However, the word’s context valence score is much more negative (–0.8 SDs 
below the mean). This is presumably because the word is used to modify many 
negative things, such as mild recession, mild depression, and mild fever. Thus, the 
mismatch between the isolated and contextualized valence scores yields a 
quantitative measure of how much intuition fails native speakers for particular 
words. 
 There was also statistically weaker evidence for the idea that English taste 
adjectives are overall more positive than smell adjectives. Why would this be the 
case? Classen (1993, p. 53) provides the following explanation: “We can choose 
our food, but we cannot as readily close our noses to bad smells” (see also Krifka, 
2010). This would entail that on average, humans are more likely to be exposed 
to unpleasant smells than to unpleasant tastes. In general, it is to be expected that 
the cuisines of cultures have evolved to fit the tastes of their communities, and 
individuals learn throughout their lifetime what they like or do not like in terms 
of food. As a result, adults very rarely taste things they strongly dislike. 
Intriguingly, Huisman and Majid (2018) report that food odors were rated as 
more pleasant than nonfood odors. 
It is also possible that the exertion of control over taste itself (being able to 
choose what to put into one’s mouth)—compared to the lack of control over 
smell (we cannot choose to not smell)—may further contribute to the perceived 
negativity of smell, as we generally dislike things that we have less control over 
(see, e.g., Casasanto & Chrysikou, 2011). These cultural beliefs may further taint 
smell language. Altogether, there are many potential factors that may explain the 
relative negativity of smell words compared to the relatively more positive 
language of taste. 
However, despite some negative differentiation for odors and positive 
differentiation for tastes, both modalities are ultimately associated with both 
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positively and negatively valenced words (e.g., the smell word fragrant is 
positive; stinky is not). Given that communicating the distinction between good 
and bad tastes and smells is quite important (e.g., telling a family member that 
something tastes moldy), both good and bad words should exist for both sensory 
modalities. 
In sum, this chapter provided another set of comparisons for the three 
models from Chapter 15 (the continuous model, the categorical model, and the 
cluster model). Once again, the continuous model outperformed all other 
models. This reveals another dimension of language use (in this case, evaluative 
use) better predicted by a graded model of the senses than by a categorical one. 
As with other linguistic patterns uncovered in this book, evaluative language is 
characterized by sensory continuity.																																																								
1 Kölsch is obviously superior to Alt. 
 
2 z-scoring involves centering the distribution by subtracting the mean and subsequently dividing 
each value by the standard deviation. The latter step means that the measure is then expressed in 
standard units: A word with a value of +1z, for example, has a valence score that is one standard 
deviation above the mean; a word with –1z has a valence score that is one standard deviation 
below the mean. Centering the distribution is necessary to derive the absolute valence measure. 
The absolute value function makes negative numbers positive. Words with an absolute value 
close to 0 are neutral words. Words with an absolute value far away from 0 are relatively more 
evaluative. The extra step of dividing by the standard deviation is not strictly speaking necessary 
for this measure, but it helps to make the Warriner et al. (2013) scores and the Snefjella and 
Kuperman (2016) scores more comparable. 
 
3  For each model presented in this chapter, I assessed compliance with the normality and 
homoskedasticity assumption by means of residual plots and Q-Q plots. Visual inspection of 
these plots revealed no major problems with these assumptions.	
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Chapter 17. Re-evaluating the hierarchy of the senses 
17.1. Introduction 
The idea that sensory words are used according to a hierarchy of the senses is a 
compelling one (Chapters 8–9). There have been a number of quantitative studies 
claiming to find support for the hierarchy (Ronga et al., 2012; Shen, 1997; Strik 
Lievers, 2015; Ullmann, 1959). However, given the methodological concerns 
outlined in Chapters 10 and 11, it is necessary to reassess this evidence. In 
particular: Is there evidence for the hierarchy using the sensory modality 
classifications from Lynott and Connell (2009)? 
 Even though I have argued throughout this book that a word’s association 
with the senses is best treated continuously (particularly Chapters 11, 15, &16), 
this chapter will begin by treating sensory words in a categorical fashion. This 
allows us to assume common ground with the existing literature on synesthetic 
metaphors. The categorical assumption is, however, only a temporary one and 
will be relaxed toward the end of this chapter. In the end, it turns out that the 
analyses presented here are indeed consistent with the views presented in 
Chapters 6 through 9; namely, synesthetic metaphors are neither synesthetic nor 
metaphorical, and there is no monolithic hierarchy of the senses. However, to get 
there, I first assume the same constraints that characterize this literature. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. After asking how one is to interpret 
corpus data so that it can be counted toward or against the hierarchy (Chapter 
17.2), I will present a new analysis that on the surface appears to support the 
hierarchy of the senses (Chapter 17.3). The point of this analysis is to show that 
given the methods used throughout this book, it is possible to replicate what has 
been achieved in the literature on synesthetic metaphor. However, in a second 
step, I will show that there are problems that have been overlooked (Chapter 
17.4). Overcoming these problems leads to alternative analyses that cast serious 
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doubt on the notion of a monolithic hierarchy of the senses. In a final analysis, I 
will demonstrate the relevance of two linguistic factors in predicting crossmodal 
language use: namely, the factor of emotional valence and the factor of iconicity 
(Chapter 17.5). The empirical evidence presented for multiple explanatory 
mechanisms provides further evidence against the notion of a one-size-fits-all 
principle. Chapter 17.6 concludes by incorporating the evidence presented in this 
chapter with the theoretical background on crossmodal language outlined in 
Chapters 6 through 9. 
 
17.2. What counts as evidence for the hierarchy? 
Before engaging with the empirical evidence, one must specify which 
asymmetries count toward the hierarchy. The most common approach in 
research on synesthetic metaphors is to create crosstabulations of the senses, as 
already discussed in Chapter 11 with respect to Ullmann’s data from Byron. 
When using such tables to compare counts of hierarchy-consistent versus 
hierarchy-inconsistent cases, it is important to specify what counts as hierarchy-
consistent or not, especially in the presence of different variants of the hierarchy. 
 Figure 22 provides a helpful guide. In this matrix, rows indicate sources; 
columns indicate targets. The blue cells along the diagonal of the matrix are all 
cases of within-modality uses, such as when a touch-related adjective is used to 
modify a touch-related noun (e.g., abrasive contact). All cells off the diagonal 
correspond to crossmodal uses. The beige cells in the upper right triangle are 
those cells that are consistent with what in Chapter 8 I called the “simplified 
consensus hierarchy” (touch > taste > smell > sight/sound). White cells in the 
lower right triangle correspond to hierarchy-inconsistent uses of sensory words. 
If a corpus analysis shows higher word counts in the beige cells than the white 
cells, the hierarchy of the senses is supported (see Shen, 1997). 
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Figure 22. Matrix of source-to-target combinations for all modalities with rows as 
sources and columns as targets. Diagonal shows within-modality uses; off-
diagonal shows crossmodal uses. Beige cells correspond to the simplified 
consensus hierarchy. The plaid cell is sight-to-sound, which can be interpreted as 
going against Ullmann’s original hierarchy as it is frequently cited (barring the 
discussion in Chapter 5.22 of his 1959 book). The cells with diagonal stripes are 
ruled out by the hierarchy of Williams (1976). 
 
The cell with the plaid pattern is the sight-to-sound cell. This cell can be 
counted toward or against the hierarchy, depending on how Ullmann’s original 
treatment is interpreted (see Shen, 1997, p. 50). The striped cells are mappings 
that are ruled out by the hierarchy of Williams (1976; I ignore his category of 
dimension words in this case). 
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 In Chapter 10, I critiqued a table of source-to-target mappings by Ullmann 
(1945) to exemplify certain methodological concerns. In particular, I argued that 
one needs to be explicit about what goes into each cell and how sensory words 
are classified. Ronga et al. (2012), Strik Lievers (2015), and Ronga (2016) 
circumvent these concerns by preparing a list of sensory words before they 
approach any corpus data. This way, sensory modality classifications are not 
made ad hoc, and furthermore, the analysis of crossmodal language can be 
automated with corpus tools. Here, I will follow these methodological 
improvements and use the Lynott and Connell (2009) word list to create a 
crosstabulation in line with Ullmann’s original analysis. 
 In addition, Ronga (2016) reminds us that when studying crossmodal 
language with a corpus, it is important to distinguish between type and token 
frequencies. For example, the expression soft voice occurred 368 times in COCA 
(tokens), but it only counts as one adjective–noun pair type. If one only looked at 
token counts, the results may be biased by a small number of expressions that are 
highly conventionalized. If all touch-to-sound mappings turned out to be soft 
voice, the evidence for this mapping being part of a hierarchy of the senses would 
be severely diminished. On the other hand, if there were many different 
adjective–noun pair types that follow the same tendency, the evidence is more 
convincing. 
 One may also consider the number hapax legomena as a measure of the 
productivity of a particular combination of two senses (see Ronga, 2016). A 
hapax legomenon is a word (or in this case an adjective–noun pair) that occurs 
only once in a corpus. Because soft voice has multiple instantiations in the Corpus 
of Contemporary American English (token frequency > 1), it disqualifies as a 
hapax legomenon. On the other hand, the pair abrasive warble would be counted 
because it occurs exactly once in the COCA data used here. If there were many 
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such hapax legomena that exhibit the same crossmodal combination (e.g., touch-
to-sound), then there would be a lot of support for this “mapping” being 
productive (i.e., it can readily be extended to novel expressions). By comparing 
word token, word type, and hapax legomena counts, one gets a richer picture of 
the evidence for the hierarchy of the senses. 
 
17.3. Analysis and results 
The following analyses use the dominant modality classifications from Lynott 
and Connell (2009) together with 219 nouns from Strik Lievers (2015). The reason 
for choosing these nouns is that they are arguably better sensory nouns than 
those provided by Lynott and Connell (2013), even though they are not norm-
based. As was discussed in Chapters 11 and 12, the nouns from Lynott and 
Connell (2013) are highly multisensory, and they do not specifically relate to 
particular senses very strongly, such as the highly abstract words suspicion, rent, 
and comedy. Moreover, there are no olfactory words in the dataset, and almost all 
words are dominantly visual. This makes this dataset unsuitable for the present 
purposes. 
 The 219 nouns from Strik Lievers (2015) include 133 sound nouns (e.g., 
voice, whirr, rattle), 49 sight nouns (e.g., glitter, scarlet, shadow), 15 smell nouns 
(e.g., perfume, stench, noseful), 14 taste nouns (e.g., savor, sapidity, flavor) and 8 
touch nouns (e.g., touch, coldness, itch). 
The COCA adjective-noun pairs from Chapter 14 were reused for this 
analysis. As a reminder, this dataset includes about 150,000 adjective-pair types 
(N = 149,387) that are formed with one of the words from Lynott and Connell 
(2009). Of the total number of adjective–noun pairs, about 4,500 (N = 4,471) were 
formed with nouns from Strik Lievers (2015). This list was further paired down, 
first by excluding words that Strik Lievers (2015) treats as auditory but actually 
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refer to instruments (lute, viola, piano) rather than sound impressions. Such 
instrument nouns were excluded because they create spurious crossmodal 
uses—for instance, black piano and red lute are not audiovisual expressions but 
literal descriptions of the visual characteristics of instruments. 
Following Ronga et al. (2012), 36 dimension words were also excluded.1 
These words are highly multisensory and mostly classified as visual by the 
native speakers in Lynott and Connell (2009). The dimension words excluded 
were (in alphabetical order): big, broad, bulky, chubby, colossal, compact, deep, empty, 
enormous, fat, flat, gigantic, high, hollow, huge, immense, large, little, long, low, 
miniature, narrow, open, petite, puny, shallow, sheer, short, skinny, small, steep, tall, 
tight, tiny, uneven, wide. Shape words such as angular, conical, and rectangular were 
included. Following the native speaker ratings of Lynott and Connell (2009), 
these were classified as visual. 
The following analyses are targeted at assessing the validity of the 
hierarchy of the senses. Because this hierarchy is about clearly delineated sensory 
modalities and their relative connections, it is best to work with only those words 
that are very strongly tied to particular sensory modalities. One advantage of 
using the modality norms is that quantitative criteria can be used to exclude 
highly multisensory words (Chapters 11–12). To this end, I analyzed only the 
80% most unisensory words (i.e., those words that were above the 20th percentile 
of exclusivity values). The 20% most multisensory words (such as strange, unripe, 
and strong) were excluded. 
Finally, as one last additional data cleaning step, the highly frequent 
nouns look and eye were excluded. This was done because initial inspection of the 
data revealed that almost all instances of pairs with the word look referred to an 
action, as in He gave her a sour look; and almost all instances of eye were literal uses 
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describing eyes (such as blue eye and brown eye) rather than descriptions of 
sensory impressions. 
After all of these exclusions, the remaining dataset contained about 2,600 
pair types (N = 2,571) and 15,000 tokens (N = 14,652). This will form the basis of 
all analyses presented below. It has to be emphasized that these adjective–noun 
pairs combine what Werning et al. (2006) call “strong” and “weak” synesthetic 
metaphors (see also Petersen et al., 2008; Chapter 6.2). That is, cases such as cold 
sound and cold anger are lumped together; genuine perceptual and non-
perceptual uses of sensory adjectives are not distinguished. This is potentially 
problematic when comparing the data to other studies on crossmodal language 
(such as the more carefully constructed datasets by Ronga et al., 2012, and Strik 
Lievers, 2015). However, to some extent at least, the proof is in the results: 
Similar patterns to what has been reported in the literature can be obtained using 
my approach. Moreover, several authors already pointed to the possibility that 
strong and weak synesthetic metaphors may require the same set of explanations 
(see Abraham, 1987, p. 179; compare Engstrom, 1946). In essence, the analyses 
presented in this chapter show how far we can take an approach that does not 
hand-check each individual crossmodal expression. 
Figure 23 shows a crosstabulation of the source–target combinations for 
the cleaned data. The counts in this matrix are adjective–noun pair tokens (not 
types); that is, these are the raw frequencies of particular source-to-target 
mappings that are attested in COCA. Because we are looking at tokens, not 
types, these counts disregard the fact that specific adjective–noun pairs may be 
overrepresented (e.g., the type soft voice is associated with 368 tokens). 
 
	 302	
 
Figure 23. Token counts of sources and targets. Contingency table constructed 
from the Lynott and Connell (2009) adjectives and the Strik Lievers (2015) nouns. 
Same-modality cases are bracketed and not included in the row and column 
marginal frequencies. 
 
The diagonal (blue cells) shows that within-modality uses of sensory 
adjectives were quite frequent. In this case, they account for about 62% of the 
tokens. That is, sensory adjectives of a particular modality were most often used 
to modify nouns from the same modality. In contrast, crossmodal uses were 
relatively more infrequent. 
The row totals in Figure 23 exclude within-modality counts. In terms of 
raw numbers, adjectives associated with touch (2,568) were used most frequently 
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as sources, followed by adjectives associated with sight (1,720), taste (1,136), 
sound (130), and smell (71). On the other hand, sound was by far the most 
frequent target (3,049), followed by smell (1,176), sight (714), touch (499), and 
taste (187). These numbers can be used to calculate source-target ratios (i.e., 
dividing the row total by the column total). A ratio larger than one indicates that 
a given modality is used more as a source than as a target; a ratio smaller than 
one indicates that a modality is used more as a target than as a source. These 
numbers indicate that taste (6.07) and touch (5.15) were used much more as 
sources than as targets—namely, about 5–6 times as much. The same was the 
case for sight (2.41), although to a much lesser extent. Finally, smell (0.06) and 
sound (0.04) occurred more frequently as targets rather than as sources. 
Following Shen (1997) and others, I compared the overall count of 
hierarchy-consistent cases (beige cells) to the overall count of hierarchy-
inconsistent cases (white cells). Overall, 4,836 out of 5,625 tokens were in those 
cells that are consistent with the simplified consensus hierarchy, which is 86% of 
all tokens. A simple binomial test indicates this to be reliably different from 
chance (p < 0.0001, using a chance baseline of 55% for 11 out of 20 cells). If the 
sight-to-sound cell is excluded from counting toward the hierarchy (strictly 
following Ullmann’s original hierarchy), the percentage of hierarchy-consistent 
cases drops to 67%. A binomial test indicates this to be reliably different from 
chance (p < 0.0001, using a 50% baseline for 10 out of 20 cells). For the hierarchy 
of Williams (1976), the match is 80%, reliably different from chance (p < 0.0001, 
using a 35% baseline for 7 out of 20 cells). These binomial tests have to be 
interpreted with care as the same adjective–noun pair contributes multiple data 
points, which violates the independence assumption of this statistical test. This 
concern can be alleviated by analyzing adjective–noun pair types, rather than 
tokens. These types are shown in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24. Type counts of sources and targets. Values below each count are 
adjusted standardized Pearson residuals, calculated without taking the diagonal 
into account. 
 
The small numbers below each type count in Figure 24 are standardized 
Pearson residuals (calculated without taking the diagonal into account). Positive 
residuals indicate overrepresentation; negative numbers indicate under-
representation. As a rule of thumb, values larger than |2| can be interpreted to 
indicate reliable over- or under-representation (Levshina, 2015, pp. 220–221). 
Again, inspecting the table shows that within-modality uses of sensory 
adjectives were relatively frequent, accounting for about 50% of the data. Next, 
looking at the row totals (which exclude within-modality counts) reveals that 
	 305	
touch adjectives were used most frequently to talk about the other senses (524); 
that is, touch was the most prolific source domain. This was followed by sight 
(492), taste (175), sound (54), and smell (31), respectively. Looking at the column 
totals reveals that sound nouns were most often modified by words from the 
other senses (686); that is, sound was the most frequent target domain. This was 
followed by sight (223), smell (199), taste (86), and touch (82), respectively. As 
was done for token counts, the source and target frequencies can be brought into 
correspondence with each other via source–target ratios, which was highest for 
touch (6.39), followed by sight (2.21), taste (2.03), smell (0.16), and sound (0.08). 
 A comparison of hierarchy-consistent cases to hierarchy-inconsistent cases 
reveals that 84% of the type counts fit the simplified consensus hierarchy 
(binomial test: p < 0.0001, using a chance baseline of 55% for testing 11 out of 20 
cells). After excluding the sight-to-sound cell, there are only 57% hierarchy-
consistent cases, although a binomial test indicates this to be still reliably 
different from chance (p < 0.0001, using a 50% baseline for 10 out of 20 cells). For 
the hierarchy of Williams (1976), the match is 77%, reliably different from chance 
(p < 0.0001, using a 35% baseline for 7 out of 20 cells). 
 Finally, let us look at counts of hapax legomena (see Ronga, 2016), as 
shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. Hapax counts of sources and targets. Values below each count are 
adjusted standardized Pearson residuals, calculated without taking the diagonal 
into account. 
 
 These counts corroborate the results of the type counts. Source–target 
ratios are highest for touch (5.65), followed by sight (2.45), taste (1.73), smell 
(0.21), and sound (0.09). As was the case for type and token counts, only smell 
and sound occurred more often as targets than as sources.  
 Let us draw some interim conclusions. I have presented new evidence for 
the hierarchy of the senses. In line with prior reports, touch was the most 
frequent source domain and sound was the most frequent target domain. 
However, smell was another frequent target, as well as an infrequent source. 
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This is consistent with what Ullmann (1959) and Tsur (2008) noticed. It is also 
consistent with the fact that smell is not a possible source in the hierarchy of 
Williams (1976; see also Chapter 8). The fact that smell is a frequent target in 
crossmodal expressions furthermore fits the view that smell is lexically under-
differentiated, which may necessitate the use of metaphor. 
It has to be emphasized that the percentage of hierarchy-consistent cases 
reported here is surprisingly similar to what has been reported in the literature. 
Shen (1997) reported a match of 91% for his Hebrew corpus if sight-to-sound was 
included and 73% if sight-to-sound was excluded (see also Whitney, 1952). Strik 
Lievers (2015) reports perhaps the lowest figures, with 62% consistent cases for 
English and 74% for Italian.2 It is also noteworthy that the highest match was 
observed for token counts, with lower percentages observed for type and hapax 
counts. This suggests that stronger evidence for the hierarchy is obtained if 
highly conventionalized adjective–noun pairs are taken into account. 
Of the three different versions of the hierarchy analyzed here, the 
simplified consensus hierarchy (as embodied, for example, by Shen’s work) 
consistently had the highest percentage of hierarchy-consistent cases. However, 
the hierarchy by Williams (1976) was a close second, and one has to acknowledge 
that this hierarchy is also more parsimonious (it reaches a high percentage of 
hierarchy-consistent cases while at the same time positing fewer connections). 
Interestingly, similar to what was found here, Strik Lievers (2015) also 
reports that a comparably high number of sight adjectives acted as sources in her 
data, more so than what is perhaps expected based on past descriptions of the 
hierarchy, which put sight at the top along with sound. The high number of sight 
words used as sources may be due to the fact that her dataset, like the dataset 
considered here, has a large proportion of sight adjectives. To control for this, the 
number of adjectives needs to be compared against a baseline. Moreover, it must 
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be emphasized that the binomial tests conducted so far have violated the 
independence assumption because the same adjective can recur across multiple 
different adjective–noun pairs (i.e., there are repeated measures for adjectives). 
To circumvent these concerns, the following analysis uses the total set of 
adjectives from Lynott and Connell (2009) as a baseline. I then look at how many 
of the adjectives in this list are used for each crossmodal combination. In essence, 
this analysis is treating the Lynott and Connell (2009) word list as the pool of 
words that crossmodal expressions can be drawn from. Figure 26 shows the 
percentage of adjectives used crossmodally. In this matrix, a value close to 100% 
means that nearly all of the adjectives from that sensory modality were used in 
the corpus; values close to 0% mean that adjectives from that modality were 
underutilized. 
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Figure 26. Percent of adjectives used (out of the adjective list from Lynott and 
Connell, 2009). Same-modality cases are bracketed and not included in the row 
and column averages. 
 
Let us first look at the row averages. These show that on average, about 
50% of the touch words from the Lynott and Connell (2009) dataset occurred in 
descriptions with targets from the other sensory modalities. In terms of source 
percentages, the next-highest modality was taste (46%), followed by smell (33%), 
sight (27%), and sound (11%). Column averages reveal that taste (22%) and touch 
(24%) attracted less distinct adjectives from the other modalities. Smell (34%), 
sight (41%), and sound (46%) attracted comparably more adjectives in 
crossmodal usage. On average, hierarchy-consistent cases (using the consensus 
hierarchy) had a higher percentage of adjectives used (44%) than hierarchy-
inconsistent cases (20%; Wilcoxon rank sum test, W = 84, p = 0.01). 
Source-target ratios of these percentages reveal that touch (2.08) and taste 
(2.06) were used about twice as likely as sources, followed by smell (0.99), which 
was equally likely to be used as source and target. Sound (0.23) and sight (0.66) 
were less likely targets than sources. Thus, once controlling for lexical 
differentiation (in particular, the overrepresentation of sight words in English), 
the data resembles the hierarchy of the senses even more closely. With this 
analysis, sight appears as a more frequent target, next to sound. 
 
17.4. Deconstructing the hierarchy of the senses 
The evidence presented so far looks remarkably consistent with what has been 
reported in the literature on synesthetic metaphors, even though I have used a 
different dataset (COCA), a different way of classifying the senses (Chapter 10), 
and my analysis did not distinguish between strong and weak synesthetic 
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metaphors. On the surface at least, it looks as if there is a lot of independent 
support for the hierarchy of the senses, especially if we take this study together 
with already existing empirical studies, in particular the rigorous investigations 
conducted by Ronga et al. (2012), Strik Lievers (2015), and Ronga (2016). 
However, a closer look at the data suggests that the hierarchy may not be 
a good explanatory model. It should be emphasized that the following critical 
arguments are not targeted at the hierarchy of the senses as a descriptive 
generalization. Instead, my arguments are targeted at the idea that there is one 
unifying principle that explains all of the observed asymmetries (i.e., the idea 
that there is a monolithic hierarchy of the senses), such as is the case with Shen’s 
directionality principle (see Chapter 9.2.1). In essence, my argument will be that 
the observed descriptive patterns are inconsistent with a one-size-fits-all 
principle. 
 First, it is illustrative to have another look at the crosstabulations shown in 
Figures 23–26 to investigate which specific cells are overrepresented. Ignoring 
within-modality cases, the largest number of tokens (Figure 23) was obtained for 
the touch-to-sound cell (1,677). The second largest number of tokens was 
obtained for the sight-to-sound cell (1,080). The third largest number was 
obtained for the taste-to-smell cell (742). These three cells alone account for over 
62% of the total number of tokens (out of 5,625 tokens that constitute crossmodal 
uses, excluding within-modality counts). Moreover, these three cells alone 
account for about two-thirds of the hierarchy-consistent cases (72%, simplified 
consensus hierarchy). Performing such computations for type and hapax counts 
paints a similar picture. For both of these modalities, the sight-to-sound, touch-
to-sound, and touch-to-sight cells were the three cells with the highest 
frequencies. These three cells accounted for 61% (type counts) or 62% (hapax 
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counts) of the total number of crossmodal uses, as well as for 73% and 75% of the 
total number of hierarchy-consistent cases (simplified consensus hierarchy). 
 Thus, about two-thirds of the hierarchy-consistent cases are accounted for 
by only three cells out of the eleven cells that are generally treated as being part 
of the simplified consensus hierarchy. This means that the other eight cells don’t 
do as much “work” in supporting the hierarchy of the senses. It is also 
noteworthy that except for the case of sight-to-sound, the cells with the highest 
frequencies were among those particular modality combinations that were 
argued to be perceptually associated with each other (see Chapter 14; see also 
arguments in Cacciari, 2008, p. 436; Ronga, 2016; Ronga et al., 2012). This is 
particularly the case when looking at the standardized residuals, which assumed 
large positive values (overrepresentation) for the touch-to-sight cell and the 
taste-to-smell cell—precisely those domains that I have argued are perceptually 
associated with each other (Chapter 14). With this in mind, the evidence 
presented in the crosstabulations of this chapter actually looks more consistent 
with the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis than with the hierarchy of the senses. 
The evidence is furthermore consistent with the theoretical account presented in 
Chapter 7, where I have argued that many crossmodal uses of sensory words are 
driven by the fact that these words have broad referential meaning 
encompassing multiple perceptually related modalities. 
 Moreover, the very fact that the standardized residuals are all over the 
place—and quite different even between different cells that are counted toward 
the hierarchy—casts doubt on the idea of a monolithic hierarchy. In Chapter 9, I 
introduced the distinction between local and global explanatory accounts of the 
hierarchy. To merely count the proportion of hierarchy-consistent versus 
hierarchy-inconsistent cases neglects the fact that particular mappings are over- 
or underrepresented, which would speak to a local rather than global account.3 
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Moreover, across different studies, different crossmodal connections are strong 
or weak. What appears as hierarchy-consistent in one study may be 
substantiated by quite different sensory mappings than what appears as 
hierarchy-consistent in another study. This is the danger of using a gross 
summary measure, such as the percentage of upwards-transfers. The specific 
crossmodal connections may not actually support the bigger picture of a 
monolithic hierarchy, especially if some of them disproportionately contribute to 
the count of hierarchy-consistent cases. 
 It should be noted, however, that in this dataset, there is indeed a strong 
link between sight and sound, as already discussed by Ullmann (1959). The 
standardized residuals for the sight-to-sound cell and the sound-to-sight cell are 
both quite high. This specific mapping warrants further explanation. The 
experimental findings by Marks (1974, 1975, 1982a), already briefly discussed in 
Chapter 7, may explain this particular crossmodal connection. Marks found that 
non-synesthetes consistently associate brightness with loudness and pitch. This 
particular crossmodal correspondence is presumably widely shared in the 
population and may motivate this language use. However, if this crossmodal 
correspondence would lie behind the high frequency of audiovisual language, 
this would be even more evidence for a local as opposed to a global explanatory 
account. Specifically, Marks’ research on sound/sight matching is something that 
is specific to these two modalities. Thus, invoking this as an explanation for the 
observed asymmetries between sight and sound would lead us further away 
from a monolithic account of the hierarchy. 
 Finally, the present data supports the hierarchy of the senses even less if 
we take the differential ineffability of the senses into account. In Chapter 4, I 
explored the idea that for certain senses, there are more words than for other 
senses (see Levinson & Majid, 2014), which was supported by empirical evidence 
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in Chapter 12. When looking at crosstabulations such as shown in Figures 24 
through 26, one needs to ask the question: Given the imbalances present in the 
sensory vocabulary of English, what asymmetries in source-to-target mappings 
are expected even without invoking any extra principles that pertain specifically 
to crossmodal expressions? That is, could it be that the asymmetries in the 
composition of the sensory vocabulary alone play a role in what crossmodal 
expressions are frequently observed? This was indeed suggested by Strik Lievers 
(2015), and another test of this idea will be provided here. 
In the following analysis, I combined all adjectives from Lynott and 
Connell (2009) with all nouns from Strik Lievers (2015), which yielded about 
80,000 (N = 81,639) adjective–noun pairs, including about 60,000 (N = 62,612) 
crossmodal combinations. For this set of adjectives and this set of nouns, these 
adjective–noun pairs exhaust all possible combinations. Then, within this set of 
crossmodal combinations, I counted the number of hierarchy-consistent cases 
(type counts). This turns out to be 82% (simplified consensus hierarchy), which 
was found to be statistically reliable by a binomial test (p < 0.0001, with a 55% 
chance baseline for 11 out of 20 cells). This number is eerily similar to what we 
observed above on the basis of actual corpus data, where the figure was 84%. A 
look at source-target ratios reveals the following ranking: touch (4.59) > sight 
(2.76) > taste (1.87) > smell (0.78) > sound (0.15). This ranking also closely 
corresponds to what was observed in the corpus data. 
This simple computation thus produces a striking result: It shows that 
even if speakers were to randomly combine adjectives and nouns from the two 
datasets considered here, evidence consistent with the hierarchy would arise. 
Therefore, imbalances that are already present in the sensory vocabulary can 
create patterns that an analyst would interpret to be in line with the hierarchy of 
the senses. If this is the case, the underlying mechanism is not a hierarchy 
	 314	
specific to crossmodal language, but, in fact, asymmetries that characterize the 
composition of the sensory lexicon in general. This shows that it is important to 
consider crossmodal language in the broader context of the sensory vocabulary. 
When this is done, there may not be any extra explanations necessary to account 
for the observed asymmetries. 
The next section presents further evidence against a monolithic hierarchy 
by demonstrating the influence of two other factors, emotional valence and 
iconicity (see Chapter 9). This is the first step towards an analysis that explores 
the role of multiple explanatory constructs in a conjoined fashion. If it is possible 
to show that multiple factors play a role in accounting for crossmodal language 
use, a one-size-fits all principle appears less likely. 
 
17.5. Emotional valence and iconicity predict metaphor choice 
The evidence presented so far clearly shows that there are asymmetries with 
respect to which adjective–noun pair combinations are more frequent, even if 
these asymmetries may be driven by the general composition of the sensory 
lexicon. However, these asymmetries in and of themselves have nothing to say 
about what explains the observed patterns, as discussed in Chapter 9. As 
happened so often in the history of linguistics, the observed descriptive 
regularity of a hierarchy of the senses was directly interpreted as being a 
governing principle itself—that is, a ranking seen in the data was taken to reflect 
a hierarchy of the senses that explains the observed asymmetries. This is circular 
reasoning (Dąbrowska, 2016a; Gibbs, 2007). To get around this circularity, 
external datasets are needed. Merely analyzing frequencies of crossmodal uses 
does not allow strong inferences on specific explanatory accounts. Instead, one 
needs to correlate the frequency of adjective–noun pairs with other measures that 
relate to specific explanatory constructs. 
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 In this section, I will consider the role of two linguistic factors that have 
been hypothesized to drive crossmodal language use: valence and iconicity. As 
was discussed in Chapter 9, several authors have noted that many of the 
crossmodal uses of sensory adjectives appear to have evaluative qualities. This 
predicts that relatively more evaluative sensory words are more frequently used 
in a crossmodal fashion, compared to relatively more neutral sensory words. 
Accordingly, the adjective–noun pair sweet music is predicted to be more frequent 
than palatable music, given that palatable is more neutral than sweet (as per the 
valence norms of Warriner et al., 2013). In addition, Chapter 9 introduced the 
possibility that iconicity may restrict the domain of application of sensory words. 
Thus, iconic words are predicted to be used less in crossmodal expressions—that 
is, squealing color should be less frequent than loud color. 
 To test these ideas, the valence norms from Chapter 16 and the iconicity 
norms from Chapter 15 will be used. For the first analysis, the COCA data used 
to construct the crosstabulations seen in Figures 23–26 was coded for whether an 
adjective–noun pair indicates a crossmodal use (off the diagonal of the 
crosstabulations) or a within-modality use (on the diagonal). This binary 
measure was then subjected to a mixed logistic regression analysis with the fixed 
effect “Absolute valence” (lower values = more neutral; higher values = more 
evaluative; see Chapter 16). The model also included random intercepts for 
adjectives, as well as random intercepts for nouns and by-noun varying random 
slopes for the effect of absolute valence. 
The model estimated a positive relationship between absolute valence and 
crossmodal use (logit estimate: +0.72, SE = 0.32, Wald’s z = 2.25, p = 0.03), as 
shown in Figure 27a. For each increase in absolute valence by one raw valence 
point, the odds of being used crossmodally increased 2.05 to 1. A similar analysis 
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with the absolute valence derived from contexts (from Snefjella & Kuperman, 
2016) revealed no reliable effect (–0.26, SE = 0.33, z = –0.78, p = 0.44). 
 The analysis was repeated for iconicity, with a separate model where the 
absolute valence predictor was exchanged for the iconicity ratings used in 
Chapter 15. There was a negative relationship between iconicity and crossmodal 
use (–0.50, SE = 0.15, z = –3.30, p = 0.001), as shown in Figure 27b. For each 
increase in iconicity by one raw iconicity rating point, the odds of observing a 
within-modal use increased 1.65 to 1.4 
 
 
Figure 27. Probability of an adjective being used crossmodally as a function of the 
adjective’s (a) absolute valence and (b) iconicity. Each data point (with vertical 
scatter for visibility) indicates one adjective–noun pair; shaded areas indicate 
95% confidence region; data from 2,571 adjective–noun pairs 
 
 The analyses so far were constrained to a categorical classification of the 
senses—a constraint which Chapter 7 has argued against, and a constraint that is 
furthermore inconsistent with the evidence presented in Chapters 15 and 16. 
Now, we will relax this methodological constraint and use the continuous 
measure of modality association that is afforded by the Lynott and Connell 
(2009) norms. In Chapter 14, I used cosine similarity as a general measure of 
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modality affinity. Even though the results in Chapter 14 were not discussed this 
way, they actually do speak to the topic of synesthetic metaphor. Namely, if the 
cosine similarity between an adjective and a noun is high, then this indicates a 
within-modality use. If the cosine is low, this indicates a crossmodal use. In fact, 
the cosine similarity can be interpreted as a continuous measure of 
metaphoricity, with lower cosines (such as sweet music) having a more 
“metaphoric” feel than words with higher cosines (such as abrasive contact), 
which appear relatively more literal. Is this measure of metaphoricity (as 
operationalized through modality fit) predicted by valence and iconicity? In line 
with the theory outlined here (and in Chapter 9), it is expected that relatively 
more evaluative adjectives occur in adjective–noun pairs with lower cosines 
(more crossmodal). In contrast, it is expected that relatively more iconic 
adjectives occur in adjective–noun pairs with higher cosines (less crossmodal). 
 Mirroring the analyses just performed on categorical sense classifications, 
cosines were regressed onto absolute valence, absolute context valence, and 
iconicity. Linear mixed effects models had the same fixed and random effects 
structure as before. Models were estimated with maximum likelihood and p-
values were computed with likelihood ratio tests. There was only a numerical 
trend for absolute valence (–0.03, SE = 0.014, χ2(1) = 3.72, p = 0.054). There was, 
however, a statistically reliable pattern of absolute context valence (–0.08, SE = 
0.01, χ2 (1) = 38.57, p < 0.001), as shown in Figure 28a. Both patterns were as 
predicted: Words with higher absolute valence—that is, less neutral words—
were more likely to be used crossmodally. 
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Figure 28. Cosine similarity as a function of the adjective’s (a) absolute valence 
and (b) iconicity. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence region. 
 
 Furthermore, there was a positive correlation between iconicity and 
cosines: Relatively more iconic adjectives were more likely to occur in 
expressions where the adjective assumes a similar modality to the noun (+0.17, 
SE = 0.006, χ2(1) = 6.93, p = 0.008), as shown in Figure 28b. 
 The evidence presented in this section shows at least two factors 
contribute to crossmodal uses of sensory adjectives: valence and iconicity. 
Adjectives that were relatively more valenced (less neutral) were more likely to be 
used crossmodally; adjectives that were relatively more iconic were less likely to 
be used crossmodally. It should be emphasized that the two analyses presented 
here (of the categorical data and of the cosines) share a common denominator, 
the sensory adjectives of Lynott & Connell (2009). However, other than involving 
the same adjectives, the two analyses are at least partially independent because 
they involve different noun sets. In the case of the categorical data, I used the 
nouns from Strik Lievers (2015). In the case of the cosine data, I used the nouns 
from Lynott and Connell (2013). The fact that the two analyses converge on the 
same set of results despite differences in data and method needs to be 
highlighted. Altogether, this data suggests that it is fruitful to step away from the 
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notion of a monolithic hierarchy of the senses. Instead, we should think about 
what linguistic factors predict crossmodal uses of sensory words. 
 
17.6. Conclusions 
This chapter began by presenting new evidence for the hierarchy of the senses. 
Using different methods, this chapter obtained results that were highly similar to 
what has been reported by other empirical studies, such as Ullmann (1959), Shen 
(1997), Ronga et al. (2012), Strik Lievers (2015), and Ronga (2016). However, I 
then showed that even though descriptively there were clear asymmetries 
between the senses, this did not provide evidence for a monolithic hierarchy. In 
particular, specific crossmodal connections were overrepresented, namely those 
senses that are tightly connected in our everyday lives and in our perceptual 
systems. From this perspective, the evidence presented here is very much in line 
with the evidence for modality affinity obtained in Chapter 14. The evidence 
presented here is also consistent with the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis 
(Chapter 5) since yet again, I found that perceptually associated senses are also 
linguistically associated. 
 Furthermore, it must be emphasized that there was a large number of 
within-modality mappings. These have been ignored in previous studies of 
synesthetic metaphors, but in the present data, they constituted at least half of 
the uses of sensory words. Thus, one must view the prevalence of crossmodal 
language within the broader context: In line with the concept of modality affinity 
(Chapter 14), it seems as if sensory words like to attach to words of the same 
modality, or to words associated with related modalities. What others call 
“synesthetic metaphors” is not the dominant pattern in perceptual language. 
 Perhaps the biggest concern for a notion of the hierarchy was the fact that 
exhaustively combining the sensory words from the respective adjective and 
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noun word lists created a pattern of asymmetry that looked remarkably like 
what was seen in the corpus data and what has been reported in other studies. 
This suggests that when doing studies on crossmodal uses of sensory adjectives, 
one has to think about the composition of the sensory lexicon. Asymmetries that 
characterize the perceptual vocabulary of English can create patterns that look 
like what others have treated as the hierarchy of the senses. This connects the 
findings presented here with the empirical study of dominance relations 
discussed in Chapter 12 and more generally, this shows that the concept of the 
“differential ineffability of the senses” plays a role crossmodal language. 
Importantly then, the hierarchy of the senses is not a hierarchy that governs 
specific crossmodal uses (e.g., ruling out sound-to-touch etc.), but a descriptive 
generalization that at least in part may result from the way the English lexicon is 
composed. This makes it unnecessary to evoke cognitive constructs such as 
accessibility (see Chapter 9) to explain the empirically observed asymmetries, as 
is done by Shen and others (Shen, 1996, 1997, 2008; Shen & Aisenman, 2008; Shen 
& Cohen, 1998; Shen & Gadir, 2009; Shen & Gil, 2007). 
Any notion that is grounded in one monolithic explanatory principle that 
actively governs specific “mappings” neglects the fact that there are already 
asymmetries in how the sensory vocabulary is composed, and it furthermore 
neglects the fact that certain hierarchy-consistent “mappings” are more frequent 
than others. In addition, I empirically demonstrated that there is more than just 
one mechanism at play by providing two partially independent analyses 
demonstrating the relevance of valence and iconicity. As far as I am aware, this is 
the first direct test of an explanatory account, rather than relying on verbal 
arguments. It is this kind of empirical evidence that needs to be incorporated into 
the debate about what explains the hierarchy of the senses. 
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Each of these two explanatory factors is interesting in its own right. The 
idea that emotional valence predicts crossmodal uses of sensory adjectives is in 
line with the proposal that synesthetic metaphors often have affective qualities 
(Chapter 7.5.2, Chapter 9.3.2). It seems that when speakers use language 
primarily to evaluate, the referential fit does not have to be as close. As was 
discussed in Chapter 7.5.2, speakers choose particular words for multiple 
reasons. The denotational fit (i.e., whether a word identifies a referent and its 
characteristics precisely) is only one of those reasons. Oftentimes speakers also 
choose words for reasons of evaluation and the expression of affective content. 
When doing so, a speaker may be more loose with the denotational fit. Thus, 
both descriptive and evaluative factors co-determine word choice, but when one 
factor is foregrounded, the other may be less important. Thus, the evidence 
presented here is in line with the notion of a trade-off between emotional and 
perceptual meaning, which is also suggested by the work of Vigliocco et al. 
(2009) and Kousta et al. (2011). 
The idea that iconicity is negatively associated with crossmodal use also 
warrants further discussion. As was discussed in Chapter 9, there is existing 
evidence from research on signed languages that the iconicity of signs may block 
certain metaphorical uses (Emmorey, 2014; Meir, 2010). As was discussed in 
Chapter 3, iconicity communicates perceptual content very vividly. For sensory 
words, this means that iconic words are very strongly connected to their 
associated sensory modalities. For instance, the word squealing is highly 
evocative of a particular type of sound, and the link to this sound is more 
concrete due to the depictive qualities of this word. As already argued by 
Classen (1993, Chapter 3), this may prevent using such words outside of their 
core domains. The finding that iconicity is anti-correlated with crossmodal uses 
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is in line with the general idea that iconicity is inimical to abstraction (Lupyan & 
Winter, 2018), which limits the reusability and extendibility of iconic word forms. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that this chapter clearly demonstrated 
that to understand crossmodal language, one first needs a thorough 
understanding of sensory words more generally. In showing that the hierarchy 
of the senses is influenced by such factors as the composition of the lexicon, 
emotional valence, and iconicity, I have used findings from the previous chapters 
to shed light on crossmodal uses of sensory words. It seems that a lot of previous 
research in this literature has studied crossmodal language without considering 
the general properties of the sensory lexicon. The results presented in this 
chapter show that once one considers these properties, the idea that crossmodal 
language is governed by a monolithic hierarchy falls apart. 
 																																																								
1 Dimension words were based on manual classification, but similar results are obtained if the 
words belonging to the “shape & extent” cluster from Chapter 13 are excluded. It should further 
be noted that because most dimension words are classified as primarily “visual” by the native 
speakers in Lynott and Connell’s (2009) study, including dimension words would only serve to 
strengthen the evidence against the hierarchy because more visual words would be sources 
(which goes together with a lower position on the hierarchy for this modality). 
 
2 These percentages obviously depend on what hierarchy is being assessed, which is not always 
specified in the literature on synesthetic metaphors. 
 
3 In fact, one might even want to argue that computing the proportion of hiearchy-consistent 
versus hierarchy-inconsistent cases is an analytical practice that is biased towards finding 
evidence for the hierarchy. Moreover, a gross proportion measure neglects the fact that given the 
linear ordering of the hierarchy, we actually expect some senses to be more frequent than others. 
In particular, touch should have a higher source-target ratio than taste, smell, sound, and sight, 
respectively. Obtaining source-target ratios that obey this order is actually more compelling 
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evidence for the hierarchy than mere counts of hierarchy-consistent versus hierarchy-inconsistent 
cases, which neglects the role of order. 
 
4  I chose to present separate models for valence and iconicity in the main text for ease of 
discussion. Moreover, since the data do not fully overlap, combining them leads to unnecessary 
exclusions. The online script includes several analyses that also control for additional factors, as 
well as analyses that simultaneously incorporate valence and iconicity. In the additional iconicity 
model (mixed logistic regression on categorical data), I controlled for auditory strength. In this 
case, the iconicity effect disappeared (+0.02, SE = 0.13, p = 0.857), which suggests that because of 
their strong correlation, effects in the simple iconicity-only model might actually driven by 
auditory strength, rather than iconicity per se. However, a separate subset analysis of auditory 
words only (dominant modality classification) shows a reliable effect of iconicity (–0.97, SE = 
0.002, p < 0.0001). This suggests that even within the class of highly auditory words, differences 
between iconic and non-iconic words matter (e.g., loud versus squealing). Additionally, a separate 
analysis of cosines shows an iconicity effect even when the auditory strength of the adjective is 
controlled for (+0.02 higher cosines, SE = 0.007; χ2(1) = 7.72, p = 0.005). 
There is a conflicting result for absolute context valence when gustatory and olfactory 
strength is controlled for in the categorical model (more valenced, less likely to be used in 
contexts); however, this effect reverted sign (in the predicted direction) in the cosine analysis that 
controlled for the same perceptual strength measures (–0.04, SE = 0.01; χ2(1) = 12.6, p = 0.0004). A 
simple linear model fitted on the average cosine per adjective and combining all factors (iconicity, 
valence, gustatory strength, olfactory strength, auditory strength) shows a reliable iconicity effect 
as well as a reliable context valence effect, both in the predicted direction. 
Thus, overall the evidence is consistent with the predicted theoretical account, although 
it depends on model choice. Future research with extended iconicity ratings and modality ratings 
should see to replicate these results. 
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Chapter 18. Conclusion 
18. Core themes 
This chapter summarizes the book’s core themes, including the five senses folk 
model (Chapter 18.1.2), the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis (Chapter 18.1.2), 
metaphor (Chapter 18.1.3), ineffability and the composition of the English 
sensory vocabulary (Chapter 18.1.4), and methods (Chapter 18.1.5). I will then 
discuss possible applications (Chapter 18.2) and future directions (Chapter 18.3) 
for sensory linguistics. 
 
18.1.1. The five senses folk model redux 
In Chapter 2, I argued that the five senses folk model is a convenient falsehood, a 
temporary tool for making generalizations about the sensory vocabulary of 
English. The evidence presented in this book has shown the model both right 
and wrong. The model has proven its worth, for example, by showing us that 
vision is dominant in the English language (Chapters 12 & 15), that sound words 
are isolated from the rest of the sensory vocabulary (Chapters 12, 13, 14, & 17), 
and that taste and smell words are relatively more emotional (Chapter 16). These 
conclusions would not be possible without assuming the five sense folk model in 
some way or another. 
On the other hand, I have also shown the limitations of assuming a five-
fold distinction of the sensory world. Chapter 13 found that there are both more 
and less distinctions, depending on whether one assumes a micro- or a macro-
perspective on the sensory vocabulary of English. When zooming in, one finds 
many more than just five categories. When zooming out, one finds fewer than 
five senses. Both of these perspectives are equally true. 
The degree to which the five senses folk model can be misleading is 
perhaps most apparent for taste and smell. Although we distinguish these two 
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senses in the five senses folk model, the data shows that taste and smell words 
are similar on almost any measure possible. This book showed that taste and 
smell words have similar overall perceptual strength ratings (Chapters 11–13); 
similar usage patterns in naturally occurring language (Chapter 14), including 
similar word frequencies (Chapter 15); and similar evaluative qualities (Chapter 
16). Perhaps it is best to think of taste and smell words as forming one unified 
vocabulary. According to this view, there is no taste vocabulary that is clearly 
separated from the smell vocabulary. Instead, some words veer toward the taste 
pole and some toward the smell pole of an underlying taste–smell continuum. 
There are, however, some differences between words that are primarily 
gustatory and words that are primarily olfactory. In particular, on the taste end 
of the continuum, there is a higher preponderance of positive words (delicious, 
tasty, sweet). On the smell end of the continuum, there is a higher preponderance 
of negative words (pungent, stinky, smelly). That is, taste exhibits positive 
differentiation and smell exhibits negative differentiation within the English 
sensory vocabulary. 
The five senses folk model also breaks down when considering the 
multisensoriality of perceptual words. The fact that sensory words are 
multisensory means that one has to be extremely careful about classifying 
sensory words in a hardcut fashion, which I only did sparingly in this book 
(namely, for isolated analyses in Chapter 12 and Chapter 17). The data presented 
in this book, particularly in Chapters 13 through 16, demonstrates that it may be 
misleading to shoehorn sensory words into discrete categories, such as when 
saying that crunchy is a touch word and only a touch word. Although such labels 
may provide useful heuristics in some cases, they generally neglect the 
underlying multisensoriality that characterizes perception as well as sensory 
language. 
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The results presented in this book highlight how it always must be kept in 
mind that when speakers are in the heat of a conversation, discrete categories 
such as “taste words” or “touch words” do not matter as much. In broad 
correspondence with a continuous view of language and cognition (e.g., Spivey, 
2007), the results in Chapters 15 and 16 demonstrated how the continuous 
association of words to senses is more predictive of linguistic behavior than 
categorical classification systems. This is the case even when we use more very 
fine-grained categorical classifications such as the clusters computed in Chapter 
13. I have argued repeatedly throughout this book, including in the discussion of 
crossmodal language (Chapter 7), that linguistic categories such as “taste words” 
or “touch words” only emerge when speakers, including linguists, reason about 
language in a metalinguistic fashion (compare Connell & Lynott, 2016). Actual 
language use may not be structured around these categories. 
Whatever we conclude from these reflections on the five senses folk 
model, it should be clear that sensory linguistics cannot tacitly assume its 
validity. To the extent that the five senses model is employed in linguistic 
research, this needs to be openly addressed. 
 
18.1.2. The Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis 
What evidence presented in this book supports the Embodied Lexicon 
Hypothesis? Let us take stock of perception–language correspondences seen 
throughout this book. 
First, vision is dominant in perception (Chapter 3) and in language. The 
dominance of visual language was revealed through multiple patterns, ranging 
from dominance in type frequencies (Chapter 12), through dominance in token 
frequencies (Chapter 15), all the way to crossmodal language, where vision was 
found to be a primary “target” of semantic extension (Chapter 17). Visual 
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adjectives were furthermore found to be relatively high in semantic complexity 
(Chapter 15) but not emotionality (Chapter 16). The lack of specialization into 
emotionality is consistent with visual dominance: Whereas taste and smell are 
restricted to emotional language, vision is not. Taste and smell language is 
obligatorily evaluative (compare Levinson & Majid, 2014). On the other hand, 
visual language can express evaluation (attractive, ugly, shiny), but it does not 
have to since there are also many more neutral words to draw from. In Chapter 
4, I discussed the fact that there is a multiplicity of factors which may lie behind 
visual dominance in language, such as cultural factors. However, given the 
strong evidence for visual dominance in perception, the available linguistic 
evidence is at least consistent with an embodied explanation and thus supports it 
indirectly. 
A second correspondence between language and perception involves the 
fact that taste and smell are more emotional in perception, and the associated 
words are more emotional as well, compared to words from the other senses. 
Chapter 16 showed that the taste and smell adjectives from Lynott and Connell 
(2009) have overall higher emotional valence ratings. These results were obtained 
by looking at valence ratings in isolation (Warriner et al., 2013), as well as by 
looking at valence in contexts (Snefjella & Kuperman, 2016), which constituted a 
specific operationalization of the corpus-linguistic notion of semantic prosody. 
There is, by now, a wealth of converging evidence for the emotionality of taste 
and smell language (see Winter, 2016). 
Third, I have shown that those modalities for which there is independent 
language-external evidence for intense crossmodal integration are also integrated 
in language (Chapters 13–14). In particular, taste and smell are highly associated 
in perception, which is mirrored by the fact that taste and smell are similarly 
inseparable in language. The same applies to the highly integrated modalities of 
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sight and touch: There is abundant evidence for the neural and behavioral 
integration of these two modalities (Chapter 14), and this is mirrored in how 
sight and touch are associated with each other in the lexicon (Chapter 13) and in 
language use (Chapter 14). 
Fourth, and perhaps most abstractly, I have discussed repeatedly that 
perception is intensely multisensory (e.g., Spence, 2011; Spence & Bayne, 2015), 
and so is language (Chapters 11–17). The multisensoriality of perception is 
reflected in the fact that the perceptual vocabulary of English is multisensory as 
well, although there are limits to this multisensoriality (Chapter 4). This is 
another correspondence between language and perception, albeit a fairly high-
level one. 
Together, these patterns can be seen as supporting the Embodied Lexicon 
Hypothesis. In addition, it should be kept in mind that there already is a lot of 
independent empirical evidence for the embodied processing of sensory words 
coming from psycholinguistic studies, reviewed in Chapter 5. The evidence 
presented here suggests that not only processing, but also structural and usage 
patterns follow embodied principles. 
 
18.1.3. Metaphor 
Crossmodal language use is a fascinating topic, rich with hypotheses that await 
to be tested (see Chapter 9). In Chapters 6 through 9, my discussion of 
crossmodal language was largely theoretical and argumentative, using our 
existing knowledge of synesthesia, metaphor, and the senses, to question the 
synesthetic and metaphorical nature of synesthetic metaphors. Whereas 
expressions such as sweet smell and hot food are generally seen as metaphors 
(involving taste-to-smell and temperature-to-taste mappings), Chapter 7 argued 
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for seeing adjectives such as sweet and hot as highly supramodal descriptors that 
encompass multiple senses (Paradis & Eeg-Olofsson, 2013; Rakova, 2003). 
My reconceptualization of synesthetic metaphors also stands against the 
five senses folk model, which assumes separate senses. Howes (2006) mentions 
how people generally think that “each sense has its own proper sphere” (p. 381). 
In contrast to this common belief, sensory words appear to involve highly 
overlapping spheres. Once we recognize this multisensoriality, crossmodal 
language appears less metaphorical. With Rakova (2003, p. 15), I concluded that 
“there is much more literalness in language than has traditionally been 
supposed” (see also Paradis & Eeg-Olofsson, 2013). A literal analysis of 
synesthetic metaphors has far-reaching conclusions for lexical semantics and 
conceptual metaphor theory (Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980). In essence, a literal analysis compels us to see the continuity of 
the senses as reaching all the way down into the lexical representation of 
individual words. Such a view is, in fact, more embodied than assuming separate 
senses (Chapter 7). 
Moreover, a literal analysis has an advantage in preventing us from 
positing an ever-growing number of metaphors. If too many disparate 
phenomena are subsumed under the same label “metaphor,” any theory to 
account for these phenomena will become either unwieldy or hollow. Restricting 
the number of phenomena to which the notion of metaphor is applied helps to 
make metaphor theory theoretically and empirically tractable. In this book, I 
suggested that at least those linguistic expressions that are called “synesthetic 
metaphors” do not have to be accounted for by theories such as conceptual 
metaphor theory. 
I furthermore discussed the fascinating proposal that a hierarchy of the 
senses governs how sensory words can be combined with each other (Chapters 
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8–9)—that is, some senses are more likely used to talk about other senses than 
the reverse. I have argued that we need to distinguish between the hierarchy as a 
descriptive phenomenon and the hierarchy as a governing principle. Although 
Chapter 17 found evidence that appears to be in line with the hierarchy, it only 
supports this as a descriptive generalization. A deeper look at the data suggests 
that there is no evidence for a monolithic hierarchy of the senses, such as Shen’s 
directionality principle (Shen & Gil, 2007). In particular, I argued that it is 
important that one looks at which specific crossmodal combinations are 
overrepresented. When one does this, the pattern of results looks much more 
consistent with the Embodied Lexicon Hypothesis and the results presented in 
Chapter 14—that is, modalities that are perceptually associated with each other 
are also linguistically associated with each other. In addition, I showed that the 
hierarchy of the senses is inevitable given the composition of the word lists used 
in this study. The hierarchy of the senses may be grounded in the simple fact that 
some senses have more adjectives than others. The importance of what others 
call synesthetic metaphors is furthermore diminished when one acknowledges 
the fact that due to modality affinity (Chapter 14), there is a tendency for sensory 
words to be used in contexts that involve highly similar rather than dissimilar 
sensory modalities. 
The idea of a monolithic hierarchy of the senses was further deconstructed 
by employing a multiexplanatory approach. Rather than assuming that the 
empirically observed asymmetries are caused by one principle, I argued that it is 
fruitful to look at how multiple factors are at play. Any discussion of the 
hierarchy of the senses needs to acknowledge that many different factors have 
been proposed, many of which have been not been tested yet (see Chapter 9). 
However, in Chapter 17, I showed new evidence consistent with the role of at 
least two linguistic factors, emotional valence and iconicity. In particular, corpus 
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analyses revealed that highly evaluative adjectives were more likely to be used 
crossmodally. On the other hand, highly iconic adjectives were less likely to be 
used crossmodally. Future research needs to look at the influence of other 
linguistic factors. Ultimately, the goal is to have a multivariate model of 
crossmodal language use that combines the different factors and is able to assess 
their relative influence. However, given the evidence presented in Chapter 17 
and the theoretical discussion in Chapter 9, it is clear that it is highly unlikely a 
one-size-fits-all principle lies behind the empirically observed asymmetries in 
crossmodal language use. 
 
18.1.4. Ineffability and the composition of the sensory vocabulary 
There are several results that speak to the high-level design characteristics of the 
English sensory vocabulary. I have shown that words occupy a sweet spot 
between complete unisensoriality on the one hand and complete 
multisensoriality on the other. Adjectives for perceptual sensations are more 
multisensory than most linguistic analyses acknowledge, but they also show 
clear signs of specialization (Chapter 12), including the fact that sensory words 
pair with words from their own modality in language use (Chapter 14). 
Specialization leads to ineffability. Fainsilber and Ortony (1987) say that 
“language partitions the continuity of experience into discrete units comprised of 
words and phrases having a relatively narrow referential range” (p. 240). As was 
shown in Chapter 4, this entails that language is highly limited in its ability to 
convey fine perceptual detail. Moreover, the specialization of sensory words also 
means that language is incapable of expressing the subjective and multisensory 
nature of perceptual experience. 
 When it comes to the differential ineffability of the senses, I have 
presented new evidence for smell ineffability, as well as taste ineffability. 
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Ankerstein and Pereira (2013) showed that even when people describe food 
items, they list relatively few taste terms. The data presented in this book 
suggests that there are fewer unique taste and smell words (Chapter 12), and 
these words are used less frequently (Chapter 15). The fact that smell was 
infrequently a source but frequently a target of crossmodal expressions (Chapter 
17) can be seen as further evidence for smell ineffability, given that “metaphor” 
is frequently seen as a device to express the inexpressible (Fainsilber & Ortony, 
1987; Ortony, 1975). From this perspective, taste is slightly more effable, as it has 
dedicated taste words such as sweet, sour, and bitter, which are also frequently 
used to talk about words associated with the other senses. Thus, whereas both 
taste and smell lack lexical differentiation compared to sight, the ineffability of 
smell is more pronounced. 
On the other hand, there were also weaker signs for the ineffability of 
sound. Throughout the book, sound was shown to have an isolated position in 
the sensory lexicon, with high exclusivity ratings (Chapter 12), anti-correlations 
with all other senses in naturally occurring language (Chapter 14), and a low 
propensity for semantic extension (Chapter 15), as well as a low propensity for 
being used to describe the other senses in crossmodal expressions (Chapter 17). 
Sound has relatively little dedicated vocabulary of its own (Chapter 12), in 
particular in the adjectival domain. Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) also mention 
that “there are names for colors but no similar names for pitches” (p. 23). They 
similarly say that “for timbre there is a host of ill-defined terms” (p. 24), many of 
which are metaphorical. Miller and Johnson-Laird conclude that “it is ironic that 
people use vocal sounds to name everything else yet have such a limited 
vocabulary for sounds themselves” (p. 25). 
In line with these indicators of ineffability, sound has been found to be a 
frequent target of crossmodal expressions in Chapter 17. The fact that the 
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expression of sound needs support from “metaphor” has been noted by many 
researchers. Engstrom (1946, pp. 10–11) notes in passing that there are 
particularly many metaphors for descriptions of voices. Pérez-Sobrino and Julich 
(2014) find that music descriptions have more metaphorical content than other 
types of discourse. 
This book has also shown something previously only demonstrated for 
signed languages (Emmorey, 2014; Meir, 2010)—namely, that iconicity restricts 
semantic extension. This is one additional factor that explains the low propensity 
of sound concepts being used to talk about the other senses. The high iconicity of 
sound words (Chapter 15) may restrict sound language even more (Chapter 17). 
The finding that iconicity restricts semantic extendibility is also an important 
result for iconicity research because it may be that this restrictive nature of 
iconicity is one reason for why languages are not more iconic than they could be 
(Lupyan & Winter, 2018). Moreover, this finding is important for linguistics more 
generally because it shows that the nature of the form–meaning mapping of a 
word has downstream effects in the linguistic system, such as in which linguistic 
contexts a word occurs. 
 
18.1.5. Methods 
Finally, a theme that ran across the entire book was the use of rigorous statistical 
methods, coupled with highly constrained operational definitions. Chapter 11 
defended the validity of introspective data, as long as introspective judgments 
are collected from a large number of unbiased participants. The resulting 
semantic norms can be incorporated into a corpus-based work flow to counteract 
the fact that the ratings were collected in an isolated and decontextualized 
fashion. 
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All empirical chapters demonstrated how useful rating studies are for 
sensory linguistics. This usefulness extends to the language sciences writ large, in 
particular to the quantitative study of word meaning. Throughout the book, I 
have used the modality norms by Lynott and Connell (2009), first introduced in 
Chapter 10. It was shown that given the right analyses, there is a wealth of 
theoretically important findings that can be generated with such a simple 
dataset. Chapters 12 and 13 showed that the ratings can be studied in their own 
right. Chapter 14 and Chapter 17 showed that the ratings can be studied together 
with corpus data. Chapters 15, 16, and 17 showed that the modality norms can be 
combined with a wealth of linguistic resources (including corpus frequencies and 
dictionary meaning counts) and other norm datasets (valence norms and 
iconicity norms). This illustrates the utility of a norm-based linguistics. In the 
future, the availability of norms from numerous large-scale rating studies will 
prove to be an invaluable addition to the linguistic toolkit. 
 The methods used throughout this book furthermore allowed the 
quantification of two core concepts of corpus linguistics: Chapter 14 provided 
quantitative evidence for the notion of semantic preference, and Chapter 16 
achieved the same for the related notion of semantic prosody. Interestingly, in 
both cases, the evidence showed that ratings on isolated words are highly 
predictive of linguistic behavior in context. With respect to semantic preference, 
it was found that the crossmodal correlations in the rating data (Chapter 13) 
correspond to crossmodal correlations observed in corpora (Chapter 14). With 
respect to semantic prosody, I demonstrated a close fit between decontextualized 
valence ratings and the valence of contexts in corpus data (Chapter 16). Corpus 
linguistics has an aversion to introspective judgments on isolated words, often 
for the right reasons. However, the results from this book clearly show that in 
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some cases, considerable leverage is gained from looking at words without 
context. 
 There were several methodological themes, first introduced in Chapter 10, 
that crosscut all of the analyses presented here. These include the issue of 
reproducibility and how important it is to utilize explicit criteria, as well as how 
important it is to publish one’s data and analysis code. As many analytical 
decisions as possible need to be laid open to be transparent to other researchers, 
and data and methods need to be shared to achieve cumulative progress in the 
language sciences. In line with the theme of reproducibility, data and code are 
publically available for all analyses presented in this book. Moreover, as argued 
in Chapter 10, the use of standardized norm data furthers the reproducibility of 
semantic analyses, as different researchers will come to the same conclusion 
when given the same dataset. 
 Another methodological theme that characterized multiple chapters can 
be related to the phenomenon of “base rate neglect” (see Pennycook & 
Thompson, 2017), whereby people (including researchers) ignore or undervalue 
the a priori probability of a particular phenomenon. I would argue that such base 
rate neglect characterized the previous literature on synesthetic metaphors in 
two ways. First, the phenomenon of crossmodal language was not compared to 
the base rate of unimodal language, which I explored under the concept of 
“modality affinity” in Chapter 14, as well as by quantifying the number of 
within-modality uses of sensory words in Chapter 17. When this base rate is 
considered, one has to acknowledge that genuinely crossmodal language is not 
all that frequent compared to the within-modality uses of sensory words. Second, 
when researchers investigated the hierarchy of the senses, they did not consider 
the base rate of sensory words for particular sensory modalities as much. In 
Chapter 17, I showed that the composition of the sensory lexicon affects the types 
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of hierarchical patterns we see in corpus data. More generally, I argued that any 
analysis of crossmodal language use (such as is done in the literature on 
synesthetic metaphors) needs to be based on a thorough understanding of the 
sensory lexicon. 
 The idea of a “base rate” was also an analysis strategy in other chapters. In 
Chapter 12, I reinvestigated Lynott and Connell’s (2009) claim that a modality 
exclusivity of 46% means that sensory words are multisensory. By reshuffling the 
rating data (permutation-based approach), I was able to create a base line against 
which to compare this figure. This analysis showed that despite the evidence for 
multisensoriality, sensory words exhibit statistically reliable specialization into 
particular sensory modalities (i.e., a drive towards unisensoriality). In Chapter 
14, I created a base line of crossmodal language use by combining all Lynott and 
Connell (2009) adjectives with all Lynott and Connell (2013) nouns. These 
hypothetical adjective–noun pairs were then compared with corpus data to show 
that sensory words tend to stick to their own kind, or to highly related sensory 
modalities (modality affinity). Altogether, these analyses suggest that 
quantitative research on perceptual language needs to think more often and 
more deeply about whether an observed phenomenon is actually unusual. It is 
then important to create statistical base lines to act as appropriate points of 
comparison. 
A final methodological theme that characterized all analyses was that 
imposing constraints on oneself is often a good thing. Chapter 10 argued for 
endorsing abstraction and simplification to achieve higher levels of 
generalization and falsification. In line with Healy’s (2017) “fuck nuance” credo, 
the analyses showed that considerable leverage is to be gained, for example, by 
assuming the obviously oversimplified model of the five senses, or by restricting 
the complex notion of emotional meaning to the positive/negative dimension 
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alone. As long as simplification is done carefully and knowingly, and as long as 
it is addressed openly, it can further progress the language sciences. 
 
18.2. Applications 
This book focused on fundamental problems of sensory language, including the 
general question of how perceptual content is encoded in language. Given the 
central function of the senses in our daily lives and in society, the issues raised 
here naturally have far-reaching implications for applications. 
 Perhaps the most obvious domain of application is in advertising and 
marketing (see also Fenko et al., 2010). Several researchers have argued for the 
importance of what is called “sensory marketing” (Hultén, 2015; Hultén, 
Broweus, & van Dijk, 2009; Lindstrom, 2010), an approach to marketing that 
focuses on engaging all the senses. In particular, sensory marketing pushes 
against the fact that to this day, most advertising focuses almost exclusively on 
sight and sound alone. Elder and Krishna (2009) showed that ads describing 
products with multisensory language are more effective than ads that focus on 
only one sense. This research substantially benefits from a deep theoretical 
understanding of sensory language. This research also benefits from the methods 
discussed here. For instance, Lynott and Connell’s (2009) dataset could be used 
to select sensory adjectives for advertisements in a more systematic fashion, and 
to quantify the degree of multisensoriality that is used in a specific 
advertisement. More generally, knowing about the semiotic toolkit (Chapter 3) 
and the limits of language (Chapter 4) is key to advertisers who frequently need 
to find effective ways of communicating the sensory qualities of products. 
 The book’s findings also have applications in food science, where 
researchers work together with practitioners to develop sensory lexicons to 
standardize the description of such domains as wine, coffee, or kimchi. These 
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standards are used (among other things) in food testing, where it is important to 
have a shared vocabulary between experts. Knowing about sensory language 
(and its limitations) is key to developing effective sensory vocabularies, as is 
investigating how expert vocabularies differ from lay vocabularies (e.g., 
Diederich, 2015). 
Perceptual psychology research also benefits from a firm understanding of 
the properties of the sensory lexicon. In many perceptual psychology 
experiments, responses are delivered verbally. Evidence for the role of language 
in perceptual tasks has been attained by Huisman and Majid (2018), who showed 
that odors with high-frequency labels were named correctly more often. This 
suggests that when perception is studied using linguistic tasks, the researcher 
has to pay attention to the linguistic properties of the words involved, such as 
the many properties discussed throughout this book. In fact, the perceptual 
researcher must consider the fact that had the perceptual task been done in other 
languages, different results may have been obtained. Evidence for this comes 
from the fact that the deficiency of smell naming is connected to the relative lack 
of smell terms in English, at least when compared to the vocabularies of other 
languages with larger smell vocabularies, such as the Jahai from Malaysia (Majid 
& Burenhult, 2014). 
 Finally, the research presented in this book may have relevance for 
research into visual impairment and other sensory deficits. For example, many 
researchers are interested in audio descriptions for the visually impaired (e.g., 
Peli, Fine, & Labianca, 1996; Schmeidler & Kirchner, 2001; Szarkowska, 2011). To 
develop effective audio descriptions, it helps to understand not only how 
sensory language works, but also how the sensory language of sighted 
individuals differs from the sensory language of individuals with visual 
impairments (see Landau & Gleitman, 1985; Shephard & Cooper, 2001). 
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 Thus, although the book’s goals were primarily theoretical, a thorough 
understanding of sensory language is very relevant to a whole range of applied 
domains. 
 
18.3. Future directions 
Although Part II of this book has reported a large number of results on 
perceptual language, there are many things that we currently do not know. 
Sensory linguistics is rich with hypotheses waiting to be tested and issues 
waiting to be explored. The following list presents range of potential topics for 
future research that is intended to pique interest. 
 
• Dąbrowska (2016a) lists the neglect of individual differences as one of the 
“sins” of cognitive linguistics. For sensory language, there is a whole 
world of individual differences to explore. Do people who are better 
tasters or better smellers also have different taste and smell vocabularies? 
What about experts such as wine tasters and coffee tasters? (see Croijmans 
& Majid, 2016) 
 
• Is the sensory language of blind individuals different from the sensory 
language of sighted individuals (see, e.g., Landau & Gleitman, 1985)? Do 
blind individuals, for example, use touch-related adjectives in a different 
fashion? 
 
• What about deaf individuals? What semiotic strategies are used to talk 
about such perceptual domains as sound, smell, and color? Are there 
noteworthy differences in the sensory vocabularies of different signed 
languages? 
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• Do synesthetes use sensory language differently? Do they use different 
crossmodal expressions? At present, it is impossible to make inferences 
about a person’s perceptual system from language use alone (see Cytowic 
& Eagleman, 2009, p. 188), but at some point such inferences may be 
possible. 
 
• How does the claim that synesthetic metaphors are best analyzed as literal 
expressions (Chapter 8) pare against classic approaches within lexical 
semantics, such as tests of ambiguity and vagueness? (Geeraerts, 1993; 
Zhang, 1998; Zwicky & Sadock, 1975) 
 
• Do strong and weak synesthetic metaphors (cold anger versus cold sound) 
share an underlying mechanism, as hinted at by the results of Chapter 14 
and Chapter 17? 
 
• There are many different explanations for the hierarchy of the senses 
(Chapter 9). What explanatory factors matter the most in explaining 
asymmetries between crossmodal uses of sensory adjectives? How do the 
different explanatory factors (frequency, iconicity, gradability, evaluation, 
etc.) interact? 
 
• How do the relations between sensory words change between different 
types of discourse? For example, does the hierarchy of the senses differ 
between such text types as perfume descriptions, wine tasting notes, and 
music reviews? 
 
• Do speakers of languages with more elaborate smell vocabularies (such as 
the Austroasiatic languages Maniq and Jahai; Majid & Burenhult, 2014, 
Majid et al., 2018; Wnuk & Majid, 2014; or the Austronesian language 
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Amis; Lee, 2015) use crossmodal expressions differently? Investigating 
this is particularly important because the evidence for the hierarchy of the 
senses has so far come almost exclusively from languages spoken in large 
industrialized societies. 
 
• How are sensory words used together with other semiotic tools in situated 
interactions, such as when buying cheese in an artisan cheese shop or 
when buying perfume? 
 
• How do the results obtained here for sensory adjectives compare to other 
parts of speech, such as nouns and verbs? 
 
• What happens when sensory words are translated between languages? 
How much perceptual information is carried over in translation? Can 
modality norms be translated? 
 
• How does sensory language interact with gesture? 
 
• The analyses presented here are exclusively synchronic and need to be 
supplemented with diachronic analyses. How does sensory language 
change over time? 
 
• How do technologies, societal practices, and belief systems shape sensory 
language? 
 
These are but some of the many questions that fall within the domain of sensory 
linguistics. As is clear from the list, there are many questions that await to be 
answered. Sensory linguistics is a thriving field with much left to be explored. 
 
18.4. Conclusions 
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Clearly, “we are not just minds floating in the air” (Rakova, 2003, p. 18). Humans 
are bodily beings who are connected to the world around them via their senses. 
Far from the frequently held view that language is an arbitrary symbol system 
that mostly obeys abstract formal principles, this book has demonstrated that 
language is deeply infused with sensory information, and knowing about our 
sensory world helps us understand the linguistic world we live in. Moreover, 
language provides a window into the senses. Using sensory linguistics, we can 
study what Marks (1978) has called “the fabric of mental tapestry richly woven 
in form and color, sound, taste, touch, and scent” (p. 255). Using the tools 
outlined here, we can study some of the most fundamental aspects of being 
human: namely, how we sense the world around us, and how we can 
communicate our sensory worlds to others. 
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